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Preface 
While attending high school at the Taipei American School from 1984 to 
1986, I would occasionally meet my friends at the McDonald’s on Chung Hsiao 
East Road (忠孝東路) in downtown Taipei a few minutes before an air raid drill, 
which the Nationalist Party-led government periodically orchestrated when the 
country was still under martial law in preparation for a possible military attack 
from China. As we waited out the hour-long mock exercise, which meant staying 
off the streets and remaining indoors, we would consume Chicken McNuggets 
and French Fries as we surreptitiously kept watch for signs of anyone defying the 
government’s ban on public mobility. In our rudimentary ethnographic 
observations, no one ever did. 
In contrast, my experiences with McDonald’s during my ethnographic 
research in Taipei from 1998 to 2000 were decidedly not restricted to nor 
associated with air raid drills. Instead, I used the city’s ubiquitous McDonald’s 
establishments as a rendezvous point where I would meet and interview various 
“local” informants who ranged from former Taipei City council members to 
college students to taxi drivers. Even the menu reflected the sign of the times as I 
found choices catering to Taiwanese taste buds in the form of “red tea” (hongcha 
紅茶) (a.k.a “black tea”), corn chowder soup (yumi tang 玉米湯), and teriyaki 
chicken burgers. 
However, the event that best epitomized the Taiwanization of this U.S.-
based Golden Arches franchise in my eyes was its wildly successful Hello Kitty 
promotion in 1999. In an advertising coup that reflected how intimately Ronald 
McDonald’s handlers had their finger(s) on Taiwan’s pop cultural pulse, the fast 
 xi
food chain offered the dynamic duo of Hello Kitty and her male friend (Daniel) at 
the bargain price of NT$150 (approx. US$5) with each Happy Meal purchase 
(limited to one per customer, please). In the first promotion (there were two 
promotions that offered five pairs of Hello Kitty and Daniel each time),1 avid 
collectors-cum-consumers lined up the night before to ensure their share of this 
marketing prize. Those who succeeded in purchasing this coveted product would 
later showcase their trophy acquisitions in storefront display cases and the back 
windows of their Honda Accords and BMWs. Thus, the McDonald’s I had known 
in the mid-1980s as an escapist bunker during mock air raid drills had been 
transformed in the late 1990s into a site for interviews on political call-in shows 
and where Taipei’s postmodern citizenry would queue up to buy Hello Kittys. 
Another contrast between the Taiwan I knew in the twilight of its martial 
law years and the democratizing nation-state I witnessed at the cusp of the 21st 
millennium can be captured in the transformation of another space: Taipei’s 
public buses. I recall the oppressive silence of these public bus rides, save for 
when my International friends and I were on board, at which point we were the 
only ones speaking in this marked and potentially monitored public sphere. 
Today, silent bus rides are a part of Taiwan’s forgotten and discarded past as 
radios play to the driver’s station of choice, students talk loudly to each other 
across the length of the bus, and elderly patrons criticize bus drivers for their poor 
driving skills while the drivers retort by exhorting the same elderly patrons to 
disembark faster. 
As a final example, I provide a more subtle yet nonetheless significant 
contrast of the Taipei of my teenage years and the cosmopolitan society I returned 
                                                 
1 In the first promotion, Hello Kitty and Daniel were outfitted in different, ethnic attire. For 
instance, they would be dressed in traditional Japanese, Chinese, and Korean clothing. In the 
second promotion, the stuffed pair were dressed in Western wear and according to gendered roles 
such as a bride and groom or in 1950’s U.S. attire, with Hello Kitty in bobby socks and a poodle 
skirt and Daniel in a leather jacket and rolled up jeans. 
 xii
to a decade later as a graduate student. While my mobility as a high school 
student was limited by parental curfews, the eminent threat came from my 
parents’ scoldings and the omnipresent gaze of the KMT-regime. Besides, there 
were no 24-hour KTV (karoke) bars or MTV (movie rental) establishments to 
patron in the mid-1980s as there are today, and have been since the early 1990s. 
Yet when I returned in the summer of 1996 to pursue Mandarin language study, 
my mobility was again monitored by my parents, but no longer by the central 
government (which was still under KMT rule). Their exhortations that I take 
precautions in my public activities was no less parental than before; however, the 
difference was the source of the potential threat, which came not from 
government censors, but rather from kidnappings, ransoms, and worse as 
witnessed by the high profile murder of singer Bai Bing-bing’s teenage daughter 
in the summer of 1997. Similarly, I recall my father’s aversion to taking taxicabs 
as his status as a KMT spokesperson not only made him vulnerable to such 
extortions, but moreover, to public criticism from those who were displeased with 
the central government’s policies. Such verbal censure would have been unheard 
of ten years earlier. However, uninhibited expressions of dissent now had multiple 
venues, which Taiwan’s democratically maturing and politically-savvy citizenry 
increasingly exercised under a revised Republic of China constitution that 
protected this newfound personal right. 
I describe these personal experiences as not merely impressionable, 
adolescent memories and striking, ethnographic moments, but also as token 
examples of Taiwan’s political and sociocultural transformation from the mid-
1980s to the late 1990s. In particular, the vignettes from my teenage years capture 
the manner crisis discourses of eminent military invasion by China’s Red Army 
and the silencing of public discourse permeated everyday life in Taiwan prior to 
the lifting of martial law. In contrast, my graduate student awareness of the 
advantages of a modernizing Taiwan society in the form of unfettered commercial 
 xiii
consumption and relatively open political discussion, and inversely, its 
accompanying disadvantages in the form of increased crime and unsolicited 
criticism attempts to reconcile and give equal weight to these conflicting aspects 
in an increasingly democratic and civil society. 
Moreover, these juxtapositions represent the personal starting point for my 
study’s exploration of how Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses have shifted 
from being vehicles of governmental propaganda to being featured as prime-time, 
popularized infotainment, five nights a week in the guise of Taiwan’s politically-
oriented TV call-in shows. It is this incongruity between my memories and 
experiences of Taiwan, and namely, metropolitan Taipei, that inspired me to 
ethnographically explore and capture the dramatic changes that are unfolding in 
this sociopolitically democratizing, mass media liberalizing, and economically 
commercializing country. 
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Chapter One: Introducing Call-in Show “Open Talk” 
 
Figure 1: 2100: All People Open Talk moderator Lee Tao. 
DISCOVERING “KNOCK AND RESPOND” (CALL-IN) SHOWS 
My “a-ha” moment for this dissertation occurred two years before I was 
consciously seeking a topic. In the summer of 1996, while surfing the channels of 
Taiwan’s1 newfound and rapidly growing cable television selection, I happened 
upon a program featuring a man dressed in a striped, long-sleeved collared shirt 
accessorized with a pair of suspenders. He was seated behind a broadcaster’s desk 
leaning on his right forearm, his left arm propped to the side and at a right angle 
with his hand flat against the tabletop. I paused in mid-click, struck by his 
sartorial and embodied familiarity. As the camera shifted to another angle, I 
noticed four or five individuals seated behind a long, curved table. It gradually 
                                                 
1 I have opted to use “Taiwan” rather than “Republic of China” (ROC) when referring to this 
geopolitical entity in this dissertation. However, I do use “ROC,” when emphasizing cross-straits 
differences between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (a.k.a. China), as well as 
when differentiating between the country’s China-based national identity (ROC) versus a Taiwan-
based worldview. For further reading on these issues, see Wachman (1994:3-29). 
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dawned upon me that I was watching a talk show, referred to in the local parlance 
as a “knock and respond” (kouying 叩應)2 or “call-in” show.3  
A series of other observations followed. I recognized the moderator as an 
Asian Larry King look-a-like, and then realized I wasn’t watching a foreign 
program but a local, Taiwan-based broadcast. This was no CNN-produced Larry 
King Live. This was Taiwan’s “Larry King” live from a downtown Taipei4 TV 
studio. This was call-in show “open talk”5 (kaijiang 開講) as characterized by 
dramatic introductions, verbal sparring, and scaremongering, courtesy of 
Taiwan’s liberalizing mass media and my parents’ cable TV subscription. 
Apparently, 50-odd years of official, censored (mis)information was being 
replaced and reformulated right before my jaded, Western “I’ve-seen-this-before-
no-wait-what’s-this?!” eyes. 
WHY STUDY TAIWAN’S POLITICAL TV CALL-IN SHOWS? 
I begin this dissertation on Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows with a 
personal account to illustrate that while talk shows populate television 
programming in many Western societies,6 mass-mediated verbal interactions 
constitute a potentially significant political and social phenomenon for emerging 
                                                 
2 Mandarin Chinese terms will be represented in Hanyu pinyin and accompanied by their Chinese 
ideographic script. However, the Wades-Giles Romanization system, which is primarily used in 
Taiwan, will be used for conventionalized names such as “Kuomintang” and established figures in 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment (e.g., former President Lee Teng-hui).  
3 I elaborate upon the word play on the Mandarin Chinese term “kouying” in Chapter Two. 
Briefly, kouying represents the Mandarin Chinese transliteration of “call-in.” However, the two 
characters which comprise the term also literally mean “knock” (kou 叩) and “respond” (ying 應). 
4 Taipei is the capital of the Republic of China (a.k.a. Taiwan). 
5 The translation of the program’s title as  “All People Open Talk” and my lower case use here 
recalls Goffman’s (1974) notion of “fresh talk,” which he describes as “the extemporaneous, 
ongoing formulation of a text under the exigency of immediate response to our current situation” 
(146). 
6 As a small cross section of the international appeal of “audience participation programmes” 
(Livingstone and Lunt 1994), talk show studies have also been conducted in Israel (Liebes 1999), 
Germany (Liebscher 1999), and the United Kingdom (cf. Tolson 2001a). I provide a review of 
U.S. talk show studies later in the chapter. 
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democracies like Taiwan. Consequently, I regard the rarified “open” air of 
Taiwan’s TV call-in shows as an invaluable discursive space for study, especially 
when considering that its latest generation of leaders and general populace still 
carry memories of incarceration or worse for voicing their opinions on 
sociopolitical matters less than 20 years ago during Taiwan's martial law era 
(1949-1987). My interest in exploring political TV call-in show verbal 
interactions thus stems from personal awareness that participation in 
sociopolitical discussions represents a hard-earned privilege and is a nascent 
practice in Taiwan. 
In a society where Survivor and Big Brother have yet to wield their 
programming influence on the viewing public, Taiwan’s political TV call-in 
shows represent the local equivalent of “reality TV.” Instead of voting a fellow 
participant off an island, call-in show viewers voice their approval or disapproval 
toward sociopolitical leaders (many of whom also appear as call-in show 
panelists) by phoning in or registering their views through dial-in opinion polling. 
Rather than competing for monetary capital, call-in show panelists compete for 
the social capital to shape the worldviews of program viewers. And instead of 
protecting oneself from being sold out by, or inversely, selling out fellow 
competitors to survive, call-in show participants verbally spar over which 
politician or political party is selling out Taiwan to China. 
Despite the fact that Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows are largely 
inspired by their U.S. counterparts, such as Larry King Live and Sunday morning 
current affairs talk shows, it must be emphasized that this programming 
phenomenon is primarily an indigenized7 or “made in Taiwan” product.8 Taiwan 
                                                 
7 Miller (1992) describes the process of “indigenization” as involving digestion, incorporation, 
and assimilation.  
8 The phrase “Made in Taiwan,” which is often abbreviated as “MIT,” is a familiar saying/joke 
among Taiwan residents, especially for those who have lived or studied abroad in the U.S. The 
phrase, and especially the abbreviation, indexes and plays on the symbolic capital associated with 
the original “MIT” or Massachusettes Institute of Technology. Given that Taiwan is known to be a 
 4
media scholars Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) capture this sentiment when they 
acknowledge that scholars “must be mindful that…audiences indigenize foreign 
programs in the way they interpret them and give them a meaning that is relevant 
to their own experience” (121).9 As a result, I consider Taiwan’s call-in shows 
and participants’ language practices as products of the country’s mass media 
liberalization and sociopolitical democratization processes. For instance, while 
criticizing the government, and especially a government official, could lead to 
incarceration during martial law, in post-martial law Taiwan call-in participants 
frequently reappropriate and strategically revoice a leading sociopolitical figure’s 
words to obliquely contest the utterance, and thus the person’s political stance, in 
order to negotiate a new interpretation of an issue or event. In examining how 
call-in shows encourage the animated discussion of controversial issues and 
individuals, this study contributes to research that investigates the role language 
use plays in mass-mediated spaces in democratizing societies. 
Yet, it is equally important to recognize and understand that ‘local’ 
cultures are continually refashioned out of elements, such as mass media 
programming, initially produced elsewhere (cf. Miller 1992). Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical environment proves to be no exception. Given that the country 
imports and absorbs so many U.S. economic, cultural, political, and mass media 
products and practices, one often finds traces of “non-native” characteristics in 
Taiwan—from McDonalds to skateboarding and from Ally McBeal to political 
campaign ads. In the case of Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows, it is equally 
valuable to understand the talk show genre in the U.S. as a means to comprehend 
how Taiwan’s mass media and sociopolitical practices have adopted certain 
                                                                                                                                     
major exporter of inexpensive (e.g. shoes, bicycles) and expensive (e.g., computers, 
semiconductors) products to many Western countries (including the U.S.), the “Made in Taiwan” 
descriptor here also refers to the country’s international reputation and the scale of its 
socioeconomic production. 
9 See Liebes and Katz’s (1990) study of the “indigenization” of Dallas (a U.S.-derived television 
drama series) by Israeli viewers for a thoughtful analysis of foreign mass media products. 
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features, while modifying others. To do so, I provide a brief background of the 
rise of U.S. talk shows in a later section in this chapter. 
Given the complexity of this research setting and topic, my study takes an 
interdisciplinary approach to examining political TV call-in show verbal 
interactions. In particular, I use a discourse-centered approach (cf. Bauman and 
Sherzer 1989; Sherzer 1987) to investigate call-in participant linguistic practices 
based on ethnographic observations. I supplement this approach with theoretical 
concepts and methods from conversation analysis, ethnopragmatics, and 
communication studies as well. It is through these approaches that I situate my 
study within the developing field of Taiwan studies and the growing body of 
research on its society and people. Subsequently, my analysis of how call-in 
shows frame and its participants reproduce Taiwan’s crisis discourses through the 
calculated use of edited video clips and selective speech reporting respectively, 
illustrates the importance of grasping the close relationship between the mass 
media, sociopolitical processes, and linguistic practice. 
Popularizing Taiwan politics 
Most significantly, this study regards call-in show ways of speaking as 
part of an emerging form of political deliberation in Taiwan that I regard as the 
popularization of politics or “pop politics.” By providing a mass-mediated forum 
for the deliberation of sensitive sociopolitical issues and events, political TV call-
in shows reflect Taiwan’s emerging democracy-in-practice through linguistic 
practice. In focusing on call-in participants’ language use as a significant site of 
study for understanding Taiwan’s sociopolitical democratization and mass media 
liberalization, this research project seeks to redress the field of anthropology’s 
“failure to attribute much significance to language in the study of politics” (Myers 
and Brenneis 1984:5).  
Given that “politics is so inherently linked with value,” this study seeks to 
investigate and situate popularized forms of political discourses by considering 
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call-in participants’ “relationships to sources of social value and to the processes 
that generate it” (ibid:4). The two primary sources of social value that I examine 
in this study thus are: Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses and call-in 
participants’ use of reported speech. Meanwhile, the processes that I investigate 
as reproducing these two social values are Taiwan’s democratizing sociopolitical 
environment and liberalizing mass media. 
Consequently, I explore the emergence of a sociolinguistically based “pop 
political” arena in Taiwan through an ethnographic investigation of one specific 
venue: political TV call-in shows. By studying the manner in which call-in show 
participants use reported speech in innovative and spontaneous ways, this study 
examines and, in the process, reconfirms the claim that “[i]deas and opinions 
don’t have to be ‘well formed’ before they can be expressed” (Livingstone and 
Lunt 1994:24). This understanding proves particularly salient for mass-mediated 
venues that embrace audience participation, and moreover, are oriented to the 
popular discussion of the political. By championing this perspective, this study 
not only emphasizes the playful and strategic linguistic practices participants 
demonstrate through call-in show talk, but also seeks to understand how Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical events and issues are increasingly popularized through everyday 
language use in new discursive spaces such as call-in shows. 
At the intersection of Taiwan politics, language, and mass media 
This study’s investigation thus builds upon previous research on Taiwan’s 
political, sociocultural, linguistic, and mass media development. Studies on 
Taiwan’s political development, processes, and practices have received the most 
attention. Taiwan scholars have investigated the complex relationship between 
party politics and ethnic identity (Chu 2000; Kerr 1965; Lin 1990; Wachman 
1994; Wang 1994; Wu 1992); elections, pluralism, and political participation 
(Chen 1981; Hsieh 2000; Li 1988; Peng 1966; Rigger 1999; Tsai 1984); 
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nationalism and national sovereignty (Mendel 1970; Wachman 1994, 2000); as 
well as sociopolitical behavior and democratization (Kim 2000; Kuo 2000). 
Scholars who examine Taiwan’s evolution from a state under martial law 
to a postmodern nation-state have provided insights into the society’s unique 
blending of traditional and (post)modern practices (cf. Aspalter 2001; Bosco 
1994; Chun 1996a, 1996b; Guy 1999; Huang 1994; Jordon et al. in press; 
Maguire 1998; Marsh 1996; Rubinstein 1994, 1999). In particular, anthropologists 
have contributed rich ethnographies that document these political and 
sociopolitical changes in Taiwan, including studies on the evolution of guanxi 
(關係) networks and local politics (Bosco 1992), bridal portrait industry and 
evolving wedding practices (Adrian 1999), popularized rituals and religious 
beliefs (Boretz 1995, 1999; Moskowitz 2001, in press), the globalization of 
Taiwan identity through the culture of baseball (Morris in press), family relations 
and household networks (Wolf 1968), and Taiwan’s evolving class consciousness 
(Gates 1981, 1987, 1992). 
Similarly, Taiwan’s rich, multilingual environment has attracted many 
linguistic anthropological and sociolinguistic studies. This corpus of research 
covers a wide range of topics including language change and language contact 
(Ann 1998; Cheng 1979, 1985, 1987; Kubler 1985a, 1985b; Lu 1988; Peng 1991; 
Young 1988), language attitudes and choice (Thatcher 1995; Young et al. 1992), 
identity and language ideology (Hsiau 1997; Liao 2000; Lin 1983; Shih 1983; Su 
2000; Tse 2000; van den Berg 1986, 1992), language socialization (Farris 1991), 
language policies and standardization (Li 1985; Tse 1986), and online 
communities (Su in press).  
With the recent liberalization of the country’s mass media environment, a 
number of scholars have also begun to monitor this evolving industry and its 
influences on Taiwan society. For instance, Berman (1992) analyzes the role of 
Taiwan’s press in the country’s democratization process while Rampal (1994) 
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documents Taiwan’s “media boom” in the areas of print, radio broadcasting, cable 
television, and satellite transmission following the lifting of martial law in 1987. 
In a study regarding viewers’ political socialization as a result of their exposure to 
mass media, Wei and Leung (1998) find that in post-martial law Taiwan residents 
generally have positive impressions of the media, including the political 
knowledge it imparts. On a similar note, Chen (1998) states that the mass media 
play an integral role in Taiwan’s emerging democracy, while Chiu and Chan-
Olmstead (1999) acknowledge the impact of cable television programming (e.g., 
call-in shows) has on political campaign practices.  
While previous studies of Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows have taken 
either a historical (Chen 1994) or quantitative approach to understanding 
participatory public communication (Hsu 1994; Huang 1995; Lee 1998; Peng 
1999, 2001; Shen 1999), this study offers an ethnographic perspective that 
contextualizes participants’ linguistic practices within both the call-in show studio 
setting and the country’s sociopolitical environment. That is, the current project 
counterbalances questionnaire-based studies of participants’ and viewers’ 
impressions of TV call-in shows with a contextualized understanding of how 
participants’ verbal interactions reflect and reconstruct sociopolitical processes. 
Although the present study on Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows 
examines several talk show episodes that addressed the country’s 2000 
presidential elections, I do not focus on political party electoral strategies, such as 
the use of call-in teams (kouying budui 叩應部隊) (which I elaborate upon in 
Chapter Two), nor on party representatives’ campaign practices, such as the 
wearing of campaign paraphernalia when appearing on a call-in show. What this 
study does investigate is the call-in show’s promotion and perpetuation of 
dominant sociopolitical discourses in Taiwan. The following section elaborates 
upon the study’s thesis in greater detail. 
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FOCUS OF STUDY: CALL-IN SHOW “CRISIS” DISCOURSES AND SPEECH 
REPORTING 
Through the tri-focal lens of Taiwan’s sociopolitical, mass media and 
linguistic processes, this study examines how call-in shows frame and program 
participants to perform a narrative logic that revolves around crisis-oriented topics 
and interpretations. Specifically, this study explores how call-in shows foreground 
and participants’ linguistic practices recreate dominant sociopolitical “crisis” 
discourses.10 Drawing from Bourdieu’s (1977, 1985) notion of “cultural capital,” 
this study investigates how Taiwan’s political TV call-in programs institutionalize 
and the manner in which participants strategically cultivate through their 
linguistic practices during program deliberations. By regarding Taiwan’s crisis 
discourses as a form cultural capital, I consider them as sociopolitical and cultural 
knowledge as well as sociolinguistic skills that are “embodied, incorporated 
within the body or mind (habitus) of those who know how to do certain valued 
things” (Smart 1993:393). The “value” that this cultural capital has for various 
“agents” (ibid: 392) includes the struggle for power and status among Taiwan’s 
main political parties (e.g., the Nationalist Party, Democratic Progressive Party, 
New Party, and People’s First Party),11 as well as establishing a particular 
worldview regarding Taiwan’s national identity (i.e., are its citizens “Chinese,” 
“Taiwanese,” both, or neither?) and sovereignty as a nation-state. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that Taiwan’s populace have been have 
been inculcated by certain sociopolitical crisis discourses (e.g., cross-straits 
tensions with the PRC) through various institutions—including the state, 
education, and mass media—particularly during martial law (1945-1987) under 
the KMT regime,12 but also within Taiwan’s democratizing environment through 
other means. For instance, with the liberalization of Taiwan’s mass media, crisis 
                                                 
10 Henceforth, I will refer to crisis discourses without quotation marks. 
11 I discuss Taiwan’s political parties and their ideologies in Chapter Three. 
12 I elaborate upon the KMT governing practices in Chapter Three. 
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discourses are institutionalized under the guise of “infotainment” through political 
TV call-in shows, and subsequently, reproduced and embodied by call-in 
participants. Given that most participants include leading public figures from 
Taiwan’s political, academic, and mass media spheres, these “agents” (e.g., 
moderators, producers, guest panelists, and call-in teams) are quite knowledgeable 
and capable of capitalizing upon the privileges (e.g., status and power) and 
generating products (e.g., public anxiety, electoral results, program ratings) that 
this form of cultural capital accords them (cf. Smart 1993; Thompson 1991). Thus 
while the institutionalized conduits and forms of cultural capital changes over 
time or can even be removed (Smart 1993:393), the knowledge that these 
institutions disseminate and the practices its agents engage in cannot easily be 
erased. 
Furthermore, this study considers Taiwan’s crisis discourses as a 
representative, and revealing, response to Harrell and Huang’s (1994) query: 
“What does it mean to be of this island [of Taiwan]?” (21). Regardless if one is an 
entrepreneur, caretaker, student, or politician in Taiwan, social interactions are 
continuously defined and influenced by prevailing sociopolitical issues and events 
that subtly or blatantly threaten the daily lives of its residents and the national 
security of this nation-state in “real” and imagined ways. I introduce several of 
these factors in Chapter Three, including Taiwan-China cross-straits relations, 
ethno-political tensions between “local Taiwanese” (benshengren 本省人) and 
“Mainlanders” (waishengren 外省人), Taiwan’s competing national identities, 
and traditional cultural values towards gendered relations of power and status.  
From a sociolinguistic perspective, I examine how popularized 
understandings of the Mandarin Chinese term for ‘crisis,’ weiji (危機), are 
performed by call-in participants in their deliberations. While a dictionary 
definition of “weiji” describes the term as “a pivotal moment of life or death, 
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success or failure,”13 a contemporary interpretation highlights the inherent tension 
between the two ideograms that comprise the word, namely, wei (危)—meaning 
‘danger’—and ji (機)—meaning ‘opportunity.’ Consequently, this study explores 
the manner in which call-in show participants infuse rhetorical urgency in their 
remarks to animate and juxtapose the program topics’ dangers and opportunities. 
As previously mentioned, call-in shows frequently feature topics that foreground 
Taiwan’s precarious geopolitical status vis-à-vis the PRC and the international 
community, as well as domestic issues such as its nascent yet maturing 
democratic environment. 
Specifically, I examine the manner in which Taiwan’s political TV call-in 
shows feature topics that encourage participants to use language in strategic ways 
to enact and perpetuate crisis discourses drawn from prevailing issues and events 
in the sociopolitical arena. This study’s premise that TV call-in show verbal 
interactions contribute to the dramatization of Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis 
discourses draws from Tolson’s (2001b) observation that the significance of talk 
shows “has crucially to do with the fact that [they] revolve around the 
performance of talk” (3; original emphasis). In later chapters, I explore how 
participants perform and articulate Taiwan’s competing crisis discourses through 
the creative use of reported speech. As a prevalent linguistic device in everyday 
language use, this study finds that speech reporting proves even more versatile in 
the dramatic and discursive space of call-in shows. 
With their edited video clips, verbal sparring, and 20-second caller 
commentaries, Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows constitute a forum rich with 
opportunities for participants to “transmit, recall, weigh and pass judgment on 
other people’s words, opinions, assertions, [and] information” (Bakhtin 
1981:338). In this mass-mediated forum, speech reporting carries serious 
consequences—given the “weight of ‘everyone says’ and ‘it is said’ in public 
                                                 
13 The Chinese definition reads as: 生死成敗的緊要關頭 (簡明活用辭典 , 1990: 185.) 
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opinion, public rumor, gossip, slander and so forth” (ibid), an observation this 
study substantiates through its exploration. It is not surprising that another 
speaker’s utterances experience greater scrutiny within the fervent and 
contentious environment of call-in show discussions, especially when linguistic 
competency is not only highly valued, but moreover, characterizes this linguistic 
setting. I thus regard participants’ speech reporting practices as a key component 
in maintaining and perpetuating the call-in show’s crisis frame, such that its 
prevalent application represents a form of verbal art unique to this programming 
genre. 
Speech reporting epitomizes Vološinov’s (1973 (1929)) notion of 
dialogism or “double voiced discourse,” a theoretical construct that also 
foregrounds the metadiscursiveness of language as a whole. Described as “speech 
within speech, utterance within utterance and at the same time speech about 
speech, utterance about utterance” (ibid:115), Vološinov’s construct recalls the 
Chinese saying “within speech there is speech” (hua zhong you hua 話中有話). 
This cross-cultural acknowledgement of the self-reflexivity of speech reveals that 
this aspect of language use is appreciated and recognized across languages, a 
finding that is substantiated in the diverse body of research on reported speech I 
present in Chapter Four. 
Similarly, the prevalence of reported speech in call-in show verbal 
interactions suggests that presenting and framing crisis scenarios does not require 
a specialized vocabulary or language that only the media and sociopolitical elite 
are privy to or command. This study forwards that speech reporting represents an 
argumentative style that popularizes or “communizes” the political discussion of 
sociopolitical issues, thus making discursive participation readily available to 
speakers of varying linguistic competencies. In other words, reported speech 
provides one means that lay participants (i.e., callers) can have the same fluency 
in accessing and contesting mainstream discourses as do their invited panelist 
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counterparts. Any participant can introduce the speech of another as a reputable 
source and as credible evidence to bolster an argument or detract from an 
opponent’s remarks. As my study later demonstrates, the reappropriation and 
acceptance of reported speech represents a highly negotiable process, which 
makes this linguistic feature all the more versatile for its users, not to mention 
intriguing for scholarly analysis. 
That said, my study does not discount the influence of other factors that 
contribute to call-in participants’ language use, including gender, class,14 
ethnicity, education, and culture. However, I focus on speech reporting for the 
primary reason that it crosses such sociocultural boundaries insofar as it 
highlights the linguistic competency of its users regardless of their political 
affiliation, gendered politics, and language ideologies.15 Moreover, the manner in 
which participants use reported speech to present, contest, and negotiate their 
crisis interpretations of program topics emphasizes the degree to which they 
reproduce embodied practices and institutionalized understandings of Taiwan’s 
crisis discourses. 
SITUATING THE TALK SHOW 
Media-ting (oppositional) public sphere(s) 
The mass-mediated speech event commonly known as the “talk show” has 
frequently been compared to Habermas’ (1984) notion of the “public sphere,” 
where private individuals discuss public affairs and “something approaching 
public opinion can be formed” (198). Nevertheless talk show scholars are quick to 
suggest that this postmodern programming genre bears little resemblance to 
                                                 
14 Some Taiwan scholars argue that Taiwan ha only recently shown signs of developing a class 
structure in its society. For further reading see Gates (1981), Hsiao (1993), Marsh (1996), and 
Tsay (1993). 
15 I cite these three sociopolitical factors as they feature prominently in call-in show “crisis” topics 
and the verbal interactions I analyze in this study. 
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Habermas’ idealized space (cf. Liebes 1999; Livingstone and Lunt 1994; Tolson 
2001b). Nor, these scholars argue, do talk shows constitute Habermas’ revised 
notion of a “pseudo-public sphere” (Habermas 1989), which he claims mass-
mediated societies foster given their evolution from a “culture-debating” public to 
one that is “culture-consuming” (cf. Livingstone and Lunt 1994).16 
While Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows do provide its populace a 
newfound public space in which to deliberate sociopolitical issues, their primary 
participants cannot be categorized as “private” individuals. Rather, call-in 
participants are predominantly comprised of an elite circle of sociopolitical 
figures who are recruited and paid to appear on, and in some cases even to lobby, 
TV call-in programs.17 While socioeconomic development since the 1980s has 
gradually created and cultivated a consumer-oriented populace in Taiwan (Bosco 
1994; Wu 1997), an equally valuable sociopolitical phenomenon has arisen in the 
form of political TV call-in shows, namely, the emergence of a viable “cultural 
debate” forum that reflects Taiwan’s democratization process. I thus consider 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows as a representative example of what Negt and 
Kluge (1993) regard as “oppositional public spheres,” that is, spaces where 
conflicting discourses are welcomed, nurtured, and disseminated. Consequently, 
rather than heralding call-in programs as abetting Taiwan’s populace to achieve 
consensus around controversial issues (Bu Dazhong 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000), I 
champion the call-in show’s contesting (and contested) discursive space, and in 
                                                 
16 The notion of a public sphere is interpreted as a “forum in which the authority of the state could 
be criticized and called upon to justify itself before an informed and reasoning public” (Thompson 
1990:109). However, Habermas’ construct has been criticized by revisionist historiography as an 
idealized rather than historical reality (Curran 1991). With the arrival and influence of mass 
media, Habermas (1989) subsequently suggests that a “pseudo-public sphere” has been “hollowed 
out by the mass media” leading to a “no longer literary public…[that is] patched together to create 
a sort of superfamilial zone of familiarity” (162). 
17 It should be noted that political parties have been known to send a recommended list of 
speakers to call-in program producers, particularly during national elections, as a means to control 
which party representatives are invited as guest panelists (James C. Hsiung 2000). A detailed 
discussion of the selection process for call-in show guest panelists is provided in Chapter Two. 
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particular, its “debate without conclusion” format (Livingstone and Lunt 
1994:301). 
Performative practice and “infotainment” product 
Acknowledging that call-in shows showcase “crisis” topics without 
offering definitive answers does not diminish their significance or worth, 
however. While call-in show detractors find the call-in program’s non-conclusive 
conclusions disconcerting—most vividly illustrated by overlapping panelist 
voices at the end of each 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices (Badian Da Xiao Sheng 
八點大小聲) episode while the credits roll18—my study forwards that the 
program’s unfinished, “messy” finale lends itself to the enormity and complexity 
of the issues its participants deliberate. 
Given their transnational reach, Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows also 
have a pronounced impact on how overseas viewers interpret the “crisis”-framed 
information featured on the programs as “news.” In examining the presentation of 
affect in Israeli newspapers, Lefkowtiz (2001) finds that “the packaging of 
information as ‘news’ takes on ever greater significance as the world becomes 
increasingly global and interconnected” (179).19 In short, the program’s 
infotainment premise of infusing newsworthy topics with entertainment features 
unashamedly accepts and openly promotes its product as constructive 
sociopolitical deliberation but with a performative twist, what Kalb (1998) 
describes as “the new news.” 
Performance thus represents a crucial component of talk shows. Goffman 
(1959) describes performance as any activity that can influence other participants 
                                                 
18 On 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices, panelists are cued when the program is about to conclude 
when they hear the show’s theme music on the in-studio speakers. In-studio participants also have 
visual access to several TV monitors arranged around the soundstage that allow participants to 
view the broadcast including superimposed text and images. 
19 For more reading on the relationship between global processes and news coverage, see 
Appadurai (1990) and Friedman (1999). 
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to take seriously the contrived context such that “the impression of reality which 
he [sic] stages is the real reality” (17; original italics). In the case of Taiwan’s 
call-in shows, the “reality” that participants endeavor to create and maintain is 
one defined and informed by crisis discourses. Moreover, the performativity of 
call-in show discourses lies in speakers’ and viewers’ participation in the 
construction and deconstruction of these discourses. The reward for participants 
lies in neither their ability to offer argumentative cogency or resolution to the 
featured crisis discourses, but rather in their direct or vicarious engagement in the 
performance. In short, closure is anathema to the call-in show’s modus operandi 
to dramatize sociopolitical events and issues. 
The call-in show’s infotainment premise also adheres to Goffman’s (1981) 
dramaturgical model that regards modern, and I would add modernizing,20 
societies as a “theater” in which political participation is enacted through the 
medium of talk. Although situating the call-in show as theater (in both the 
physical and rhetorical senses) allows for a greater appreciation of talk as a 
primary form of sociopolitical participation, it also leaves the genre vulnerable to 
criticism. Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) ambivalently recognize that while call-
in programs offer the people of Taiwan “greater opportunities to participate in the 
political process,” they also question whether these programs are providing 
“‘political participation’” given that viewers of Taiwan’s leading call-in show, 
2100: All People Open Talk (Quanmin Kaijiang 全民開講), are restricted to 
voicing their opinions in the “last five minutes of the program” (67-68). Although 
callers’ participation is limited by time restrictions, which I expand upon in my 
ethnographic description of 2100 in Chapter Two, this study’s examination of 
caller excerpts suggests that their ability to economically communicate their 
perspectives effectively ensures their presence in call-in programs. 
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Goffman’s theater construct can also be applied to societies that are not 
generally considered to be “modern” or even “modernizing” insofar that language 
represents the primary conduit through which politics unfolds. In Duranti’s (1994) 
study of the fono, a political speech event in the Falefā community in Western 
Samoa, he considers oratory as “intrinsically tied to social dramas [and] political 
confrontations” (2) given that Samoan politics takes the “form of a linguistic 
problem” (3). Similarly, Carpignano et al. (1990) capture the dramatic tendencies 
and conflict orientation of talk shows when they describe them as “the most 
eloquent example of the crisis of theatricality” (49).  
The notion of a “crisis of theatricality” succinctly epitomizes the political 
TV call-in show’s crisis frame and participants’ representations of crisis 
discourses. In my investigation into how call-in programs present topics through a 
crisis-based interpretation, I draw upon Goffman’s (1974) notion of “frame” or 
“frameworks,” which involves the process of identifying and labeling an activity 
from something that is meaningless into something that is “meaningful” (21). 
Similarly, I examine how call-in participants animate crisis scenarios and 
sociopolitical tensions by strategically using reported speech to portray locally 
recognizable personas through calculated shifts of “footing” (Goffman 1981) that 
distinguish their own voice from those that they perform. 
Aside from the aforementioned public sphere/dramaturgical model 
positionings of the talk show, this programming genre and speech event embraces 
a wide spectrum of televised talk, incorporating daytime, celebrity, and current 
affairs talk shows into one big pool (Haarman 2001). Describing a talk show by 
its most basic elements—format (talk) and participants (speakers)—simplifies an 
                                                                                                                                     
20 I consider the notion of “modern” problematic as it presumes a categorization or assignation by 
a privileged group or society simultaneously excludes others as it further establishes its own 
superiority. Despite these problems, the Goffman’s theater construct proves useful to my analysis. 
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eclectic mass media phenomenon.21 In the U.S., the phrase “talk show” usually 
elicits references to personified daytime TV varieties (e.g., The Oprah Winfrey 
Show, The Ricki Lake Show) or sensationalism-driven (trash) talk shows (e.g., The 
Jerry Springer Show and The Maury Povich Show).22 Weekday morning talk 
news shows (e.g., Good Morning America, The Today Show) as well as current 
affairs versions in the form of “Sunday talk” (e.g., Meet the Press, Face the 
Nation, This Week) and cable TV prime time talk (e.g., Hardball, Crossfire, The 
O’Reilly Factor) can also be included in this genre.23 A growing array of 
technologically advanced programs with call-in (e.g., Larry King Live, Imus in the 
Morning) and chatroom features (e.g., The Spin Room) further broaden the talk 
show’s participatory options.  
From this brief survey, one can observe that the talk show24 genre tends to 
evolve and expand its participatory features with each technological 
improvement, leading to an even greater diffusion of public communication.25 
Within Taiwan’s nascent mass media environment, cable TV call-in programs 
                                                 
21 Although my study focuses on TV current affairs talk shows, it should be noted that nationally 
syndicated talk radio programs in the U.S., including those hosted by Rush Limbaugh and Howard 
Stern, and local programs, such as Radio Mambi and Radio Marti in Miami with its talk about 
Cuban politics, offer public forums for political discussion and increasingly wield influence in 
shaping public opinion. A similar relationship between radio and TV call-in shows can be found in 
Taiwan (see Chapter Two). 
22 Kevin Glynn (2000) lists other labels talk shows and tabloid TV programs have been called, 
including “reality-based” or “actuality” programming, “confrontainment,” and “trash TV.” (2) 
23 With a second wave of political talk shows (The McLaughlin Group, Crossfire, and This Week 
with David Brinkley) appearing in the early 1980s (Hirsch 1991:9), coupled with the spread of all-
news cable stations such as CNN, MSNBC, and the Fox News Channel, political talk shows no 
longer only occupy Sunday morning time slots, but also secure the post-evening news and pre-
primetime niche on weeknights. 
24 Late (late) night programs such as The Daily Show, The Late Show with David Letterman and 
The Tonight Show with Jay Leno are not considered “talk shows,” but rather are categorized by 
some researchers as “discussion programs.” Discussion programs highlight the host, who usually 
interview invited guests with the aim to entertain a live studio and television audiences. This 
format places less emphasis on audience/viewer participation, and subsequently, more focus on the 
host and guests (Abt and Mustazza 1997). 
25 It can be argued, however, that the dissolution and diffusion of public communication precludes 
the coherence of any “spheres” per se, thus breaking down and relegating the notion of 
“oppositional public spheres” obsolete. I thank Dr. Boretz for bringing this to my attention. 
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have quickly adapted to and capitalized upon the country’s democratizing and 
technologically savvy society. Moreover, their popularity suggests a sustained 
interest on the part of viewers to watch, and more importantly, to participate in 
mass-mediated deliberations. 
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF MASS MEDIA 
Given the rise of participatory programs in Taiwan and its common 
presence in mass-mediated societies in general, anthropology appears well suited 
to exploring the impact this programming genre has on sociolinguistic behavior as 
well as its influence in shaping sociopolitical discourses. Recalling Geertz’s 
(1973, 1984) declaration for creating ethnographies with “thick descriptions” of a 
community’s values, relationships, and practices, Eiselein and Tapper’s (1976b) 
rhetorical query of whether anthropologists can “afford to ignore media’s possible 
influence if we wish to do a complete and accurate ethnography” (114) seeks to 
uphold this methodological and theoretical premise of anthropological research. 
Moreover, drawing attention to the omission of media in ethnographic-based 
studies is discerning for understanding media’s subtle yet significant presence in 
any society. 
Prior to the advent of Direct TV, Tivo, and the Internet, early prononents 
of “media anthropology”26 (Eiselein and Topper 1976a) had already recognized 
that “[s]ome form of media is found in almost every human society today, and yet 
many current ethnographies ignore the importance and even the existence of 
media” (Eiselein and Topper 1976b:114).27 Two decades later, Spitulnik (1993) 
also reasserts the claim that “[t]here is as yet no ‘anthropology of mass media’” to 
develop “numerous angles for approaching mass media anthropologically” (293). 
Yet another ten years have passed since these scholars’ “state of (mass) media 
                                                 
26 I place “media” in quotations to highlight the slightly different, yet significant terminology 
Spitulnik versus Eiselein and Topper use to refer to this medium. 
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anthropology” declarations. Are anthropologists finally heeding their concerns, 
and more importantly, responding to their “call for research”? 
At the turn of the 21st century, it is encouraging to witness the growing 
appreciation and valuing of mass media-oriented anthropological research as an 
increasing number of scholars orient their studies towards discovering the 
sociocultural, economic, and political resonances of mass media in daily 
interactions. This includes understanding the role the mass media play in social 
relations of identity, power, space, and time in diverse and diversifying, as well 
as, modern and modernizing societies.28 A growing body of research examines the 
role of the mass media in a variety of contexts (Dickey 1997; Spitulnik 1993) as 
well as its interaction with individuals and communities through film (Yang 
1994b), indigenous media (Ginsberg 1994, 1997; Klain and Peterson 2000), 
literacy programs (Besnier 1995; Schieffelin 2000; Schieffelin and Doucet 1994; 
Street 1993, 2001), online communities (cf. Crystal 2001, Hawisher and Self 
2000; Herring 1996; Herring et. al. 1995; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996; Porter 
1997; Ronkin and Karn 1999; Su in press; Wilson and Peterson 2002), print 
media and journalism (Lefkowitz 1995, 2001; Peterson 2001), radio broadcasting 
(Spitulnik 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999; Van de Bulck and Van Poeke 1996), 
telecommunications (Hall 1995; Keating 2000; Keating and Mirus in press), and, 
of particular interest to this study, television talk shows and dramas (Liebes 1999; 
Mankekar 1993a, 1993b, 1999; Miller 1992; Painter 1994). 
                                                                                                                                     
27 Anthropologists who did recognize the value in conducting mass media research in the 1970s 
and earlier include Divale (1972), Eiselein (1974), and Powdermaker (1950). 
28 Four decades earlier, anthropologists also noted that the study of media should not be restricted 
to industrial societies or to minority groups within those societies. For instance, many indigenous 
forms of media exist in “developing and peasant societies” (Eiselein and Topper 1976b:114), 
including “signal drums, petroglyphs, smoke signals, as well as the ever present transistor radio 
and the battery-operated phonograph” (Eiselein and Toper 1976c:124) (cf. Mathur 1965; Rodgers 
1969; Schramm 1964). The ideologies of the time can be found in the terms the scholars used to 
refer to these communities. 
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Nonetheless, what explanation can one give for the lack of anthropological 
literature on “popular” mass media programming such as TV talk shows?29 A 
simple answer might be found in the discipline’s fear of “popularizing” 
anthropology by studying and hence giving merit to such cultural forms (Eiselein 
and Topper 1976c:130). Another explanation derives from an anthropological 
aversion to activities having an “aura of non-intellectual pleasure,” causing many 
an anthropologist to “shy30 away from scholarly consideration of pleasure, leisure, 
and escape” (Dickey 1997:414). Hannerz (1971) also notes that “anthropologists 
usually regard mass media research within their discipline as gimmickry,” while 
immediately adding that this is “a rather unfortunate attitude” (186). 
Eiselein and Topper (1976c) are less reserved in their criticism of 
anthropologists’ “high culture” positioning when they state, “the omission of any 
consideration of the artifacts of media and their usage shatters the holistic nature 
of anthropology” (114). Similarly, Dickey (1997) observes that even if her 
anthropological colleagues could avoid popular cultural experiences in their 
personal lives, “we have no excuse for so thoroughly ignoring the media in our 
own work” (414). Morley and Robins (1995) summarize this need with the 
following insightful and succinct observation: 
Anthropologists, as much as anyone else, need to take the contemporary 
media very seriously indeed, not least for the simple reason that the media 
now make us all anthropologists in our own living rooms, surveying the 
world of al those others who are represented to us on the screen (238). 
These researchers thus concur that the field of anthropology and 
anthropologically-minded scholars have much to offer in understanding how 
                                                 
29 I provide a summary of talk show research in other fields—including mass media studies, 
cultural studies, communication studies, and sociology—in the section entitled “Situating the ‘talk 
show’.” 
30 Interestingly, Eiselein and Topper (1976c) also described anthropology’s avoidance of media 
research as an exhibition of “shyness” (131). 
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people from various cultures use and create different forms of media, including 
the ways they are embedded in social, political, and economic systems. 
Developing a linguistic anthropology of mass media 
To leave the study of popular television programming to other disciplines 
(e.g., mass media studies, sociology, and communication studies) assumes that 
anthropology, and linguistic anthropology in particular, has little to contribute to 
this topic. To the contrary, this is far from the case. Rather, linguistic 
anthropologists are particularly well-equipped in terms of methodology and 
theory to address questions pertaining to the production and reception of linguistic 
practices, cultural values, and social relations in the realm of mass media (cf. 
Carbaugh 1991; Dickey 1997). As Eiselein and Tapper (1976b) argue, given that 
“culture is communication, . .we can base our study of media upon the models of 
linguistic anthropology and conceptualize the workings of the various media as a 
kind of grammar” (115). 
Given the link between communication and mass media, why the paucity 
of studies on popularized forms of mass-mediated language use? One reason for 
this oversight can be explained by what this form of linguistic interaction does not 
represent, namely, face-to-face communication (Spitulnik 1999). In other words, a 
preference for focusing on “the individual communication event and the sender-
receiver dyad” in linguistic anthropology has contributed to a lack of 
understanding of “how media forms are situated within broader social processes 
and in relation to specific understandings of the communication genres that they 
instantiate” (Spitulnik 1993:298). In short, this linguistic anthropological bias has 
led to the marginalization of (quasi-)mediated31 interactions. 
However, recent linguistic anthropological research into “non-face-to-face 
communication” in indigenous radio broadcasting among the Navajo (Klain and 
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Peterson 2000) and on Zambia national radio stations (Spitulnik 1994, 1997), 
video telecommunication technology for the deaf (Keating 2000; Keating and 
Mirus in press), and Taiwan-based online communities (Su in press) demonstrates 
growing awareness of the need explore these emerging and diversifying modes of 
communication, as well as recognition of their influential and integral roles in 
everyday linguistic practices. This study also contributes to the research lacuna in 
linguistic anthropology on quasi-mediated interactions by investigating how new 
communication technologies such as video clips and call-ins influence 
participants’ linguistic practices. I am particularly interested in analyzing how 
participants draw from technological resources within the call-in show setting, 
while applying linguistic strategies already present in their cultural repertoires to 
discuss and negotiate sociopolitical relations of status, power, and identity. In the 
process, I seek to understand the communicative consequences participants’ 
linguistic choices have in shaping present and absent relationships (Basso 1979) 
and how call-in show verbal interactions establish and contribute to new cultural 
practices (Keating 2000:114).  
For instance, to what extent do call-in participants’ speech reporting 
practices merely represent the recycling of existing linguistic resources? 
Inversely, in what ways are their verbal interactions introducing new and 
innovative linguistic practices as a result of interacting with technologically based 
props in a mass-mediated forum? To begin exploring these questions, it is first 
necessary to acknowledge that “nothing begins from zero,” even for mass-
mediated communities that “are large, shifting, and somewhat intangible” 
(Spitulnik 1997:161). Yet, mediated communities are also based on “some 
experience of belonging and mutuality” (ibid:163) that is created and maintained 
through language use.  Drawing from these perspectives, I argue that Taiwan’s 
                                                                                                                                     
31  I elaborate on what forms of communication are considered to be “quasi-mediated” interactions 
later in the chapter. 
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sociopolitical crisis discourses on the one hand, and the call-in show’s “crisis” 
frame and participant discussions on the other, constitute an experience and 
practice of belonging for the people of Taiwan. Consequently, political TV call-in 
shows represent a prime verbal forum for one to explore and understand Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical processes across space and time.  
Talk show ethnographies: an emerging fieldsite 
Inspired in part by Carbaugh’s (1988) ethnographic study of Donahue, a 
leading U.S. daytime talk show during the 1980s, scholarly interest in talk shows 
has increased in the last fifteen years, leading to a broader understanding of this 
mass media genre.32 Scholars in sociology, sociolinguistics, and communication 
studies have produced the most research on the subject in their explorations of 
talk shows as a social phenomenon, linguistic practice, and pop cultural product.33 
However, linguistic anthropological investigations into the genre remain 
markedly absent as their “popular” characterization and mass-mediated 
production often relegates them to the domain of folklore or cultural studies 
(Traube 1996). When it comes to talk shows, a “benign neglect” (Goodwin 
1990:1) persists in the linguistic anthropological literature in investigating talk as 
an agent and resource in reconstructing and negotiating relations of power, status, 
and identity in this milieu. A gap thus exists between theoretical analysis and 
ethnographic observations of talk shows, as well as between sociolinguistic 
analyses of linguistic behavior and sociopolitical contextualization of discursive 
processes. 
                                                 
32 For instance, a number of researchers have examined the impact talk shows have had on 
political processes (Anderson 1999; Hirsch 1991; Verwey 1990), democratic practices and values 
(Goyton 2001; Jones 2001), sexual identity and power relations (Gamson 1998; Masciarotte 1991; 
Shattuc 1997), cultural production (Montgomery 1999), as well as mass media in general (Delli 
Carpini and Williams 2001; Munson 1993; Patterson 2000; cf. Scannell 1991). 
33 This includes studies on participant verbal interactions to better grasp the nuances of advice-
giving (Hutchby 1995), conflict talk (Hutchby 1996, 2001; Wood 2001), presentations of the self 
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A few exceptions exist, however. These include Grocer’s (1998) 
examination of a Donahue episode that focused on the 1990 Brown University 
rape list controversy and Liebscher’s (1999) inquiry into national identity 
formation in a reunified Germany on German talk shows. Although both studies 
provide detailed linguistic anthropological analyses from videotaped data of talk 
shows, they do not offer an ethnographic perspective of the talk show setting 
itself. Consequently, my study fills this gap by offering a “thick description” of 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in show verbal interactions by combining participant 
observation of the call-in show production setting and process, including its 
behind-the-scenes dynamics, varied participant pool (e.g., moderators, guest 
panelists, callers, political parties), and studio environment, with detailed analysis 
of participants’ language use.34 
WAYS OF EXPLORING CALL-IN SHOW TALK: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERPECTIVE 
In exploring Taiwan’s crisis discourses as enacted through talk on political 
TV call-in shows, I draw from the theoretical and methodological approaches of 
the ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis, language as social action, 
speech play and verbal art, as well as media studies. My analysis culls from 
various fields in order to paint a broad portrait of how this mass-mediated 
phenomenon is situated in Taiwan’s sociolinguistic and sociopolitical landscape. 
In my aim to contribute to these various fields with this study, I also take an 
interdisciplinary approach and attempt to write in a style that is accessible to 
readers in as many disciplinary fields as possible. 
                                                                                                                                     
(Avery and Ellis 1979; Myers 2001), therapy talk (Brunvatne and Tolson 2001; Lowney 1999), 
personal narratives (Thornborrow 1997), and performance (Haarman 2001; Thornborrow 2001). 
34 Having said this, I am aware that my study does not address viewer and non-viewer 
perspectives toward call-in shows. 
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Ethnographic ways of studying call-in shows 
In my examination of Taiwan’s TV call-in shows, I use a discourse-
centered approach (Sherzer 1987), which is based on the ethnography of speaking 
(Bauman and Sherzer 1989; Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Hymes 1995 (1962)) or 
“ways of speaking” model (Hymes’ 1989 (1972)).35 In particular, a discourse-
centered approach foregrounds how “reality, knowledge, and sociocultural 
experience are constructed, perceived, transmitted, and actually performed 
through the filter of everyday discourse” (Sherzer 1983:17). My study thus 
explores how language intersects with cultural patterns and social functions in 
ways that contribute to the “collaborative construction of meaning” (Keating 
1998:3). 
Through this approach, I am able to explore the “socioexpressive 
dimensions” of speaking (Bauman and Sherzer 1989:12), and moreover, how such 
linguistic features “ramify throughout the sociocultural life of whole 
communities” (ibid:11), in this case, Taiwan. I also take an ethnopragmatics 
approach to my topic, in that it “relies on ethnography to illuminate the ways in 
which speech is both constituted by and constitutive of social interaction” and 
regards “discourse as always embedded within socioculturally organized 
activities” (Duranti 1994:11). Subsequently, I investigate how sociocultural 
values and political ideologies in Taiwan inform and influence participants’ 
linguistic practices on political TV call-in programs. 
Although Carbaugh’s (1988) ethnographic examination of language use on 
Donahue also adopts a “ways of speaking” approach to explore the “talking that is 
American, more than an American that is talking” (2; original emphasis), my 
study differs from his by avoiding all-encompassing, sui generis claims that call-
                                                 
35 The phrase and methodological approach, “ways of speaking,” draws upon Whorf’s “fashions 
of speaking” construct (Hymes 1989 (1972):446). Other ethnography of speaking research, such as 
Sherzer’s (1983) exploration into “Kuna ways of speaking” and Ide’s (1998) study on “small talk” 
and “American ways of speaking,” have also expanded upon this concept. 
 27
in show verbal interactions represent the “talking that is Taiwanese” or even of a 
“Taiwanese that is talking.”36 Rather, I regard call-in participants’ language use, 
including speech reporting, as being uniquely applied within this mass-mediated 
speech event. 
In exploring call-in show ways of speaking, I also investigate the 
performance of two other “mini-speech events” within the political call-in show 
itself, namely, “reconciliation (hejie 和解) talk” and “saliva wars” (koushui zhan 
口水戰).37 I identify and label them as speech events following Hymes’ (1995 
(1962)) ethnographic observation that “[i]nsofar as participants in a society 
conceive their verbal interaction in terms of [speech events], the critical attributes 
and the distribution of these are worth discovering” (258). As such, the 
descriptors “reconciliation talk” and “saliva wars” represent translations of terms 
that call-in programs and participants have used to refer to certain linguistic 
practices and events. 
For instance, I derive “reconciliation talk” from a 2100 episode entitled 
“Big Reconciliation Coffee” (da hejie kafei 大和解咖啡). The program producers 
culled the headline from an event of the same name that was organized by several 
legislators at the Legislative Yuan (lifayuan 立法院), Taiwan’s highest 
parliamentary body. The term “saliva war” has even greater associations with 
                                                 
36 As I explain in Chapter Two, the descriptor “Taiwanese” as an adjective and noun is 
problematic for ethnographic and sociopolitical reasons in Taiwan’s multiethnic and multilingual 
society. However, I use the descriptor here to describe those residents who live in Taiwan. 
37 I translate the term “koushui zhan” as “saliva war” as opposed to “spitting war” or the more 
commonly known English equivalent of “mudslinging” in order to capture the term’s literal 
meaning in Mandarin Chinese. Other suggestions I have received toward translating this 
sociolinguistically expressive term and complex practice include “verbal dueling,” “snarling 
match,” “dog fight” (I thank Avron Boretz for these interpretations). While each of these 
descriptors capture various aspects of “koushui zhan,” my choice of the somewhat awkward 
sounding term “saliva war” serves to emphasize its culturally-unique origins, including the manner 
in which I examine its practice, namely, call-in participants’ contestation and negotiation of 
“crises” in Taiwan’s sociopolitical arena. Lastly, I opted not to use “duel” or “dueling” as it 
suggests the involvement of only two individuals or parties, whereas it is possible to have more 
than two participants involved in koushui zhan. 
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Taiwan politics, as this colloquial moniker captures the verbal blustering and 
heated confrontations between politicians on the legislative floor. The notion 
carries the same derogatory meaning as the English term “mudslinging” and its 
characterization of negative rhetorical practices politicians use to denigrate others, 
especially during electoral campaigns. I provide a more detailed explanation of 
these sociocultural values and negotiations in Chapters Six and Seven. 
My ethnographic investigation of the call-in show production process is 
also supplemented by my observations as an end-user or consumer. My fieldwork 
observations capture activities such as topic and panelist selection, videotape 
editing, caller management, and the studio telebroadcast. My ethnographic 
research also includes on-site visits to six of the nine weeknight call-in shows that 
aired in early 2000.38 Out of the six programs, I select two—TVBS’s 2100: All 
People Open Talk and SETN’s 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices—as my primary 
fieldsites for investigating call-in show crisis framing and participant verbal 
interactions.39 In addition, my study incorporates insights from interviews with 
call-in show producers and participants (i.e., moderators and guest panelists).  
My reasons for studying 2100 and 8 o’clock include their popularity 
among viewers, as demonstrated through their high rankings in Taiwan’s A.C. 
Neilsen polls, and the moderators’ different facilitation styles. Although the two 
programs have unique features and moderation styles, they nonetheless encourage 
similar discursive practices, including topic selection and a discussion orientation 
that encourages speakers to foment anxiety-ridden rhetoric. I present a more 
detailed analysis of these similarities and differences in Chapter Two. 
                                                 
38 Other call-in programs that I observed included CTN’s Face-to-face Debate (Xiang dui lun 
相對論), ETTV’s Always Speak Your Mind (You hua lao shi jiang 有話老實講), FTV’s 
Everybody Let’s Deliberate (Dajia lai shenpan 大家來審判), and STV’s Final Decision 2000 
(Juezhan 2000 決戰 2000). 
39 Four of the nine political TV call-in programs discontinued airing immediately or soon after the 
presidential election on March 18, 2000. This was another determining factor for choosing 2100 
and 8 o’clock as my primary fieldsites. 
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Call-in show talk as talk-in-interaction 
The methodological tools of conversation analysis (CA) (Sacks et al. 
1974; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973) proved particularly helpful to 
my examination of how call-in participants use and manipulate reported speech to 
recall and inscribe crisis readings of program topics. In praising conversation 
analysis as an analytical tool, Goodwin and Goodwin (1992) note that 
“[p]articular interpretations of events in the world may be far less important than 
the structures used to accomplish such congruent interpretations of a social 
activity in the first place” (182). Given the focus that CA places on examining the 
regularities of everyday talk, many scholars have applied its methodology to 
understanding linguistic behavior in social institutions (Agar 1995) such as 
courtrooms (Atkinson and Drew 1979), at political rallies (Atkinson 1984), and 
during formal interactions between professionals and clients (Antaki and Rapley 
1996; Boden and Zimmerman 1991; cf. Drew and Heritage 1992). 
Of particular interest to this study is the breadth of CA research that 
examines verbal interactions in broadcast talk (Greatbatch 1988, 1992; Heritage 
1985; Scannell 1991), and specifically, on talk radio (Hutchby 1992, 1995, 1997) 
and talk shows (cf. Haarman 1999; Tolson 2001a). In his research on news 
interviews, Heritage (1985) describes interviewers as refraining from producing 
backchannel cues or continuers (Schegloff 1981)—such as “uh huh” or “right”—
when interviewees are speaking in order to avoid acting as the primary recipient 
of the interviewee’s answers, thus allowing the overhearing audience to assume 
that role. As for panel-based TV interviews, Greatbatch (1992) finds that host 
allocations of turn-taking plays a key role in determining the confrontation level 
between panelists. In contrast, Hutchby’s (2001) examination of a U.S. daytime 
talk show, The Ricki Lake Show, demonstrates that guest panelists routinely 
address one another directly and even appeal to the host for support. Here, talk 
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show hosts serve as advocates and facilitators of verbal confrontations between 
disputants. 
Although my study does not conduct a micro-analysis of call-in 
participants’ turn-taking, I do note marked instances of linguistic behavior such as 
interruptions of or contributions to another speaker’s turn of talk. For instance, the 
moderator of 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices exhibits a facilitation style 
characterized by frequent interjections and rephrasings of other speakers’ 
utterances. While these interruptions may be interpreted as backchannel cues in 
the spirit of attentive listening, such an assessment must nevertheless be 
contextualized within the interaction itself. In one excerpt I later examine, the 
male moderator and a male guest panelist incredulously repeat a phrase another 
female panelist had previously uttered. Rather than serving as a supportive 
backchanneling cue the repetition acts as a disparaging and subversive appraisal 
of both utterance and speaker, which succeeds in undermining the female 
panelist’s main argument. 
Conversation analysis’s emphasis on situating each subsequent action as 
dependent upon the prior action (Goodwin 1994) and its examination of the 
manner in which every utterance is “context shaped and context renewing” (Holt 
1999:506; original emphasis) also proves invaluable to my study. My 
investigation of call-in participants’ speech reporting as a prominent linguistic 
device in program deliberations focuses on its role in expanding upon call-in 
show sound bites and speaker comments. Intrigued by the myriad of ways 
participants insert “direct” reported speech (a.k.a. “quoted speech”) in their 
commentary to forward their own or dissuade another’s interpretation of an 
utterance or incident, I suggest that what is presented as “direct quotation” often 
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bears little or no resemblance to previously spoken or technologically replayed 
utterances.40 
My analysis of call-in show verbal interactions also benefits from 
technological tools such as videotaped data, which supplemented my 
ethnographic observations. As I was not allowed to videotape call-in programs 
within the studio setting itself, my study relies upon call-in show telebroadcasts 
for detailed linguistic analysis.41 By reviewing videotaped recordings, I was able 
to verify, or in several cases disprove, the source utterance and original speaker 
from which the reported speech derived. Videotaped segments and sound bites 
featured on the call-in show provide additional access to utterances spoken 
outside the program context. Researchers who study reported speech have voiced 
frustration at rarely being present when the original utterance was made. 
Consequently, the effort to “determine systematically how quoting speakers 
transform others’ words is impeded by the difficulty of directly comparing 
original utterances with subsequent quotations of them” (Koven 2001:519).  
Fortunately, in the present study, the technological resources of call-in 
shows partially overcome this analytical conundrum. Although original utterances 
appear in a decontextualized and edited form on call-in shows, participants (and 
researchers) are nonetheless allowed to see and hear the original speaker’s 
remarks. Again, such opportunities rarely occur in most studies on reported 
speech. By reviewing videotaped call-in programs, I am able to compare whether 
the “quoted speech” call-in participants present is indeed direct reported speech or 
a creative (re)construction of another speaker’s words (cf. Haberland 1986; 
Tannen 1989). 
                                                 
40 The phrase “technologically replayed utterances” refers to sound bites and video clips of 
utterances that call-in shows play at the beginning and during the program. 
41 My inability to gather videotaped data within the studio setting prevented me from analyzing 
off-camera verbal behaviors, which could have further contextualized participants’ “on-camera” 
remarks. 
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Aside from its usefulness for research on reported speech, Charles 
Goodwin (1994) explains other advantages to using videotaped data: 
I use videotapes as my primary source of data, recognizing that, like 
transcription, any camera position constitutes a theory about what is 
relevant within a scene—one that will have enormous consequences for 
what can be seen in it later—and what forms of subsequent analysis are 
possible. A tremendous advantage of recorded data is that they permit 
repeated, detailed examination of actual sequences of talk and embodies 
work practices in the settings where practitioners actually perform these 
activities (607). 
I glean similar benefits from repeated viewings of program recordings, including 
tracing how certain utterances evolve during the course of a single episode and 
even across several episodes. In attending to this speech reporting process, I 
adhere to the emphasis CA places on the patterned progression of verbal 
interactions.42 By repeatedly viewing call-in show verbal interactions, I was also 
able to link speech reporting practices to participants’ performances of 
reconciliation talk and saliva wars. 
How to do things on call-in shows 
My methodological approach is also influenced by the language as social 
action school of thought (Austin 1962; Labov and Fanshel 1977; Searle 1969). In 
the seminal work How to do things with words, Austin (1962) explains that a 
speaker performs and accomplishes specific acts through his utterances. Austin 
regards language as a force that influences the social world and specifically names 
three including: (1) locutionary force, the act of producing the utterance itself; (2) 
illocutionary force, the conventional effect of the utterance in social interaction; 
and (3) perlocutionary force, the extended effects of utterances, including side 
effects or consequences, the speaker’s intentions notwithstanding. Additionally, 
                                                 
42 Although this is not a focus of my study, selective camera angles and supplementary program 
devices (such as graphics) contribute toward the packaged product that is the political TV call-in 
show. 
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studies as diverse as honorific language use in Pohnpei, Micronesia (Keating 
1998) to the performance of small talk in service encounters in the United States 
(Ide 1998) demonstrate that language as social action has the force to negotiate 
and confer status relations as well as to facilitate interactions between relative 
strangers. 
Receivers or hearers of reported speech—such as other guest panelists, the 
moderator, and television viewers—are able to comprehend and situate quoted 
utterances within ongoing talk by relying upon general principles of cooperative 
conversation (Grice 1957, 1968), shared information, and the ability to draw 
inferences (cf. Schiffrin 1994). For speech reporting to be successful, reporters of 
quoted speech expect listeners to possess the required knowledge about events, 
people, and places that the reported utterance recalls and indexes. 
Likewise, call-in shows assume that viewers have a basic understanding of 
past and present sociopolitical issues in Taiwan. Nonetheless, call-in shows 
mediate the exchange of information between program and viewer by providing 
supplemental material. In creating a crisis ambiance, call-in shows rely upon the 
joint use of technological props such as video clips, digital cartoons, graphics, and 
text.43 While these program features are important, my study primarily focuses on 
the linguistic tools participants wield when contributing to the call-in show crisis 
frame. 
Hybrid social interactions and the exchange of symbolic forms 
An examination of TV call-in shows also requires a media studies 
perspective to orient the multiple interactions within and through this mass-
mediated product. In applying Thompson’s (1995) social interaction category of 
                                                 
43 Although it is not a primary focus of this study, I include on-site productions among the call-in 
show’s repertoire of crisis-rendering tools. These broadcasts typically occur in the area where a 
“real” crisis has occurred such as 2100’s broadcast from Chi-chi (集集), the area in south central 
Taiwan that sustained the most damage from the 921 earthquake in 1999 and claimed over 2000 
victims. 
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“mediated quasi-interaction”—which generally applies to reader or recipient 
interactions with books, newspapers, radio, and television—my study situates 
call-in show verbal interactions within this classification. Thompson distinguishes 
mediated quasi-interactions from face-to-face interactions and mediated 
interactions by their reduced “degree of reciprocity and interpersonal specificity,” 
given that they are produced for “an infinite range of potential recipients” 
(ibid:84). Thompson also concedes that many social interactions exhibit a “hybrid 
character” that combines these three forms of interaction.  Taiwan’s TV call-in 
shows, for instance, include not only mediated quasi-interactions between studio 
participants and television viewers but also face-to-face interactions between the 
moderator and guest panelists within the studio setting.44  
Drawing from Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of symbolic capital, Thompson 
describes participants in mediated quasi-interactions as predominantly partaking 
in a process of communication and symbolic exchange. A distinct characteristic of 
this form of interaction includes participants producing “symbolic forms for 
others who are not physically present, while others are involved primarily in 
receiving symbolic forms produced by others to whom they cannot respond” 
(Thompson 1995:84-85). My study in this respect regards call-in participants’ 
linguistic practices as readily exchangeable cultural and symbolic currency in 
both the immediate call-in show context and Taiwan society at large. 
Mediated quasi-interactions also require senders and receivers to interact 
across space and time, which in some senses limits participants to a narrower 
range of symbolic cues in comparison to face-to-face interactions. I also approach 
call-in show interactions as the asymmetrical production of symbolic forms 
between studio participants and television viewers, with the former constituting 
                                                 
44 Of the six call-in programs that I visited, only one program (Final Decision 2000) included a 
live studio audience in its format, which was allowed to pose questions to the guest panelists. As I 
do not include excerpts from this program, I will not be examining this form of studio verbal 
interaction. 
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the primary producers and the latter representing the main receivers. As a result, 
call-in participants often draw upon tested and reliable rhetorical devices, such as 
reported speech, to increase the successful reception of their indexically rich 
commentary. 
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
Transcribing verbal data into textual form represents a “practical problem” 
for linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists alike as they confront the politics 
of representation (Goodwin 1994; cf. Ochs 1979; Schieffelin and Doucet 1994). 
Although a form of representation itself, a conversation analysis approach 
attempts to overcome this obstacle by using detailed transcription conventions 
that capture participants’ varied verbal features and bodily orientations during an 
unfolding social interaction (Sacks et al. 1974). Linguistic anthropologists equally 
emphasize that in transforming speech practices into physical and visible lines on 
a page, the transcription should make apparent to readers how a speaker organizes 
his or her talk into relevant units (cf. Sherzer and Woodbury 1987). In my study, I 
use a format that combines the transcription features of conversation analysis 
while attempting to maintain the organizational structure of call-in show talk from 
a linguistic anthropological perspective. These transcription conventions can be 
found in Appendix A. 
As for the data excerpts in this study, I first transcribed call-in show verbal 
interactions into the original languages, in this case Mandarin Chinese and 
Taiwanese, which I then translated into English. In my transcriptions, I present 
both versions by placing Chinese ideograms and English text side-by-side. Given 
grammatical differences between Chinese and English, the two textual versions 
may not correspond line-for-line in the transcribed data excerpts. Excerpts I do 
not analyze in detail are presented in English, with the Chinese text available for 
reference in Appendix B. 
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Following the appendices is a Glossary that lists key Chinese terms and 
phrases I cite in the dissertation (e.g., waishengren, koushui zhan).  The Glossary 
is organized in alphabetical order according to the Romanization system I use 
most frequently in the dissertation. Chinese terms that I generally represent in 
Hanyu Pinyin in the text will be rendered thusly in the Glossary, as will those 
terms that I present according to the Romanization system used in Taiwan.45 In 
addition to an English gloss, I provide alternate English transliterations, a brief 
description of each term or phrase, and when applicable, its relevance to the 
present study. 
Following the Glossary is a List of Individuals that includes the call-in 
show participants and sociopolitical figures from Taiwan and the PRC that appear 
throughout the dissertation. In this list, I provide each individual’s Chinese name, 
its transliteration, and, if known, an English name. I also briefly describe the 
individual’s title and sociopolitical affiliation. 
I have chosen to transliterate most Chinese terms and names in Hanyu 
Pinyin, which is the Romanization system used in the PRC, as this is the 
transliteration system taught in most Chinese language courses in the U.S. 
However, I adhere to other orthographic forms for names and terms that the 
English language media in Taiwan have conventionalized. For instance, I use the 
English transliteration of “Kuomintang” instead of “Guomindang” for the 
Nationalist Party (國民黨). In addition, I refer to several individuals by their 
English names, rather than their Chinese transliterated name, if one is available. 
Examples include political figures such as People’s First Party Chairman James 
Soong (a.k.a. Song Chuyü 宋楚瑜) and ROC Vice President Annette Lu (a.k.a. 
Lu Hsiu-lian or Lu Xiulian 呂秀蓮), as well as some of my interviewees (e.g., 
James C. Hsiung 熊杰) and call-in participants (e.g., Tim T. Y. Yu 丁庭宇). 
                                                 
45 I deliberately do not specify which Romanization system here as multiple systems are currently 
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In addition, I periodically incorporate Chinese ideograms and their 
corresponding transliteration in the body of the text. I resort to this dual reference 
when introducing certain terms or concepts in their corresponding Chinese form 
(e.g., ‘crisis’ as weiji (危機), ‘harmony’ as he (和)). When examining call-in 
show data excerpts, I generally include both the English translation and the 
original Chinese text in the discussion, particularly when they prove central to my 
analysis. I do not include these terms and phrases in the Glossary, however. 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
In the following chapter, Chapter Two, I explore the rise of call-in shows 
in Taiwan, including their influence on language, society, and politics. This 
chapter also includes an introduction to the study’s main ethnographic sites, 
namely, the political TV call-in shows 2100: All People Open Talk and 8 o’clock 
Loud and Soft Voices. In describing the program participants, production 
processes, and broadcasting formats, I compare and contrast 2100 and 8 o’clock in 
terms of how these features influence the discursive ambience for and verbal 
interactions of its participants. 
In Chapter Three, I present this study’s conceptualization of crisis 
discourse through the dual lens of mass media studies and linguistic anthropology. 
In particular, I appropriate Edelman’s (1977, 1988) observation that crisis events 
are linguistic constructions created for political purposes. The chapter introduces 
Goffman’s (1974) notion of frame and primary frameworks in relation to this 
study’s argument that political TV call-in shows recreate and contribute to 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses by promoting and maintaining a crisis 
frame through their selected topics and program deliberations. As previously 
mentioned, the chapter considers popularized understandings of the Mandarin 
Chinese term for “crisis”—weiji (危機)—as reflecting the dialectical meanings of 
                                                                                                                                     
in use. 
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its two ideograms, namely, “danger” (wei 危) and “opportunity” (ji 幾). This 
contemporary interpretation informs my study’s examination of how call-in 
participants index and negotiate these two aspects of crisis-oriented topics during 
program deliberations. 
In the second half of Chapter Three, I introduce several sociopolitical 
events and issues that were featured as call-in show topics during the eight-month 
period in which I conducted fieldwork for this study (January to August 2000). 
Figuring prominently on call-in shows are discussions on cross-straits relations 
between Taiwan and the PRC. This issue also represented a significant factor in 
Taiwan’s presidential elections, which I refer to in my analyses. Another 
dominant topic that call-in shows frequently feature is benshengren/waishengren 
(本省人/外省人) relations between so-called local Taiwanese and Mainlanders, 
also known as “ethno-political sentiments” (shengji qingjie 省籍情結). I 
summarize this intergroup dynamic as deriving from competing sociopolitical 
worldviews between benshengren, who advocate for a Taiwan worldview, and 
waishengren, who maintain a China-based perspective. Lastly, I consider the 
increasing role of gendered politics in Taiwan’s democratizing environment 
through the political trajectory of Taiwan’s first female Vice President, Annette 
Lu (呂秀蓮), and particularly, the crisis discourses Lu’s unconventional linguistic 
behavior raises, including the alleged threat it poses to Taiwan’s national security. 
In Chapter Four, I introduce the linguistic device of reported speech, 
which serves as the focus of this study’s analysis of call-in show participants’ 
verbal interactions. The chapter begins by distinguishing the forms and functions 
of direct and indirect reported speech. I then problematize the “reportedness” of 
direct reported speech by considering the notions of hypothetical reported speech 
(Haberland 1986) and constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989). The remainder of the 
chapter introduces a broad interdisciplinary body of research on reported speech 
and explores how it informs the present study. 
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Chapters Five, Six, and Seven constitute the core of my study’s 
exploration of the call-in show crisis frame, and specifically, how crisis 
discourses are performed through participants’ use of reported speech. The three 
chapters inform and elaborate upon each other as they investigate speakers’ use of 
various speech reporting practices, including direct, indirect, and hypothetical 
reported speech. 
Chapter Five provides an overview of the ways participants use reported 
speech to explore the complex crisis readings underlying each call-in program 
topic. This includes using reported speech to “editorialize” (Buttny 1998; Buttny 
and Williams 2000) and “mark” (Clark and Gerrig 1990; Mitchell-Kernan 1972) 
the original utterance and speaker. The chapter also considers the use of speech 
reporting in collaboration with other linguistic devices such as polyphonic 
strategies (Günthner 1999) or “parodic stylization” (Bakhtin 1981) and code-
switching or code displacement (Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996). Together, these 
linguistic features highlight the ways reported speech subverts and supplants 
socially recognizable identities and local power relations. Overall, reported 
speech practices foreground the heteroglossic (Bakhtin 1981, 1986) nature of 
language use, such as allowing the reporter to simultaneously present the original 
speaker’s and his own ethno-political identities and ideologies, while juxtaposing 
the worldview of the linguistically constructed “storyworld” with that of the real 
world (Günthner 1999). 
The next two chapters, Chapters Six and Seven, examine two speech 
events—reconciliation talk and saliva wars—that epitomize call-in show ways of 
speaking. Chapter Six introduces the notions of harmony (he 和), “moral face” 
(lian 臉), and “social face” or “image” (mianzi 面子) in Chinese societies as it 
applies to Taiwan. Despite the subversive and confrontational atmosphere of 
political TV call-in shows, the chapter examines how participants maintain these 
social values between present and absent interlocutors and sociopolitical entities 
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through the performance of reconciliation talk. The chapter illustrates that 
reported speech plays a key role in negotiating competing ideologies and 
understandings of crisis issues, for instance, through allowing a participant to 
voice and reconcile various characters and perspectives in the same stretch of talk. 
Conversely, Chapter Seven investigates the display of social dis-harmony 
on call-in shows through verbal disputes or saliva wars. The chapter provides a 
local understanding of saliva wars in Taiwan’s sociopolitical sphere by 
introducing the speech event within the context of legislative debates in Taiwan. 
Speech reporting plays a prominent and strategic role in saliva wars as program 
disputants manipulate and create quoted utterances to further their arguments. In 
particular, reported speech serves as a form of evidentiality (Besnier 1993) and 
represents reputable sources or bases (Pomerantz 1984) that reaffirms a speaker’s 
entitlement claims to privileged insider knowledge of an event or issue. In cases 
when an event or topic is surrounded by innuendo and hearsay, participants 
frequently use hypothetical reported speech to create the illusion of authenticity 
and to enhance their credibility. However, other speakers can deny the validity 
and even ridicule the use of reported speech as evidence. In this chapter, I 
demonstrate instances in which participants undermine another speaker’s use of 
reported speech as support for argumentative claims by recontextualizing or 
reclaiming the original utterance as their own. 
In the concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, I provide an overview of the 
study’s claims and findings, addressing the questions I pose in Chapter Four 
regarding the roles reported speech play in call-in participant discussions of 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses. For instance, the study finds that 
reported speech allows participants to distance themselves from a controversial 
utterance while reappropriating it to another speaker. In addition, the speech 
reporting can provide participants the means to concurrently present and negotiate 
opposing perspectives to an issue or event by engaging in “thought experiments” 
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through hypothetical reported speech (Myers 1999b).  The chapter also extends 
the study’s contributions towards other disciplinary fields, including media 
studies, popular culture studies, and political science. I consider some of the 
study’s limitations and propose areas for future research that this project has 
inspired such as the influence of speech play and argumentative styles in call-in 
show discussions. 
In this final chapter, I also address the ways Taiwan’s political TV call-in 
shows have “indigenized” or “Taiwanized” talk shows. I reflect upon how call-in 
show deliberations have introduced a form of “pop politics” in Taiwan that is 
characterized by everyday linguistic practices such as speech reporting. In 
extending the “danger/opportunity” dichotomy, I consider the dangers and 
opportunities call-in shows pose to the sociopolitical topics they feature as well as 
the risks involved and rewards gained in researching this programming 
phenomenon. Lastly, I explore the dialogical relationships underlying this study’s 
investigation as call-in show “ways of reporting,” especially the dependence upon 
and recreation of sociopolitical crisis discourses. 
The following chapter provides a brief background on Taiwan’s mass 
media environment as well as introduces the study’s primary fieldsites, the call-in 
shows 2100: All People Open Talk and 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices. 
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Chapter Two: Welcome to 2100: All People Open Talk and 8 
o’clock Loud and Soft Voices 
 
This chapter provides an overview of how Taiwan’s political TV call-in 
shows rose to prominence and popularity in the wake of sweeping changes in 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical and mass media environments. In addition, I 
ethnographically situate the two call-in show settings where I conducted 
fieldwork for this study, namely, TVBS’s 2100: All People Open Talk and 
SETN’s 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices. 
THE RISE OF TAIWAN’S CALL-IN SHOW “MANIA” 
In investigating mass media development in Taiwan, scholars such as 
Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) qualified their understandings by situating their 
assessments within local cultural and political processes. For instance, mass 
media liberalization followed Taiwan’s sociopolitical development, with the 
passage of the first reformative legislation occurring seven years after the lifting 
of martial law in 1987. Political TV call-in shows thus appeared on television 
screens in Taiwan at the same time TV station ownership passed from 
governmental control to capitalistic competition. 
Upon closer inspection, however, Taiwan’s TV “call-in (show) mania” 
(kouying rechao 叩應熱潮) (Shen 1999:175) was quieting brewing long before 
mass media liberalization. As underground radio stealthily increased its 
broadcasting presence in the 1970s and 1980s, radio call-in shows attracted a 
sociopolitically oppressed populace who used the anonymous forum with its 
reduced risk of state retribution as a public space to voice their social discontent 
(cf. Chen 1998; Shen 1999). The Taiwan-based opposition movement, locally 
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referred to as the dangwai (黨外),1 used these illegal broadcasting conduits to 
promote a “Taiwanese consciousness”2 (bentu yishi 本土意識) and mobilize a 
local populace comprised mostly of “local Taiwanese” (benshengren 本省人).3 
The opposition movement’s bentu (本土) or “local” (meaning Taiwan) agenda 
sought to counter the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT 國民黨) regime’s 
China-based ideologies, which the KMT promulgated through the country’s mass 
media and other institutional conduits. Underground radio subverted the KMT’s 
China and Chinese-oriented inculcating policies by broadcasting in Taiwanese 
(Taiyu 台語) or Hohlo (河洛話),4 a language spoken by most benshengren and 
which originated from the southern region of Fujian province in China, rather 
than in the “national language” (guoyu 國語) or Mandarin Chinese, a dialect from 
northern China.5 
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s illegal cable television industry6 began transmission 
in the late 1960s, providing Taiwan’s populace alternatives to the three KMT-
                                                 
1 Dangwai (黨外) literally means “outside the party,” referring to outside the KMT party. This 
term arose given the restrictions the KMT regime placed on the formation of political parties, out 
of fear of organized opposition to their rule, during the period Taiwan was under martial law. 
2 The Mandarin term bentuhua literally means “to nativize” and is commonly translated in 
Taiwan’s English-language newspapers as “Taiwanese consciousness.” Here, I use “Taiwanese 
consciousness” for butuyishi. More discussion on the notions of bentuhua and Taiwanese 
consciousness is provided in Chapter Two. 
3 I explain the distinctions between Taiwan’s ethno-political groups in greater detail in Chapter 
Two. 
4 The term Hohlo represents the Taiwanese term for “Taiwanese.” This term has only recently 
entered public use in Taiwan. In Mandarin, Hohlo is also referred to as Minnanhua (閩南話), 
which translates as the Min Southern language. 
5 Taiwan is a multilingual society with its residents speaking a variety of Chinese languages, 
including Mandarin and Taiwanese or Hohlo, as well as Hakka and eleven Aborigine languages. 
For the most part, Mandarin and Taiwanese share a written language based on Han Chinese 
characters. 
6 Cable television in Taiwan was originally transmitted through Common Antennas Television 
(CATV) systems set up by “pirate” cable television companies and the political opposition 
(Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2001). 
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owned and operated TV stations (Chen 1998).7 By the mid-1980s, cable TV had 
gained a strong enough foothold in Taiwan such that it was colloquially called 
“the fourth channel” (disitai 第四台)8 in a facetious nod to the aforementioned 
three terrestrial stations. Most significantly, cable television contributed to 
cultural change and political action (cf. Topper and Wilson 1976) in Taiwan. In 
March 1990, the underground media made a breakthrough when Taiwan’s first 
local political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; Minjindang 
民進黨)—which evolved from the former dangwai movement—established an 
island-wide network of radio and television stations called “The Voice of 
Democracy” (ibid:26).9 Soon after, the 1993 Cable TV Law legalized private 
ownership of Taiwan’s mass media enterprises, thus opening this nascent market 
to foreign and local investment (Rampal 1994:73). 
Launched by a Hong Kong-based news enterprise (TVB),10 the country’s 
first all-news TV channel (TVBS) began broadcasting on September 28, 1993 
(Shen 1999:145). Since the mid-1990s, five 24-hour news TV stations compete 
for viewers in a nation with only 23 million residents. This news broadcasting-to-
population ratio is even more impressive when compared with the U.S., which has 
                                                 
7 The three “terrestrial” channels include Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) (Taishi 台視), 
China Television Company (CTV) (Zhongshi 中視), and the Chinese Television System (CTS) 
(Huashi 華視) (ROC Yearbook 2000:276). 
8 The moniker “the fourth channel” refers to a break from the standard, three terrestrial 
broadcasting networks that were owned and operated by the previous ruling party, the KMT. Prior 
to the 1993 Cable TV laws, viewers acquired cable TV channels (such as CNN, MTV, NHK, and 
various local stations) through illegally installed satellite attennas or “little ears” (xiao erduo 
小耳朵) on apartment rooftops and windows. 
9 When television first arrived in Taiwan in 1962, Taiwanese language programs were the most 
popular. In 1972, the KMT government ordained that all TV stations could only broadcast 
Taiwanese language programs one hour per day, which was divided into two half hour segments 
once at noon and again at night. By 1976, all television shows were to be broadcast in Mandarin 
while the Taiwanese language shows would be gradually phased by the end of the year (Wachman 
1994:107).  
10 At the time, TVBS only broadcast one channel. By the late 1990s, the cable enterprise had 
expanded its cable selection to include those devoted solely to news, sports, and general 
entertainment. 
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a population ten times larger (250 million) than that of Taiwan but has only five 
national all-news stations.11 
The evolution from cable TV news coverage to infotainment news 
programming did not take long in Taiwan’s rapidly liberalizing mass media 
environment (cf. Shen 1999). On August 1, 1994, Taiwan’s first cable TV call-in 
show12—2100 All People Open Talk—made its debut on TVBS (ibid:145). The 
program’s popularity among viewers, and its influential clout within political 
circles, led other cable TV stations to produce their own political call-in 
programs. By the time I conducted fieldwork for this study in early 2000, nine 
weeknight political call-in programs could be found on Taiwan’s airwaves vying 
for the country’s coveted viewership. 
Other TV stations’ imitation of 2100’s format not only confers the highest 
form of flattery upon this flagship political TV call-in show, but also highlights 
Taiwan’s increasingly competitive mass media environment. The call-in show’s 
political influence can also be felt at the voting booth as studies indicate that 
candidates who appear on 2100: All People Open Talk, Taiwan’s leading political 
TV call-in program, have a greater chance of being elected (Chiu and Chan-
Olmstead 1999). Similarly, the call-in show’s prestigious station in Taiwan 
society can be logged in the number of calls producers receive from legislative 
assistants who lobby on behalf of their bosses (e.g., politicians) for a coveted spot 
on the program’s high profile guest panel. As for profitability, with their low 
overhead, the programs quickly earn financial rewards from commercial sales. 
This is particularly true during the election season, which occurs yearly in 
                                                 
11 As of August 2000, the time research for this study concluded, Taiwan’s five all-news stations 
were TVBS, ETTV (Dongsen 東森), FTV (Minshi 民視), Global TV (Huanqiu 環球), and CTN 
(Dadi 大地). In the U.S., the five all-news TV stations include CNN Headline News, CNN Live, 
MSNBC, CNBC, and Fox News. 
12 Although Taiwan’s TV stations also offer relationship, financial/investment, and social issue 
(including women, children, and education) call-in programs, those discussing political topics are 
by far the most widely viewed. 
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Taiwan, when political candidates and their parties fill the 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. time 
slot with campaign commercials during live call-in show broadcasts, not to 
mention the additional advertising revenue TV stations earn during reruns.13 
To a certain extent, the latest wave of “call-in mania” epitomizes a trend 
towards a more popularized form of political participation in Taiwan. The 2000 
edition of the Republic of China Yearbook,14 a guide to Taiwan that the 
Governmental Information Office (GIO) publishes, proudly describes that call-in 
show listeners are “eager to express their views on the air about national 
developments and to put questions to government officials who visit the studios to 
answer inquiries about government policy” (274).  
The program’s participatory premise can likewise be found in the locally-
coined moniker “call-in show” (kouying jiemu 叩應節目). Playing on the English 
pronunciation of “call-in,” its Mandarin transliteration—kouying (叩應)—literally 
means to “knock and respond” (Shen 2000:146). This linguistic interpretation 
reflects the Taiwanization of this programming genre, particularly in its 
interactive format and purported emphasis on callers rather than guest panelists.  
In the following sections, I explore the various ways Taiwan’s political 
TV call-in shows have become indigenized or “Taiwanized.” In my ethnographic 
account of the neighborhoods where this study’s two primary fieldsites—2100: 
All People Open Talk and 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices—are situated, I 
describe how these distinct areas of Taipei reflect the city’s, and country’s, 
rapidly changing environment. 
                                                 
13 Political TV call-in programs repeat their programs later in the night and sometimes the next 
day. For instance, 2100 rebroadcasts its program from midnight to 1 a.m. and again from 3:30 
p.m. to 4:30 p.m. the following afternoon. 
14 The Republic of China (ROC) represents Taiwan’s official name, which is used on most 
government issued documents. Recently, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) under 
President Chen Shui-bian’s administration approved and began issuing passports that read 
“Republic of Taiwan.” The MOFA explained this decision as a way to protect Taiwan’s citizens 
abroad who were being confused with travelers from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
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INTRODUCING TAIPEI: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Located at the northern end of Taiwan, the capital of the Republic of 
China (ROC), Taipei (Taibei 台北),15 is nestled in a basin and surrounded by 
mountains. Part of this mountain range has been allocated as Yangmingshan 
(陽明山) National Park,16 a popular destination for local residents and tourists 
alike. Taipei proper covers an area of 271.11 square kilometers and is divided into 
12 districts. The capital represents the country’s most populous city with 2.63 
million residents (as of January 2003),17 while the Taipei-Keelung18 (台北-基隆) 
Greater Metropolitan Area has approximately 6.4 million residents (ROC 
Yearbook 2000: 24). 
Before the arrival of Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan during the Ming 
(明) Dynasty (1368-1644), Taipei was originally the home of the Kaidagelan, one 
of Taiwan’s eleven Aboriginal groups. Until the Ching (清) Dynasty (1644-1911), 
the area that now comprises greater Taipei was considered by Han Chinese 
immigrants to be wild, undeveloped, and thus, uninhabitable. Chen Lai-chang, a 
native of Chuanchou (川州), Fujian Province (China), sought permission from the 
Ching rulers to develop the area currently known as Wanhua (萬華) District, 
Taipei’s oldest section. With its convenient access to water, most notably the 
Tamsui (Danshui 淡水) River,19 and its geographical attributes as a naturally 
                                                 
15 The name “Taipei” means “north (or northern) Taiwan.” 
16 The name “Yangmingshan” can be translated as “Sun(light) Bright Mountain” or “Brilliant 
Sunlight Mountain.” 
17 This figure was reported by the Taipei City Government webpage: 
http://www.taipei.gov.tw/English/. Unless otherwise noted, the information on Taipei has been 
gathered from this website. 
18 Keelung is located at the northern tip of Taiwan and is one of the country’s busiest seaports. 
The Spanish were the first to settle in the area (May 12, 1626), naming it Santissimo Trinidad.  
19 Originally, the river was named by Spanish colonizers as Tarfarlan River (Hung 2000:23). Its 
current Chinese name, “Tamsui,” means “calm waters.” 
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protected harbor, the region soon became a major trading center for the Ching 
Dynasty in the Taipei basin area. 
During the periods when Taiwan was a Dutch colony, and later when it 
was under Ching Dynasty rule, the island’s capital was located in Tainan (台南),20 
a port city in southeastern Taiwan. After the Ching Dynasty’s defeat to the 
Japanese in the Japanese-Sino war in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan and 
became a Japanese colony for the next 50 years (1895-1945). Subsequently, the 
Japanese colonial government relocated the capital to Taipei. In so doing, Taipei 
was torn down and redesigned three times before assuming the proportions of a 
city suitable to be the capital for the Japanese colonial government (Hung 2000). 
With the KMT regime’s relocation from China to Taiwan in 1949, Taipei 
preserved its capital city status, but now represented the “temporary” seat of 
government for the Republic of China. Since then, the city has emerged as the 
country’s political, economic, educational, cultural, and transportation hub. As the 
official Taipei City Government website declares: “Taipei is a vibrant blend of 
traditional culture and cosmopolitan life. . .[and] now proudly stands as one of 
East Asia’s most important cities.”  
In the following sections, I describe two Taipei neighborhoods, Kuanghua 
Market and the area surrounding the World Trade Center construction project, 
which had yet to be completed at the time this study was completed in August 
2000. In these two areas, one finds the two TV stations and their call-in programs, 
TVBS’s 2100: All People Open Talk and SETN’s 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices, 
where I conducted fieldwork from January to August 2000. Incidentally, these 
two neighborhoods epitomize the “vibrant blend” of traditional and cosmopolitan 
Taipei as described by the official city government website. 
                                                 
20 The name “Tainan” means “south (or southern) Taiwan.” 
 49
Kuanghua Market 
A pedestrian exploring the space-deprived sidewalks of Kuanghua Market 
(Kuanghua Shangchang 光華商場) in central Taipei finds herself encountering 
the metropolis’ “old” and “new” economies side-by-side.21 Two to four-story 
business-households compete with each other for retail and living space in this 
commercial/residential neighborhood, which became renowned for its 
inexpensive computer software, hardware, accessory equipment, and repair 
services in the early 1980s.22 With the liberalization of Taiwan’s 
telecommunications market in the late 1990s, Kuanghua’s computer-dominated 
enterprises now include a growing array of telecommunication businesses. The 
popularity of “hand machines” (shou ji 手機), or mobile phones, manifests itself 
in the number of stores selling the handsets and their accessories, valued as 
fashion statements and hence status markers.23  
Equally integral to the neighborhood’s ambiance are mobile food stalls. 
Tucked away between computer and cell phone storefronts, these Taiwanese “fast 
food” (kuaican 快餐) vendors offer customers (e.g., students, businessmen, and 
shoppers) sweets such as shaved ice with red bean and condensed milk (baobing 
刨冰), pearl milk tea (zhenzhu naicha 珍珠奶茶), hot grass jelly (shaoxiancao 
燒仙草), and egg pudding with white peanuts. “Salty” (xian 鹹)24 food can also 
be purchased in the form of knife-pared noodles (daoxiaomian 刀削麵), scallion 
                                                 
21 I deliberately refer to Taipei, rather than Taiwan, as the environment described here is unique to 
the nation’s capital, which also represents Taiwan’s most industrialized and cosmopolitan city. 
22 Taipei now has at least two main computer shopping districts. The relatively older location is 
located in the Kuanghua Market District described here. A newer computer shopping mall is 
concentrated in the Acer-sponsored building located across from the main Taipei train station. 
23 These accessories include cell phone covers, removable antennas in neon and with flash lights, 
dangling beads, handset cradles shaped as plastic chairs or teddy bears, and face-plates featuring 
Coca-Cola logos and Japanese manga characters reminiscent of commercialized versions of 
interchangeable Gucci watch frames. 
24 In Chinese culture, food is generally differentiated into two categories, “sweet” (tian 甜) and 
“salty” (xian 鹹). 
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pancakes (congyoubing 蔥油餅), potstickers (guotie 鍋貼), Cantonese-style BBQ, 
and the local specialty, Taiwanese stinky tofu (chou doufu 臭豆腐). 
Occupying larger corner spaces are music/DVD stores featuring an array 
of international artists; for instance, Mariah Carey’s Rainbow CD is displayed 
alongside Taiwan pop-diva A-mei’s Regardless. While Taiwanese, Mandarin, and 
Cantonese pop music occupy a significant portion of the floor space, a substantial 
amount of room is dedicated to U.S. artists. This musical categorization is also 
evident in the prominent display of separate “Top Ten” charts for Taiwan and the 
U.S.  
Located on the floors above the street-level music, computer, and 
telecommunication businesses one finds 24-hour manga reading establishments, 
which rent books for on-premises reading at NT$1 per minute (approx. US$.03).25 
As an imported Japanese product, manga, which are books with cartoon-like 
drawings that have on average 50 volumes per storyline,26 have a strong set of 
devotees among Taiwan’s high school and college-aged students of both genders. 
Manga genres include storylines featuring hybrid martial art/sci-fi sagas, 
superhero chronicles, basketball dreams, adolescent anxiety, cartoon character-
populated worlds, and “soft”-porn (these books are locked in glass-paneled 
cabinets where the potential reader can “look but not touch”). For the manga 
reader’s comfort, the establishments provide small alcoves with or without tables 
that are outfitted with sofas, armchairs, and reading lamps that emit a soft glow, 
which combine to create a relaxed and inviting reading atmosphere. To sustain the 
                                                 
25 I use “rental stores” here to refer to the procedure of charging readers a fee for reading the 
material, just as video rentals charge borrowers a fee to rent a movie. However, manga 
establishments usually do not allow customers to take the literature out of the store. 
26 The length of each manga series depends in part to its popularity among readers. In some cases, 
discontinued storylines are “revived” following widespread demand for its continuation by fans. 
The more popular manga series have been translated for television in the form of dramas (with 
people acting out the manga characters) and animé or Japanese-style animation. 
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reader’s stamina, these stores sell hot and cold beverages with unlimited refills, 
“small eats” (xiao chi 小吃) or appetizers, and even three-course meals. 
At the heart of Kuanghua one also finds the downtown headquarters of 
cable TV conglomerate TVBS. This 16-floor monolith juts out as an anomaly 
amidst the squat “skyline” of its surroundings. While its neighboring, modest 
businesses settle for slivers of commercial property, TVBS occupies a privileged 
tract of land that includes in its landscaping a coveted Taipei commodity: open 
space. Extending from the sidewalk, where a lone guardhouse demarcates the 
separation between TVBS’s private property and Kuanghua’s public streets, a 
gleaming, white-tiled driveway stretches toward the tint-glass windowed and 
rectangular-shaped high rise. Inside the building’s foyer, two or three guards, 
whose primary job is to pose standard security questions to non-TVBS badge-
wearing persons, sit behind a chest-high, chrome counter. The gate-keeping 
process merely contributes to both the building’s and TVBS’s imposing and 
professional allure. 
Yet, TVBS’s physical and commercial presence imparts a quiet 
respectability to a district infamous for bootleg software and imitation products. 
Aside from being a major employer in an area dominated by family-owned 
businesses, TVBS contributes to the neighborhood’s economy through its 
employees’ daily consumer practices. The TV station’s white-collar, college-
educated employees mingle with middle-aged shop owners as well as university 
and high school students who prowl the stores for CDs, cell phone accessories, 
and second-hand computer equipment.  
Thus Kuanghua’s neighborhood ambiance comfortably juxtaposes old and 
new technologies, mom-and-pop businesses and chain-store conglomerates, as 
well as face-to-face transactions and private-reading hideaways. While Kuanghua 
is able to accommodate these unique contrasts, such is not the case for the area 
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where SETN is located, a twenty-minute taxicab ride away, where modernizing 
construction projects are already building the Taipei of the future. 
World Trade Center District 
At the eastern end of Jen-ai Road (Renai Lu 仁愛路), where it meets 
Keelung Road (Jilong Lu 基隆路), one finds a different configuration of 
commercial space. Here, the Taipei City Government’s aspiration to transform the 
capital into a modern, international Asian city—comparable to Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore—is evident throughout the area.27 This goal is mirrored on 
the city government’s official website which describes this section of the city as 
“the modern face of Taipei with its glass and steel skyscrapers, wide boulevards, 
and the World Trade Center.”28 
However, prior to attaining its current reputation as a shopping and 
entertainment district, the area where SETN is presently located originally housed 
thousands of mainland Chinese refugees.29 Many of the refugees were Nationalist 
party or Kuomintang (KMT; 國民黨) foot soldiers who fled to Taiwan along with 
the KMT regime in the mid to late 1940s. To those who recall Taiwan’s colonial 
and martial law periods, this section of Taipei reflects the civilian experience of 
the country’s tumultuous political past. In a site that was once overrun with 
“temporary” housing units constructed from cheap wood, corrugated-steel, and 
                                                 
27 The government’s goal evidently also extends to the virtual world. On the first page of the city 
government’s website (http://www.taipei.gov.tw/English/), it displays a picture of Taipei Mayor 
Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) with the word “Taipei” in orange, shadow-boxed letters above his head. 
To the picture’s right is a quotation by Mayor Ma that has the headline: “BUILDING A 
CYBERCITY.” The quotation itself reads: “When I campaigned for Taipei mayor three years ago, 
I promised Taipei citizens that I would build Taipei into a world-class capital if I were elected. To 
deliver that promise, I am building Taipei into a CyberCity first, because it is the best way to 
enhance Taipei’s competitiveness in the 21st century.” 
28 The quotation was posted at: http://ezgo.taipeielife.net/homepage/english/eng_introduction.htm) 
29 Interestingly, the Taipei City Government website states that until the 1970s, this area was 
comprised of what it euphemistically describes as “largely underused fields,” after which the city 
began to develop it as a “financial and commercial district” (see above footnote for website). 
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rubber-tires for dislocated waishengren (外省人),30 or Mainlander, families one 
now finds towering construction cranes, steel girders, and Southeast Asian 
immigrant workers hired to erect Taipei’s own “World Trade Center.”31  
Just across the street from this construction project stands a 25-story Hyatt 
Hotel. The tract of land on which the hotel is currently located once hosted a 
cemetery during Japan’s 50-year (1895-1945) colonial occupation of Taiwan. 
Today, oral history, in the form of local “urban legends” that even foreign visitors 
are familiar with serves as the primary means of preserving this section of 
Taipei’s, and Taiwan’s, past. Such accounts weave tales that the ghosts of 
executed Taiwan residents continue to wander the carpeted halls and faux-marble 
lobby of this international hotel chain for spiritual release and perhaps retribution. 
Neither museums nor plaques preserve these post-colonial, post-martial law tracts 
of history. While other recognized “historical” landmarks around the city are 
commemorated by a large marble slab or stone on which hand-chiseled words 
carved in the style of Chinese calligraphy memorialize the location and events 
that took place there, this former burial ground is absent of any such markings. 
Rather, since the mid-1980s, the pre-industrialized past of this ten block 
radius has been gradually erased and replaced by high-rise shopping malls. One of 
the first shopping complexes in this area was the hastily erected32 Warner Village 
(Huana weixiu 華納威秀) with its trendy boutiques,33 food court,34 and 16-screen 
                                                 
30 The Mandarin term, “waishengren” literally translates as “outside the province person” and 
generally refers to Han Chinese from Mainland China. The term’s sociopolitical ramifications will 
be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
31 At the time I conducted my fieldwork in 2000, this project was advertised on the construction 
site’s temporary wooden barriers as Taipei’s “World Trade Center.” However, the name may have 
been changed since the events of September 11, 2001.  
32 I describe the construction of Warner Village as “hastily erected” given rumors that building 
materials were compromised in the rush to quickly erect the shopping mall and cinemaplex. 
However, this information has not prevented shoppers and entertainment-seekers from patronizing 
its stores and services. 
33 Stores located in Warner Village include Nine West, BCBG, and various other European and 
U.S.-based clothing and shoe companies. 
 54
cinemaplex; the high-scale Japanese Mitsugushi (Xinguang sanyue 新光三越) 
Department Store; and the most recent addition, a “New York, New York” 
shopping arcade complete with a miniature Statue of Liberty. These multi-storey 
consumer monuments reflect the non-Taiwan orientation of the city’s new 
identity, which is prominently defined by pop culture. 
For instance, Warner Village has the influence to draw devoted fans of 
Hollywood movie stars such as Tom Cruise and Hong Kong-based “crossover”35 
star Chu Yun-fat (Zhou Runfa 周潤發). Here, as elsewhere around the world, fans 
wait hours to catch a glimpse of these transnational celebrities. Meanwhile, 
located a ten-minute walk and 30-minute drive away respectively, Taiwan’s two 
main national memorials, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Halls, 
contrast markedly with Taipei’s increasingly consumer-environment as 
epitomized by the aforementioned shopping malls. Originally constructed to 
commemorate the founder and former presidents of the Republic of China, these 
institutional monuments now host so-called “high cultural” productions including 
opera, Western classical music, and traditional Chinese music in their concert 
halls. 
Located between the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and Warner Village are 
the modest edifices of the Taipei City Government and City Council Hall. At first 
glance, these institutional buildings seem oddly placed, situated at the intersection 
of several major thoroughfares. Yet, to Taiwan’s fengshui (風水) or geomancy-
conscious architects, the government buildings are designed to bring positive 
energy or qi (氣) to the city and its administration. For instance, two Chinese lions 
                                                                                                                                     
34 Fast-food establishments in the food court include Burger King, Hägen Daas, a mini-cafe, a 
Chinese food stand, and a Japanese food stand. At the time this study was conducted, there was 
also a Planet Hollywood on the 2nd floor. 
35 The notion, “crossover,” in its broadest definition “refers to a performer or media text that gains 
a new audience;” yet, in U.S. popular use it primarily describes “non-white performers and media 
texts that become popular with white audiences” (Beltrán 2002:42). 
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guard the main building’s front entrance and face its counterpart at the other end 
of Jen-ai Road, namely, the Presidential Palace and the seat of the ROC 
Presidency. 
Thus, standing at the eastern end of one of Taipei’s largest and most 
decorated boulevards is the post-modern, minimalist-looking Taipei City 
Government. In contrast, at the western end of Jen-ai Road resides the 
Presidential Palace, a model of Japanese colonial architecture, itself modeled on 
European buildings of the late 19th century. The city government’s spread of 
cubic-like structures surrounded by modern, towering high rises lie in symbolic 
and geographic juxtaposition to the national government’s historically-laden and 
emblematic seat of power.36 
At the fringes of the World Trade Center district corporate offices styled 
with landscaped patios and pane glass walls. The office buildings appear oddly 
placed, as though “Little Taipei” in Monterrey Park, California,37 had been 
supplanted and transferred to Taipei as “Little LA.” The attempt to emulate U.S. 
corporate culture is most evident in the marble and glass office buildings. These 
distinctly contemporary structures characterize this section of Taipei as they 
increasingly dominate the landscape with their imposing height and wide 
entrances, which contrast with the crowded neighborhood outdoor markets and 
squat four-storey buildings. However, unlike Kuanghua Market where old and 
new economies and architectural styles cohabitate, the World Trade Center 
district is rapidly and distinctly replacing outdated structures with modern 20-
storey apartment complexes. 
In sum, my description of Taipei’s geographical transformation from a 
besieged city under martial law, where bodily and verbal movements were once 
                                                 
36 Currently, the DPP occupies the Presidential palace while the KMT occupies the Taipei city 
government. Another coincidental juxtaposition. 
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restricted and silenced, to its late 20th century reconfiguration as an 
internationalizing metropolis, where capitalistic enterprises and pop cultural 
products reflect the city’s zeitgeist and increasingly command the populace’s 
attention, captures in broad paint strokes a similar evolution within Taiwan’s mass 
media environment and sociopolitical landscape. My description of these two 
sections of Taipei also serves to illustrate the laminations of old and new, the 
contrast of erased history and history-in-the-making, as well as its residents’ 
struggles with negotiating lingering traces of the past with present-day, 
modernizing agendas. In many ways, Taipei’s visible evolution, as witnessed in 
its increasing skyline and merchandize-laden city sidewalks, underlies this 
dissertation’s inquiry into Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows and participants’ 
deliberations of sociopolitical crisis discourses. In fact, I regard the programs as 
an emerging, mass-mediated site where the country’s democratization processes 
are showcased, performed, and reproduced. 
In the following sections, I explore how these processes manifest 
themselves in the production and broadcast of political TV call-in shows. 
Specifically, I demonstrate how its participants—including moderators, 
production staff, guest panelists, and callers—contribute to presenting current 
events within a crisis frame and as infotainment products through orchestrated 
panelist representation, dramatic topic headlines, selectively edited video clips, 
and technologically-enhanced tools such as graphics, textual representation, and 
screen presentation.  
THE CALL-IN SHOW WORKSPACE 
As I approach the 2100 production unit located on the 3rd floor of TVBS’s 
downtown office building, I notice that the desktops are covered with phone 
                                                                                                                                     
37 Monterrey Park, Temple City, Alahambra, and its surrounding suburban cities are located in the 
suburbs of Los Angeles, CA, and have been dubbed by locals as “Little Taipei” due to its large 
Taiwan immigrant population. 
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directories, newspaper clippings, buried telephones, news magazines, fax 
coversheets, potential guest lists, and half-finished milk-tea cartons. Suspended 
from the ceiling and cradled in black frames hang two television sets. One is 
turned to TVBS’s 24-hour news channel (TVBS-N) while the second airs one of 
Taiwan’s four other 24-hour news channels. The televisions presence serves as a 
constant reminder of the business the call-in staff is in, namely, the creation of 
newsworthy products. On a nearby mobile desk, a computer, printer, and fax 
machine occupy its entire surface. The staff members must share the one 
computer and printer, or borrow one from an adjoining unit. Yang,38 the unit 
manager, however, has his own laptop reserved for his use. 
It is interesting to note that 2100’s production unit is located not with the 
TV station’s news division, but among the entertainment-oriented programs and 
the TVBS newsmagazine staff.39 In addition, the 2100 production unit’s 3rd floor 
location is conspicuously separated from 2100 moderator Lee Tao’s office, which 
is located on the 10th floor among the executive suites. Moreover, while other 
call-in show production units work 8 to 9 hours per day, 2100’s staff members 
regularly put in an arduous 14-hour workday. 
If 2100 represents the prototype that other call-in programs model 
themselves after, then SETN’s 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices offers a slightly 
different variation on the original. As the second-ranked political TV call-in 
program at the time this study was conducted (January to August 2000), 8 o’clock 
represents the only serious challenge to 2100 and the TV programming genre that 
it introduced to Taiwan. Located in Taipei’s new commercial center near the 
Taipei City Hall, 8 o’clock’s call-in show style is undoubtedly influenced by its 
                                                 
38In deference to the production staff’s privacy, I have decided to use pseudonyms. However, 
guest panelists’ and moderators’ names will remain unchanged as the call-in programs are publicly 
accessible. 
39 Although Shen (1999) notes that 2100 is “integrated as part of the whole news teamwork in 
TVBS” (187), I found this was true insofar that 2100 has access to the news division’s videotapes 
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parent company, SETN, and its local Taiwanese programming bent. As a less 
prominent political TV call-in show, 8 o’clock enjoys more programming latitude 
and less ratings pressure than 2100, a situation that is readily apparent in its more 
flexible organizational structure. 
Like 2100, the 8 o’clock production unit is placed with the other 
commercial/entertainment program units and not with the news division.40 At 
SETN, this includes programs that review Japanese fashion, monitor pop star 
lifestyles, and report on the local music scene. As the 8 o’clock staff cold calls 
prospective guests, the Japanese pop songs playing in the background provide an 
amusing contrast to the call-in show staff’s discussions of sociopolitical 
machinations and cross-straits tensions. Grouped with these pop culture-oriented 
shows, yet also framed as a news program, the 8 o’clock’s production staff 
literally and figuratively finds itself situated at the crossroads of “news” and 
“show.” 8 o’clock’s hybrid positioning and eclectic character is also epitomized 
by the show’s moderator, Yü Fu (漁夫), whom I introduce in the following 
section. 
THE MODERATORS 
2100 moderator: Lee Tao 
2100’s moderator, Lee Tao (李濤), generally initiates, delegates, and 
approves each stage of the call-in show’s production process including selecting 
the call-in topic(s), planning the guest list, editing the computer graphics, 
requesting video footage, and phrasing viewer polling questions. The “hotline”41 
in the 2100 production unit, a phone line reserved exclusively for calls between 
                                                                                                                                     
and editing rooms. However, the news division took precedence when it came to using and 
accessing these resources. 
40 The news units occupy two floors, half of the 8th floor (on the opposite side of the reception 
area) and the floor above, the 9th floor. 
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Lee Tao and the production unit, reflects this top-down organizational structure.42 
In turn, the production unit realizes Lee Tao’s vision for each episode. This is not 
to say, however, that the production staff does not contribute suggestions or 
alternative directions that are later included in the actual broadcast. 
The 10th floor, where TVBS’s executive offices are housed (including Lee 
Tao’s), differs dramatically from the 3rd floor, where 2100’s production staff is 
located. In contrast to the hustle and bustle of the programming units, the 
executive suites have a hush-hush atmosphere reminiscent of a museum or 
library.43 One reason for Lee Tao’s exclusive office address derives from his 
multiple positions as TVBS Vice President as well as senior director and 
moderator of 2100: All People Open Talk. Consequently, Lee Tao represents one 
of the most visible “faces” of TVBS in Taiwan and abroad.44 Lee Tao’s 
experience with international mass media environments serves as one of his 
greatest assets.45 It was while Lee Tao was working as a reporter in the U.S. that 
he found inspiration from CNN’s talk show Larry King Live, which eventually led 
him to produce Taiwan’s first cable TV call-in show in the form of 2100: All 
People Open Talk. Prior to 2100’s incarnation, however, Lee Tao already had 
experience hosting a radio call-in program. With 2100 being Lee Tao’s trademark 
                                                                                                                                     
41 The direct line between the 2100 production unit and Lee Tao is concretely represented by a red 
phone that sits on the production unit manager’s (Yang) desk. 
42 My observations differ from Shen’s (1999) impressions that 2100 makes a “conscious effort to 
avoid imposing too much of the host’s [Lee Tao] personality on the [program] discussion” (189). 
As I analyze in subsequent data chapters, Lee Tao’s unique prosodic stylization infuses his topic 
introductions and discussion commentary as well as influences guest panelist deliberations. 
43 During my seven months of fieldwork at 2100, Lee Tao’s personal office was not accessible to 
me, although we did have a one-on-one interview in a waiting room near his office.  I once asked 
2100’s production manager if I may accompany him in his pre-broadcast meetings with Lee Tao, 
which is held in Lee Tao’s office. However, he informed me that this wouldn’t be appropriate as 
the discussions were private. 
44 His high recognition factor and executive position keeps him traveling overseas, such as to the 
PRC, to seek collaborative projects, attract investors, increase distribution, enlarge TVBS’s 
market, as well as research and monitor new programming trends. 
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contribution to the local cable media landscape, he is widely regarded as the 
“founder” of the political TV call-in show genre in Taiwan. 
As previously mentioned, Taiwan’s political TV call-in programs differ 
most from their U.S. counterparts in striving to present a non-ideological, non-
partisan image. 2100’s success is based on its so-called “objectivity” and 
“neutrality.” Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) claim that in Taiwan, “the media 
that gains the trust of audiences, and thus captures the largest share of the market, 
are those that perform as ‘objective’ and ‘professional’ journalists rather than 
tools of any one political party” (60). Lee Tao credits 2100’s rapid and sustained 
success to its ability to earn acceptability and credibility in the eyes of the public 
(Lee Tao 2000). To him, the moderator plays a key role in this effort, including 
projecting a “neutral” (zhongli 中立) image that avoids openly demonstrating 
political leanings towards a candidate, political party, or Taiwan’s sovereignty 
issue.46 As Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗), moderator of Always Speak Your Mind (You Hua 
Laoshi Jiang 有話老實講), explains: “if [a call-in program] already [has] a 
preconceived standpoint, the people that you attract are the small masses 
(xiaozhongi 小眾) ... So I feel that Lee Tao, the reason why he is successful, is 
understandable; that is, he definitely does not attract a [niche] market” (Jin Xiuli 
2000). 
8 o’clock moderator: Yü Fu 
In contrast to 2100’s spatial arrangement, 8 o’clock moderator Yü Fu’s 
office is situated within six paces from the call-in show production unit. He caters 
to a tacit “open door policy” with staff members entering his office at their 
                                                                                                                                     
45 In the early 1980s, Lee Tao was stationed in the United States as a reporter in its Washington 
D.C. bureau while working for China TV (CTV), a government (KMT)-owned and operated 
television station. 
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convenience to use the computer, desk, phone, or balcony. Given that Yü Fu does 
not arrive at SETN until after 6 p.m., open access to his office has practical 
implications and carries over to the staff’s casual attitude toward and close 
relationship with the moderator. Although the staff addresses Yü Fu by his 
official title of “director general” (zhongjian 總監), a title that most closely 
resembles “senior vice president” within an American business context, they use 
the address term in a way that emphasizes camaraderie rather than status or 
hierarchy. 
In contrast to my non-accessibility to Lee Tao’s office, I was shown to Yü 
Fu’s personal office from my first interview with him and had continued access 
while conducting fieldwork. Yü Fu’s office was spacious and simply decorated. 
Several framed works of Chinese calligraphy hung on the walls, with each 
artwork dedicated to Yü Fu in the artist’s own hand.47 A small television set sat 
recessed in a cubby hole opposite from the desk and to the right of the doorway. 
To the right of the television set, a sliding glass door led to an enclosed balcony 
which overlooked a modern shopping district that included Warner Village and a 
Mitsugushi department store. Two office chairs faced the desk, which were 
usually occupied by the staff during pre-broadcast meetings. The desk itself was 
L-shaped, with a scanner and computer occupying the shorter leg, while the 
evening’s papers, crisply folded and untouched, sat in the center of the longer 
portion of desk. 
A man of many hats, Yü Fu moderates 8 o’clock as his “nightshift” in a 
varied workday and eclectic career. For instance, Yü Fu’s “day jobs” as a radio 
talk show host, political cartoonist, restaurateur, and computer animation 
                                                                                                                                     
46 Several viewers and guests, however, have expressed to me that Lee Tao appears biased in his 
moderating, but towards which political parties/candidates or guests varies depending on whom 
one asks (personal interviews). 
47 In the Chinese culture, having a piece of artwork addressed to you in Chinese calligraphy by the 
artist is a sign of respect. People display these items (usually a scroll or a painting) in a prominent 
place in their home or office.  
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entrepreneur48 prevent him from investing more time at SETN or into 8 o’clock 
than his 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. commitment. Although he holds the title of board 
member at SETN, the designation is mainly honorary as Yü Fu is minimally 
involved in 8 o’clock and the TV station, including business strategizing or 
programming processes. Given his outside responsibilities, Yü Fu’s involvement 
with 8 o’clock is thus limited to his role as program moderator. 
Upon arriving at SETN, Yü Fu begins his “day” at 8 o’clock with a 
lunchbox meal (or some other form of Taiwan-style fast food) that has been 
placed on his desk prior to his arrival. SETN’s news channel plays on the TV set 
in his office as Yü Fu eats his meal. The evening’s papers are neatly stacked on 
his desk corner for his review, should he choose to do so.49 Soon after, Mia50 and 
several 8 o’clock staff members enter Yü Fu’s office to update him on the 
program’s topic. Seated in one of the two chairs facing Yü Fu’s desk, the staff 
member who booked the evening’s guests provides Yü Fu a summary of each 
panelist’s perspective toward that evening’s topic. Next, the group spends a few 
minutes brainstorming titles for that night’s broadcast.51 The task inspires joking 
(including off-colored ones) and satirical political commentary, generally led by 
Yü Fu himself. Throughout these tasks, Yü Fu is usually sketching a political 
cartoon for the next day’s papers. As soon as Yü Fu finishes a drawing, he calls 
his assistant over who takes the sketch and dries the ink with a hairdryer. 
                                                 
48 At the time of my first interview/meeting with Yü Fu (April 2000), the computer animation 
company was a month away from being launched. I later visited this site where I also observed Yu 
Fu’s weekday radio program. 
49 Unlike at 2100 where the staff clips and organizes articles for Lee Tao for his reading and 
preparation for that night’s broadcast, Yü Fu does not request this service nor go to such lengths to 
prepare for the evening’s program topic. 
50 Pseudonym. 
51 Inevitably, the program’s headliner is coined by Mia after 10 to 15 minutes of half-hearted 
contributions by Yü Fu and the staff. 
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Figure 2: 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices moderator Yü Fu in his trademark 
pastel-colored shirt and tie. 
After the meeting, and shortly before 7:30 p.m., Yü Fu changes into a 
brightly colored shirt and an ornate tie that the SETN wardrobe department has 
provided and delivered by 4 p.m. While Lee Tao’s trademark sartorial style is his 
patterned suspenders, Yü Fu’s wardrobe includes artistic ties and rainbow-colored 
shirts. On another call-in show, the moderator (male) is consistently outfitted in 
colorful vests. Interestingly, female call-in show moderators do not have a 
“clothing trademark,” and therefore, have more latitude in their apparel. By 7:30, 
Yü Fu walks up two flights of stairs to the makeup room/greenroom where he 
makes his final preparations for the broadcast. It is here that Yü Fu’s contributions 
to the call-in show truly begin. Hence, in contrast to 2100 where moderator Lee 
Tao runs and embodies the call-in show, at 8 o’clock, it is the production unit that 
plans and produces the program’s format and thematic direction. 
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THE PRODUCTION UNITS 
A day in the life of 2100 
At the time I began my fieldwork at 2100, the five staff members included 
four men and one woman, while their ages ranged from early twenties to early 
thirties. All of the staff had at least a college degree, while one member attended 
college in the U.S.52 A few, but not all, of the staff had some experience related to 
the production and thematic content of 2100 such as communication studies, 
broadcasting, or political science.53 
With 14-hour workdays five days a week, the six 2100 staff members 
arrive at their desks between 8 and 9 a.m. and leave the TV station half an hour 
after the program’s conclusion at 10 p.m. The first to arrive each morning is 
Yang, the production unit manager. The morning begins with a phone call from 
2100 moderator, Lee Tao, which Yang answers. This first call of the day 
establishes the general direction for that evening’s program. However, within the 
space of 30 minutes, Lee Tao might call another two to three times to elaborate 
upon his initial ideas. 
The conclusion of Yang’s phone conversation with Lee Tao cues the other 
staff members to cease their individual activities and jot down on whatever is 
accessible (e.g., scratch paper or discarded fax coversheets) Yang’s summation of 
Lee Tao’s instructions. Included in these instructions is the program topic or 
topics, which are usually inspired from the previous night’s news or, if it is a slow 
news day, an issue that Lee Tao incites emotional reactions from program viewers 
such as ROC-PRC cross-straits tensions or the ambivalence and controversy 
surrounding Taiwan’s national identities.54 
                                                 
52 The sole female staff member did her undergraduate studies in the U.S. At least one staff 
member expressed interest in persuring a graduate degree. 
53 For instance, one staff member had earned an undergraduate degree in English. 
54 More discussion on these two issues is provided in Chapter Three. 
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Once the preliminary guest panelists have been invited, Yang writes a 
brief summary of the evening’s topic, which the staff faxes over to the potential 
panelists’ offices. Meanwhile, the other staff members read through a stack of 
daily newspapers from which they clip promising articles, with “promising” 
meaning those that discuss sociopolitical issues that may be useful for future 
programs.55 Articles related to that evening’s topic are later collated in a folder 
and delivered to Lee Tao by 5 p.m. for his review before the 8 p.m. broadcast. 
By mid-afternoon, the production unit has further solidified the topic and 
program direction. At this time, the staff recontacts the initially invited guest 
panelists as well as any other panelists they may have added in the interim. These 
follow-up conversations are part of the final screening process that reconfirms 
each panelist’s ideological stance towards the evening’s topic(s). At this point, 
those individuals who are not compatible with the program’s political 
representation are eliminated. A more detailed description of the panelist selection 
process is provided in a later section. 
A day in the life of 8 o’clock  
In comparison to 2100’s predominantly male production staff, 8 o’clock 
had an equal distribution of two women and two men in its production unit at the 
time I began my observations in late April 2000. By the end of my fieldwork in 
early August, however, this gender ratio (female:male) had changed to four to 
one.  Although 8 o’clock’s production unit’s membership continuously changed 
during the course of my fieldwork, Mia represented the one constant in the group. 
The age range of 8 o’clock’s staff, from the early to late twenties, proved to be 
slightly younger than 2100’s. As with 2100, the production staff included college 
graduates who did not necessarily have political experience or even interest in 
                                                 
55 The selected articles are placed in a large rectangular butter cookie tin, which serves as a “half-
way house” before being filed away in the 2100 archives (a set of file cabinets and some folders). 
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politics,56 but who had experience with or majored in media broadcasting. In fact, 
recent hires admitted that SETN did not immediately inform them which unit they 
would be assigned to work on. Several even confided that they had never watched 
8 o’clock prior to working for the unit, and in some cases, had barely even heard 
of it. 
Three hours after the 2100 staff have started their work day, the staff of 8 
o’clock Loud and Soft Voices arrive at SETN in the flexible starting time between 
late morning and early afternoon. Mia is usually the first to arrive, the production 
unit manager and 3-year veteran of 8 o’clock at the time fieldwork was conducted. 
The remaining staff members arrive shortly thereafter, with all being present by 1 
p.m. 
8 o’clock production staff roles are clearly defined to minimize task 
overlap. Staff members are assigned one of the following responsibilities: calling 
and booking guest panelists; writing the introductory segment as well as selecting 
and cutting video segments; writing the “supplement” sections, which are 
segments of quoted statements related to that night’s topic and featured before 
commercial breaks; and clipping articles from that day’s papers. Mia generally 
decides the evening’s topic, with some input from the other staff members. 
Consequently, 8 o’clock’s moderator, Yü Fu, does not provide, nor is he solicited 
for, input on the show’s topic. On rare occasions, however, SETN’s executive 
management may intervene and insist that the call-in show address a given 
issue.57 
In contrast to 2100’s 14-hour workday, 8 o’clock’s relatively short nine-
hour work schedule (approximately from noon to 9 p.m.) requires it pursue tasks 
that many of the other TV call-in shows’ production units have already 
                                                 
56 For instance, Mia earned her undergraduate education in French, which included studying 
abroad for a year in Poitiers, France (a personal coincidence as I had done the same, including a 
six-week stage in Poitiers, my junior yeaer abroad). 
57 I recall this occurring only once during my observations. 
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accomplished by noon. For instance, by the time 8 o’clock’s staff arrives at work, 
2100 has already contacted a preliminary list of invitees and earmarked them as 
possible guests. Meanwhile, 8 o’clock spends a majority of the afternoon 
soliciting and booking guests for that evening’s program, namely, those who 2100 
or any of the other six call-in shows did not invite.58 Also, while 2100 enlists two 
to three of its production members in this task, 8 o’clock assigns one individual in 
this endeavor, a job that is rotated among the staff members on a weekly basis. 
THE GUEST PANELISTS 
In brainstorming for potential guest speakers, the 2100 staff typically 
creates a preliminary list of invitees who are divided by political affiliation (e.g., 
KMT, DPP, New Party, and “other”).59 These guests include politicians, media 
personalities such as editors or journalists, as well as a few political pundits and 
scholars. Interestingly, these same guests usually decline invitations from other 
TV call-in shows as they do not wish to be “blacklisted” from 2100, as 2100 is 
known to be quite territorial with their guest list.  
However, some guests flout this tacit contract with 2100 and accept 
appearances on other shows. In doing so, these guests have known to be 
“penalized” by 2100 in the sense of not being invited back to the show for a 
certain period after their transgression. Certain names frequently reappear on this 
list regardless of the program’s potential topic. I regard these panelist regulars as 
“friends of Lee Tao.” Yang (1997) offers a different description by referring to 
these “old faces” as “a group of safety air bags.” From a quantitative approach, 
                                                 
58 Some guests are booked from several days to a week in advanced regardless of what the topic 
may be. This again demonstrates 8 o’clock’s tendency to invite guests who do not necessarily 
exhibit expertise on a particular topic or issue per se but rather have a general knowledge of 
politics. 
59 These four categories applied during the primary period in which my fieldwork was conducted 
(again, from January to August 2000). Since July 2000, however, two new parties have been 
formed including the People’s First Party (PFP) in mid-July 2000, and the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU) in August 2001. 
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Shen (1999) provides a more detailed analysis of the lack of panelist diversity on 
2100 (220-225). Although these individuals may not be well versed in every topic 
that 2100 features, they are nevertheless considered as having a solid grasp of 
sociopolitical issues in general. More importantly, these regulars demonstrate 
linguistic dexterity and exhibit a “TV presence” that resonates with viewers, 
fellow guests, and most importantly, Lee Tao himself. 
In contrast, “non-regular” panelists are invited for both their expertise and 
ideological stance towards a given topic. It is telling that these two criteria are 
often blurred, particularly when the call-in show’s dual goals are to entertain and 
inform. While one way to achieve these objectives is to select a controversial 
topic, the other is to convene as contentious a guest panel as possible. This 
includes pre-selecting individuals who are willing to articulate and represent 
dissenting perspectives and unpopular opinions. 
Preliminary phone interviews with potential panelists allow the production 
unit to assess if they meet their guest panel profile as well as to gauge their stance 
towards the evening’s topic.60 Between inviting a well-informed versus TV savvy 
guest, production units typically select the latter as they are regarded as being 
more televisually compelling than the former. As Shih Hsin University 
(世新大學) communications professor James C. Hsiung (Hsiung Jie 熊杰) 
explained, “[If] you’re not dynamic enough, [or] you don’t have enough” an 
individual won’t be considered, much less invited as a guest panelist (Hsiung Jie 
2000; original emphasis).61 Consequently, speakers who articulate their ideas 
clearly, concisely, and in an entertaining fashion are coveted and regarded as “A-
list” guest panelists. This practice is also common in interviews as news programs 
                                                 
60 Contacting potential guests (typically through a politician’s assistant or secretary) occupies the 
entire morning period—roughly from 8:30 a.m. to 1 p.m.—given the difficulty in locating the 
individual and then waiting for their return call. 
61 It is interesting that Prof. Hsiung evokes “enough” to encapsulate all the intangible qualities that 
an individual needs to be invited at a call-in show panelist. 
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are “obliged” to seek subjects who can make events seem interesting (Berman 
1992). The challenge, then, is to find guests who are knowledgeable about a topic 
as well as physically and linguistically attractive to audiences. 
As the leading political TV call-in show, 2100 is in the enviable position 
to be selective in their invitations, insofar as to even disinvite guests. If an 
individual known for her conservative views reveals herself to be more moderate 
than expected, the person may later be replaced in favor of someone else who 
meets the “role” (e.g., ideological position) the program seeks. Another reason 
might derive from changes in the program’s direction or featured topic(s). This 
often arises from sudden shifts in the daily news cycle, loss of interest in the 
initial topic, or difficulties in finding guests who can, or are willing, to take 
different sides to the selected issue. The last reason is particularly important for a 
call-in show, for if several guests advocate the same viewpoint, it undermines the 
“crisis” discourses upon which the call-in show thrives and produces.62 Should the 
topic still be deemed worthy for broadcast, the production unit will then continue 
to find qualified panelists. This usually requires broadening the list of invitees 
from the political realm to mass media and academic spheres, and upon occasion, 
to non-profit organizations and independent scholars/writers. 
The decision-making process for the final group of panelists can be as 
informed as it is arbitrary; that is, the most knowledgeable individuals may not 
prevail, while more “recognizable” or “well-known” personalities do. That is not 
to say that the popular personalities are not well-versed in the topic for discussion. 
The comparison only serves to emphasize that an individual’s knowledge of the 
topic alone is not enough for one to be selected for a call-in show appearance. 
Other times, the opposite occurs where a less familiar figure is invited in an 
attempt to introduce a fresh face and voice into a repeatedly featured yet still 
popular and controversial issue. Lastly, potential guests may themselves suddenly 
                                                 
62 I elaborate upon what I mean by “crisis discourses” in Chapter Three. 
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decide to bow out from a program due to unforeseen events or an invitation from 
another program, though this scenario is less likely to happen to 2100 than to 
other call-in programs.  
Given that 2100 is the top-ranked TV call-in program in Taiwan, most 
invited speakers prefer to appear on 2100 over other programs given its higher 
ratings, and hence, greater audience exposure. 2100 also has an unstated policy 
that they do like to have guests appear on more than one program per evening, 
whereas other political TV call-in programs do not. Finally, once the guest panel 
has been confirmed, the production staff provides Lee Tao with a summary of 
each panelist’s perspective to help him prepare for the program. 
In contrast, guest panelists for 8 o’clock are generally decided by Mia and 
one other staff member. Given that 8 o’clock’s staff does not report to work until 
early afternoon, they often find that their guest selection is limited to whomever 
the other call-in shows do not invite. Moreover, as a result of moderator Yü Fu’s 
blunt moderating style, 8 o’clock has a reputation for inciting animated 
discussions, which dissuades potential panelists who dislike this approach.63 Yet, 
despite these qualities, 8 o’clock remains Taiwan’s second-ranked political TV 
call-in program, a status that lends it considerable political weight as well as 
commercial success. 
THE STUDIO SETTING 
The 2100 studio 
A row of blue, textured office chairs spaced a body width and a half apart 
are lined up behind a curvilinear table. Pads of paper and pens have been placed 
neatly before each seat, while a flat-screen monitor occupies the far right end of 
the table. A recessed TV monitor behind the moderator’s seat intermittently 
flashes different images, graphics, and words. A grey and bright blue backdrop 
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with a network of Swiss-cheese holes serve as the set’s backdrop. Such are the 
details of 2100’s call-in show studio that viewers see on their television screens. 
Beyond the viewers’ gaze, however, one can find three large cameras on 
mobile tripods, more computers and closed-circuit television sets, floodlights, 
extra chairs, pitchers filled with hot water, butcher paper, and overhead speakers. 
In addition, a largely silent yet cognizant production staff stands in the wings as 
they closely monitor the entire broadcast. Their roles range from refilling the 
guests’ and host’s glasses with hot water,64 resetting the 20-second timer for each 
caller, signaling when a commercial break is due, or notifying the host when a 
video segment is ready. Although 2100 has its own studio, its operation spills 
beyond the formal studio’s steel vault door and spills into a cramped space which 
I call the “half studio.”65 It is here that 2100’s eleven call-in operators, seated in 
two rows of five to six people each, receive callers and log their personal 
information (e.g., name, gender, and calling location).  
The 2100 production staff usually arrives in the studio half an hour to 45 
minutes before its 9 p.m. broadcast, the time when the majority of its competitors 
are airing their programs during the time slot of 8 to 9 p.m. One staff member 
records the other call-in shows’ topics and guest panelists as a means to keep 
track of the competition. This information is later stored in a binder for future 
reference. Another staff member accompanies the broadcast manager—who is in 
continuous communication with the moderator through a headset and microphone 
and cues him throughout the broadcast—in the control room where the program is 
composed through added text, graphics, split-screens, and other technological 
                                                                                                                                     
63 Excerpts of Yü Fu’s moderating style is provided later in the dissertation. 
64 It is common for people in Taiwan, as well as other Chinese societies, to prefer to drink hot 
rather than cold water. 
65 The call-in show operators’ quarters are so tightly confined that the outward swinging studio 
doors to its left and right only open to one-third of their full axis. Given that the width of the door 
opening is barely one medium-sized body wide, entering and exiting the 2100 studio requires one 
to shuffle sideways into the room (for even petite, Taiwanese women). 
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wizardry. The remaining four staff members spread themselves throughout the 
studio. Once Lee Tao takes his place behind the call-in show desk, however, all 
eyes remain on him. 
Guest panelists begin arriving approximately 30 minutes prior to airtime. 
They are first directed to the make-up studio, which is located on the 16th floor. 
After their make-up has been applied (for all guests regardless of gender), the 
guests make their way to the 2100 studio one floor below. As they enter, Lee Tao 
interrupts his activities in mid-gesture or mid-sentence to heartily greet guests by 
enthusiastically shaking their hand and patting them on the shoulder. The 
consummate host, Lee facilitates guests introductions, asks questions, engages in 
small talk in order to put the panelists at ease. 
Once a majority of the guests have arrived and are seated, Lee Tao 
positions himself in the center of the room and on top of the 2100 logo that lies on 
the floor in front of the guest panelists. He then launches into a five minute “pre-
broadcast” talk that outlines the show’s topic(s), its ramifications, and the 
questions/possibilities it raises. Lee Tao’s enthusiasm is evident through his 
animated gestures, and most distinctly, in his voice inflection. During Lee Tao’s 
talk, guest panelists might venture a joke or two, foreshadowing the animated and 
quick-witted discussion to come. 
The 8 o’clock studio 
Located just outside of the 8 o’clock studio, the makeup/greenroom is 
sparsely outfitted with a set of two barber shop-styled chairs facing a wall of 
brightly lit mirrors. An armchair and small couch are arranged in an alcove near 
the door, while a small storage room filled with costumes occupies a back corner 
of the room. The small space creates an intimate setting that lets the guest 
panelists and moderator to mingle and make small talk prior to the broadcast. 
Panelists arrive anywhere between 30 minutes to a few minutes prior to the 8 p.m. 
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air time.66 Once guest panelists begin to file in, Yü Fu assumes his role as host, 
filling in the awkward down time between make-up and the program broadcast. 
Yü Fu’s hosting style include plying his captive audience with anecdotes of his 
travels, accounts of his two daughters, personal observations of recent 
sociopolitical events, and the occasional politically incorrect joke. 67 
 
Figure 3: The 8 o’clock studio set with moderator, Yü Fu (far right), and five 
guest panelists deliberating the featured topic: “Former ROC president Lee (Teng-
hui), ROC president (Chen Shui-) Bian, ROC vice president Lu (Hsiu-lian): Who 
is most for Taiwan independence?” 
Once the previous program (a Japanese pop culture show) exits the shared 
studio, Yü Fu and the panelists make their way onto the 8 o’clock set. The studio 
space itself is divided into three different sets. The call-in show set is located 
directly across from that of the Japanese pop culture program. The difference 
between the two sets presents a study of contrasts. The 8 o’clock sound stage, 
coordinated in steel grey, blue, and yellow, includes a semi-circular row of chairs 
that surround a prominent 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices logo, the size and shape 
                                                 
66 An 8 o’clock staff member greets the guests in the 1st floor lobby and personally escorts them to 
the elevators, as the elevators are only accessible to building pass holders after 7:30 p.m. Some 
panelists even arrive after the broadcast has begun.  
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of a large dial. In contrast, the Japanese program features a jarring kaleidoscope 
of colors from neon pink and fluorescent green to sherbet orange and lemon 
zinger. 
The seating arrangement for the guest panelists is similar to that of 2100, 
with the moderator positioned at the right end of a long table while the guest 
panelists sit to left. A row of three TV sets, suspended from the ceiling behind the 
panelists, flash an undulating SETN logo throughout the broadcast. Directly 
opposite the call-in set stands a life-sized Hello Kitty with a clock for a stomach 
that stars impassively at the participants. Various other IKEA-inspired68 items fill 
out the pop cultural program’s set, including a backdrop of bookcases lined with 
pop cultural kitsch such as stuffed animals, CD cases, and magazines. During the 
broadcast, I perch my laptop on a pink cube-shaped coffee table and I sit on the 
edge of an overstuffed lime-green armchair as I type my notes. 
A three-person crew operates the cameras while a set manager cues the 
moderator for commercial breaks and callers. One 8 o’clock production staff 
member stands opposite to the moderator near a dry erase board to write each 
caller’s name, gender, and location for Yü Fu’s reference. Although Mia is 
present on the set during the broadcast, her role is more of a bystander. For 
instance, she shuttles between the set, control room, and call-in operator room 
more to monitor than direct the proceedings. Occasionally, however, she will 
consult with Yü Fu during commercial breaks to remind him to stay on topic or 
follow up a previous line of questioning. 
                                                                                                                                     
67 Yü Fu is also an avid world traveler and photographer. He once gave me copies of a calendar 
that was filled with photographs that he had personally taken. 
68 IKEA had opened at least three stores in Taipei by 1999-2000. Its distinct furniture and interior 
decorating style quickly influenced Taiwan’s culture, including its television programs. I recall 
seeing a program featuring a couple in their mid-to late 20’s that took place entirely in their 
bedroom, which was decorated entirely by IKEA products. 
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THE BROADCAST 
2100 program format 
The 2100 broadcast begins with a 30-second video montage of previous 
2100 episodes, accompanied by digitized music punctuated with fast-paced drum 
beats. Following this segment, the camera swings over to Lee Tao as he poses in 
his signature hunched, elbow-leaning posture. Lee Tao begins the program with 
an opening monologue, similar to the one in the chapter’s epigraph, which 
welcomes viewers and introduces the evening’s topic. Lee Tao then introduces 
each panelist by their occupational title(s)—such as “Legislator,” “professor,” 
“editor-in-chief,” “director,” or “former VP candidate”—and affiliation (e.g. 
political party, organization, company). As a group, Lee Tao refers to the 
panelists as “honored guests” (guibin 貴賓), a generic term of respect that can be 
used in a variety of social contexts. To the viewer, guest panelists are identified in 
the lower right hand corner of the screen by their social position (first line); if 
applicable, by political affiliation (second line, in parentheses); and by name 
(third line, separated by a red bar). As for the television audience, Lee refers to 
them with an equal mixture of politeness and intimacy, addressing them as “(our) 
viewer friends” (guanzhong pengyoumen 觀眾朋友們). 
Following these formalities, each panelist is invited to briefly present their 
perspective towards the featured topic, speaking between two to four minutes 
each. The order in which panelists are invited to speak is arbitrary, usually 
decided upon by Lee Tao minutes before the broadcast.69 These opening 
summaries assist the viewer in situating each panelist’s ideological stance 
regarding the featured topic. 
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Figure 4: The studio setting at 2100: All People Open Talk. Present are seven legislators 
deliberating the featured topic, “Big reconciliation: what is our (national) identity?” 
2100 follows a five segment, four commercial break broadcast format. The 
first commercial break typically arrives 12 to 15 minutes into the program, during 
which time each panelist has addressed the topic at least once. Although the 
production staff outlines to the second the length of each segment and commercial 
break, Lee Tao regularly diverges from this master plan. Lee Tao often makes 
impromptu, executive decisions on when to cut to a commercial break, how long 
a segment will run, and how many callers to receive per episode. From my 
observations, these decisions are based on his “feel” for the program’s rhythm. 
For instance, if a heated deliberation is underway, Lee Tao may either allow it to 
continue to maintain the program momentum, or inversely, interrupt the 
discussion for a commercial break to create suspense and pique viewer interest. 
Unlike 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices, where speaker interruptions and 
overlapping is common if not expected (I expand upon this later), Lee Tao 
                                                                                                                                     
69 Should Lee Tao invite the panelist immediately to his right to speak first, the remaining 
panelists speak in adjacent seat order sequence. The same applies if the guest furthest from Lee 
Tao is invited to introduce her perspective first.  
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maintains a tight hold on the program’s progression including speaker turns, the 
introduction of video clips, and commercial breaks. Another reason why overlaps 
seldom occur derives from Lee Tao’s tendency to paraphrase or reinterpret a 
speaker’s remarks, thus preventing a guest panelist from securing the next speaker 
turn. Generally, clearly defined panelist turn taking is the rule, while interruptions 
and floor-wrestling are the exception on 2100. Should callers personally denigrate 
another speaker—be it a panelist, moderator, or caller—Lee Tao politely reminds 
them to critique the issue and not the person. In turn, Lee Tao performs the 
language and behavior he exhorts his guests and callers to adopt, namely, one of 
tolerance and open-mindedness on the one hand, and the sharing of personal 
experiences and perspectives on the other. 
Depending on the remaining time, each guest is given 15 to 30 seconds to 
summarize their arguments at the end of each episode. Lee Tao’s closing 
monologue reminds viewers of the topic’s relevance to current sociopolitical 
events, while thanking viewers for their participation and reminding them to 
return the following night for another episode of 2100. Due to the program’s free-
flowing script, 2100 often exceeds its allotted one hour broadcast time by running 
five to ten minutes longer. In other words, Lee Tao’s moderating style both 
influences 2100’s variable broadcast length as well as characterizes the program’s 
inspired format. 
Callers on 2100 are addressed in an even more perfunctory manner given 
the program’s unmatched inclusion of 20-30 callers per episode. By including so 
many callers, however, requires placing a 20-second cap to each caller’s speaking 
time. A sequentially ascending digital clock shown on the lower right hand side of 
the TV screen reminds both callers and the moderator of this time limit. Should a 
caller surpass the 20-second mark, Lee Tao may allow a grace period of five 
seconds for the caller to wrap up, though he usually interrupts the caller by 
thanking her and introducing the next caller. This speaking limit was initiated 
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even before the arrival of call-in teams (kouying budui 叩應部隊), which 
appeared in full force during the last three months of Taiwan’s 2000 presidential 
election. Call-in teams are comprised of volunteers who are usually supporters of 
a particular political party or candidate. The teams emerge on the call-in show 
scene during an election period, and more so for national than local elections. 
More discussion of callers and call-in teams is provided later in this chapter. 
However, guest panelists and callers do find ways to subvert and 
outmaneuver such speaking constraints. Panelists might capitalize on the brief 
silence between a previous guest’s comments and Lee’s summarizing soliloquies 
or simply interrupt another speaker. Callers have less latitude to break the timed 
speaking harness imposed upon them by both the digital clock and Lee’s 
preemptory “thank you’s,” which pragmatically signal that the caller’s 20-seconds 
of abbreviated Warholian70 fame has been breeched. Yet, rambling callers 
frequently escape with a few seconds of unallotted speaking time. 
While some scholars note that new mass media programming such as call-
in shows have provided the people of Taiwan with greater opportunities to 
participate in the political process, they simultaneously criticize these shows for 
restricting public opinion to “the last five minutes of the program,” deriding such 
moments as hardly representative of “political participation” (Rawnsley and 
Rawnsley 2001:67). Although this study focuses on the linguistic tactics call-in 
show participants use to frame program topics as crises, and less on their 
participatory nature (cf. Shen 1999), the ethnographic observations I proffer in 
this study suggest that viewers creatively maximize their allotted 20 seconds in 
ways that strategically articulate their political perspectives and personal 
experiences. 
                                                 
70 In using “Warholian,” I refer to U.S. artist Andy Warhol’s infamous line that every person on 
earth will enjoy at least 15 minutes of fame. In this case, I suggest that Taiwan’s call-in shows 
provide callers at least 20 seconds of broadcast fame. Given Warhol’s close association with 
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8 o’clock program format 
In comparison to 2100’s more flexible broadcast format, 8 o’clock’s 
telecast is predictably divided into five segments and four commercial breaks with 
little variation episode to episode.71 The first segment includes a topic and guest 
panel introduction by the moderator, which is followed by a one-minute video 
montage and voice-over that situates the featured topic within current events, 
opening comments by each panelists, and a brief panel discussion. 8 o’clock also 
adds a 30-second “Supplement” segment prior to each commercial break that 
presents quotes or a chronology of events related to the topic, which I elaborate 
upon later in the chapter. 
During the second and third segments, which run between eight to ten 
minutes, the moderator receives three caller comments in each segment, which he 
intersperses between panelist deliberations. In the fourth segment, which lasts 
between seven to eight minutes, the moderator gradually wraps up the panel 
discussion. The fifth segment constitutes a three to five minute free-for-all 
conclusion that includes little moderator direction as the panelists speak over each 
other in a bid for having the last word. When 8 o’clock’s theme music begins to 
play over the studio speakers, the moderator is cued to quickly summarize the 
episode’s deliberation, thank the viewers, and remind them to return for the next 
broadcast. 
THE CALLERS 
2100 call-in phone bank 
By far, 2100 has the most sophisticated caller selection process among all 
the call-in programs, which incidentally, reflects the program’s high caller traffic. 
As previously mentioned, 2100’s call-in phone bank or operator room resides in 
                                                                                                                                     
popular culture, I reappropriate his utterance within the infotainment programming genre of 
Taiwan’s call-in shows. 
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the “half studio” space outside the program’s main studio. Thirty red telephones 
are neatly arranged on two staggered rows, behind which five to six operators are 
seated per row. Each operator is assigned to three phones. A blue cardboard tag 
with a number that increases in succession from right to left, front row to back 
row, is attached to the back of each phone. Thus, the operator in the front row far 
right, answers phones 11, 12, and 13, while the operator to her right monitors 
phones 21, 22, and 23, and so on. Similarly, the operator in the second row, far 
right answers phones 61, 62, and 63, while the person her right uses phones 71, 
72, and 73, etc. 
 
Figure 5: The 2100 call-in phone bank, as shown on the screen to the right of the 
moderator, Lee Tao. The call-in “hot line” number for 2100 is shown at the 
bottom of the screen and below the topic headline: “(ROC President) A-bian 
wants Tang Fei: is this a ‘mission impossible’?” 
The head operator sits in the center of the first row and manages the 
switchboard that links each phone and caller with both the call-in show studio’s 
speaker system and the control room during the program. Directly in front of the 
switchboard hangs a long Plexiglas holder that can carry up to six large drawing 
pads. When fielding a caller, the operator asks for the caller’s surname, gender, 
                                                                                                                                     
71 For an outline of the program, see the 8 o’clock “rundown” sheet in Appendix C. 
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and calling location, which she records with a felt-tip marker on a large drawing 
board. For instance, the operator would identify a caller’s gender by writing either 
an “L” (for “lady”) for a female or an “S” (for “sir”) for a male in a lower right 
hand box.72 In the upper right hand box, the operator records the caller’s calling 
location such as Taipei county (Taibeixian 台北縣). Lastly, the caller’s surname 
(e.g., “Chen” (陳)) is written in the center and represents the most prominent 
notation on the drawing pad. Meanwhile, the operator asks the caller to wait on 
the line until Lee Tao cues the operator to connect the caller’s phone line with the 
studio and control room. 
Suspended from the ceiling directly opposite the call-in operators is a TV 
camera that captures the entire phone bank set. This camera allows TV viewers to 
literally watch the operators on their television screens, which appears in a small 
window below the main image. This live broadcast of 2100’s phone bank 
achieves several purposes some functional, others symbolic. Practically speaking, 
the drawing boards inform the moderator of the caller’s name, location, and 
gender, which he reads aloud to the studio participants and viewing audience. 
 The operator room broadcast also allows callers, who are often 
simultaneously watching the program, to monitor the order their call will be aired. 
Featuring the operators at work through live footage also provides viewers a 
“behind-the-scenes” peak that portrays the program in an unmediated or “raw” 
form. The image of young, fresh-faced operators—who are predominantly female 
and range in age from the early to late twenties—contrasts in age and gender with 
the older, and predominantly male, guests and moderator. Given that other call-in 
programs do not broadcast their call-in operation, 2100’s inclusion of this footage 
                                                 
72 Although “L” and “S” may seem odd choices to the native English speaker, rather than “F” for 
female and “M” for male, they nonetheless roughly correspond to similar gendered address terms 
in Chinese, namely, xiaojie (小姐), which means “Miss,” and xiansheng (先生), which means 
“Mister” or “Sir,” respectively. 
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symbolically presents the show as being upfront and open about its caller 
selection process, which enhances the program’s viewer credibility. 
8 o’clock call-in operation 
While 2100 boasts eleven operators on its call-in staff, 8 o’clock relies 
upon a one-person, three-phone, six-line call-in operation. Moreover, 8 o’clock 
airs only six callers per episode, a format that rarely changes. 8 o’clock’s modest 
call-in operation is situated in a narrow room, about twenty times smaller than 
that of 2100’s. Its operator is not broadcast live, and moreover, caller phone 
numbers are not filtered and selected by an external telecommunications 
company. A production staff member doubles as the call-in operator during the 
broadcast and takes calls in sequential caller order. The operator records the 
callers’ name, location, and gender on a pad of paper, which is then handed to 
another production staff member who writes the information on a white erase 
board located in the studio. As he watches the program broadcast via a small 
television set in the cramped “switchboard room,” the operator waits for the 
moderator to introduce a caller’s name before linking the phone line with the 
studio control room. As the call is broadcast over the air, it is simultaneously 
transmitted over the sound system within the studio for the guest panelists and 
moderator to hear. 
Unlike 2100 where each call is restricted to 20 seconds, callers on 8 
o’clock do not face a set speaking time limit. Rather, the moderator decides when 
to conclude a call. Upon occasion, the moderator places a caller on hold, asks a 
panelist to respond to the caller’s remarks, and then returns to the caller for 
further comments. Featuring fewer callers consequently allows 8 o’clock to 
incorporate panelist-caller and moderator-caller interactions, an option that 2100’s 
call-in assembly line format precludes. 
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Figure 6:  8 o’clock guest panelist, New Party Legislator Hsieh Chi-ta (left), and 
moderator, Yü Fu (right), listening to a caller’s remarks. The call-in phone 
number is listed on the bottom of the screen. 
Although 8 o’clock is also targeted by call-in teams, a caller phenomenon 
I clarify in the next section, it does not use screening procedures to thwart or 
diminish their presence on the program. One reason may be its low caller 
acceptance ratio. Another explanation may derive from its parent TV company’s 
political orientation. Given SETN’s self-promotion as a “native Taiwan” (bentu 
本土) TV station and its “Taiwanization” approach to programming, its viewers 
tend to be more open to pro-Taiwan sentiments and pro-DPP supporters. 
Consequently, call-in teams may find it difficult to penetrate 8 o’clock’s core 
audience, and therefore, consider it more profitable to focus their efforts on other 
TV call-in programs during the 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. time slot instead.73 
Call-in team phenomenon 
The conflation of Taiwan’s increasingly competitive electoral 
environment and call-in show mania (kouying rechao 叩應熱潮) has contributed 
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to the recent campaign tactic of using call-in teams to flood call-in show 
switchboards with the aim of manipulating the political representation of its 
received callers. Call-in teams can be differentiated between those that are 
“organized” versus “non-organized.”74 While both types involve callers who 
speak on a political candidate’s behalf, organized call-in teams are more likely to 
be managerially and spatially (e.g., in one location) centralized.  
For instance, organized call-in teams operate from a facility equipped with 
computerized phones that can repeatedly dial a call-in show with different phone 
numbers. The campaign staff provides organized call-in teams with several 
prepared scripts or “talking points,” including slogans that promote their 
candidate, or inversely, disparage their opponents. Callers on organized teams are 
also monetarily compensated for participating and are even given a financial 
bonus if their call is aired. In contrast, non-organized or voluntary call-in teams 
are not centralized in one location. These callers generally dial from non-
automated phones and from a personal residence or cell phone. Like its 
counterpart, non-organized call-in teams have access to talking points prepared by 
their candidate’s political party. However, non-organized call-in team members 
generally speak without prearranged scripts, in other words “naturally,” which is 
one way of distinguishing between the two types of call-in teams during a 
program.75 
Regardless of its organized or non-organized structure, call-in teams 
reflect the degree to which callers play an increasingly strategic role not only on 
                                                                                                                                     
73 This assessment assumes that call-in teams are primarily KMT-friendly, or even more 
specifically, KMT supported. From my conversations with informants, it appeared that the 
origanized and paid call-in teams were KMT-based. 
74 It was very difficult to determine which political parties had “organized” versus “non-
organized” call-in teams as well as to procure the actual prepared call-in scripts. However, it is 
widely circulated that the former ruling party, the KMT, had organized call-in teams while 
opposition parties—such as the DPP, NP and Independent candidate James Soong’s campaign—
relied upon non-organized call-in teams. 
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Taiwan’s political call-in shows but in the campaign environment as well. For 
veteran call-in show participants and viewers, spotting call-in team and non-call-
in team callers has become a game of sorts. According to some informants, a 
familiar voice heard on an earlier episode, or those who use hackneyed slogans or 
familiar “good (political) party/bad party” stories, often reveals that a caller hails 
from a call-in team. 
In contrast, the average caller calling from home on a single phone line is 
at a disadvantage when competing against call-in teams with automated phones, 
scripted slogans, and monetary incentives. However, as the call-in show excerpts I 
later examine will demonstrate, the most personal and entertaining callers are 
those who speak from their own perspectives and share personal anecdotes. To 
the best of my knowledge, the calls that I analyze do not include those from call-
in teams. Consequently, this study does not address call-in team language use, an 
area I fully encourage other scholars to explore. 
Caller selection process: strategic randomness 
In response to the emergence of call-in teams, 2100 implemented 
procedures to screen their presence and hopefully diminish their impact. It was 
the first call-in program to contract its caller selection operation to an outside 
private telecommunications firm, which designed and implemented a procedure 
that weeds out assumed call-in team phone numbers. For instance, the 
telecommunications firm would automatically reject sequential phone numbers 
(i.e., 2477-4000, 2477-4001, etc.), which usually suggests numbers belonging to 
an organized call-in team. Another feature involves amassing caller phone 
numbers until a certain point in the program, then submitting the numbers to the 
telecommunications company for random selection. These phone numbers are 
sent when a button, which sits on the front edge of the panelists’ table and is 
                                                                                                                                     
75 Of course, organized call-in teams could have caught on to this distinction and thus altered their 
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visible to studio and television viewers alike, within the call-in show studio is 
pressed, an honored task that Lee Tao asks one of the panelists to perform.  
From the amassed phone numbers, the telecommunication’s company 
selects a group of 20 numbers and transmits them to a computer in the call-in 
operator studio. These 20 phone numbers are then projected on a closed-circuit 
TV monitor for the operators’ reference. From this list, each operator is assigned 
two phone numbers from which she selects and calls a non-Taipei City/County 
phone number. The reasoning behind this method is to give priority to non-Taipei, 
(e.g., non-02 area code) phone numbers in order to provide a more “balanced” 
caller representation around the country. For instance, if one number has a 
Kaohsiung area code and the other a Taipei one, the Kaohsiung number will take 
precedence. If both numbers have non-Taipei area codes, the operator randomly 
chooses one of the two.76 In cases where the phone number turns out to be an 
“empty” line with no answer, the operator dials the second phone number.77 There 
are several reasons why a phone number may have no response. One possible 
reason is that the number belongs to an “organized” call-in team which uses 
automated phones and serial phone numbers. Non-answered phone numbers 
provide operators another means for weeding out calls from call-in teams. 
2100’s counter call-in team tactics seem to reduce their presence and 
influence on the program. Nevertheless, call-in teams were still able to infiltrate 
2100’s call-in operation, as well as those of other call-in shows, and subsequently 
provide the call-in team’s political candidate with 20-seconds worth of free air 
time. 
                                                                                                                                     
strategy to include calls that sounded unscripted and thus “genuine.” 
76 This also applies if both phone numbers have Taipei area codes. 
77 This is the second reason why each operator is assigned two phone numbers despite the fact that 
only 10 callers are selected per call-in group. 
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THE PROPS: FRAMING THE TOPIC 
Aside from its human participants, a call-in show episode is also filled 
with various inanimate props including topic headlines, video clips or longer 
video montages, satellite-fed interviews of guests who are unable to appear in the 
studio, and computer graphics such as political cartoons and program titles. 
Different topics and program styles lend themselves to certain props better than 
others; thus the variety of props varies from episode to episode as well as from 
program to program. The following represents the standard props that 2100 and 8 
o’clock regularly use in their broadcasts. 
Headlines and teasers 
In a significant departure from other call-in shows that concentrate on only 
one topic per one-hour episode, 2100 may feature two to four topics within the 
same time span. Sometimes the topics are related and merely refinements of an 
initially broad issue; other times they represent a hodge-podge collection of 
current events that reflect the eclectic news day. 
As with the production process, Lee Tao also decides each episode’s 
headlines and teasers (or subheadline). He typically drafts headlines in the studio 
as he reviews that evening’s program. As soon as the headlines are completed, 
they are delivered by voice over an in-studio microphone to the broadcasting 
booth so that they can be typed into a Mac computer program for later broadcast. 
Aside from the moderator’s introduction of the topic, headlines or teasers 
represent the primary frame from which participants understand the featured 
issue. Most headliners are phrased as a question—such as “Should the Vice 
President be recalled?”—which establishes a pro/con, yes/no deliberative format. 
In the aforementioned example, the use of “recalled” rather than “retained” also 
frames the question in a manner that already entertains the possibility of removing 
rather than keeping Annette Lu as Vice President (cf. Shen 1999:232-236). Shen 
claims that to frame a topic in a question form “implies, above all, that the issue is 
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open to discussion” (ibid:233). Occasionally, programs construct headlines in a 
proclamatory manner, such as “China Bans A-mei!” (Zhonggong fengsha A-mei! 
中共封殺阿妹!). These types of headliners have an aura of outrage that increases 
the crisis mentality of an event or issue. For instance, Shen observes that the call-
in program’s “open-to-discussion” spirit is conveyed in the headline’s statement, 
or in this case exclamatory, format (ibid:233). 
Oftentimes, 2100 inserts variations of its program name “All People Open 
Talk” within the headline as a tag line. For instance, in the aforementioned teaser 
“China Bans A-mei!” the full headline for this episode reads: “China Bans A-mei! 
All People Open Talk!” Although Shen (1999) documents 2100’s use of “open 
talk” in its statement-oriented headlines—such as “The legislator opened mouth to 
bite? Voters open mouths to talk” (立委開咬? 選民開講!) and “One month after 
the presidential inauguration: All people come for open talk” (總統就職滿月﹐ 
全民來開講!)—she fails to link this rhetorical format as a calculated gesture of 
call-in show self-promotion (234).78 Spitulnik (1997) finds a similar practice in 
her study of Zambian radio broadcasts and states that program titles “are designed 
for reproducibility and recognizability” by listeners or, in the case of call-in 
shows, viewers (172). By embedding the program name within the headline, 2100 
strategically achieves several marketing strategies: to promote the program, to 
link the program’s objective with the deliberated topic, and lastly, to increase 
viewer recognition of the program as a 2100 product. 
From my observations, no other call-in show included its program name 
within a headline or teaser. Whether this finding indicates other programs’ non-
creative headline-making endeavors or modest restraint is uncertain. However, the 
fact that 2100’s program name occasionally doubles up as a headliner reveals a 
practice that is not hindered by any of the aforementioned reasons. 
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In comparison, 8 o’clock’s headlines are crafted through a group 
brainstorming process that includes both the production staff and moderator. 
Although Mia generally crafts the final headline, other production staff members 
are always invited to contribute. Headline-making at 8 o’clock often inspires 
humorous word play among the staff, usually leading to titles that are 
inappropriate for a politically-oriented program. While many of the other tasks in 
the call-in production process requires “serious” work such as research, collating, 
and condensing information, in contrast headline-making opens the door for 
greater creativity, including language play. 
Despite its marginal role within the entire production process, crafting 
call-in show headlines are critical as it establishes an episode’s theme and directs 
the subsequent discussion’s initial line of inquiry. Headlines can thus both inform 
and direct viewers in their assessments toward an controversial sociopolitical 
issue or event. For instance, the following two part headline—“Recalling ‘A-
Lian’: is it that serious?” (Bamian A-lian You name yanzhong? 
罷免阿蓮:有那麼嚴重?)—exposes the call-in show’s own interpretation of 
recent events, namely, whether a legislative motion to recall Vice President 
Annette Lu is warranted. First, by using a fictional, hybrid name “A-Lian”79 in the 
main headline, the call-in show subtly implicates both President Chen and Vice 
President Lu within the recall motion rather than linking it with VP Lu alone. This 
linguistic maneuver tactically broadens the issue to incorporate President Chen as 
well as shifts the focus from the recall motion to Chen and Lu’s rocky working 
relationship. Through a nine-character headline, the call-in show predisposes 
                                                                                                                                     
78 The second title refers to former President Lee Teng-hui’s 1996 inauguration and Taiwan’s first 
direct presidential election. The English translations are the original author’s. 
79 Again, the abbreviation “A-Lian” (啊蓮) is comprised of the first character in President Chen’s 
nickname “A-bian” (阿扁) and the second character in VP Lu’s given name Hsiu-lian (秀蓮). 
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viewers’ interpretation of events, including whether VP Lu’s recent behavior 
warrants a recall vote.80  
Introductory montage 
Although 8 o’clock’s moderator introduces the topic of discussion in the 
call-in show’s opening sequence, Yü Fu does not situate the issue as Lee Tao does 
in his opening monologue. Rather, a one-minute video montage with 
accompanying voice-over performs this function. An 8 o’clock staff member 
prepares the montage by culling from various news clips within the SETN video 
archives, while the accompanying text is researched and written by a second staff 
member. Preparing the introductory text may take most of the afternoon as the 
staff member must be alert to any changing developments throughout the day 
related to the chosen topic. Selecting and slicing the news clips for the video 
montage can be completed within an hour or less, depending upon how many 
clips are included, and is typically accomplished one to two hours before the 
broadcast. After the video segment’s completion, a voice-over is added, which is 
usually read by a female production unit member.81 
The following represents an example of an introductory segment for an 
episode on “Recalling ‘A-Lian’: is it that serious?” (Bamian A-lian you name 
yanzhong? 罷免阿蓮 有那麼嚴重?). The verbal text, in both the original Chinese 
version and an English translation, follows: 
 
國民黨立委今天發起罷免副總統呂秀蓮﹐ 而且親民黨﹐ 新黨立委也都 加 
入連署﹐ 因此整個罷免呂秀連案已經逼近通過門檻﹐ 罷免案發起人國民黨
立委穆閩珠批評呂秀蓮無視於副總統備位而不干政的憲政職份﹐ 一再發表
                                                 
80 I examine excerpts from this episode later in the dissertation. 
81 The person who reads the text is usually not the same person who writes it. The reason why a 
female voice is used for the voice-over may be related to the public perception that I often heard in 
my interviews with call-in participants, and namely from male informants, that female announcers 
and broadcasters have a more “attractive” sounding voice. 
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不當言論﹐ 加深兩岸緊張的關係﹐ 罷免案將提供陳水扁總統一個重新選擇
副總統的機會。而對罷免呂秀蓮的聲浪轉高﹐ 日前才發新聞稿否認黑臉說
的總統府﹐ 終於出面表遺憾﹐ 也澄清陳水扁﹐ 呂秀蓮互動良好﹐ 外界傳聞
並非事實。從民進黨主席林義雄出面制約﹐ 到國代建議﹐ 立委發起罷免﹐
呂秀蓮就任不到一個月﹐ 就經歷如此重大的政治風暴﹐ 呂秀蓮到底不能能
閃得過﹖ 雖然民進黨禁止黨籍立委連署﹐ 但是立委周伯倫引用陳水扁的--
“國家利益鉤高於 政黨利益” 談話﹐ 認為不該強制約束﹐  使得副總 統自 
己的同志也可能加入。副總統罷免案﹐ 使立法院熱鬧滾滾﹐ 但是立法院想
罷免呂秀蓮﹐  真的是為了台海安全著想﹖  還是想拿 呂秀蓮﹐  嚇唬 嚇唬 
陳水扁﹖   
Today, KMT Legislators proposed a motion to recall Vice President Lu Hsiu-lian 
(Annette Lu). People’s First Party and New Party legislators, moreover, also followed 
suit. Consequently, the entire Vice Presidential Recall Bill is close to surpassing the 
required threshold. The author of the [VP] Recall Bill and KMT legislator Mu Minzhu 
criticized Lu for ignoring the fact that, according to the constitution, the Vice Presidency 
is not designed to interfere with policy making. But Lu has continuously issued 
inappropriate statements, which has [contributed to] intensifying and worsening relations 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Recall Bill will give President Chen 
Shui-bian another opportunity to select a vice president. As clamor for the recall of Lu 
Hsiu-lian increases, the Presidential office recently issued a news release that denied 
[Lu’s] “black face” remarks. It also finally expressed their regrets [for the comments] and 
clarified President Chen and Vice President Lu’s relations as being on good terms. 
Circulating rumors about their relations as being otherwise are inaccurate. From DPP 
Chairman Lin Yixiong’s [call for] restraint, to the National Assembly’s proposal, to 
Legislators’ motion to recall [the Vice President], it has been barely a month since Lu 
took office. Given these recent and large political eruptions, can Lu evade these attacks? 
Although the DPP forbids its legislators from supporting the motion, Legislator Zhou 
Bolun has [nevertheless] quoted President Chen’s slogan that “national interests take 
precedence over party interests” to state that the party should not forcefully restrict them 
[and their actions]. This has caused [even] the Vice President’s own colleagues to 
participate in the motion. [As such], the Vice President Recall Bill has caused the 
Legislative Yuan to boil over with excitement. Yet, is the Legislative Yuan’s interest in 
recalling the Vice President truly in the name of preserving peace in the Taiwan Straits? 
Or is it [merely] using [VP] Lu to frighten [Pres.] Chen? 
The introductory summary’s wording and its accompaniment of selected 
video clips frames the featured topic, the recalling of Vice President Lu from 
elected office, in a manner that predisposes the viewer’s assessments in a crisis-
oriented direction. The introductory montage’s framing process begins subtly, 
first by presenting several “facts,” and then by gradually introducing more 
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circumspect evaluations. For instance, the introduction blandly states that a recall 
bill was initiated by a group of KMT (Nationalist) party legislators who sought to 
remove Vice President Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lian 呂秀蓮) from office. The text 
then builds upon this information by noting that the People’s First Party (PFP) 
and the New Party (NP), both of which are KMT splinter parties, also introduced 
similar legislative bills soon after. Thus, within two lines, the introduction has 
rhetorically escalated the tensions surrounding the unprecedented recall bill as 
well as established the grounds for a political confrontation between the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its opposition parties, including the 
aforementioned KMT, NP, and PFP.  
At the end of the introductory passage, it explicitly states why VP Lu 
should be recalled. However, it does so by framing it within the remarks of 
opposition party legislator, KMT Legislator Mu Minzhu (穆閩珠), who claims 
that VP Lu has overstepped the bounds of her elected office and constitutionally 
designated powers. Without analyzing the entire introductory segment, one can 
see that with each line, the oppositional party dissent against Vice President Lu 
builds both “factually,” through the listing of legislative behavior, as well as 
rhetorically, through the inclusion of “reported” statements by certain 
politicians.82 
However, what I wish to emphasize here is the introductory passage’s use 
of reported speech, namely, indirect reported speech. This rhetorical strategy 
allows the reporter, in this case the call-in program, to provide “evidence” and 
“sources” of why this headlining topic warrants attention and discussion. I expand 
upon call-in participants’ strategic speech reporting practices and their 
                                                 
82 I place “reported” in quotation marks in order to highlight that what is described as reported 
reported is not always a faithful reproduction of a prior utterance. I introduce various theoretical 
understandings of this linguistic device in Chapter Four. 
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effectiveness in contributing to the call-in show’s crisis frame in my analysis of 
call-in show excerpts later in the dissertation. 
Lastly, the introductory segment situates or frames the topic’s discussion 
even before the guest panelists have had an opportunity to present their own 
perspectives. Based on a scripted narrative that is supplemented with background 
video clips of images somewhat related to the verbal text, the introduction 
audio/visual montage carries more weight than its one-minute air time suggests. 
The staff member who writes the verbal text is usually not the same 
person who compiles and edits the video clip montage.  In addition, a third person 
may record the verbal text that viewers hear during the call-in show broadcast. 
Video clips for the introduction montage are taken from an archive of video 
footage taken by SETN cameramen. Occasionally, the introduction’s verbal text 
will be paired with video footage that is not chronologically accurate. For 
instance, if the text describes President Chen as performing a duty, such as 
visiting a hospital, that occurred earlier that day, the video clip may feature him 
doing a similar activity but on a different day. 
Although the introductory montage can stand alone disconnected from the 
rest of the program, its presence and inclusion is significant by assuming that 
viewers (and perhaps even guest panelists) need the background information or 
perspective it offers before launching into an open discussion of the featured 
topic. In other words, 8 o’clock does not assume that its viewers are 
knowledgeable about the latest developments in Taiwan’s constantly shifting 
sociopolitical landscape. 
“News mixed supplements” 
Unlike the introductory segment with its video footage, 8 o’clock’s four 
individual Supplement segments are presented as written and oral texts. Drawn 
from newspapers, magazines, the 24-hour news stations, and the Internet, these 
brief snippets are prepared by an 8 o’clock staff member the day of the broadcast. 
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However, “mews mixed supplements” (xinwen dabu tie 新聞大補帖) do not 
necessarily correlate with the direction the panel discussion follows as they are 
prepared prior to the program broadcast. Instead, these segments focus the 
viewer’s attention on political party behaviors, individual comments, or a series of 
events that are related to the featured crisis topic. 
An examination of the following Supplement examples reveals how this 
textual device uses reported speech to draw attention to dominant crisis discourses 
in Taiwan’s sociopolitical sphere. In the first example, the Supplement focuses on 
the actions of one person, President Chen Shui-bian. Entitled “Long Live the 
Republic of China: Is A-bian sincere?” (Zhonghuaminguo wansui A-bian zhen xin 
ma? 中華民國萬歲阿扁真心嗎?), the Supplement lists and compares several 
comments President Chen made within the space of two months regarding 
Taiwan’s future. 
大補帖一 
阿扁語錄— 兩岸篇 
0501 提出“善意和解﹐積極合作與永久和平”的兩岸和解方針 
0520 在既有基礎上﹐共同處理“未來一個中國”問題 
0620 兩岸對“一中”沒有共識的共識﹐南北韓能﹐為何兩岸不能 
0628 新政府願意接受 “一個中國, 各自表述,”但大陸方面卻不承認. 
 
Supplement One 
A-bian’s quotations83 (verbal record)—on cross-straits [relations] 
0501 Proposed an approach for cross-straits peace through “goodwill 
reconciliation, active cooperation and permanent peace.” 
0520 On the basis of the existing situation, [both sides of the Straits] 
jointly work to resolve the “future one China” issue. 
0620 The cross-straits attitude to “one China” is to “agree to disagree” 
[have a “consensus without a consensus”], [yet] if North [and] 
                                                 
83 By calling the Supplement “A-bian’s quotations,” the call-in staff may be playing on the notion 
of Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) quotations published in the PRC in the infamous “little red book.” 
 95
South Korea can, why can’t the two sides of the [Taiwan] 
Straits? 
0628 The new government is ready to accept “one China [but] with 
respective interpretations,” but Mainland China does not 
recognize it. 
The above Supplement groups President Chen’s comments by date, which 
serves to highlight their chronological proximity and evolution. The first quote 
occurred less than a month before his inauguration (May 1st) while the second 
quote took place the day he assumed office (May 20th). Chen’s third comment 
was drawn from his first presidential press conference on the one-month 
anniversary of his presidency (June 20th), while the fourth quote took place a 
week later (June 28th). This type of comparative format emphasizes subtle shifts 
in language use, and consequently, foregrounds any inconsistencies. Here, 
President Chen’s cross-straits approach is portrayed as shifting from one of 
collaboration (first two quotes) to one that respects differences “agreeing to 
disagree” (third quote), and finally, to acknowledging a stalemate (fourth quote). 
By presenting quoted remarks in a decontextualized manner, 8 o’clock cloaks its 
reframing of “real quotations” under the rubric of a “factual” (and chronological) 
presentation. This misleading format leads viewers to interpret comments in a 
manner that complements the call-in show’s agenda: to root out or even 
manipulate controversial events or, in this case, utterances.  
In similar manner, Supplement sections also use reported speech to 
compare differing perspectives among Taiwan’s four main political parties: the 
Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Party (NP), and 
People’s First Party (PFP).84 This format serves as a foil for the political 
representatives on the program who typically echo and enact, albeit 
                                                 
84 Background on Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment is provided in Chapter Three. 
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unknowingly,85 party-affiliated remarks featured in the Supplement segment. The 
following excerpt is drawn from the same episode as the previous example: 
大補帖三 
誰在製造麻煩? 
民進黨:  總統表達最大善意, 若中共再無善意回應, 就是麻煩製造者 
國民黨: 肯定陳水扁回到 “ 一中,” 希望中共儘速回復談判 
親民黨:  既已接受 “一中各表”, 也應回歸國統會, 儘速召開國統會 
新黨: 表示歡迎 , 但過於簡化, 客易引起大陸誤解, 指為 “兩國論” 
 
Supplement Three 
Who’s stirring up trouble? 
DPP: The President expressed the greatest goodwill (towards 
Mainland China); if Communist China again doesn’t return this 
goodwill, then they are the troublemakers. 
KMT: Undoubtedly Chen Shui-bian has returned to [a] “one China” 
[stance]; [we] hope that Communist China quickly resumes 
negotiations 
PFP: Since [we] have already agreed to “one China, [but] with 
respective interpretations,” [we] should also return to the 
National Reunification Council [and] quickly reconvene the 
National Reunification Council. 
NP: We welcome [Chen’s] approach to [cross-straits] peace. But it is 
over simplified. It will easily lead to misunderstandings on the 
part of Mainland China and be misinterpreted as [former 
President Lee Teng-hui’s] “two-state principle.”86 
This Supplement format deliberately highlights the differences between 
each political party’s perspectives toward the featured topic. Although each 
quotation is associated with a particular party, no single name or voice is assigned 
                                                 
85 The guest panelists are not aware of the content of the Supplement sections until the actual 
broadcast, if at all. Given that the Supplements come before a commercial break, the guests are 
often talking to each other “off the air” at this point and not paying attention to the closed-circuit 
TV screens in the studio. 
86 The “two states principle” or “two China theory” (liangguolun 兩國論) was proposed by 
former President Lee Teng-hui in August 2000, which stirred the PRC’s ire. This stance deviates 
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to the remarks. As such, 8 o’clock encourages viewers to find their thematic link 
and to engage in “sense-making” (Tannen 1989). Nonetheless, the program 
producers have framed the quotations for easier associative reading, in this case 
through their order of appearance. For instance, the DPP quotation is introduced 
first, which orients the viewer’s subsequent assessment from this perspective. The 
remaining order lists the viewpoints of the opposition parties, namely, KMT, 
People’s First Party (PFP), and New Party. To informed viewer, the quotations 
associated with these three KMT-based parties (the New Party and PFP were 
founded by former KMT party members) reveal nuanced differences regarding 
their approach to ROC-PRC relations, namely, their China-reunification 
orientation. The larger picture that these four quotations paint are the 
sociopolitical tensions and ideological differences between the ruling DPP party 
and the “pan blue camp,”87 meaning the KMT, New Party, and People’s First 
Party. 
Presenting each political party’s comments in this manner foregrounds 
their differences while downplaying their similarities. A closer examination of the 
last excerpt reveals another juxtaposition, namely, a tacit alliance between 
Taiwan’s political parties and against China. Yet, whether President Chen is 
sincere in his loyalty to the Republic of China—as opposed to his reputation for 
advocating an independent “Republic of Taiwan”—the Taiwan-China cross-
straits situation is temporarily subsumed under the current episode’s emphasis on 
domestic tensions between the ruling DPP and its opposition, including the 
aforementioned three political parties. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
from the “one China” and even “one China but with different interpretations” theories as it 
approaches declaration of an independent “Republic of Taiwan.” 
87 The opposition to the “pan blue camp” is the “pan green camp,” which is comprised of the DPP 
and the recently formed Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). 
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Figure 7: Example of a 8 o’clock “news mixed supplement.” This supplement 
features quotations from various public figures addressing the featured topic: 
“Should the (ROC) vice president be recalled?” 
Although Supplement segments are featured in transition between 
program discussions and commercial breaks, they function as more than mere 
fillers. Rather, these textual scripts reinforce the episode’s crisis-interpretation of 
the topic by feeding viewers bite-sized quotes or summarized histories that 
support this reading. By packaging such information for easy viewer 
consumption, the Supplement’s abridged and decontextualized presentation 
dangerously simplifies the sociopolitical issues and events it highlights as well as 
diminishes alternative interpretations of the featured topic. 
Sound bites/video clips 
Edited video clips of a key public figure (e.g., President Chen Shui-bian, 
Vice President Annette Lu, pop singer A-mei, or a political candidate) related to 
the featured topic offer another form of reported speech-influenced reading of a 
sociopolitical issue or event. Moreover, coupled with the episode’s headline, 
video clips and sound-bites also reinforce the call-in show’s overall crisis frame, 
regardless of the topic. 
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Political cartoons 
One of 2100’s unique props involves the political cartoon, which is 
computer generated rather than hand-drawn. The inclusion of cartoons provides 
an alternative, and typically humorous, angle from which to view a topic or issue. 
As Goodwin (1994) observes: 
A theory of discourse that ignored graphic representations would be 
missing…a key element of the discourse . . . Instead of mirroring spoken 
language, these external representations complement it, using the 
distinctive characteristics of the material world to organize phenomena in 
ways that spoken language cannot… (609). 
Consequently, the cartoons’ humorous, witty, and descriptive devices 
enable the program to express viewpoints or agendas that are too risqué to voice 
aloud. For instance, during the 2000 presidential elections, 2100 featured a 
cartoon that satirized the three leading ROC Presidential candidates—KMT 
candidate Lien Chan (連戰), DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), and 
independent candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜). The cartoon portrayed each of the 
candidates as imitating ROC President Lee Teng-hui by showing a caricature of 
each candidate looking into a mirror and seeing President Lee’s reflection. While 
the panelists might allude to the candidates’ attempts to walk in Lee Teng-hui’s 
very long shadow in their remarks, the 2100 cartoon subtly takes the critical 
observation to a higher level. 
In another example, a 2100 cartoon depicts ROC Prime Minister Tang Fei 
(唐飛) as an action hero similar to Tom Cruise’s character in the movie “Mission 
Impossible” (see Figure 8). Here, the prime minister’s “mission impossible” (bu 
keneng de renwu 不可能的任務) is to prevent the inter-party contentiousness of 
Taiwan’s opposition parties (e.g., the KMT, New Party, and the recently formed 
People’s First Party) from paralyzing the ROC’s new ruling party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party. The cartoon depicts Tang Fei swooping down from the ceiling 
(like Cruise’s character does in the movie) to reclaim the prime minister’s podium 
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(a symbol of the prime minister’s authority) in the Legislative Yuan, (lifayuan 
立法院) Taiwan’s highest parliamentary body, from the reaching hands of several 
legislators.  
 
Figure 8: ROC Prime Minister Tang Fei depicted in a “mission impossible” 
political cartoon featured on 2100: All People Open Talk. 
As a former KMT member and a former ROC Secretary of Defense, Tang 
Fei was selected to hold the third-highest cabinet position in President Chen Shui-
bian’s administration as a gesture to accommodate the interests, and thus mollify 
the fears, of the recently defeated KMT party and its splinter parties (i.e., the New 
Party and PFP). Moreover, Tang Fei’s unassuming personality and esteemed 
background as a decorated military leader brought needed experience to President 
Chen’s inchoate administration. Despite these qualities, Tang Fei’s former 
affiliation with the KMT as party member made his new role as a DPP official all 
the more difficult given oppositional party resistance to President Chen’s 
presidency. The cartoon’s humorous portrayal of Tang Fei’s “mission impossible” 
insightfully captures the intricacies of his role as well as the symbolism of his 
lonely and controversial position as a former KMT official within a DPP 
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administration.88 In fact, Tang Fei’s career as ROC Prime Minister only lasted 
several months as he voluntarily resigned in early October for health reasons.89 
 Political cartoons thus express latent impressions of controversial issues 
that panelists and moderators, and perhaps even callers, are hesitant to voice.  
Such props can also both foreground and mitigate sensitive issues by cloaking 
them under the rubric of satire. 
Satellite-fed interviews 
Satellite-feed interviews represent another 2100 feature that its 
competitors do not offer. Located off-site, or outside the call-in show studio, the 
“special” guest panel member is both visible and audible via satellite 
transmission. Long-distance interviews are used when a guest cannot appear in-
person in the studio. This commonly occurs when 2100 invites a mainland China 
or Hong Kong-based scholar to participate as an “honorary guest panelist.” These 
guests are typically invited to participate on programs that feature cross-straits 
ROC-PRC relations as its topic. To set up this link, the production staff are 
required to communicate with China-based—or Hong Kong-based TVB—
colleagues. These honorary guests are usually solicited by Lee Tao himself, with 
the technical details handled by the staff. Lee Tao travels quite extensively within 
China, often meeting with government officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs in his 
capacity as TVBS’s vice president and 2100’s executive producer and moderator. 
Thus, Lee Tao is able to use this clout to solicit and invite politicians, scholars, 
and media-related personalities to appear on 2100. 
                                                 
88 In fact, Tang Fei voluntarily resigned his KMT membership after several KMT officials 
proposed doing so through an executive decision by the KMT central standing committee. 
89 Prior to assuming his position, he had undergone surgery for a benign brain tumor and thus was 
hospitalized for several weeks at the beginning of his Prime Ministership. In this sense, Tang Fei 
faced multiple challenges as Prime Minister, political opposition notwithstanding. Thus his 
reasons for resigning due to health concerns were quite serious and not entirely a convenient 
excuse. 
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This procedure may also used for speakers located within Taiwan. During 
an episode on crime, 2100 featured a woman who had been assaulted and 
interviewed her from a hospital bed in Kaohsiung, a city in southern Taiwan. In 
this case, an image of a injured crime victim heightened the topic’s emotional and 
visual quotient. Moreover, off-site guests not only enrich the guest panel and 
discussion, but also focus the discussion around the “honorary” guest’s expertise 
or experience. In turn, satellite-feed interviews extend a call-in show’s participant 
pool to encompass those outside of the greater Taipei metropolitan area, and even 
beyond the island (or country) of Taiwan, where most, if not all, guests are 
located.90 
Phone-in and public opinion polling 
Aside from the program’s standard call-in feature, both 2100 and 8 o’clock 
occasionally offer viewers the chance to participate in phone-in polls that invites 
them to respond to a question related to that evening’s topic(s). Such polls 
generally ask questions in a “yes/no” or “pro/con” manner, such as “Should Chen 
Shui-bian declare Taiwan independence?” A multiple choice format is 
occasionally used for questions that ask voters to select among a variety of 
answers. For instance, in an episode that deliberated ethno-political identities, 
2100’s viewers were asked if they identified themselves as being “Chinese but not 
Taiwanese” (wo renwei wo shi zhongguoren bu shi taiwanren 
我認為我是中國人), “Taiwanese but not Chinese” (wo renwei wo shi taiwanren 
bu shi zhongguoren 我認為我是台灣人), both (“liangge dou rentong 
兩個都認同), or neither (liangge dou bu rentong 兩個都不認同).  
Aside from on-the-air call-in show polling, 2100 conducts its own public 
opinion polls through its in-house polling division. A prime feature during 
                                                 
90 The transnationalism of call-in show participants is evidenced in a caller excerpt I examine in 
Chapter Five that features a woman who identifies herself as “Singaporean.” 
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national elections, 2100’s public opinion polls are featured as “exclusive” 
findings. In recent years, Taiwan’s public opinion polling craze has reached near 
saturation levels to the extent that most political organizations, research institutes, 
and political parties hire or sponsor “independent firms” to conduct polls for 
them. Each polling source, as well as the entity that hires it, promotes its figures 
as more “objective” and “accurate” than its competitors. To combat public 
suspicion of polls commissioned by special interest parties, 2100 and its parent 
TV station (TVBS) promote the reliability and validity of their polls by 
emphasizing their “neutral” stance and non-political affiliations. Frequently, 
national newspapers and magazines often reprint TVBS’s polling results. This 
“free” publicity lends their figures with even greater authority and credibility.  
By interweaving public opinion with topical deliberation, 2100 seeks to 
both assess popular sentiments as well as generate discussion among its panelists 
and viewers. Moreover, 2100 presents polling results as “fact” and downplays—
i.e., ignores—the polls’ inherent statistical errors.91 This misguided use of polling 
figures further subsumes any questioning or problematize of 2100’s polling 
methods, error ratios, or validity. By not explaining their polling process, 2100 
encourages its viewers to take the figures at face value. Furthermore, the 
moderator often uses polling results to seek reactions and direct participants’ 
comments in a certain direction. By designing a topic around public opinion polls, 
and supplementing it with call-in polling, reifies polling results as well as reduces 
the topic itself to mere numbers and percentages. 
Unfortunately, the role of phone-in and public opinion polling on call-in 
shows is often overlooked given the call-in show’s repertoire of eye-catching 
props, such has satellite-feed interviews, and contentious participant deliberations. 
However, their passive presence lends them greater influence in situating issues 
within a “factual” or “objective” light. Be it through a formal TVBS polling 
                                                 
91 2100 does not provide the margin of error for any of their polls. 
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division or live call-in polling, 2100 presents public opinion polling as a serious 
and “added value” service to its viewers. The stamp of a TVBS or “2100” public 
opinion or call-in poll represents another feature that distinguishes the program 
from its competitors. 
8 o’clock began including phone-in polling soon after 2100 introduced it 
on its program. 8 o’clock charges callers NT$1 (approx. US$0.03) per call or 
vote. The polling question is always related to the main topic. For instance, on the 
episode entitled, “Recalling ‘A-Lian’: is it that serious?” (Bamian A-lian you 
name yanzhong? 罷免阿蓮 有那麼嚴重?), 8 o’clock’s polling question asked 
viewers whether Vice President Lu should be recalled, with the option to vote 
“yes,” “no,” or “undecided.” Processing phone-in polls is not conducted at the 
SETN studio, but rather contracted to an outside company. Throughout the 
program, a running ticker tape appears on the bottom of the television screen and 
continuously updates the poll’s results. The moderator also announces polling 
figures throughout the program, typically after a commercial break, while the 
“final results” are announced at program’s end. 
Such polls are inaccurate, however, as there are no restrictions for repeat 
voters. Moreover, polls are even more susceptible to call-in teams as there is no 
screening process that weeds out suspected call-in team numbers. Phone-in voting 
is thus one of the most effective areas where call-in teams can skew political party 
representativeness on call-in shows. For this reason, polling numbers fluctuate 
wildly across a call-in program’s one-hour duration. 
Yet, because phone-in polling attracts viewers by galvanizing call-in 
teams and/or viewers to participate in this low-risk, passive-aggressive activity, 8 
o’clock, as well as other call-in shows, frequently incorporates them as an added 
feature to its standard roundtable discussion format. Unlike 2100, however, 8 
o’clock does not conduct its own in-house polls, nor quote other polling sources, 
for inclusion on their call-in show. Hence, featuring “objective” polling results is 
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not a priority for 8 o’clock, which is consistent with its general indifference 
towards presenting a “neutral” stance in its program format. 
In the following chapter, I introduce various approaches to 
conceptualizing the notion of “crisis” and particularly its relation to language use 
in politically-oriented settings. The next chapter also summarizes the 
sociopolitical issues and events that are featured or referenced in the call-in show 
excerpts I later examine. 
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Chapter Three: Framing Call-in Show “Crisis” Discourses 
 
This chapter explores the concept of ‘crisis’ as a form of strategic power 
(Edelman 1977, 1988; Tulis 1987) and a unifying force (Liebes 1999), which 
forms the basis of the study’s notion of “crisis” discourses. Next, the chapter 
discusses how Taiwan’s call-in shows present their featured topics within a 
“crisis” frame through Goffman’s (1974) notion of primary frameworks. I then 
introduce how ‘crisis’ is conceptualized and represented in Chinese by the two 
ideograms wei (危) and ji (機) as well as consider how the term is popularly 
understood by speakers in Taiwan as a juxtaposition of these two characters’ 
individual definitions as “danger” (wei) and “opportunity” (ji). This inherent 
duality of weiji informs this study’s investigation of Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis 
discourses, which I introduce in the latter half of the chapter. 
WHAT ARE CRISIS DISCOURSES? 
Crisis as concept and frame 
Despite its urgent and ominous connotations, ‘crisis’ as a conceptual 
construct cannot be easily categorized as either good or bad, positive or negative. 
When used to depict an emergency or threat, the term can inspire the need for 
unity and common sacrifice (Edelman 1977:45). Yet, when applied to shape 
public opinion, the descriptor can rationalize political policies that are detrimental 
to disadvantaged groups (Edelman 1988:32).  
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Of particular interest to this study is Edelman’s (1988) linkage of crisis to 
media practices, which he communicates in the following observation:1  
[A] crisis, like all news developments, is a creation of the language used to 
depict it; the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a 
fact or of a rare situation (31). 
Similarly, in his research on Israeli newspaper coverage of sociopolitical events, 
Lefkowitz describes over-dramatized press coverage as “media crises” (183). 
Edelman (1977) also recognizes that the language used to discuss each crisis is 
selective in what it chooses to emphasize and obscure (44). Drawing upon these 
perspectives, this study explores the manner in which call-in participants use 
language to recreate and contest Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses in ways 
that both encourage reconciliation and sow dissention. In addition, I examine how 
their linguistic practices contribute to maintaining the status quo as it 
simultaneously exposes the reproduction of such discourses. 
This study regards Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses as constituting 
and constituted by the political TV call-in show’s “primary framework,” which 
renders “what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of a scene into something 
that is meaningful” (Goffman 1974:21). Primary frameworks can vary in their 
organization, allowing users to “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly 
infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (ibid). In the case of 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows, their primary framework revolves around a 
crisis orientation, which participants contribute toward primarily through their 
linguistic behavior both verbally and nonverbally. Shen (1999) makes a similar 
assertion in her call-in show study when she claims that program headlines 
                                                 
1 Murray Edelman (1992) elucidates his concept of crisis in the article in “The construction of 
uses and social problems” by vividly conceptualizing a social crisis is a “radiation of signifiers” 
that evokes “an exploding set of scenes and signs that move in unpredictable directions and that 
radiate endlessly” (278-279). 
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engender a calculated and confrontational “simple dichotomy,” which call-in 
show hosts emphasize through their language use and moderating tactics (234).2 
My study is particularly interested in the organizing principles call-in 
participants use when orienting their speech towards Taiwan’s crisis discourses. 
Goffman’s notion of “frame” thus forms a central component of my analysis of 
the call-in show’s constructed crisis ambiance: 
I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and 
our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to 
such of these basic elements as I am able to identify (ibid:10-11, emphasis 
added). 
Given this study’s ethnographically-oriented and discourse-centered approach, my 
investigation into the crisis frame of Taiwan’s political call-in shows also 
considers the sociopolitical contexts (e.g., issues and events) participants’ 
linguistic practices index within and outside the call-in studio setting (cf. Duranti 
and Goodwin 1992). In this regard, I consider context as a process of inference 
(Gumperz 1982), in which linguistic actions are both context shaped and context 
renewing (Heritage 1984).3 
By extension, this study examines call-in participants’ linguistic 
construction of crisis discourses through a “frame space” (Goffman 1981:230). 
Frame spaces allow speakers to select certain options and forfeit others such that 
they are using only part of the entire space at any given time. This linguistic 
strategy proves particularly salient when presenting self and other voices through 
quoted speech as a means to establishing and reconfiguring the footing of ongoing 
talk. For instance, a speaker can utter words “formulated by someone in the name 
                                                 
2 In her observations of 2100’s host, Lee Tao, Shen describes him as “calculatedly orchestrat[ing] 
a preferred juxtaposition of conflicting opinions” toward the featured topic “with a tempo he 
schedules” (239). 
3 Duranti and Goodwin (1992) recognize the difficulty in defining the depth and range of 
“context” when they admit, “it does not seem possible…to give a single, precise, technical 
definition of context, and eventually we might have to accept that such a definition may not be 
possible” (2; original emphasis). 
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of someone, directing these remarks to some set of others in some of their 
capacities” (ibid:230), a tactic call-in participants frequently use and which this 
study later examines in greater detail. 
For call-in show crisis frames to be correctly performed and understood, 
participants assume that listeners share the same pool of beliefs and knowledge 
that they do as derived from their sociopolitical environment. Goffman (1974) 
describes this shared knowledge as a social framework or “guided doings,” which 
includes “background understanding [of] events that incorporate the will, aim, and 
controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human 
being” (22). Political TV call-in shows rely heavily upon the guided doings 
participants and viewers bring to the program, including their grasp of the 
sociopolitical events and issues that inform the program’s featured topics. 
Social frameworks aside, Edelman (1977) suggests that crisis discourses 
tend to be less emergent and more chronic as they reflect endemic economic and 
political power imbalances (44). In his investigation into the “continuing crisis” of 
U.S. education, Rollins (1996) identifies an inherent oxymoron when noting that 
the notion of a “persistent crisis” obscures an underlying and obfuscating 
discourse in “the larger drama of American citizenship itself” (4). He declares that 
crisis rhetoric substitutes for a clear mission and fails to fulfill a vision of an ideal 
society (ibid:262). Similarly, my study regards the call-in show’s crisis-
orientation as capitalizing upon prevailing sociopolitical inequalities in Taiwan’s 
international and domestic arenas, including Taiwan-China cross-straits relations, 
ethno-political tensions between benshengren (本省人) and waishengren 
(外省人), and gendered roles. Most significantly, call-in shows’ repeated 
featuring of crisis topics, as well as participants’ willingness to deliberate and 
viewers’ interest in watching the programs, suggests the need for public 
discussion of these issues within the country’s increasingly open and democratic 
environment. 
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In exploring the common practice of U.S. Presidents evoking crises to 
bolster their popular leadership, Tulis (1987) warns that routinized use of “crisis 
politics” may inversely undermine the public’s ability to distinguish genuine from 
spurious crises. However, Edelman (1977) argues that the divergence between the 
symbolic representation of crises and their concrete manifestation is intrinsic to 
their popular acceptance. Both these perspectives inform my exploration into the 
ways political TV call-in shows not only encourage, but also popularize a form of 
political deliberation that reproduces crisis discourses through its program format 
and participants’ linguistic behavior.  
Yet, two of the most problematic political influences in shaping social 
beliefs are public opinion on the one hand, and labeling events and issues as 
crisis-ridden on the other (Edelman 1977:43-46). This study’s investigation on 
call-in show crisis discourses focuses on the latter, and particularly, the act and 
negotiation of labeling sociopolitical events and issues as being in crisis. In their 
study of high school students’ labeling (or naming) practices, Eckert and 
McConnell-Ginet (1995) claim that labels represent a “socially significant and 
contested practice” and are only “endowed with meaning” when used in “relation 
to real people in real situations” (478). Rymes’ (1996) study of naming practices 
confirms this finding and adds that naming constitutes a social practice that can 
have “multiple generations of meaning” with the potential for appropriation and 
redefinition within different communities (258). 
Although these scholars focused upon the practice of labeling or naming 
persons rather than events, their understandings are applicable to my study’s 
interest in how sociopolitical issues and incidents are labeled (or not) as crises by 
call-in participants. The following opening monologue by 2100 moderator Lee 
Tao illustrates the manner in which program topics are infused with crisis 
descriptors and sentiment: 
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Hello everyone. Welcome to 2100: All People Open Talk! Right now we 
are going to discuss a problem. It is possible that this problem has always 
existed in our society, but seldom do people talk about it because this issue 
is quite…sensitive.4 
Just as labeling individuals requires “not simply a matter of fitting a word to a 
pre-existing [social] category” (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1995:478), the 
practice of labeling sociopolitical events or issues as “urgent,” “sensitive,” and 
“forbidden” also involves identifying and negotiating the various (e.g., dominant 
and marginal) discourses such terms engender.5 In my data analysis, I illustrate 
that Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses are not sui generis, but rather created 
and contested through call-in participants’ verbal interactions, and in particular, 
through reported speech. 
From a Foucaudian (1970) perspective, the act of naming is significant 
insofar as it points out that naming one thing is not naming another. For instance, 
it is significant to note how the same sociopolitical issue (e.g., ethno-political 
relations) are described by some as leading to “feelings of anxiety” and a “sense 
of loss,” while at other times they are regarded as “reconcilable” and “simple.”6 
Later, I examine a saliva war between two legislators where one accuses the other 
of labeling him or “putting a hat on” (kou maozi 扣帽子) him, while doing so in 
return. Contestations of acts of labeling or “acts of identity” (Le Page and 
Tabouret-Keller 1985) are telling moments of social interaction and sociopolitical 
processes as they reveal which groups or speakers are overtly marked, and 
inversely, which are not. 
Talk shows can also assume the role of an institutionalized facilitator by 
mediating between extraordinary, stressful “real world” events and a displaced 
                                                 
4 See Appendix B, Excerpt 1 for Chinese text. 
5 2100 moderator Lee Tao used these terms to describe Taiwan’s ethno-political tensions, which 
was the featured topic for that evening. 
6 There terms are used by President Chen Shui-bian and PFP Legislator Diane Lee respectively. I 
present excerpts of these statements in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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populace. For instance, when 2100: All People Open Talk broadcast on-site 
episodes in locales such as Chi-chi (集集) in central Taiwan following the 
devastating  1999 September 21 earthquake in which over 2000 people were 
killed, the call-in show filled a sociopolitical need by providing victims a public 
forum and outlet to express their frustrations and fears toward the local and 
central governments. Similar examples can also be found in the U.S., including 
24-hour coverage by network and cable news stations in the days and weeks 
following September 11, and more recently, during the U.S. war with Iraq. 
However, mass media need not inspire participants to deliberate exceptional 
events for viewers and non-viewers alike to feel its presence and impact on public 
opinion and political decision-making (Meyorwitz 1985).  
In personal interviews with two of the producers of CTN’s Face-to-face 
Debate (Xiang dui lun 相對論), they stated that their call-in show abets viewers 
and panelists to build consensus around controversial issues and events, which 
also contributes to strengthening Taiwan’s maturing democratic society (Ho Sun-
sea 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000). While this study concurs that call-in shows provide 
an invaluable space for the public deliberation of previously banned topics, such 
as Taiwan’s national identity and which continues to be a sensitive issue, this 
study considers these programs as being less a model of “consensus-building” per 
se than an example of “agreeing to disagree.”  
When the study turns to examining several instances of guest panelists 
engaging in “saliva wars” or verbal sparring, I investigate how this oppositional 
yet collaborative linguistic practice represents the primary manner through which 
dissenting views are articulated, contested, and negotiated. Moreover, given the 
study’s premise that call-in shows present their featured topics within a crisis 
frame and participants’ reproduce sociopolitical crisis discourses through their 
language use, it would be antithetical to regard call-in shows as regarding 
consensus-building as their modus operandi as that would preclude the 
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regeneration of the aforementioned mass-mediated and discursive products five 
nights a week. 
Similarly, consciousness-raising does not necessarily lead to critical 
thinking or the reassessment of sociopolitical crises. Bourdieu (1977) expresses 
this sentiment when he states that while a crisis represents a “necessary condition 
for a questioning of doxa,” it is “not a sufficient condition for the production of a 
critical discourse” (169). In the present study, I forward that Taiwan’s political 
TV call-in shows minimally include and entertain the heterodox voices of callers 
who supposedly represent the “true” voice of the people, even as the programs 
abet the orthodox agendas of Taiwan’s political parties by inviting guest panelists 
that represent their worldviews. 
This study thus regards call-in show crisis discourses as a form of cultural 
capital (Bourdieu 1985, 1991) that the programs institutionalize and participants 
strategically wield, context, and exchange during program deliberations. 
Specifically, cultural capital consists of “knowledge, skills, and other cultural 
acquisitions as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications” (Thompson 
1991:14), which an individual can use to generate “privilege, products, income, or 
wealth” (Smart 1993:392). Moreover, cultural capital can be both “embodied 
within the self through a process of education and cultivation, and 
institutionalized, such as when…accorded recognition by authorities” (ibid, 
original italics). 
Within Bourdieu’s (1991) “political field,” which he describes as a site 
where “political products, issues, programs, analyses, commentaries, concepts and 
events are created” (172), cultural capital constitutes an invaluable instrument that 
is necessary to participate actively in politics. Consequently, this study regards 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows as a mass-mediated political field where 
agents (e.g., moderators, guest panelists, and callers) participate in the exchange 
and production of crisis discourses in the form of program topics on controversial 
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sociopolitical issues and events. These discourses thus serve as and represent call-
in participants’ primary cultural capital within the political field of the call-in 
show. 
By repeatedly featuring crisis-oriented topics episode after episode, call-in 
shows abet the institutionalization of Taiwan’s crisis discourses through 
participants deliberations as they animate, contest, and negotiate their existence, 
real or imagined.  Drawing further upon Bourdieu’s description of the political 
field, this study also regards Taiwan’s political TV call-in programs as: 
…limiting the universe of political discourse…[to] what is politically 
thinkable, to the finite space of discourses capable of being produced or 
reproduced within the limits of the political problematic, understood as a 
space of stances effectively adopted within the field—i.e. stances that are 
socio-logically possible given the laws that determine entry into the field 
(ibid:172; original italics). 
In terms of Taiwan’s mass media and sociopolitical arenas, what is “politically 
thinkable” are the country’s real or imagined sociopolitical crises, four of which I 
introduce later in this chapter. As my analyses of call-in show excerpts later 
illustrate, participants who are willing to adopt a crisis stance and perform crisis 
voices are those who are most successful in having their interpretation 
deliberated, but not necessarily accepted. Inversely, those participants who 
attempt to discredit crisis-oriented readings of an event or issue, or even dare to 
expose the fallacy of the discursive production and reproduction of crises, are 
marginalized in this elite playing field or “game” (Bourdieu  1977, 1991). This is 
particularly apparent when guest panelists engage in saliva wars or verbal 
sparring whereby verbal duelists compete to present a more persuasive crisis 
interpretation than one’s opponent, a speech event I elaborate upon in Chapter 
Seven. 
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Weiji (crisis) as danger and opportunity 
Whether “crisis” is rendered in English or in Mandarin Chinese as “weiji”  
(危機), both languages share similar interpretations for this concept. For instance, 
a U.S. English dictionary defines “crisis” as an “unstable or crucial time or state 
of affairs in which a decisive change is impending” or “a situation that has 
reached a critical phase” (Merriam Webster’s Dictionary 1995: 275). A Chinese 
dictionary from Taiwan offers a comparable explanation for weiji (危機) as: (1) a 
potential for latent disaster or misfortune; (2) a critical moment between life or 
death, success or failure; or (3) a phrase of warning as in “economic crisis.”7 
Recently, however, a popularized conceptualization of weiji has emerged 
that reflects and highlights the dialectical tension between the two Chinese 
ideograms that comprise the term, namely, wei (危) and ji (機). Given the above 
dictionary definitions for “weiji,” “wei” translates as “danger,” while “ji” (機) is 
contextually understood as “a pivotal turning point”—as in 樞機 (shuji) meaning 
a “vital point” or “pivot.”8 Nonetheless a “folk etymology”9 has emerged that also 
regards ji (機) as meaning “opportunity,” thus contrasting this ideogram with 
wei’s (危) meaning as “danger.” 10 
Examples of this popular evolution of weiji as constituting a juxtaposition 
between “danger” and “opportunity” can be found in the following example. The 
late UC Berkeley chancellor Tien Chang-lin (田長霖) reportedly displayed the 
                                                 
7 The original definition reads as: (1) 潛伏的禍機﹔(2) 生死成敗的緊要關頭﹔(3) 即 
“經濟危機”的省語(簡明活用辭典﹐五南圖書出版公司﹐1997). English translation made by 
the author. 
8 The Chinese explanation is represented as: 事物的關鍵 (簡明活用辭典, 1990:686). 
9 I thank Dr. Avron Boretz for contributing this descriptor as a means for explaining the 
contemporary interpretation of ji as “opportunity.” 
10 The Greek language has a similar understanding of “crisis” as a combination of danger and 
opportunity. (I thank Kristen Hoerl for bringing this to my attention.)  I should also add that ji can 
also mean “time”; thus, weiji as “danger” and “time” more closely approximates the English 
interpretation of “crisis” as a  “time of danger” or critical moment. 
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Chinese characters “危機” on his office wall and stated that he preferred to see 
most crises as opportunities.11 Common sayings that use wei such as “turning 
danger into stability or peace” (zhuan wei wei an 轉危為安) and terms that 
include ji such as “a favorable turn” (zhuanji 轉機) likewise capture the notion of 
turning an unfavorable event into something favorable. 
This study regards this popularized understanding of weiji as a delicate 
balance between “danger” and “opportunity” as a useful (bifocal) lens through 
which to analyze the crisis frame of political TV call-in shows, and moreover, the 
crisis discourses participants deliberate. In the following chapters, I seek to 
demonstrate how call-in shows and their participants address and render Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical crisis discourses as cultural capital by seizing upon the latent and 
manifest dangers and opportunities in the topics they feature and deliberate 
respectively. I regard language, and specifically speech reporting, as the primary 
tool through which participants commodify and exchange this cultural capital 
during program deliberations. 
CRISIS DISCOURSES AS SPEECH PLAY 
If one considers the political call-in show format as “infotainment,” that is, 
a mixture of news and entertainment, then successful adherence to both aspects 
requires participants to engage in linguistic hybridity or “blendings” (Bauman 
1992) of several speech genres. I forward that the crisis discourses participants 
perform on Taiwan’s call-in shows blends and extends the verbal artistry that 
speakers use in the daily conduct of their social lives into the realm of mass media 
and politics. Briggs (1988) suggests that speakers are frequently inspired by 
resources within their immediate social, physical, and linguistic context when 
engaging in speech play and verbal art. Interdisciplinary research on the creativity 
of language use also recognizes that speech play can occur anywhere, and 
                                                 
11 Taken from: http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2002/10/tien.html. 
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moreover, can be found embedded within other linguistic forms (Sherzer and 
Woodbury 1987:8-9). 
In call-in participants’ endeavors to orient their linguistic behavior 
towards the call-in show’s overarching crisis frame, my study explores how their 
performance of two types of speech play, or speech genres with a playful 
orientation, contributes to this end including “reconciliation (hejie 和解) talk” and 
“saliva wars” (koushui zhan 口水戰). My study considers reconciliation talk and 
saliva wars as opposing yet complimentary speech genres that collectively capture 
the opportunities and dangers of the sociopolitical crisis issues and events call-in 
shows feature. This includes the reconciliation or appeasement of crisis 
interpretations on the one hand, and the enactment of crisis scenarios through 
verbal sparring on the other. 
Participants’ manipulation of the part-real, part-imaginary nuances of 
crisis discourses in call-in show talk corroborates Goffman’s (1959) interpretation 
of performance as any activity that succeeds in persuading other participants that 
the “impression of reality which he [sic] stages is the real reality” (17; original 
emphasis). Basso’s (1979) study of Western Apache joking practices of the 
Whiteman represents a primary example of how speech play and discursive 
ideologies intersect. In his observations, he discovered that joking often indexes 
and renegotiates complex sociocultural relations of power and status that the 
performer has experienced or observed. Similarly, this study later explores how 
call-in participants use various strategic linguistic devices (e.g., reported speech, 
code-switching, and prosodic stylization) to index locally-recognizable personas 
and editorialize their unequal sociopolitical relations.  
However, before doing so, the following sections introduce several 
ideological issues and sociopolitical events that captured the attention of Taiwan’s 
political TV call-in shows during the period I conducted fieldwork for this study. 
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TAIWAN’S “REAL” SOCIOPOLITICAL CRISES 
Taiwan’s historically-based yet evolving sociopolitical conflicts serve as 
the backdrop to and material for the call-in show’s crisis-oriented topics, and 
subsequently, participants’ deliberations. In the call-in show excerpts I later 
analyze, participants frequently reference and deliberate the following four issues 
and events: 1) cross-straits relations between Taiwan and China,12 and in 
particular, the concept of “China” (zhongguo 中國) and the “one China principle” 
(yige zhongguo de yuanze 一個中國的原則); 2) the 2000 ROC presidential 
election held on March 18th; 3) ethno-political relations (shengji qingjie 
省籍情解) between Taiwan’s two main ethno-political groups, “Mainlanders” or 
waishengren (外省人) and “Taiwanese” or benshengren (本省人);13 and, 4) 
gendered identities and roles in Taiwan politics as embodied by the Republic of 
China’s (ROC) first female vice president, Annette Lu. 
The cross-straits crisis: Taiwan-China relations 
The cross-straits “crisis” between Taiwan and China can be summarized 
as a 53-year old civil war over two opposing worldviews: one which argues for a 
unified “one China” (yige zhongguo 一個中國) versus another that pursues 
official declaration of Taiwan independence (Taidu 台獨 or Taiwan duli 
台灣獨立). These divergent sociopolitical agendas stem from the “temporary” 
establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國)14 
government to the islands of Taiwan (台灣), Penghu (澎湖), Matsu (馬祖), and 
Kinmen (金門) following the Nationalist Party’s (a.k.a. Kuomintang, KMT 
                                                 
12 Throughout the dissertation I use “China” interchangeably with its official title, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Distinctions between Taiwan and ROC on the one hand, and China and 
the PRC on the other, are provided later in the chapter. 
13 I explain these terms in more detail later in this section. 
14 The Republic of China was officially established by Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山) on 
mainland China, the current PRC, on October 10, 1911. 
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國民黨) defeat under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) (Zhongguo Gongchandang 中國共產黨). Subsequently, 
under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤東), the CCP founded the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
中華人民共和國) on the mainland (dalu 大陸) or what is generally recognized 
today as “China.”15 Since this geopolitical division, the leadership on both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits has been mired in an impasse over what constitutes “China,” 
and by extension, the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty as an independent nation-
state.16 
For the PRC, Taiwan represents the last jewel in the Chinese Communist 
Party’s crown that has yet to be reunited with the “Chinese motherland,” 
especially following the repatriation of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in 
1997 and Macau from Portugal in 1999. In Taiwan, however, the notion of 
“China” is alternately embraced and vilified by vying ideological groups who 
range from China reunification traditionalists to Taiwan independence advocates. 
In short, the Taiwan-PRC cross-straits crisis represents the unresolved status of 
disparate political ideologies regarding the reestablishment of a unified “China” 
or the formal declaration of an independent “Republic of Taiwan.” However, 
given the geopolitical consequences of either outcome, cross-straits relations 
continuously oscillate between the status quo and potential military confrontation 
depending upon the domestic and international events that might be considered 
(un)favorable to either side of the Taiwan Straits. 
                                                 
15 Chairman Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 
1949. 
16 Although I attempt to provide an objective presentation of cross-straits relations, I am aware 
that my ideological biases emerge in my writing. However, to completely ignore or erase them is 
neither possible nor appropriate for my study’s ethnographic approach. Thus while my account 
exposes my political leanings to the careful reader, attempts have been made to moderate them as 
much as possible. 
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Taiwan’s national identity crisis 
Cross-straits tensions also play a crucial role in Taiwan’s national identity 
in terms of whether the island constitutes a sovereign nation-state or represents a 
province of China or (cf. Copper 1996). This issue becomes particularly salient 
during Taiwan’s national elections—including those for the Legislative Yuan, 
Taipei mayor, ROC president—as voters weigh potential candidates and the 
parties they represent by their pro-(China) unification or pro-(Taiwan) 
independence stance. Generally, voting decisions are also linked to concerns over 
Taiwan’s national security, and particularly, in its relations with China.17 During 
the 1990s, these concerns entered the economic domain as Taiwan’s economy 
became increasingly linked, and some would argue dangerously dependent upon, 
with China’s. 
Taiwan’s political parties and candidates thus attempt to differentiate 
themselves from their opponents, and for their voters, by their national identity 
platforms and cross-straits policies or “white papers” (baipishu 白皮書). Parties 
labeled as “mainland China-friendly” (qin dalu 親大陸)—such as the New Party 
(NP) (Xindang 新黨) and to a lesser degree the KMT—campaign on platforms 
that advocate eventual reunification with China.18 Since the late 1980s, the KMT 
has attempted to shed its mainland China-identity by pursuing a “Taiwanization” 
or bentu (本土) approach that incorporates more local Taiwanese in its ranks, 
such as former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). The KMT has also attempted to 
shift to the political center by representing the status quo, which includes neither 
                                                 
17 Many candidates create slogans or mottos that directly include terms such as “peace” (heping 
和平) and “stability” (pingan 平安) a long with “prosperity” (fu 福) and “happiness” (yule 愉樂) 
notions that promote national and personal well-being, which is important to Taiwan’s economy 
and international/national status. 
18 Recently, the New Party has altered its ideological perspective to reflect Taiwan’s present 
sovereign status. However, the party continues to base its argument on the 1945 Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Shinoseki that repatriated Taiwan and its territories to “China” after 50 years of Japanese 
colonial rule.  
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renouncing unification nor taking steps towards Taiwan independence. Despite 
the party’s persistent claims that the Republic of China (ROC) represents 
“China,” the KMT’s predominantly benshengren or Taiwanese support base has 
forced the party to take a more pragmatic stance towards Taiwan’s national 
identity issue. 
In contrast, political parties that lean towards Taiwan independence to 
varying degrees—such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Minjingdang 
民進黨), the current ruling party, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 
(Taiwan Tuanjie Lianmeng 台灣團結聯盟)19—offer a Taiwan-based worldview. 
This ideological stance contends that Taiwan has never been a part of present-day 
“China” as represented by either the ROC or PRC governments given that it was 
the Qing (清) Dynasty that seceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 following their 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (Gardella 1999: 187).20 Since becoming Taiwan’s 
ruling party in May 2000, however, the DPP has moderated its Taiwan 
independence stance under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Under the 
guidance of former ROC president and former KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui 
(李登輝), the TSU now represents the country’s most vocal proponent of Taiwan 
independence. 
Another new party, the People’s First Party (PFP) (Qinmindang 親民黨) 
has attempted to present itself as apolitical in regards to Taiwan’s national identity 
discourses. Founded in 2000, James Soong (宋楚瑜), the PFP’s chairman and a 
former KMT high-ranking official, has engineered a party platform that focuses 
                                                 
19 The Taiwan Solidarity Union was formed by Lee Teng-hui supporters in late 2001. While its 
members include former KMT and DPP supporters, the party continues Lee’s vision of building a 
“Taiwanized” (bentuhua 本土化) ROC. 
20 Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist Party or KMT overthrew the Qing Dynasty 
in 1911. 
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on combating “black gold”21 (heijin 黑金) or political corruption, while 
obfuscating its cross-straits agenda as a means to not only differentiate itself from 
the KMT and New Party, given that most of its followers were former KMT and 
to a lesser degree NP supporters, but also to attract moderate voters.22 
ROC national elections and PRC saber-rattling 
Taiwan’s national identity discourses have faced new complications for 
reasons arising from rapid sociopolitical changes within the country over the last 
15 years. This includes the lifting of martial law in 1987 as well as the gradual 
democratization of its political system and national elections throughout the 
1990s, which recently produced the ROC’s first democratic transfer of power 
from the mainland China-derived KMT to the Taiwan-based DPP party in 2000.  
Nonetheless, Taiwan’s national sovereignty issue remains linked to and 
influenced by its tenuous relations with the PRC. For instance, prior to Taiwan’s 
first democratic presidential elections in 1996,23 the PRC launched “military 
exercises” in the Taiwan Straits as its leadership regarded the elections as a step 
towards Taiwan independence.24 Despite the PRC’s saber rattling and attempts to 
intimidate Taiwan’s voters, presidential incumbent and KMT candidate Lee Teng-
                                                 
21 To the U.S. reader, and especially Texans, “black gold” in this case does not refer to the other 
kind of “gold,” namely, oil or petroleum. 
22 As of February 2003, reports have circulated that PFP chairman James Soong may team with 
KMT chairman Lien Chan in the 2004 presidential race. If this presidential ticket transpires, the 
PFP’s political stance will have swung decidely back into the KMT camp. 
23 In an instance where art imitates life, a recent episode (February 28, 2002) of The West Wing 
(NBC)—a political drama that details events within a Democratic White House—depicted a cross-
straits scenario loosely based on events in March 1996 when China engaged in military exercises 
in the Taiwan Straits. While the TV series portrayed China’s actions as a warning to Taiwan for 
testing “American-made Patriot missiles” and for “thinking about holding democratic elections,” 
the actual incident occurred in anticipation of Taiwan’s first democratic presidential elections. 
24 The first direct presidential elections in 1996 escalated cross straits tensions to its highest point 
in 40 years between not only the two main protagonists, but also China and the United States. 
President Clinton responded to the PRC’s military exercises by deploying two US aircraft carriers 
to the Taiwan Straits. 
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hui enjoyed a landslide victory, one which further cemented Taiwan’s place 
within the club of democratic nations.25  
In response, the PRC suspended future cross-straits talks and refused to 
acknowledge the “one China, each with his own interpretation” (yige Zhongguo 
gezi biaoshu 一個中國各自表述) understanding unofficial representatives from 
Taiwan and China had reached in 1992.26 Events in the summer of 1999 added to 
cross-straits tensions when President Lee unceremoniously introduced his “special 
state-to-state relations” (teshu guo yu guo guanxi 特殊國與國關係) cross-straits 
policy,27 which stated that both Taiwan and China are sovereign states yet enjoy a 
special relationship due to their shared cultural origins. Following this impromptu 
pronunciation, the PRC claimed that President Lee’s revised reading of the “one 
China” agreement was tantamount to declaring Taiwan independence. 
In the months before Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, the PRC again 
threatened Taiwan’s voters, this time opting to exercise verbal rather than military 
missiles. For instance, in a call-in show excerpt I later examine, a video clip 
features PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) warning “Taiwan compatriots” 
(Taiwan tongbao 台灣同胞) to not do “anything emotional and rash,” otherwise 
they “won’t have any opportunities to regret it.”28 The prime minister’s 
unambiguous language sought to dissuade Taiwan’s voters from electing Taiwan 
independence advocate and DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian. However, 
the PRC government’s thinly veiled threats merely emboldened Taiwan’s 
                                                 
25 Lee won with 53% of the popular vote. 
26 Aside from having official departments that address cross-straits relations, meetings between 
Taiwan and China have been held between the chairpersons of organizations that unofficially 
represent the respective governments. For instance, Taiwan is represented by Koo Chen-fu 
(辜振甫), the chair of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)), while China is represented by 
Wan Daohan (汪道涵) of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) . 
27 In July 1999, President Lee introduced this policy during an interview with a German radio 
station. 
28 For the entire excerpt, see Appendix B, Excerpt 6. 
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electorate to exercise their democratic and sovereign rights by electing Chen into 
office over independent candidate James Soong and KMT candidate Lien Chan 
(連戰) in a closely contested race.29 
Taiwan’s 2000 election represented an unprecedented presidential 
campaign for another reason as well. Political TV call-in shows played a 
significant role as candidate spokespersons and supporters capitalized upon the 
programs’ “free” airtime to articulate their support for or against a specific 
candidate. This study suggests that a primary battlefield for Taiwan’s 2000 
presidential election occurred on the small screen and not in elaborately 
orchestrated campaign rallies, such as during the 1996 presidential election and in 
the 1998 Taipei mayoral race.30 Moreover, in a departure from previous national 
elections in which TV commercials constituted the frontlines for disseminating 
candidates’ campaign platforms—as during KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui’s 1996 
election—political TV call-in shows were also pivotal in promoting candidates 
and combating misinformation. 
Although my study does not directly address the 2000 presidential 
election, several call-in excerpts refer to the cross-straits and domestic tensions it 
inspired. In one excerpt, I examine how 2100: All People Open Talk moderator, 
Lee Tao, recalls and responds to PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s forewarning 
that Taiwan’s electorate “must stay alert” (yaojingyi 要警惕). The verbal warfare 
between the two geopolitical entities subsequently enters the call-in show studio 
when Lee Tao creatively expresses the defiance of Taiwan’s voters through 
hypothetical reported speech. As I later demonstrate, call-in participants find ways 
                                                 
29 The margin of victory between Chen Shui-bian and James Soong  was separated by less than 
three percentage points. Chen 39.3%  won of the popular vote to Soong’s 36.84% (Taipei Journal, 
April 20, 2001:1). 
30 The 1998 mayoral elections also featured DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian, this time as the 
incumbent mayoral candidate, who was defeated by KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Ironcially, 
some political analysts declared Chen’s loss as a sign of his political irrelevance and eventual 
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to reconfigure sociopolitical power imbalances through innovative uses of 
language. 
Ethno-political relations (shengji qingjie): benshengren/waishengren tensions 
Aside from cross-straits relations, another issue that Taiwan’s politicians 
alternately manipulate and avoid during elections are references to “ethno-
political relations” (shengji qinjie 省籍情結). The phrase shenji qingjie can be 
literally translated as “province identity sentiments.” The notion of shengji (省籍) 
or “province identity” refers to a person’s patrilineal ancestral origins,31 while 
qingjie (情結), interpreted here as “sentiments,” denotes an individual’s 
emotional affiliation for her geographic origins or roots.  
However, Chang (1994) describes shengji wenti (省籍問題) or the 
“shengji problem” as not one simply based on provincial origin, but rather on the 
“‘making’ of an ethnic problem and the re-discovery (or for some, discovery) of a 
new ethnic identity” (94). Shengji differences can also be regarded as only one of 
several sociopolitical organizing processes in Taiwan society that is arranged 
according to different “social power dimensions” (ibid). Drawing from this 
understanding, my study prefers to translate shengji qingjie as “ethno-political 
relations” as the phrase more accurately captures the ethnic, sociocultural, and 
political factors that contribute to tensions between benshengren (本省人) or 
Taiwanese and waishengren (外省人) or Mainlanders,32 and which also impacts 
                                                                                                                                     
demise. In another inaccurate prognostication, the KMT mayoral victory was regarded as a 
forecast of the 2000 presidential election outcome. 
31 For instance, even though I was born and raised in the U.S., I would be categorized as a 
waishengren or “Mainlander” in Taiwan given that my father was born in Fuzhou, China. 
Moreover, if an individual’s father was born in China, but has a mother who was born in Taiwan, 
she would still be considered a “waishengren.” 
32 I prefer not to use “ethnic groups” to distinguish between Taiwan’s Mainlander (waishengren), 
Taiwanese (benshengren), and Hakka populations as they are all considered as Han Chinese. 
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Taiwan’s two other ethno-political categories including the Hakka (kejiaren 
客家人) and eleven Aboriginal groups.  
According to the Government Information Office’s (GIO) annual 
publication, the Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan’s population is comprised of 
four broad groups. These four groups include Taiwanese who are largely of 
Minnan (閩南)33 descent, Mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan from mainland 
China between 1945 to 1949, Hakka (kejiaren 客家人), and members of Taiwan’s 
eleven Aboriginal groups (yuanzhumin 原住民).34 As of early 2002, Taiwan’s 
ethnic composition is roughly 85% Taiwanese, 10% Mainlander, 3.5% Hakka, 
and 1.5% Aborigine (including all eleven groups).35  
The English descriptor “Taiwanese” proves both problematic and 
insufficient to describe Taiwan’s complex ethno-political differentiations as it is 
also used to represent another identifier, namely, the Mandarin Chinese term for 
Taiwanren (台灣人). In a personal interview, speech communication professor 
Jack Yu (Yu Tzu-hsiang 游梓翔) of Shih Hsin University (世新大學) explained 
that the term “Taiwanren” was originally used to describe a cultural group 
(wenhua zuqun 文化族群) (Jack Tzu-hsiang Yu 2000). Recently, another 
sociopolitical identifier, “new Taiwanese” (Xin Taiwanren 新台灣人), has 
entered Taiwan’s sociopolitical lexicon. This term gained popularity during the 
1998 Taipei mayoral election when former ROC President Lee Teng-hui used the 
descriptor to emphasize KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) identification 
                                                 
33 Minnan refers to speakers of the Southern Min dialect. These speakers largely immigrated from 
present-day southern Fujian province in China. 
34 Mainlanders, Taiwanese, and Hakka are all considered to be Han Chinese. Distinctions between 
the three groups are generally based on language and date each group immigrated to Taiwan from 
China (cf. Wachman 1994; Chen, Chuang, and Huang 1994). 
35 The Republic of China Yearbook (2000) lists nine Aborigine groups. However, an article in the 
Taipei Times in December 2002 reported that ROC government recently recognized an eleventh 
tribe. 
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with Taiwan despite having been born in mainland-China. President Lee’s 
linguistic move strategically avoided labeling Ma Ying-jeou as a Mainlander or 
waishengren as means to increase Ma’s appeal to non-waishengren voters, such 
as benshengren. Given these disparate political readings, I prefer to use the term 
benshengren rather than Taiwanese when identifying this cultural group in my 
discussions of ethno-political tensions between benshengren and waishengren. 
Similarly, I use the term Mainlander for waishengren rather than 
“Chinese” (Zhongguoren 中國人) when referring to Han Chinese who 
immigrated to Taiwan from China after 1945. This is due to the ideological and 
mythological connotations Zhongguoren evokes, including “obligations and 
loyalties of political affiliation and the myth of the Central Country” (Tu 
1991:25). According to Tu Weiming (1991), the English translations of “Central 
Country” or “Middle Kingdom” both poetically and ideologically capture the 
Chinese term and notion of “Zhongguo” (中國), more commonly referred to as 
“China.” Although debates regarding whether the people of Taiwan are 
Zhongguoren enters into ethno-political discourses, my emphasis on using 
waishengren grounds sociopolitical relations between waishengren and 
benshengren as a Taiwan-based issue as opposed to one that involves “Chinese” 
elsewhere, including those in China, Singapore, or Hong Kong. 
These descriptors represent the crux of a call-in excerpt I examine in 
which a female guest panelist presents her interpretations of the identifiers 
Zhongguoren and Taiwanren while negotiating their sensitive sociopolitical 
ideologies. In stretching the two term’s indexical meanings, the panelist 
simultaneously demonstrates their highly fluid state and arbitrary groundings. She 
succeeds in broadening the terms’ politicized understandings by reconfiguring 
their reified interpretations in a “thought experiment” (Myers 1999a) through the 
use of hypothetical reported speech, a linguistic device I elaborate upon in the 
next chapter. 
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Returning to the notion of shengji qingjie or ethno-political sentiments, the 
phrase also refers to tensions arising from historical, sociopolitical power 
imbalances between benshengren and waishengren, which still resonate in 
Taiwan even today. Tensions between these two sociopolitical groups derive from 
Taiwan’s oppressive past, including the incarceration and massacre of thousands 
of benshengren36 under the mainland China-derived KMT regime when the 
country was under martial law from the late 1940s to 1987 (cf. Phillips 1999).  
Consequently, ethno-political sentiments derive from a half century of 
waishengren hegemony over Taiwan’s local population, which is predominantly 
comprised of benshengren. The martial law policy the KMT had implemented on 
the Chinese mainland in 1948 in an effort to suppress communist rebellion was 
continued on Taiwan as a means to eliminate local cultural and linguistic 
practices, which KMT leaders considered a potential threat to their mainland-
based regime (Wang 1999:323). Several events in recent Taiwan history 
immortalize the injustices the local population endured at the hands of the KMT 
including the February 28 Incident in 1947, more commonly referred to as 2-28 
(er-er-ba 二二八); the White Terror Era (baise kongbu 白色恐怖) that covered 
the 1950s to late 1970s; and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 (cf. Kerr 1965; 
Mendel 1970; Peng 1966). 
The combined factors of a waishengren ruling party and its suppression of 
the local, predominantly benshengren population has thus contributed to lingering 
ethno-political sentiments and ideological differences between these two groups 
(Wachman 1994:30-33). Since the implementation of free national elections in the 
late 1980s, evolving power relations between benshengren and waishengren 
manifest themselves in political party ideologies as electoral candidates frequently 
                                                 
36 Individuals from other ethno-political groups were also mistreated by the KMT during this 
period, including the Hakka and Abroginal groups. Mainlanders were occasionally the victims of 
sociopolitical abuse as well. However, the overwhelming majority of the victims were 
benshengren. 
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use the identifiers to categorize, divide, and attract voters (Rigger 1999:141). As 
presented earlier in the chapter, each political party’s worldview regarding 
Taiwan’s sovereignty and national identity is distinguished in the sociopolitical 
imaginary according to pro-Taiwan independence and benshengren-favorable 
versus pro-unification and waishengren-favorable agendas.37 
Yet, these demarcations ignore Taiwan’s increasingly multicultural and 
multilingual society where such political distinctions carry less relevance in 
everyday interactions. Taiwan’s political landscape has gradually acknowledged 
these trends in its campaign strategies with the coining of the identifier Xin 
Taiwanren (新台灣人) or “New Taiwanese” an apt example of politicians’ early 
attempts to replace old ethno-political categories with contemporary, yet just as 
limiting identifiers.38  
Given that inter-group marriage is increasingly common in Taiwan, 
Professor Yu cautions that to manipulate “shengji” for political ends is dangerous 
and sensitive (Jack Yu 2000). The persistent generation of ethno-political crisis 
discourses by Taiwan’s political parties reflects sociopolitical struggles over 
power and popular support as well as a deliberate denial of Taiwan’s diversified 
demographics. Call-in shows thus emerge as another site where ethno-political 
relations take center stage as program producers recognize the range of 
politicians-cum-guest panelists available to discuss this issue as well as the wide 
of appeal it holds for Taiwan’s viewers.39 
                                                 
37 Despite this reified and dichotomous reading of Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment, concerns 
associated with the Hakka and Aborigine groups do periodically arise to public consciousness. For 
instance, in the 2000 presidential election, independent presidential candidate Hsu Hsin-liang 
(許信良) campaigned as a Hakka candidate in seeking to appeal to that segment of the population. 
38 In Taiwan parlance, this labeling practice is colloquially described as “putting a hat on 
someone” (kou maozi 扣帽子). I examine a saliva war in Chapter Seven that addresses this 
practice. 
39 I recognize that a chicken-and-egg scenario may be occurring here as viewers and guest 
panelists react to the call-in show’s emphasis on ethno-political relations and vice versa. 
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The constitutional crisis: gendered politics and VP Annette Lu 
The final crisis issue this study examines focuses on call-in show 
deliberations of ROC Vice President Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lian 呂秀蓮), and in 
particular, the “constitutional crisis” that her controversial linguistic behavior 
initiated. In a string of verbal remarks uttered shortly after her inauguration as the 
ROC’s first female vice president in May 2000, Lu referred to her position in 
President Chen Shui-bian’s administration as a “scorned woman in the palace” 
(shengong yuanfu 深宮怨婦), declared that “Jiang Zemin only dares to insult 
women” (Jiang Zemin zhi gan ma nüren 江澤民只敢罵女人) in response to the 
PRC president’s personal attacks toward her, and finally, compared herself as 
playing the “black face” (heilian 黑臉) or “bad cop” to President Chen’s “white 
face” (bailian 白臉) or “good cop.”40 
In the 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices episode my study examines, I 
demonstrate how guest panelists revoice Annette Lu’s verbal utterances and 
reframe them as endangering Taiwan’s national security. Call-in panelists succeed 
in reappropriating her original remarks by linking their evaluations of the 
utterances with their own reportings of them through quoted speech. I contrast 
these guest panelists’ negative portrayals of Annette Lu with another female 
panelist’s defense of the Vice President’s linguistic behavior. I later demonstrate 
that the female panelist’s arguments are weakened by her reliance on indirect 
rather than direct reported speech in her efforts to contextualize Lu’s remarks 
within the vice president’s speech honoring Taiwan’s women’s rights movement. 
Finally, I consider call-in participants’ deliberations regarding Annette Lu’s 
controversial linguistic behavior as reflecting the inequalities in Taiwan politics 
including gendered relations of power, status, and identity. 
                                                 
40 A more detailed analysis of Lu’s statements is provided in Chapters Five and Seven. 
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Frequently, women in Taiwan enter politics via male family connections, 
abetted by the status, prestige, and guanxi (關係), roughly translated as 
“network,”41 or influence of a father, brother, or husband. More often than not, 
when a male relation is jailed, retires, or dies, a wife, daughter, sister, or niece 
assumes the vacant position (cf. Chou et al. 1990). Annette Lu, however, entered 
into Taiwan politics driven by her own convictions and considerable resolve. Lu 
emerged onto Taiwan’s political scene in dramatic fashion during the White 
Terror Era (1950-70s) when martial law was at its height under KMT rule.  
Among the opposition leaders who were incarcerated for anti-government 
activity in the early 1970s, Annette Lu was only one of two females42 detained in 
a political penitentiary on Green Island (lü dao 綠島).43 Following the Kaohsiung 
Incident in 1979, Annette Lu was again arrested for participating in opposition 
party activities. As one of the deputy editors of the subversive journal, Formosa 
(Meilidao 美麗島),44 Lu also played a key role in promoting pro-Taiwanese 
independence consciousness. Following her incarceration, Lu and several of her 
former prison-mates continued to vociferously advocate for a transparent and 
democratic sociopolitical environment that included an eventual plebiscite on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty as an independent country. 
Incidentally, the “constitutional crisis” Lu’s verbal behavior initiated was 
not the first time Annette Lu had been criticized for undermining Taiwan’s 
national stability. For instance, her detractors decried Lu for leading Taiwan’s 
                                                 
41 The Chinese concept of “guanxi” (關係) is complex and involves not only personal networks 
and close affiliation but also reciprocal obligation and investment. For further reading on the topic, 
see Kipnis (1997), Smart (1993), Yan (1996), and Yang (1994a). 
42 Other opposition leaders who were incarcerated included current ROC President Chen Shui-
bian and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) founder and former chairperson, Shi Ming-teh 
(施明德). 
43 Green Island is located off the southeastern coast of Taiwan. The penitentiary is no longer used, 
while a monument was recently constructed on the island commemorating universal human rights. 
44 The name of the magazine was inspired by the Portuguese descriptor for Taiwan, ihla Formosa, 
which means “beautiful island.”  
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women’s rights movement and described her campaign as an attempt “to 
destabilize the society, [and] especially to arose (sic) dispute between the 
husbands and wives of our high ranking officials so that their marriages may be 
broken” (Lu 1988:12, ff.2, in Farris 1994:311). At a time when gender equality 
remained an unchampioned issue in the early 1980s, Annette Lu co-founded 
Taiwan’s first women’s organization, the Awakening Foundation (Funu Xinzhi 
Jijinhui 婦女新知基金會), that dedicated itself to women’s rights. During the 
mid-1970s when Taiwan began experiencing rising prosperity and the emergence 
of middle-class norms,45 Annette Lu incited a wave of female/women 
consciousness with her book, New Feminism, which was first published in 1974 
and reissued in 1986 (Farris 1994:310, cf. Lu 1986 (1974)). 
In her groundbreaking book, Annette Lu claims in the chapter entitled 
“Still a patriarchal society” that invisible inequalities stemming from patriarchal 
values continue to control women’s fates in Taiwan. Gender ideology, Lu states, 
acts as both a symbolic system and social constraint that abets the construction 
and maintenance of a social structure that prevents changes in women’s status in 
Taiwan. She specifically cites four Chinese patriarchal values that hinder gender 
equality including the following traditional worldviews: 1) “continuing the family 
line” (zhuanzhong jiedai 傳宗接代) which leads to “valuing men over women” 
(zhong nan qing nu 重男輕女); 2) the “three obediences and four virtues” (san 
cong si de 三從四德)46 that women must adhere, which contributes to the notion 
that “men are respected [and] women are debased” (nan zun nu bei 男尊女卑); 3) 
“one-sided chastity” (pianmian zhencao 片面貞操) where a “double moral 
                                                 
45 Applying the category “middle-class” to Taiwan society is a bit misleading, as class boundaries 
are just emerging and tend to be fluid and unstable, as many people occupy more than one class 
position at the same time (Gold 1994). 
46 The “three obediences” refer to women obeying their father before marriage, their husband after 
marriage, and their son after the husband’s demise. The “four virtues” include morality, proper 
speech, having a modest manner, and diligent work. 
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standard” (shuangzhong daode biaozhun 雙重道德標準) exists which requires 
women to be chaste and allows men to be promiscuous; and 4) a gendered 
division of labor where “men are the breadwinners [work outdoors] while women 
are housewives [work indoors]” (nan wai nu nei 男外女內) which maintains 
“sex-role differences” (xingbie jiaose chabie 性別角色差別) (Lu 1986 (1974):87-
88). Ironically, Lu finds herself constrained and harangued for flaunting these 
same gendered prescriptions, and particularly the second and fourth values, in her 
unorthodox behavior as ROC vice president. 
Upon assuming the vice presidency, Annette Lu had the opportunity to 
challenge the aforementioned gendered discourses. However, Lu’s outspokenness 
and the constraints of her elected office unwittingly made her a high profile 
victim instead. With her straightforward speaking style, Lu was labeled by the 
local media as Taiwan’s “I.B.M.,” that is, “International Big Mouth.” Similarly, 
prominent local scholars lambasted Vice President Lu’s contradictory and 
uninvited policy statements for undermining President Chen’s own cross-straits 
agenda and endangering Taiwan’s national security.  
Opposition party legislators from the KMT, NP, and PFP consequently 
threatened to introduce a bill in the Legislative Yuan that would recall Lu and 
replace her with a newly elected vice president. What began as criticism of Lu’s 
untimely and so-called inappropriate linguistic behavior escalated into a 
constitutional crisis regarding the legality of removing a democratically-elected 
official and the nation’s vice president no less. Furthermore, the Annette Lu 
controversy exposed the vulnerability of Taiwan’s nascent and untested 
democratic principles, as well as its struggles with reconciling traditional 
Confucian cultural values towards gendered roles and practices. 
The trajectory of Lu’s sociopolitical ascension from political opposition 
leader to ROC Vice President not only provides a sociohistorical mapping of 
Taiwan’s democratic and feminist movements, but also reveals the tensions latent 
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between her roles as feminist activist, scholar, and lawyer on the one hand, and 
the expectations of her elected office on the other. Call-in show deliberations 
regarding Annette Lu’s controversial vice presidency thus serve as a prime angle 
from which to explore the conflation of Taiwan’s crisis discourses regarding the 
country’s precarious geopolitical status as well as investigate the mass media’s 
intense scrutiny of a public figure’s linguistic behavior. Moreover, by examining 
how call-in participants articulate and negotiate Annette Lu’s individual and 
public roles with her language practices, my study is able to analyze the extent to 
which sociopolitical crisis discourses influence the country’s evolving democratic 
and gendered order. 
In the following chapter, I introduce the role reported speech plays in call-
in show verbal interactions as how this linguistic device allows call-in participants 
to strategically animate and creatively reconfigure Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis 
discourses. 
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Chapter Four: Speech Reporting as Call-in Show Ways of 
Speaking 
 
The importance of reported speech in natural languages cannot be over-
emphasized. . .[for] while we would like to have our public-intended messages 
reach everyone directly, circumstances are such that we are almost always 
exposed to a limited audience only. It is through reported speech that our 
utterances/messages reach hearers with whom we are not directly in touch. 
Massamba (1986:99) 
 
This chapter links the expression and negotiation of crisis discourses to the 
use of reported speech in call-in show talk. I begin by introducing traditional 
conceptions of direct and indirect reported speech, including their comparative 
roles in specific contexts and cultures. Next, I explore the ways reported speech 
highlights the heteroglossic features of speech (Bakhtin 1981, 1986) such as the 
ability for speakers to embed voices in an ongoing stretch of talk (Goffman 1974, 
1981). In introducing the notion of hypothetical reported speech, I consider the 
problematic interpretation of direct reported speech as faithfully “quoting another 
speaker” (Clark and Gerrig 1990). Subsequently, many scholars regard speech 
reporting as a creative linguistic act that depicts a constructed, selective, and even 
fictitious portrayal of a speaker’s words or thoughts (Buttny and Williams 2000; 
Fógany 1986; Kuipers 1990; Tannen 1989). The bulk of the chapter considers the 
role reported speech plays in call-in show deliberations, and particularly, how 
participants use this linguistic device to augment, negotiate, and counter crisis 
readings of sociopolitical events and ideologies in Taiwan. 
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WHAT CONSTITUTES REPORTED SPEECH? 
Demarcating the “types” of reported speech proves more complicated than 
merely distinguishing between direct and indirect reported speech.1 In the 
following section, I explore the validity of describing direct reported speech as the 
faithful reproduction of another’s utterance by introducing the notion of 
hypothetical reported speech. In the current section, however, I limit the 
discussion to differentiations between the surface form and functions of direct and 
indirect reported speech. 
What scholars of speech reporting generally recognize as direct reported 
speech has alternately been described as “quoted speech” (Coulmas 1986), “direct 
quotation” (Besnier 1993), “direct discourse” (Wierzbicka 1974), or “verbatim 
quotation” (Massamba 1986). Some researchers claim that direct reported speech 
provides a “more authentic” version of an utterance (Li 1986:41) in that it 
produces a “faithful verbatim report of a person’s actual words” (Toolon 
1988:120; original italics), a reading that has been dubbed as the “verbatim 
principle” (Clark and Gerrig 1990). 
In comparison, indirect reported speech is variously referred to in the 
literature as “indirect speech” (Coulmas 1986), “indirect quotation” (Besnier 
1993), “indirect discourse” (Wierzbicka 1974), and “summary quotes” (Buttny 
and Williams 2000). In contrast to direct reported speech, speakers engaged in 
indirect speech reporting are “free to blend information about an utterance with 
information about the world not conveyed by that utterance” (Coulmas 1986:1). 
For consistency, my study will use “direct reported speech” and “indirect reported 
speech” when referring to these two forms of speech reporting. 
                                                 
1 “Free indirect speech” is not addressed in this study. For further reading on this linguistic form, 
please refer to Banfield (1973), Wierzbicka (1974), and Coulmas (1986). The study will 
alternately use “reported speech” and “speech reporting” to refer to call-in show speakers’ use of 
direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech. 
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Distinctions between direct and indirect reported speech generally focus 
upon the reporter’s deictic orientation when recapturing the original utterance, the 
tense of the reported utterance, and the inclusion of a complimentizer “that” in 
indirect but not direct reported speech (Li 1986:29). Basic examples of direct 
versus indirect reported speech in English and Chinese include the following two 
sentences respectively: (1) Yu Fu said, “I’m tired.” (direct); (2) Yu Fu said (that) 
he was tired (indirect), whereas in Mandarin Chinese, this two forms of reported 
speech can be represented as: (1) 漁夫說﹐“我累了”; (2) 漁夫說他累了. 
Coulmas (1986) summarizes these differences in the following manner: 
In direct speech the reporter lends his voice to the original speaker and 
says (or writes) what he said, thus adopting his point of view, as it were. 
Direct speech, in a manner of speaking, is not the reporter’s speech, but 
remains the reported speaker’s speech whose role is played by the 
reporter. . .In indirect speech, on the other hand, the reporter comes to the 
fore. He relates a speech event as he would relate any other event: from 
his own point of view (2; italics added). 
What linguists regard as contrasting deictic projections of an original utterance, 
literary scholars describe as distinct stylistic forms. For instance, direct reported 
speech presents a linear style that differentiates an utterance’s author from its 
reporter. Inversely, indirect reported speech creates a pictoral style that merges 
the indirect utterance within the surrounding discourse (Vološinov 1973 (1929)).  
In terms of function, scholars suggest that depending upon the context and 
objective, speakers prefer one form of reported speech over another. Several 
studies reveal this to be the case when speakers attempt to proffer evidentiatlity 
through reported speech (Baynham 1996; Chafe and Nichols 1986; DuBois 1986). 
In Nukulaelae discourse, Besnier (1993) observes that speakers turn to direct 
reported speech when needing to separate an “authorial voice” from the reported 
voice. This strategic choice reflects a broader concern for the “presentation of 
reported speech as an authentic reflection of the original utterance” (168; 
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original emphasis).2 Brown and Levinson (1987) find a similar occurrence in their 
studies on politeness in the Tzeltal and Tamil languages where speakers use direct 
reported speech as a positive-politeness technique. For instance, in cases when a 
speaker is stressing common ground with a hearer, minimal adjustment is made 
when reporting the speech of another thus leaving uninterpreted expressions of 
reference and names “even where this may result in loss of clarity” (122). 
 However, the value and relationship between authenticity and direct 
reported speech has alternative connotations in other societies. For example, in 
the U.S. legal system of evidence law, speech reporting is considered to be 
“hearsay” given the argument that a witness’ memory of what was heard is 
unreliable (Philips 1993). Moreover, because it is the reporter of the original 
utterance and not the original speaker who is under oath (“to tell the truth, the 
whole truth…”), the truthfulness of an utterance cannot be accurately assessed. 
Subsequently, in this context, reported speech carries less weight than visual 
accountings. These three examples illustrate that individual applications and 
social understandings of direct and indirect reported speech must be observed and 
contextualized within the specific settings and communities in which they are 
used. 
In following chapters, my study examines the different influences direct 
versus indirect reported speech has on call-in participants’ presentations and 
evaluations of Vice President Annette Lu’s recent linguistic behavior. My 
analysis suggests that even when participants insert “snippets” (Clark and Gerrig 
1990) of direct speech in their commentary, they create a more descriptive and 
persuasive interpretation of the original speaker’s character and verbal behavior. 
In contrast, indirect reported speech or “summary quotes” (Buttny and Williams 
2000) can weaken one’s argument as the information provided in the summarized 
                                                 
2 Besnier notes that speakers still have room for affective or prosodic variation in the deliverance 
of quoted utterances. 
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utterance becomes lost within and subsumed by the surrounding remarks. For 
instance, I later examine how a female panelist’s use of summary quotes in her 
description and defense VP Lu’s controversial keynote address leaves her 
listeners confused as to which portion of her remarks represent Lu’s speech and 
which reflect the panelist’s own assessment. I thus illustrate that in comparison to 
the other panelists who use direct reported speech to justify their criticism of VP 
Lu’s inappropriate verbal behavior, the female panelist’s arguments appear 
insubstantial, and subsequently, less convincing. 
The polyphony of reported speech 
When distinguishing direct from indirect reported speech, the broad 
delineation between “authorial” versus reporting voices simplifies and ignores the 
heteroglossic or multivocalic nature of utterances in general, and reported speech 
in particular (Bakhtin 1981, 1986). Speech reporting foregrounds the “layering of 
voices” or polyphony (Bakhtin 1981) within speech as well as the variety of 
reflexive (Lucy 1993a), metalingual (Jakobson 1960), and metapragmatic 
(Silverstein 1993) devices that speakers use when reporting the utterance and 
voice of another. 
 Yet, the exercise of identifying and separating the authorial voice from 
that of the reporter’s during speech reporting represents a metacommunicative and 
metalinguistic exercise that “takes place all the time to help structure ongoing 
linguistic activity” (Lucy 1993b:18). For instance, Shuman (1993) acknowledges 
that the “question of whether the [quoted and reporting] voices are in solidarity or 
in conflict is crucial” to deciphering social relationships and identities in 
interactions (152). Aside from the layering that occurs within speech, language 
use is also intimately associated with and within the settings it occurs (cf. Duranti 
and Goodwin 1992). Call-in show participants are no different when it comes to 
performing identities and animating voices during program discussions. I explore 
how call-in participants’ attempts to separate their voice from the characters they 
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portray reveal as much about local sociopolitical relations and discourses as it 
does about their own ideological stance and political leanings.  
For instance, I later analyze how 2100 moderator Lee Tao uses reported 
speech to rapidly shift between his moderator voice and those of the hypothetical 
personages he animates. Through the combined use of reported speech, prosody, 
and code-switching, Lee Tao deftly illustrates the various social figures Taiwan’s 
national identity crisis implicates as they negotiate their stance towards competing 
“Taiwanese” versus “Chinese” identities. However, in performing these disparate 
voices, I illustrate that Lee Tao not only reenacts Taiwan’s sociopolitical power 
relations but also reveals his own language ideologies and identity constructions.3  
Vološinov (1973 (1929)) captures the intricate relationship between 
speech reporting and context when he suggests that “between the reported speech 
and the reporting context, relations of high complexity and tension are in force” 
(153). The dialogic relationship between linguistic practice and speech events4 
(Hymes 1989, 1995) recalls Basso’s (1979) analysis of Western Apache joking 
performances of the “Whiteman.” Here, Basso finds that joking performances 
convey messages about two sets of relationships, including the present 
relationship between the speaker and the object of the joke as well as the absent 
relationship on which the present one is modeled. Similarly, my study regards 
speech reporting on call-in shows as a rich resource for indexing present and 
absent crisis discourses and sociopolitical relationships. On the one hand, speech 
reporting provides call-in participants the means to negotiate the intricacies of the 
controversial topics they deliberate, while on the other, the linguistic practice 
allows sociopolitical discourses and tensions based in the “real” world to “leak” 
                                                 
3 I elaborate upon this example throughout the chapter, while providing a full analysis in Chapter 
Five. 
4 I explain the notion of “speech events” in Chapters Six and Seven when I examine reconciliation 
talk and saliva wars. 
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(Besnier 1993) into the participants’ words within the confines of the call-in show 
studio setting. 
Consequently, the voices and entities call-in participants portray through 
reported speech reveals much about the “social indexicality” (Koven 2001) of this 
device. As previously introduced, Lee Tao’s performance of Taiwan’s national 
identity crisis discourses succeeds in ascribing stereotyped speech to the 
hypothetical characters (e.g., a teacher, parent, and legislator) he animates. 
Although the fictional voices are not associated with specific individuals, the 
reported utterances iconically identify recognizable social personas in Taiwan 
society. The moderator’s reported speech-laden monologue corroborates Koven’s 
(2001) observation that: 
Quotations may indeed work as icons of the speech events they replay but 
they are not necessarily iconic of actual utterances. . .Quoted 
performances may not necessarily resemble the real words of actual 
people as much as they index or point to images of socially locatable, 
linguistically stereotypical kinds of people (517-518; original emphasis). 
I revisit the theoretical assertion that reported speech does not actually represent 
original utterances later in the chapter and through analysis of selected call-in 
show excerpts in subsequent chapters. 
Shifting voices and footings 
An investigation into reported speech must also incorporate Goffman’s 
(1981) notion of “footing,” which refers to managing the production and reception 
of an utterance such as the frame of an event. Embedded or reported speech 
represents one linguistic device that speakers use to shift between different 
footings within the same stretch of talk. Embedding voices and shifting footings 
allows a speaker to ascribe and reassign roles, and thus power, to various voices 
within verbal interactions. Goffman (1974, 1981) distinguishes four roles or 
voices that speakers can embed within their own speech including author, 
principal, animator, and figure. Specifically, the author represents the owner of 
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the utterance; the principal identifies the party officially responsible for the 
words; the animator constitutes the entity who actually speaks the words (e.g., 
spokesperson); while the figure plays the protagonist of a narrative (e.g., character 
in a story) (Goffman 1974:144-147). 
In the call-in show excerpts I later analyze, participants often shift the 
topic of conversation such that the conversation becomes the topic, with reported 
speech serving as the catalyst for the sudden change in footing. Shifts in footing 
through reported speech can nonetheless be ratified or rejected by other speakers. 
Speech reporting thus represents a highly negotiable and strategic tactic in call-in 
show deliberations. For instance, I later examine a verbal dispute between two 
guest panelists over the definition of “compatriot” (同胞), a term that was 
introduced into the program’s deliberations by a video clip featuring ROC 
President Chen Shui-bian use of the word when describing Taiwan-China 
relations. As the term’s definition becomes the main focus of the program, a guest 
panelist attempts to define “compatriot” by situating President Chen as the term’s 
author, while positioning himself as merely the animator of Chen’s initial 
utterance. In this context, the panelist attempts to employ “conventional brackets 
to warn us that what he is saying is…mere repeating of words said by someone 
else…[and] that he means to stand in relation of reduced responsibility for what 
he is saying” (Goffman 1974:512). However, when another speaker challenges 
the panelist to define “compatriot” in his own words, the panelist finds himself 
unable to do so, and by default, concedes the definitional dispute to his opponent. 
Parodic stylization and code-switching 
Speech reporting proves to be a highly compatible linguistic device that 
can easily be augmented with other verbal tools. For instance, combining reported 
speech with distinct shifts in prosody and code-switching allows the reporter to 
“draw upon, not only the context, but also the expression of the original speech” 
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(Buttny and Williams 2000:116). Goffman (1974) describes these linguistic 
manipulations as “invisible quotation marks” that isolate an utterance as 
belonging to someone other than the reporter. Similarly, Le Page and Tabouret-
Keller (1985) associate speakers’ linguistic choices with “shifts of identity.” To 
them, a speaker’s linguistic behavior—including choice of lexis, grammar, 
pronunciation (e.g., prosody), and code—represents a set of “acts of identity” in 
which “people reveal both their personal identity and their search for social roles” 
(14). While the present study focuses less on presentations of individual identities 
per se, these scholars’ observations inform my analyses on how call-in 
participants’ speech reporting contextually performs locally-recognizable social 
entities and ideologies (Koven 2001), especially those associated with Taiwan’s 
crisis discourses. 
As previously noted, speech reporting accentuates the heteroglossic nature 
of language. Yet, the “layering of voices” in a given utterance can be further 
dramatized through the addition of prosodic features (Bakhtin 1981). Through the 
combination of reported speech and “parodic stylization” (ibid), reporters 
emphasize the separation between their own voice and the original speaker’s in a 
hyper-performance of socially recognizable identities and linguistic stereotypes 
while retaining control of the discourse (Macaulay 1987). Associating “prosodic 
mimicking” with speech reporting further foregrounds the manner in which 
language can be used to reflect and recreate social relations of power (Álvarez-
Cáccomo 1996). Günthner’s (1999) research on “polyphonic strategies” suggests 
that combined with reported speech, this linguistic tactic blends the voices of the 
reporter and original speaker such that the same utterance carries two points of 
view from two different “worlds,” including that of the “story world” and the 
reporting world. Besnier (1993) alternately describes this blending process as the 
reporter’s voice “leaking” into both the quoted voice and utterance. Inserting 
prosodic features in speech reporting thus heightens an already marked production 
 144
of speech, demonstrating that various linguistic devices occur in tandem with, 
rather than in isolation from, one another. 
However, Gumperz (1982) observes that “not all speakers are quoted in 
the language they normally use” (82). Reporting an utterance in its original 
language as “mimetic intention” (Alfonzetti 1998) to preserve the language of the 
original locutor is not a priori, although it does occur. Consequently, it is the 
difference between the reporting and surrounding languages, rather than the 
direction of the code-switch, that is significant (Sebba and Wooton 1998). This 
observation has inspired scholars to explore the pairing of code-switching with 
speech reporting during narratives in particular and social interactions in general 
(Gal 1979; Hill and Hill 1986). Auer (1995) claims that code-alternation provides 
a “contrast between the conversational context of the quote and the reported 
speech itself” (119). This code contrast can also highlight and play with the 
quoted speaker’s identity associated with the reported language. For instance, 
unexpected “code displacement” by reporting the speech of another in a marked 
language—such as performing President G. W. Bush’s voice in Arabic and 
Saddam Hussein’s in English—allows the reporter to strategically dislocate, 
transform, or supplant socially-constituted identities and locally-recognized power 
alliances (Álvarez-Cáccomo 1996).  
Of course, for code displacement to be successful, listeners must already 
possess and share sociopolitical knowledge that allows the juxtaposition to be 
readily apparent. Koven (2001) adds that implicit sociopolitical ideologies must 
already exist for listeners to recognize associations between language choice and 
the stereotyping of certain types of people (cf. Schieffelin, Woolard, and 
Kroskrity 1998; Walters 1996, 1997; Zhang 2001). In this sense, “local ideologies 
that link register usage to socially locatable stereotypes of kinds of people,…[and] 
the register(s) in which a quotation is rendered indeed makes the quoted character 
come to life as a particular kind of person” (Koven 2001:550). 
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Again, in my analysis of Lee Tao’s marked performance of several 
constructed voices, his use of parodic stylization as well as code-switching from 
Mandarin Chinese, the language of the surrounding commentary, to Taiwanese, 
when performing the voice of an emotionally charged parent, indexes ideologies 
associated with the two languages. Accompanied by noticeable changes in tone, 
pitch, and register, the moderator’s combined code-switching and speech 
reporting enhances sociopolitical tensions laden within ethno-political relations of 
status and power between Mainlanders (waishengren 外省人) who are generally 
associated with Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese (benshengren 本省人) who are 
largely affiliated with Taiwanese (Taijyu 台語) or Hohlo.5 Such code choices 
demonstrate the ability for reporters to perform not only stereotypical identities 
but also accentuate local ideologies, such as Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis 
discourses. 
WHERE IS THE “REPORTED” IN REPORTED SPEECH? 
The previous section introduced “direct” reported speech as producing a 
“faithful” rendering of another speaker’s words. However, in conversational use, 
scholars widely agree that it is misleading to interpret direct reported speech as 
“immutable” and to decipher it apart from its reporting context (Tannen 
1989:109).6 Furthermore, Leech (1978, 1980) asserts that quoted speech cannot 
easily be categorized as either “true” or “false”; rather, understandings of reported 
speech are better served by a “broader, gradable notion of representational 
accuracy or faithfulness” (1980:58). Simply put, the phrase “direct reported 
speech” basically represents a “misnomer” (Ebert 1986) that requires both a 
metalinguistic rearticulation and a metapragmatic reconceptualization. 
                                                 
5 “Hohlo” is an English transliteration of the Taiwanese word for the Taiwanese language. 
6 Ironically, this understanding can already be found in “real” world contexts, as shown by the 
“hearsay” ruling in U.S. courts (Philips 1993). 
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There are several perspectives from which to explore these observations 
and criticisms of the “reportedness” of direct reported speech. Bakhtin (1981) 
dismantles the impression of faithfully reported utterances in his observation that 
another speaker’s words are frequently “transmitted with highly varied degrees of 
accuracy and impartiality” (337; emphasis added). Other scholars find Bakhtin’s 
“varying” degrees to be too generous and contend that reported speech is actually 
“spontaneous speech” fashioned in the moment of talk (Kuo 2001:187). Similarly, 
Haberland’s (1986) attempts to parse the notion that direct reported speech 
implies fidelity in form and content (Li 1986) to an original utterance reveals the 
problems with using the descriptor “direct” in association with “reported speech” 
or “quotation”: 
the use of direct [reported] speech only implies a commitment to the 
content of the model speech act…[such that] [n]o commitment to its 
wording (its form) is implied. . .[thus] not every case of direct speech is a 
direct quotation (Haberland 1986:225).  
Haberland’s explanation complicates his argument by concurrently using “direct 
speech” and “direct quotation” in his attempt to separate the two terms and 
linguistic forms, thus leaving the distinction ambiguous. Tannen’s (1989) coining 
of “constructed dialogue” in place of reported speech offers an alterative 
terminology that abandons the problematic phrase entirely: 
I am claiming that when a speaker represents an utterance as the words of 
another, what results is by no means describable as ‘reported speech.’ 
Rather it is constructed dialogue. And the construction of the dialogue 
represents an active, creative, transforming move which expresses the 
relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather 
the quoting party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered 
(109; emphasis added). 
In this reading, Tannen places the emphasis on the relationship between the 
quoter or reporter and listener, rather than between the reporter and the reported 
utterance.  
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Other scholars also observe that in conversational practice speakers take 
great liberties in inventing and reconfiguring purportedly quoted speech 
(Baynham 1996; Irvine 1996). Haberland (1986) created the term “hypothetical 
reported speech” to capture the practice of reporting “something which some 
other speaker might have said, but which he or she actually did not say” (225). 
For instance, I later examine how a caller attributes hypothetical reported speech 
to Taiwan pop star A-mei as a means to present the singer in an unflattering 
manner. However, the caller’s egotistical portrayal of A-mei through a self-
promoting hypothetical utterance is at odds with the pop star’s self-effacing 
demeanor as I illustrate through video clips of A-mei at a press conference 
featured earlier on the call-in show. By juxtaposing the caller’s comments with 
the video clip, I investigate how call-in participants’ linguistic practices interact 
and are informed by program resources such as sound bites, graphics, and of 
course, other participants’ comments. 
Aside from the alternative term of constructed dialogue (Tannen 1986, 
1989) and its derivative “constructed utterances” (Kuipers 1990), other 
descriptors that capture the inherent variance in speech reporting include “partial 
quotation” (Fónagy 1986), “for-example quotation” (ibid), “selective depiction” 
(Clark and Gerrig 1990), “impossible quotes” (Mayes 1990), “generic” speech 
(Fairclough 1992), “typifying reported speech” (Parmentier 1993),7 “hypothetical 
represented discourse” (Myers 1999a; Semino et. al. 1999), and “fictitious 
quotation” (Buttny and Williams 2000). For consistency, my study will 
generically refer to this form of speech reporting as “hypothetical reported 
speech” unless one of the aforementioned terms more accurately captures a 
specific example in the analyzed data. 
                                                 
7 Parmentier (1993) describes “typifying reported speech” as “reported speech that has the surface 
linguistic form of direct quotation but which does not in face report discourse which ever occurred 
in the past” (280). 
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Inaccuracy and impartiality aside, hypothetical reported speech continues 
to be regarded as “bear[ing] enough family resemblance to be considered 
alongside reported speech” (Buttny and Williams 2000:113). Svartvik and Quirk 
(1980) acknowledge that hypothetical reported speech represents the rule rather 
than the exception in everyday linguistic practices. Moreover, they suggest that 
reporters often impute a wide variety of speech to a speaker (self or other) that 
may have little resemblance to not only the actual utterance but recognizable 
speech itself. Under this broad rubric, hypothetical reported speech can include 
fillers or substitute expressions (e.g., “such and such a time”) (Clark and Gerrig 
1990), as well as musings as to what “‘could,’ ‘would,’ or ‘may’ be said” (Buttny 
and Williams 2000:113). Even nonsense speech such as “blah, blah, blah” can act 
as “stand-ins” for information or content that the reporting speaker does not judge 
necessary for a more detailed recounting (Clark and Gerrig 1990:780). 
Consequently, what must be emphasized is that nonsense speech and fillers infuse 
a speaker’s overall narrative or commentary with more description that their 
absence could not provide. 
For these reasons, this study posits that hypothetical reported speech 
constitutes a powerful and creative linguistic tool within the “family” of reported 
speech. In fact, various excerpts I examine feature call-in participants inserting 
constructed dialogue in the form of musings of what “may be said” and nonsense 
speech or “stand-ins” for intelligible verbal content. In the first instance, I 
investigate how a guest panelist relies upon hypothetical utterances to reconcile 
the seemingly contradictory notion of embracing both “Taiwanese” and 
“Chinese” identities. In another excerpt, I explore how a moderator uses a 
combination of nonsense speech and constructed dialogue to perform heightened 
emotional reaction to the question of “what is your identity?” These and other 
examples illustrate that reported speech in the form of imagined utterances allows 
call-in participants greater leverage to articulate and negotiate disparate crisis 
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discourses in sociopolitically cognizant ways that their co-participants can easily 
recognize. 
It is important to recognize that reported speech also includes non-verbal 
communication, most notably “inner speech” (Vološinov 1973 (1929)).8 As 
Wierzbicka (1974) summarizes, the problem of reported speech is “inseparable 
from that of reported thoughts, reported feelings, reported perceptions, etc.” 
(297). During an episode on the latest cross-straits incident, a guest panelist uses 
speech reporting to report the aggressive thoughts of the PRC authorities. In doing 
so, the panelist articulates an unstated yet tacitly understood sentiment among the 
participants, namely, that the PRC’s heavy-handed tactics reflects the 
government’s hegemonic attitude toward Taiwan. 
Similarly, Clark and Gerrig (1990) note that traditional studies of speech 
reporting preface speech over non-verbal actions such as reported gestures, 
behaviors, unconventional sounds, and even “reported song” (Urban 1993). By 
overlooking reenactments of facial expressions, hand gestures, onomatopoeic 
noises, and nonsense speech, researchers of speech reporting prematurely 
discount a wide range of linguistic behavior and sociocultural knowledge. Having 
said this, the present study primarily focuses on call-in participants’ use of verbal 
speech reporting, although some examples of reported thought and gestures are 
also examined.9 
WHY STUDY REPORTED SPEECH? AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH  
This study’s inquiry in the use of reported speech by call-in show 
participants follows a respected line of scholarly research in the fields of linguistic 
anthropology, sociolinguistics, literary studies, communication studies, and 
psychology. Such studies further understandings on the metapragmatic use of 
                                                 
8 Fónagy (1986) describes “inner speech” as “monologues intérieurs” (258). 
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reported speech within everyday language use and face-to-face social interactions. 
Moreover, this body of research recognizes that speech reporting provides 
individuals the means to present, contest, and negotiate self and other identities, 
ideologies, and worldviews in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways. 
In linguistic anthropology, scholars have largely focused on reported 
speech in terms of how speakers use the linguistic device to reflect and challenge 
a community’s social values and cultural practices (Bauman 1986; Duranti 1993, 
1994; Hill and Hill 1986; Hill and Irvine 1993; Michael 2001; Urban 1989). 
Citing two examples, Sherzer’s (1983, 1990) research on the Kuna community in 
Panama discovers that reported speech serves as a conduit through which 
knowledge and information is conceptualized, received, learned, instructed, and 
conveyed among its members (Sherzer 1990:118). Furthermore, speech reporting 
provides testimony of one’s achievements. In Briggs’ (1992, 1993) accounts of 
Warao ritual wailing and narratives, he illustrates that women use reported speech 
to create a collective voice that counters their marginality vis-à-vis other 
expressive genres in Warao society. In other words, users of reported speech do 
not simply draw on past experiences and incidents, but also create them such that 
they assert a right to partake in social events. This process thus allows individuals 
to explore their social relationships either directly or through specific incidents 
such as death (Briggs 1992:345). 
Both of these studies offer local understandings of speech reporting as 
practice and knowledge within a given community, an approach my study takes 
when I examine call-in participants’ verbal interactions. In several excerpts, I 
illustrate how participants validate their acquisition of and access to privileged 
information by proffering evidence through reported speech. These claims to 
knowledge are often based on hypothetical renderings of reported utterances, a 
                                                                                                                                     
9 In order to focus on certain aspects of reported speech, namely its verbal properties, this study 
did not examine in detail the accompanying use of gestures and facial expressions. I address this 
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strategy one pro-China unification legislator capitalizes upon, given his “close” 
(qin 親) relationship with PRC officials, during deliberations on the ambiguous 
events surrounding the PRC ban of Taiwan pop-star A-mei.  
Reported speech also offers marginalized call-in participants, such as 
callers, the opportunity to reclaim or contest crisis discourses that are often 
manipulated and monopolized by sociopolitical leaders and mass media 
personalities. For instance, one caller narrates a personal experience with a person 
of aboriginal descent by using reported speech to perform the aborigine 
individual’s request to use Mandarin Chinese or “the national language” (guoyu 
國語). This metalinguistic account and metapragamtic performance through 
reported speech effectively reexamines the call-in show’s crisis topic, namely, 
that lingering language ideologies undermine present, everyday interactions 
between individuals from different backgrounds and linguistic environments. 
Other linguistic anthropological studies have explored the role speech 
reporting plays in negotiating entitlement claims to narrated events. For instance, 
Shuman (1993) demonstrates that teenage girls use reported speech in fight stories 
to absolve themselves from being blamed for recounting such incidents. However, 
speech reporting allows them to actively reconfigure social relationships between 
the characters presented within the narrative. Shuman adds, however, that girls’ 
attempts to use reported speech to conflate the strategies of maintaining one’s 
social reputation on the one hand, and realigning interpersonal relationships 
through storytelling on the other, can occasionally cause them to trap themselves 
within their own “metacommunicative moves” (155). 
Similarly, Marjorie Goodwin’s (1990) study of “he-said-she-said” gossip 
disputes among African-American girls finds that speech reporting creates a 
“coherent domain of action” that includes identities, actions, and biographies of 
the participants involved as well as a past that justifies the present accusation 
                                                                                                                                     
omission in Chapter Eight in the section, “Limitations of the study.” 
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(190). In the girls’ social domain, reported speech acts as a powerful linguistic 
device in confronting accusations such as offering the defendant greater latitude 
to reframe the accuser’s version of events, which Goodwin summarizes as 
follows:  
The ability to recontextualize disputed talk by embedding reported speech 
within other quoted speech provides participants with a powerful resource 
for negotiating the meaning and interpretation of the events in which they 
are engaged (208). 
These two ethnographic studies on negotiating entitlement claims through speech 
reporting in verbal disputes inform the current investigation on call-in show saliva 
wars. Entitlement to specific knowledge as presented through reported speech 
frequently serves as a point of contention in guest panelist verbal sparring. 
However, overly relying upon quoted speech to defend one’s perspective by 
presenting sources or bases (Pomerantz 1984), or to present materials to convince 
others that one’s interpretation is accurate, can be risky and leave a speaker 
vulnerable to attack.  
For instance, my examination of two saliva war passages in Chapter Seven 
suggest that the ability to ascribe reported speech and reappropriate the speech of 
another constitutes a highly negotiated process between disputants regardless if 
one is interpreting a controversial incident or defining politically-marked terms. 
In these examples, guest panelists find that their metacommunicative tactics fail 
as a result of a lack of corroborating evidence outside of reported speech. 
Recalling the “hearsay” argument in U.S. law that denies the presentation of 
reported speech as evidence (Philips 1993), my investigation of call-in show 
saliva wars suggests that speech reporting carries as much clout as the unfolding 
verbal interaction and the other disputants allow. 
Among researchers of novels and storytelling, scholars find that direct 
speech reporting dramatizes narrated events by creating a more “vivid” (Labov 
1972; Tannen 1989) portrayal and by injecting a “‘theatrical’, playful, imaginary 
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character” to the telling (Wierzbicka 1974: 272).10 Inserting direct quotation in 
narratives restages a verbal utterance such that it “creates the illusion to witness 
the scene evoked by the narrator” (Fónagy 1986:255). In face-to-face storytelling, 
direct reported speech creates a feeling of “immediacy” between the narrator and 
audience, while encouraging greater involvement and “sense-making” on the part 
of the listener (Tannen 1986, 1989).  
Günthner (1999) claims that using reported speech in conjunction with 
prosody and voice quality provides the reporter more resources with which to 
differentiate voices and utterances in the reporting world versus the “story world.” 
Similarly, Hill and Zepeda (1993) argue that representations of a story world 
society through constructed dialogue makes the recounted events 
“sociocentrically” rather than egocentrically focused on the reporter’s own 
experience (198). Literary scholars Semino et. al. (1999) also explore the 
possibilities of the story world through hypothetical discourse, discovering that it 
offers writers a viable strategy for contrasting various “possible worlds” with the 
“actual” world of the fictional text. This strategy creates “distribution” or diffuses 
responsibility for events recounted in the “interactional world” (Chafe 1980) such 
that it metaphorically creates the effect of multi-party participation in a speech 
event, even when only one person is speaking. Similarly, Wierzbicka (1974) finds 
that when reporters portray the meaning of an utterance together with its form 
through quoted speech, they avoid “the responsibility for a correct representation 
of the meaning as such” (279). Finally, direct reported speech serves as an 
effective and economical device to synthesize and communicate a wealth of 
information in both narratives and everyday talk (Holt 1996, 1999, 2000).  
The aforementioned narrative and conversational inquiries into speech 
reporting bolster this study’s exploration into how call-in participants inject a 
                                                 
10 Michael (2001) appropriately notes that aside from lending “vividness” to the recounting of an 
event, reported speech is also frequently “yoked to social and interactive goals quite different from 
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sense of urgency into their remarks by selectively quoting another or, in the 
absence of an original utterance, creating hypothetical reported speech. By using 
real and imagined “reportings,” I examine how participants involve their co-
panelists and viewers in interpreting the revoiced utterances according to the 
participant’s crisis-engendering rhetoric and the frame of the call-in program 
itself. For instance, speech reporting allows call-in participants the means to 
temporarily suspend the “real” world while presenting crisis-ridden “story 
worlds” that conveniently portray characters with unflattering, egotistical 
linguistic behaviors, which I illustrate in my analysis of how hypothetical reported 
speech is ascribed to pop star A-mei and Vice President Annette Lu. Furthermore, 
by shifting the footing of their commentary onto reported ground, participants can 
objectively and “distributively” present competing interpretations of an incident 
without jeopardizing their own social image and political reputations. Given the 
limited time participants have to speak during call-in show discussions, any 
linguistic device that allows them to quickly summarize their perspective and 
rebut another’s counter-argument will find favor in this setting. 
Scholars across disciplines often draw inspiration from each other’s 
research on reported speech and incorporate their findings into their own. For 
instance, sociolinguist Greg Myers (1999a, 1999b) applies literary scholars 
Semino et. al.’s (1999) “possible worlds theory” in his examination of 
hypothetical represented discourse in focus group discussions. Myers finds that 
hypothetical speech reporting can act as a “thought experiment” (Myers 1999a) 
through which speakers present and weigh various perspectives of an issue. 
Moreover, the practice of addressing conflicting worldviews through “represented 
discourse” epitomizes a calculated maneuver to resolve complex issues through 
“saying rather than doing” (ibid). While hypothetical represented discourse can be 
used to dramatize tensions (Myers 1999b), the tactic also allows speakers to 
                                                                                                                                     
that of creating an engaging and affecting narrative” (50). 
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forward “counter-arguments” to mitigate contradictions within the discussion 
itself (Myers 1999a). 
Studies on the role reported speech plays in group discussions have been 
conducted among communication studies scholars as well. Research on race 
relations among college students observes that students use “summary quotes” as 
a means to condense stereotypical traits and speech practices when portraying 
out-group members as an aggregate (Buttny 1997; Buttny and Williams 2000). 
Students also use reported speech to strategically “editorialize” or evaluate both 
the content of the original utterance as “serious or ironic” and the character of the 
speaker as “favorable or unfavorable” (Buttny and Williams 2000:119). 
These findings on speech reporting practices in group discussions inform 
my study’s examination of language use in multiparty call-in show deliberations. 
In particular, I focus on how and when panelists insert reported speech to 
characterize out-group members (e.g., Chinese residents), editorialize an opponent 
and his utterance, explore conflicting readings of Taiwan’s national identity(-ies) 
through a constructed dialogue “thought experiment,” and ostensibly resolve 
Taiwan’s ethno-political tensions through a “saying rather than doing” approach. 
Interest in speech reporting has also led to collaboration between scholars 
in psychology and linguistics. For instance, Clark and Gerrig (1990) elaborate 
upon Grice’s (1957, 1968) maxims of intention by arguing that reported speech 
substitutes for or demonstrates other actions. Using reported speech as a form of 
demonstration enables listeners to experience “what it is like to perceive the 
things depicted” (Clark and Gerrig 1990:765). Building upon Goffman’s (1974) 
view that human actions fall into two broad categories—serious versus nonserious 
or “play” versus “real” (47)—Clark and Gerrig likewise assert that reported 
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speech constitute nonserious representations and enact “parts of serious activities” 
(ibid).11 
My study draws upon the perspective that speech reporting represents play 
rather than real actions when I examine guest panelists perform saliva wars or 
verbal sparring. In this case, I regard call-in show saliva wars as mock warfare or 
“transformations” (Goffman 1974) of serious actions. In the heat of call-in verbal 
disputes, participants use reported speech as linguistic ammunition in their 
nonserious performances of real sociopolitical tensions, such as the potential for 
cross-straits war between Taiwan and China. 
Lastly, while research on speech reporting in languages other than English 
proves quite extensive,12 the use of reported speech in Mandarin Chinese remains 
a sparsely researched area. Lin’s (1999) dissertation on reported speech in 
Mandarin conversational discourse represents one of the few detailed studies on 
this linguistic practice (cf. Kuo 2001). Using discourse and metapragmatic 
approaches, Lin analyzed 15 conversations and five radio interviews and 
classified speakers’ speech reporting behavior as either isolated, monologic, or 
dialogic. Lin claimed that indirect speech represented the preferred, unmarked 
form of speech reporting in her data sample. However, the functions of reported 
speech differed depending upon its “textual” versus “interactional” levels. That is, 
at the textual level, speakers used direct and indirect reported speech as a form of 
evidence or as an entitlement claim. In social interactions, Lin found that when 
speakers sought greater audience involvement and wanted to express the original 
speaker’s speech affects, only direct reported speech would be used. 
                                                 
11 This understanding distinguishes reported speech from descriptions, as Clark and Gerrig regard 
descriptions as “serious actions.” 
12 A cross-section of research on reported speech in languages other than English includes Italian 
(Alfonzetti 1998), Nukalaelae  (Besnier 1993), Warao (Briggs 1992, 1993), Samoan (Duranti 
1993, 1994), Hungarian and German (Gal 1979), Spanish (Hill and Hill 1986), French and 
Portugeuse (Koven 2001), Nanti (Michael 2001), and Kuna (Sherzer 1983, 1990). 
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In a different Mandarin-based reported speech study, Kuo (2001) 
examined the pragmatic and sociolinguistic applications of speech reporting in 
public discourse, namely, political debates. Like Lin’s investigation of speech 
reporting in conversations, Kuo also found that the three mayoral candidates in 
her study demonstrated a preference for indirect reported speech in political 
discourse. Nonetheless, Kuo concluded by cautioning that the three mayoral 
candidates’ distinct communicative styles influenced the degree and frequency 
with which speakers inserted direct reported speech in their comments. I provide a 
more detailed comparison of Kuo’s study to the current project in the following 
section. 
POPULARIZING POLITICS: CRAFTING CRISIS DISCOURSES THROUGH 
REPORTED SPEECH 
Research on political oratory confirms that reported speech serves as a 
strategic linguistic device in this speech genre. In her analysis of Reverend Jesse 
Jackson’s public speaking patterns at the 1988 Democratic National Convention, 
Tannen (1989) observes that Jackson uses quoted speech to “anticipate and 
animate others’ point of view” in order to promote his political message and 
appeal to his audience in a more engaging manner (178). In a different 
sociopolitical context, Parmentier (1993) finds that high-ranking chiefs in Belau, 
Micronesia, also use reported speech to resolve political tensions by establishing 
the norms for speaking. In this case, the insertion of quoted proverbial expressions 
creates an “overall authoritative, traditional aura,” which abets the chief in 
averting a looming political crisis (269). Parmentier concludes that reported 
speech carries “pseudo-performative force” (cf. Silverstein 1981), which speakers 
can design or reconfigure to redress sociopolitical conflict. Interestingly, the 
pseudo-performative force speakers evoke through reported speech in 
Parmentier’s observations contradicts Myers’ (1999a) finding that the use of 
hypothetical reported speech in “thought experiments” as a form of “saying rather 
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than doing” is associated with powerlessness (585). My study illustrates, 
however, that speech reporting can both empower and disempower speakers given 
its negotiable properties and process in verbal interactions. 
These two studies inform my examination of how call-in participants use 
reported speech to animate their arguments in order to appeal to fellow 
participants and viewers. Moreover, like Parmentier’s Belauan chief who resorts 
to quoting proverbial expressions to confer authority to his words, my analysis 
also suggests that call-in participants insert reported utterances, both real and 
imaginary, from authoritative figures or entities to bolster their arguments. For 
instance, guest panelists use hypothetical reported speech as a strategic linguistic 
device to claim knowledge and to establish the validity of their interpretation of a 
conflictual sociopolitical event or issue. 
As previously introduced, Kuo’s (2001) examination of political 
candidates’ use of quoted speech in the 1998 Taipei mayoral debates best 
approximates my present investigation of call-in participants’ speech reporting 
practices.13 Her findings reveal that the mayoral contenders would often “harness 
‘another’s words’” to add legitimacy to their own speech through the 
“juxtaposition of iconically represented speech” (ibid:200). In terms of 
application, Kuo claims that the candidates strategically inserted direct reported 
speech for positive, self-promotional as well as negative, oppositional purposes. 
Candidates also turned to direct reported speech when desiring to provide 
evidence of their leadership capabilities and to enhance their credibility among 
voters. Specifically, the three candidates used self-quotation or other-quotation to 
“construct and project desirable versions of their identities enacted in a succession 
of performances” (ibid:190). Direct reported speech thus allowed the candidates 
                                                 
13 I was present in Taiwan during the mayoral election and was able to observe the three televised 
debates. At the time, the Taipei mayoral election was widely touted by Taiwan scholars, political 
parties, and media as a precursor to the 2000 presidential election which this study briefly 
analyzes via selected call-in show excerpts. 
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to draw attention to their achievements through the utterance of another, while 
appearing modest by exhibiting positive politeness in the process (Brown and 
Levinson 1987). Inversely, this linguistic tactic also allowed candidates to 
distance themselves from denigrating comments directed toward their opponents, 
while increasing the reliability of their claims. 
Hence, Kuo’s study and my own share similar features including speaker 
representation of Taiwan’s major political parties, speaking time constraints, and 
mass-mediated forums. One significant departure, however, is that the majority of 
guest panelists on Taiwan’s call-in shows are not political candidates,14 even 
though most guests are politicians, scholars, and political analysts who favor or 
are aligned with a particular political party or candidate. In addition, this study 
includes callers who do not hold high profile positions. The present project offers 
an opportunity to compare the manner in which a range of call-in participants use 
reported speech in a shared public space. 
Consequently, my study intends to augment the relative paucity of 
research on speech reporting in Mandarin. In particular, I consider call-in 
participants’ speech reporting practices as one among many linguistic devices 
they draw upon in their deliberations which, moreover, animates and augments 
the program’s overall crisis frame. In his observations speech reporting in a 
classroom setting, Baynham (1996) notes that a “direct quoting strategy can also 
be seen as a means of decreasing distance, not only between the human 
participants in discourse, but also between human subjects and the topic at hand” 
(78). This observation informs my study’s premise that speech reporting likewise 
                                                 
14 Although rare, political candidates have appeared on call-in shows. For instance, New Party 
vice presidential candidate Elmer Fung (馮滬祥) appeared on all the major call-in shows during 
the 2000 presidential election. Otherwise, candidates may be invited for a “special” appearance 
either via satellite or for a one-on-one interview, which independent presidential candidate Hsu 
Hsin-liang (許信良) and DPP vice presidential candidate Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) elected to do. 
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diminishes the conceptual distance between call-in participants and the crisis 
discourses they evoke and perpetuate. 
Speech reporting as call-in show cultural capital 
On political TV call-in shows, reported speech carries significant “pseudo-
performative force” (Silverstein 1995) given the dramatic and mass-mediated 
venue in which it is used. In other words, reported speech has symbolic value, not 
only as a readily assessable and transmittable symbolic capital, but also as an 
“ideology” (i.e., norms of communication) (Silverstein 1992:694) or ideological 
activity (Bakhtin 1981:337). In the former case, call-in participants wield reported 
speech as a sign of authority and knowledge, while in the latter, call-in programs 
feature mass-mediated reported speech in the form of edited video clips and sound 
bites in their promotion of a crisis-oriented worldview. This study thus explores 
the process of how call-in participants exchange and negotiate the discursive 
value of reported speech as they buy and sell the authenticity of their 
sociopolitical knowledge within the call-in show’s competitive infotainment 
marketplace in particular and Taiwan’s sociopolitical landscape in general. 
In addition, I explore how call-in show participants use reported speech in 
ways unique to their “on-air” roles. For instance, moderators prove particularly 
adept at reappropriating another speaker’s utterances, shaping them with 
alternative meanings and interpretations as they direct and facilitate call-in show 
deliberations. It is through this reframing and embedding tactic that moderators 
selectively fashion guest panelist and caller comments into urgent-sounding 
rhetoric in order to maintain the program’s overall crisis frame.  
In comparison, guest panelists are invited as purveyors of valuable 
information relevant to the featured topic. Glynn (2000) claims that given their 
exalted status, panelists are able to “rise above contingency and politics” (196). 
However, this idealized reading of talk/call-in show panelists conveniently 
ignores their political agendas and biased rhetorical practices. For instance, call-in 
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panelists seek to persuade viewers by prefacing their remarks with self-described 
“rational” and “objective” reasoning. Panelists maintain these “rational” claims by 
masking their ideological leanings through “objective” reported speech, thus 
absolving themselves as the source of utterance. Similarly, panelists couch 
unpalatable readings of controversial issues in quoted speech, which then 
strategically places the hapless quoted speaker as the scapegoat for personal 
criticism and public scrutiny. 
Perceived as representing authentic voices of everyday experiences, call-in 
show callers are lauded as the voices of “firsthand experience and emotional 
authority” (Glynn 2000:197). In such cases, the introduction of reported speech in 
personal narratives is generally regarded as enhancing the caller’s unquestioned 
authenticity. However, my study shows that callers have also learned the skill of 
ascribing hypothetical reported speech to prominent social figures as a means to 
criticize administrative agendas and disrupt powerful discourses.  
These call-in participant linguistic profiles suggest that speech reporting 
constitutes a linguistic device that is as accessible to everyday citizens as it is to 
sociopolitical leaders. Given that call-in programs frequently feature topics that 
address assumed behaviors, anticipated events, theorized scenarios, and possible 
outcomes, reported speech represents a linguistic equalizer that allows all 
participants to venture constructed discourses of “what could or would happen” 
(Buttny and Williams 2000:127, original italics). Despite the technology to 
provide video clips or sound bites of the original utterance, call-in participants 
take liberties when revoicing, and even creating, utterances as they attempt to 
forward particular readings of the call-in show crisis of the day. Yet to the careful 
call-in show viewer, speech reporting also exposes the participants’ biased 
evaluations and ideologies. Reported speech thus represents both a rich linguistic 
resource and source of information for its user and recipient respectively. 
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Examining call-in shows ways of reporting 
In the next three chapters, I present selected call-in show verbal 
interactions for analysis in order to explore the following claims: 
First, using reported speech as a form of evidentiality constitutes a 
negotiable process between the reporter of the original or hypothetical utterance 
on the one hand, and the listener(s) to whom it is presented on the other. For 
instance, participants often insert reported speech from imputed authoritative 
figures and entities to bolster their arguments or to serve as claims to knowledge. 
The persuasiveness of reported speech as an argumentative tool can thus be 
undermined by another speaker. 
Second, participants combine reported speech with other linguistic devices 
(e.g., prosody and code-switching) as a means to heighten their verbal 
performance and/or to further differentiate between their own and the animated 
characters’ voices. 
Third, participants use hypothetical reported speech as a means to present 
and reconcile conflicting worldviews and interpretations by couching their 
comments within a “storyworld” which they juxtapose with the “real” world. 
Call-in participants also use constructed dialogue to engage in verbalized “thought 
experiments,” which allows them to forward alternative scenarios or worldviews 
that might otherwise remain unarticulated or are often marginalized. 
Fourth, participants use reported speech to editorialize another speaker’s 
utterance as well as forward their own sociopolitical worldview. 
And fifth, speech reporting—particularly the use of direct and hypothetical 
reported speech—serves as a strategic and flexible linguistic device for animating 
and augmenting sociopolitical crisis discourses. In so doing, participants 
simultaneously verbally perform conflicts generated within the present setting of 
the call-in show studio, as well as symbolically index tensions between 
sociopolitical entities outside of and absent from the call-in show studio. 
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Chapter Five: Animating Crisis Discourses through Reported 
Speech 
The more intensive, differentiated and highly developed the social life of a 
speaking collective, the greater is the importance attaching, among other possible 
subjects of talk, to another’s word, another’s utterance, since another’s word will 
be the subject of passionate communication, an object of interpretation, 
discussion, evaluation, rebuttal, support, further development and so on.  
Bakhtin (1981:337) 
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the ways call-in participants use 
reported speech to animate and recreate various crisis discourses surrounding call-
in show featured sociopolitical issues and events. In particular, I explore how 
participants use direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech to forward their 
interpretation of the call-in show topic to varying degrees of success. I also 
examine participants’ use of reported speech in combination with code-switching 
and prosodic stylization, including the manner in which these linguistic devices 
enhance the performative nature of the call-in show’s crisis frame.  
The quote by Bakhtin in this chapter’s epigraph captures the main premise 
of this study and chapter, namely, the recognition that the words of another 
represent a rich site for speakers to interpret, deliberate, contest, and support the 
worldview of another. In the discursive space of call-in shows where talk 
represents both tool for expression and a site of debate, speech reporting 
constitutes an even more persuasive and powerful linguistic device. Subsequently, 
this chapter introduces the ways in which reported speech facilitates and 
compliments the rapid give-and-take of call-in show verbal interactions. 
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CALL-IN SHOW HYPOTHESIZING 
Given that call-in shows frequently invite guest panelists and viewers to 
deliberate assumed behaviors, anticipated events, theorized scenarios, and 
possible outcomes, it is not surprising that participants resort to using hypothetical 
reported speech (Haberland 1986) or constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989) in their 
arguments and commentary. Even when the programs provide video clips and 
sound bites of the original utterance, participants often impute words to other 
speakers that more likely resemble “impossible” or “fictitious” speech (cf. Buttny 
and Williams 2000; Mayes 1990). Quoting “someone else’s words” need not be 
based on an actual utterance to be effective as a source of evidence. By using 
hypothetical reported speech, call-in participants can calculatedly recreate and 
anticipate other speaker’s linguistic behavior and thoughts in a manner that lends 
credibility to the participant’s main argument. The following excerpts highlight 
the prevalence of “coulds,” “woulds,” and “shoulds” (Buttny and Williams 2000) 
in call-in participants’ speech reporting practices as they expose and heighten the 
dangers and opportunities within call-in show crisis topics. 
Cross-straits pop political crisis 
For three nights, TVBS’s 2100: All People Open Talk invited guest 
panelists and callers to share their views of the PRC government’s decision to ban 
Taiwan pop star A-mei’s CDs, Sprite commercials, and person from China.1 
Widespread interest on the topic allowed Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows to 
dramatize and deconstruct the incident to high viewer ratings. In featuring the 
news event for three consecutive days (May 24 - May 26, 2000), the 2100 trilogy, 
                                                 
1 The ban was also reported in local Chinese newspapers. For more information, see “五二○ 
唱國歌﹕張惠妹遭中共全面封殺” (“On 520 sings national anthem: Chang Hui-mei suffers 
Communist China’s complete ban”) dated May 24, 2000,  and “阿妹汽水廣告﹐ 大陸下禁令”  
(“A-mei’s soft drink commercials, Mainland China issues orders for ban”), dated May 25, 2000, 
both published in the China Times (中國時報). 
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entitled “PRC bans A-mei” (中共封殺阿妹),2 provides a case study of how call-
in participants’ linguistic practices contribute toward performing the crisis 
discourses that surround and inform sociopolitical events within Taiwan. Given 
the lack of information about the A-mei/PRC incident,3 call-in participants thus 
used one of the few resources available to them under the circumstances: talk, 
including the use of hypothetical reported speech. 
Media coverage of the A-mei ban converged on the rumor that PRC 
authorities objected to the pop star’s performance of the Republic of China 
(ROC)4 national anthem at President Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) inauguration. 
Moreover, by singing the ROC national anthem, A-mei had demonstrated her 
support for Taiwan independence. Ironically, the PRC regime’s interpretation 
revealed their ignorance of Taiwan’s sociopolitical history, and specifically, 
divided domestic opinions toward the ROC national anthem. Pro-Taiwan 
independence advocates regard the national anthem as a vehicle of the mainland 
China-derived KMT party, and thus not representative of Taiwan and its people.5 
The latest cross-straits incident as manifested by the PRC’s A-mei ban thus 
highlighted the rapid changes within Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment. It also 
demonstrated the extent to which Taiwan’s crisis discourses are a product of 
language and ideology, which I explain in greater detail below. 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the Chinese characters for “ban” or fengsha (封殺) mean “to seal” (feng 封) and 
“to kill” (sha 殺) respectively. The term thus has broader connotations than its English translation 
“to ban” does. 
3 See “中共封殺阿妹,各層面悄然展開”  (“Communist China bans A-mei, each bureaucratic 
level quietly disperses”) , China Times, May 25, 2000. 
4 I deliberately use “ROC” and not “Taiwan” as the national anthem is associated with the 
geopolitical entity officially recognized as the “Republic of China.” 
5 The KMT represented the ruling party on Taiwan from 1949 to 2000. A more detailed 
introduction of Taiwan’s political parties is provided in Chapter Three. 
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The ROC national anthem 
As a symbolic utterance,6 the ROC national anthem assumes a myriad of 
discourses that must be carefully deconstructed and contextualized. Excerpted 
from a speech by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (孫中山), the ROC’s founding father and the 
first KMT party chairman (zongli 總理), the anthem’s refrains recall Sun’s “Three 
Principles of the People” (sanminzhuyi 三民主義) edict and pledges allegiance to 
the KMT party, rather than the ROC nation.7 For these reasons, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), which is currently the ROC’s ruling party,8 denounces 
the ROC national anthem for being a discursive vehicle of the Mainland-derived 
regime. Subsequently, the DPP and its supporters do not recognize the ROC 
national anthem as representing the Taiwan people or nation. 
The ROC anthem also figures prominently in daily lives of Taiwan’s 
residents. For instance, students from elementary to high school begin and end 
their school day singing the anthem in chorus as a recorded, militaristic version 
blares forth over the school sound system. Before doing so, students uniformly 
march into the schoolyard or gymnasium grouped by classroom, line up in rows, 
and stand rigidly to attention facing the ROC flag. Before the lifting of martial 
law in 1987, the national anthem could also be heard in public settings such as 
movie theaters, complete with visual imagery before the feature presentation.9 
During my stay in Taiwan from 1998 to 2000, the anthem continued to be played 
before performances at national concert theaters10 and sporting events.11 
                                                 
6 From a Bakhtian perspective, an utterance can be verbal or non-verbal. My reading of the ROC 
anthem in this analysis includes both aspects. 
7 Sun Yat-sen delivered the speech to the Whampoa Military Academy (黃埔軍校) in Guangzhou 
on June 16, 1924. 
8 ROC President Chen Shui-bian is a DPP party member. 
9 This cinemagraphic display would display the words of the national anthem at the bottom of the 
screen as images of soldiers performing military exercises, flying aircraft, rolling tanks, playing 
school children, and the ROC president reviewing troops paraded before movie-goers’ eyes. 
10 I recall hearing the national anthem when attending concerts at the Sun Yat-sen memorial hall 
(國父紀念館)and Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall (中正紀念館). However, later versions during 
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A-mei’s performative utterance 
DPP President Chen’s personal invitation to A-mei to perform the ROC 
national anthem at his inauguration represented a calculated move that both 
upheld the traditions of the official ceremony, while also infusing it with a new 
and alternative interpretation. By the time A-mei made her inaugural appearance, 
her Mando-pop12 diva status already extended beyond Taiwan to the greater Asia 
Pacific region, including the PRC. Local and international media coverage of her 
multi-city PRC concert tour in early 2000 described A-mei as an ambassador of 
pop culture, if not cross-straits popular diplomacy.13 That is, A-mei was credited 
for single-handedly bridging the sociocultural differences between the two sides 
of the Taiwan Straits.14 Selecting the world-renown A-mei to perform the ROC 
anthem at President Chen’s inauguration thus seemed both politically and 
popularly appropriate at what promised to be a globally monitored event.  
Aside from live coverage by Taiwan’s local and cable TV networks, CNN 
International also broadcast the Republic of China’s 11th presidential 
inauguration on May 20th, 2000, with foreign correspondent Mike Chinoy 
providing commentary from the presidential palace in downtown Taipei.15 In 
                                                                                                                                     
Lee Teng-hui’s presidency (1988-2000) de-emphasized the military tone and presented images of 
“modernity and properity,” such as Pres. Lee visiting factories and children playing in the park. 
11 I deliberately note “played” and not “sung” as I don’t remember hearing or seeing movie 
theater, concert, or sporting event attendees singing the ROC anthem, as is done in the U.S. in 
similar settings. 
12 The term “Mando-pop” refers to popular rock music with Mandarin lyrics. The term may have 
been derived from the term “Canto-pop,” which refers to popular music with Cantonese lyrics. 
Canto-pop is primarily produced in Hong Kong, although there are Cantonese pop stars from 
Guangzhou Province (PRC) and Singapore. 
13 Lefkowitz (2001) notes, “Musical tastes are part of an elaborate hierarchy of symbolic capital” 
(180). 
14 In its January 8, 2001, edition, Newsweek (Asia edition) featured a cover story on A-mei 
including the repercussions of the PRC ban on her career. The cover headline read: “Pop & 
politics: last year she was banned by Beijing. Now Taiwan singer star A-mei is staging a 
comeback.” The cover photo pictured A-mei wearing a grey, long-sleeved jersey as she reclined 
on a black leather sofa. On the shirt were several small buttons, including one that read—ad:hoc. 
15 For CNN’s English listening viewers, an American-accented female voice read the prepared 
script of Chen’s speech, which had also been translated into Japanese, Spanish, German, and 
French for the distinguished guests, international attendees, and press corps. 
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many ways, A-mei’s appearance and performance epitomized the new 
administration’s youthful, 21st century persona. Her fashionable attire in a 
lavender, strapless leather dress and pearl choker bespoke of an administration 
that intended to shed the vestiges of a mainland China-derived worldview in order 
to forge a locally-grown and forward-looking nation-state. Moreover, A-mei’s 
dulcet, soprano voice, along with her camera-savvy hand and facial gestures 
transformed the controversial national anthem from a militaristic march into an 
operatic aria.  
 
Figure 9: Video clip of pop star A-mei performing the ROC national anthem at 
President Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration on May 20, 2000. 
In fact, a guest panelist Prof. Hsieh Zhiwei (謝志偉), who appeared on the 
first night’s coverage of the PRC ban, described A-mei’s rendition of the ROC 
national anthem as “not like how we generally sing it,” adding that her “rock and 
roll style” had transformed the national anthem into a “folk song.”16 
                                                 
16 Spoken on 2100 episode that aired on May 24, 2000. This comment recalls Jimi Hendrix’s 
Woodstock rendition of the “Star Spangled Banner” in a U.S.-based context. 
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The PRC bans A-mei 
Rumors of the PRC ban was first published in Taiwan’s print media17 and 
broadcast on news channels18 on Wednesday, May 24, four days after the 
presidential inauguration. The PRC’s alleged reasoning for the ban, namely, that 
A-mei’s inaugural performance of the ROC anthem made her an advocate of 
Taiwan independence, confused the Chen administration, not to mention 
Taiwan’s public, mass media, and A-mei herself.  
Reactions by A-mei fans in China revealed that many of them interpreted 
her performance as a rejection of her Chinese identity. Some heatedly demanded 
that A-mei “apologize to all Chinese people,” otherwise she would “end up just 
like the Taiwan splittists” (Taipei Times, May 24, 2000).19 Another fan posted a 
message on the Sina.com website that both rebuked and mourned A-mei’s 
turncoat behavior:20 
You have many fans in the mainland. You knew when you sang the 
Taiwan21 national anthem, the splittists in Taiwan would applaud you, but 
Chinese fans were crying. (Taipei Times, May 24, 2000) 
These ethnic and national identity constructions of A-mei revealed her fans’ 
deliberate denial or unwitting ignorance of her personal background. A-mei 
                                                 
17 Articles in the English daily newspaper, The Taipei Times, included: “A-mei not ‘the real thing’ 
in China after inauguration” (May 24, 2000) and “Government denounces A-mei incident” (May 
25, 2000). Similar articles in the Chinese daily, The China Times (中國時報), included: “五二○ 
唱國歌﹕張惠妹遭中共全面封殺” (“On 520 sings national anthem: Chang Hui-mei suffers 
Communist China’s complete ban,” May 24, 2000), “如何看待中共封殺啊妹?” (“How to read 
Communist China’s ban of A-mei?,” May 26, 2000), and an op-ed piece entitled, 
“封殺啊妹也封殺台灣青人” (“To ban A-mei is to ban Taiwan’s youth,” May 26, 2000). 
18 Twenty-four hour news channel TVBS began reporting the story on May 24, 2000. Its call-in 
program 2100: All People Open Talk began its three-day deliberations that same evening. I 
analyze selected excerpts of this broadcast later in the chapter. 
19 The label “Taiwan splittists” refers to Taiwan independence advocates or Taidu fenzi 
(台獨份子). The quote was taken from an English language newspaper but was most likely 
translated from Mandarin Chinese, as is the subsequent quote I include later in the same 
paragraph. 
20 At the time of the incident. Sina.com was the largest Chinese language website. 
21 Again, note that the writer associated the national anthem with “Taiwan,” indicating a lack of 
understanding regarding its controversial status in Taiwan as the “ROC” national anthem. 
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heralds from the Puyuma or Beinan (卑南) tribe, an aborigine group in Taiwan, 
and proudly identifies with her ethnic background (Newsweek 2001). During her 
concert appearances in China, however, the PRC government attempted to depict 
A-mei as an “ethnic minority,” that is, not Han Chinese. In other words, the PRC 
government attempted to portray A-mei as a member one of the non-ethnic 
Chinese groups they have incorporated as part of China (ibid). Moreover, the 
PRC’s portrayal of A-mei represented a symbolic gesture to demonstrate their 
rule over Taiwan. 
Despite the political overtones of the ROC presidential inauguration, A-
mei insisted that her participation in the event was “not that serious” and that she 
was “just a singer who has been invited to give a performance” (United Daily 
News (聯合報), May 17, 2000). A-mei expressed both surprise and optimism that 
the PRC ban was a “misunderstanding” (wuhui 誤會) and continued to emphasize 
her a-political stance: 
I feel that people in the Republic of China who were born and raised here, 
then, everyone is like, this—when I was little I had thought, I believed that 
everyone all, all-all sang the national anthem, were raised like this. So this 
time it was really very simple. I accepted this invitation in the role of a 
singer, and then I sang the national anthem. So, uh, it shouldn’t be like 
this. It’s a very simple situation to sing the national anthem and to make it 
into this—it’s a little politicized. This is a misunderstanding. (2100: All 
People Open Talk, May 26, 2000)22 
The pop star’s “misunderstanding” comment later fueled the deliberations and 
emotions of 2100’s call-in show participants as they wrestled with the 
ramifications of the PRC ban on cross-straits relations.23 
                                                 
22 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 2. 
23 I analyze the contents of this video clip in greater detail in Chapter Seven and the manner in 
which guest panelists refer to it in their deliberations. 
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“I can still do this”: animating the PRC 
Much of the intrigue surrounding the PRC’s A-mei ban involved 
discerning the PRC authorities’ rationale for its behavior. In the following 
excerpt, guest panelist Mr. Jin Wei-tsun (金惟純), publisher of Business Weekly 
magazine, portrays the PRC as a bully who willfully exerts its power over 
Taiwan, which now extends to banning a Taiwan pop star. In contrast, Jin finds 
the Taiwan government too concessionary and criticizes its leaders for constantly 
declaring what it won’t do, but never what it will or intends to do in relation to the 
PRC. 
To Taiwan’s call-in show viewers, Jin’s contrast between the PRC and 
Taiwan governments’ behaviors is readily apparent. His reference to “what 
Taiwan won’t do” refers to President Chen Shui-bian’s inaugural speech in which 
he outlined his administration’s “one if and five no’s” cross-straits policy. That is, 
if the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, then Chen would 
follow the previous ruling party’s (the KMT) lead and maintain the status quo.24 
This includes not declaring Taiwan independence, not changing the Republic of 
China’s national title,25 not altering the constitution, not holding a referendum on 
independence, and not abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification with 
mainland China (Taipei Journal, July 20, 2001).26 
To linguistically foreground the PRC’s aggressive politics versus 
Taiwan’s passive one, Jin animates the PRC government’s voice through 
hypothetical reported speech or constructed dialogue, while in contrast Jin 
represents Taiwan through indirect reported speech. Buttny and Williams (2000) 
explain that reported speech constitutes a valuable resource to understand how 
out-group members are discursively constructed. They add that whether the 
                                                 
24 The pro-independence DPP party defeated the KMT in the 2000 presidential elections after the 
KMT been the ruling party on Taiwan since 1949. 
25 Such as changing the official title to the “Republic of Taiwan.” 
26 The article was entitled, “Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian: A president’s progress.” 
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reported speech provides an accurate representation “is irrelevant since we are 
interested in the participants’ discursive constructions” (123). Mr. Jin’s combined 
use of hypothetical and indirect reported speech in his remarks vividly juxtaposes 
the PRC’s and Taiwan’s respective stances in not only the A-mei ban in 
particular, but also the cross-straits standoff in general. Thus, speech reporting 
allows Jin to vividly capture the unequal relations of power and status between 
the two sides.  
The portion of his remarks that include the two uses of reported speech is 
presented below. 
Transc. 5.1: “I still can do this” 
1 Jin 。。我認為一個重要 .. I believe an important 
2  需解讀的跡象 lesson that must be learned from this 
phenomenon 
3  是說我們這邊一直 is that we (on) this side always 
4  被迫說 feel compelled to say 
5  我們不做什麼。 what we won’t do. 
6  我們要做什麼﹐ What we want to do, 
7  我們不太講﹐ we don’t say (what we will do), 
8  一直講 (we) only say 
9  不做什麼。 what (we) will not do. 
10  那中共那邊 So Communist China that side’s 
11  的思路是﹕ thinking is: 
12  “我要散佈一種訊息﹐ “I want to deliver a message, 
13  告訴你說﹐ that tells you that,  
14  我還可以做什麼。” I can still do this.” 
15  可能包括對 Perhaps it includes targeting 
16  工商企業界﹐ the business world, 
17  可能包括對 perhaps it includes targeting 
18  藝人﹐ artists (entertainers), 
19  不過當然就是 but of course it will be  
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20  軍事演習之類﹐ along the lines of military exercises,27 
21  它一直在強調說﹕ it (PRC) is constantly emphasizing that: 
22  “我還可以做什麼。 “I can still do this. 
23  很多事我都沒做。 There are a lot of things I haven’t done 
yet. 
24  我一直在暗示你﹕ (But) I am continuously reminding you: 
25  我還可以做什麼﹐ I can still do this, 
26  做什麼。” (and still) do that.” 
27  我想這樣一個事實 I think this kind of reality  
28  才是我們要  -- is exactly what we must -- 
29  值得我們要注意的。。 is worthy of us paying attention to .. 
Interestingly, Jin’s remarks portrays Taiwan as the victim in the latest 
cross-straits incident and captures Taiwan’s weak position through indirect rather 
than direct reported speech. This can be seen at the beginning of the passage when 
Jin describes “we on this side,” meaning Taiwan, as constantly feeling obligated 
to explain “what we won’t do,” meanwhile what “we want to do, we don’t say” 
(lines 3-7). Toolan (1988) explains that a narrator turns to indirect speech when he 
“purports to provide an accurate version of what the speaker said, but not by 
simply reproducing that speaker’s own words: instead, the narrator’s words and 
deictic orientation are retained” (120). Here, Jin opts to paraphrase President 
Chen’s litany of “nos” through a “summary quote” (Buttny and Williams 2000). 
By retaining his footing as the author of the summation, Jin clearly communicates 
his disappointment and criticism of the Chen administration’s approach. This 
tactic differs from the next example in which a caller uses direct speech to 
obliquely criticize both A-mei and President Chen, which I analyze shortly. 
In contrast, Jin depicts Communist China as the perpetrator in cross-straits 
relations by articulating the communist regime’s aggressive stance through direct, 
                                                 
27 “Military exercises” denotes the PRC’s military exercises in the Taiwan Straits. This tactic is 
periodically used by the PRC, as it did prior to the 1996 presidential election (see Chapter Three) 
and at least once a year in the past few years. Here, Mr. Jin suggests that the PRC engages in so-
called military exercises as a means to threaten Taiwan’s sense of security and to remind the 
island-nation of the PRC’s reunification agenda. 
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albeit hypothetical, reported speech. Jin expresses the PRC’s confidence in 
threatening Taiwan by voicing their heavy-handed tactics not once but twice in 
this brief stretch of talk. This can be seen in Jin’s first introduction of hypothetical 
reported speech—“I want to deliver a message” (lines 12-14)—and again in lines 
22-26 (“I can still do this. There are a lot of things I haven’t done yet…”).  
Why does Jin attribute hypothetical direct speech to the Chinese 
Communist regime not once but twice? First, the repetition reinforces the urgency 
of the PRC’s discursive and military threat, as well as foregrounds the perpetual 
crisis conditions under which Taiwan exists. Second, repeating the hypothetical 
utterance highlights the “immediacy and vividness” of cross-straits tensions (Kuo 
2001; Tannen 1989). Third, the hypothetical reported speech serves as an 
involvement strategy that enhances the listener’s (or viewer’s) “emotional 
experience of insight” regarding the crisis scenario (Tannen 1989:13). Finally, 
given the ambiguous and alleged nature of the topic (the PRC ban of A-mei), Jin’s 
use of constructed dialogue engages his fellow panelists and television audience 
in collective sense-making (Labov 1972; Tannen 1989) of the Communist 
regime’s ban of A-mei and its repercussions for not only A-mei, but also Taiwan. 
It is interesting to note that Jin opts to animate the geopolitical entity of 
China as a whole, rather than a specific person such as President Jiang Zeming 
(江澤民) or Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基). As previously mentioned, 
reported speech augments how a speaker demarcates in-group and out-group 
members. Here, Jin linguistically portrays his worldview of cross-straits relations 
between Taiwan and the PRC as an oppositional relationship between “us (on) 
this side” (women zhebian 我們這邊) and “Communist China (on) that side” 
(zhonggong nabian 中共那邊).  
In sum, Jin’s creative use of indirect and hypothetical reported speech 
successfully emphasizes Taiwan’s role as the victim and “Communist China” as 
the aggressor in cross-straits relations. Moreover, by presenting Taiwan through 
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indirect speech, Jin subtly illustrates his frustration at the voiceless position that 
Taiwan assumes in its dealings with China. Inversely, in depicting the PRC 
through hypothetical reported speech, Jin verbalizes the PRC’s discursive and 
somewhat effective saber-rattling practices. Finally, this example aptly illustrates 
the “dangers” (wei 危) and “opportunities” (ji 機) within the current crisis 
scenario: namely, that “we” (Taiwan) can either allow ourselves to be cowered by 
the PRC’s ban of A-mei and continue to say “what we will not do” or “we” can 
grab the opportunity to say “what we want to do.” Thus, through creative speech 
reporting Jin succinctly and effectively articulates his frustrations regarding the 
impasse between Taiwan and the PRC and, particularly, Taiwan’s passive 
acceptance of the PRC leadership’s threats to Taiwan’s national security and 
citizenry. 
“I sing very well…so let me sing (the national anthem)”: A-mei’s impossible 
quote 
In the second passage, I examine how a caller uses hypothetical reported 
speech to express her disgruntlement at both A-mei and President Chen’s 
administration. The caller strategically criticizes the pop star’s untraditional 
rendition of the ROC national anthem by portraying the singer in an unflattering 
manner through a fictitious quote (Buttny and Williams 2000). By inserting the 
hypothetical utterance in the midst of her remarks, the caller conveniently 
disassociates herself from being responsible for the critical portrayal, thus 
allowing her “to convey information implicitly that might be more awkward to 
express explicitly” (Macaulay 1987:5). 
Ms. Huang begins her call as most callers do, namely, by introducing 
herself. In this case, Ms. Huang identifies herself as a Singaporean.28 This gesture 
                                                 
28 Ms. Huang’s self-introduction stands in contrast with that of Lee Tao, the moderator, as he 
introduces her as “Ms. Huang from Taoyuan.” Taoyuan is a city in northern Taiwan, just 
southwest of Taipei, the capital. 
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immediately establishes her non-Taiwan identity. It also acts as a distancing move 
that dislocates her from Taiwan’s ethno-political tensions between waishengren 
(Mainlanders) and benshengren (local Taiwanese). However, as her remarks 
demonstrate, her Singaporean status does not prevent her from making ideological 
interpretations of A-mei’s performance and President Chen Shui-bian’s non-
performance of the ROC national anthem, respectively. The excerpt is presented 
in its entirety below. 
Transc. 5.2: “I sing very well…so let me sing then” 
1 Huang 呃﹐我是新加坡人。 Uh: I am a Singaporean.  
2  Ok,我覺得叫 張惠妹 Okay, I feel: like, for Chang Huimei29 
3  來唱國歌 to sing the national anthem, 
4  很無聊﹐很無聊。 is very ridiculous, very ridiculous. 
5  我相信從小到大的﹐ I believe that when growing up, 
6  在任何場合 on any occasion 
7  你們 要 唱 國歌﹐ when singing the national anthem, 
8  沒有人說拿一個麥克風。 no one ever held a microphone.30 
9  噢﹐“我歌唱得很好聽﹐ Uh, “I sing very well, 
10  所以﹐啊﹐我來﹐ so, eh, let me, 
11  我來唱就好。” let me sing it then.” 
12  你們大家都不要唱嗎﹖ Don’t all of you need to sing too? 
13  我也觀察到 I have also noticed that 
14  你們陳水扁 your Chen Shui-bian 
15  沒有唱國歌。 wasn’t singing the national anthem. 
The caller’s insertion of hypothetical reported speech in the middle of her 
remarks does not impede the flow of her surrounding remarks due to the 
“sequential contiguity” (Sacks et al. 1974) between her preceding commentary 
and the fictitious quote itself. Moreover, the hypothetical utterance forms the crux 
of Ms. Huang’s argument as the sentences proceeding and following the quote are 
encapsulated in it. Namely, Ms. Huang uses the fictitious A-mei quote to 
                                                 
29 A-mei’s Mandarin Chinese name is Chang Huimei (張惠妹). 
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disapprovingly enact and critique the new DPP administration’s approach toward 
the ROC presidency as epitomized by an unorthodox performance of the ROC 
national anthem.  
Ms. Huang presents her critical stance by evaluating the DPP’s decision to 
have A-mei sing the ROC national anthem as “very ridiculous, very ridiculous” 
(line 4). She bolsters her assessment by reminding her listeners that on previous 
occasions no one sang the national anthem with a microphone in hand (lines 6-
8).31 Here, Ms. Huang’s evocation of memory (“when growing up,” line 5), place 
(“on any occasion” line 6) and embodied practices (“no one held a microphone,” 
line 8), succinctly captures the semiotic resonances the ROC anthem has for many 
Taiwan residents who grew up under the KMT regime. 
Yet, Ms. Huang reserves her most vituperative criticism for A-mei. She 
does so by ascribing an “impossible quote” (Mayes 1990) to the pop singer that 
depicts A-mei bragging about her singing prowess and anointing herself as the 
representative performer of the ROC national anthem at Chen Shui-bian’s 
inauguration (line 9-11). Press coverage before the inauguration reported that 
President Chen had personally invited A-mei to perform this honor. This further 
suggests that Ms. Huang’s imputed quote is a strategically constructed utterance. 
Regardless of its veracity, the fictitious quote allows the caller to both depict A-
mei and the Chen administration in an unfavorable light without directly 
implicating herself in this denigrating portrayal. Ms. Huang succeeds in 
distancing herself from the unflattering utterance by embedding the constructed 
quote within her ongoing comments, and thus making herself the animator rather 
than the author (Goffman 1974) of the critical remark.  
                                                                                                                                     
30 For a more colloquial English translation, lines 7 and 8 would be reversed. However, for the 
purposes of this analysis, I elected to keep the English text consistent with the Chinese text. 
31 As mentioned earlier, the ROC national anthem is traditionally sung in chorus and while 
standing. A-mei’s solo performance, abetted by a microphone, deviates from earlier performances 
of the national anthem as practiced and remembered by those who grew up in Taiwan. 
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By the end of the call, Ms. Huang reasserts herself as the author, which 
coincides with her overt criticism of the audience and President Chen for not 
singing the ROC national anthem at the inauguration. Through this rebuke, Ms. 
Huang recalls the choral fashion in which the ROC anthem has traditionally been 
sung and accusingly asks her call-in show interlocutors, “don’t all of you need to 
sing too?” (line 12). Similarly, she also censures President Chen for not singing 
the ROC national anthem (“I noticed that your Chen Shui-bian wasn’t singing the 
national anthem,” lines 13-15). Her final use of the deictic “your” again distances 
herself from her Taiwan listeners, as her Singaporean identity allowed her to do 
earlier in the call.32 
In sum, the caller’s use of hypothetical reported speech to critically 
evaluate A-mei’s “very ridiculous” rendition of the ROC national anthem serves 
as a conduit for expressing her disapproval of DPP President Chen Shui-bian, and 
particularly, his irreverence for the ROC national anthem. This passage also 
illustrates a different interpretation of the A-mei controversy: namely, Taiwan’s 
current crisis derives not from the PRC, but from the Chen administration and its 
unorthodox leadership as Taiwan’s new ruling party. 
As these two examples illustrate, hypothetical reported speech offers call-
in participants a powerful and subversive means to articulate their ideological 
readings of crisis scenarios. This proves particularly salient when the events 
surrounding a sociopolitical issue are obscured by misinformation or its lack 
thereof. While the prolonged attention 2100 paid the “PRC bans A-mei” incident 
was unprecedented, the call-in participants’ hypothesizing through reported 
speech occurs in every call-in show episode and with every featured topic. Buttny 
and Williams (2000) find that “hypothetical speech provides a resource to give 
voice to counterfactual conditions—what ‘could’, or ‘might,’ or ‘should’ have 
                                                 
32 It is also possible that the caller is only dissociating herself from President Chen’s supporters, 
and not all Taiwan residents. 
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been said” (127). Constructed dialogue thus provides call-in participants the 
flexibility to select which facets of the crisis topic they wish to conveniently 
underscore or conceal. 
LINEAR VERSUS PICTORAL ARGUMENTATION 
In this section, I continue my analysis of the strategic interpretations call-
in participants issue when using direct and indirect reported speech to depict the 
leading characters in a controversial scenario. The following verbal interactions 
present three guest panelists incorporating different speech reporting devices—
direct, indirect, and hypothetical reported speech—within their comments as 
evidence for their arguments, but to varying effects. All three verbal interactions 
derive from an 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices episode entitled, “Should the Vice 
President be Recalled?” (副總統該被撤換嗎﹖). The call-in episode focused 
upon popular discourses that clamored for Vice President Annette Lu’s removal 
from office following a recent string of verbal gaffes that her detractors alleged 
had undermined President Chen’s administration, and by extension, Taiwan’s 
national security. 
As with most call-in show topics, the principle character (Goodwin 1982) 
or figure (Goffman 1974) in this episode does not participate in the call-in show.33 
In the present case, Vice President Annette Lu represents as the principal 
character, while her verbal gaffes serve as the supporting cast. However, call-in 
show participants are able to evoke VP Lu’s presence, and thus, make their 
speech reportings the primary figure in their deliberations. In the following three 
excerpts, I illustrate how participants succeed or fail to present Annette Lu as the 
principle character in their remarks through reported speech, and moreover, how 
                                                 
33 Exceptions occur can be found in the “Big Reconciliation Coffee” episode in which the 
legislators who participated in the coffee press conference were invited to appear that evening on 
2100: All People Open Talk. 
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their resourcefulness in using this linguistic device abets or detracts from their 
arguments. 
The “black face/white face” (heilian/bailian) utterance 
Airing on June 12, 2000, the topic of recalling VP Annette Lu came just 
three weeks into President Chen’s new administration. Following the PRC’s ban 
of A-mei and the pop political outcry it elicited, cross-straits tensions with the 
PRC remained at a heightened state of uncertainty. Furthermore, opposition 
parties and coalitions—including the KMT, New Party, and supporters of 
maverick presidential candidate James Soong34—of the DPP were also closely 
monitoring President Chen’s performance. Consequently, opposition party leaders 
seized upon Vice President Lu’s verbal blunders as political fodder for legislative 
censure and call-in show critique. 
Political scholar Julian Kuo (Guo Zhengliang 郭正亮) initiated the idea to 
recall VP Annette Lu in an essay in the The Journalist (Xin xinwen 新新聞), a 
popular weekly magazine. In his article, Kuo declared that Lu’s recent remarks 
not only contradicted the Chen administration’s cross-straits policies, but also 
jeopardized ROC-PRC relations. Several opposition leaders subsequently pursued 
Kuo’s suggestion and attempted to introduce a vice presidential recall bill in the 
Legislative Yuan. In response, the DPP and several scholars condemned the 
unprecedented legislation citing its unconstitutionality given Annette Lu’s status 
as an elected official. The legislative motion thus threatened to initiate a 
constitutional crisis, a repercussion that would undermine the first democratic 
transfer of power since the Republic of China’s inception 89 years earlier.35 
                                                 
34 The People First Party, which was created by Soong’s followers in the summer of 2000, had yet 
to be officially founded at this time. 
35 The impending recall bill was also an attempt to distract, or even paralyze, the new 
administration from forwarding other legislation, such as eradicating “black gold” (heijin  黑金) 
or corrupt politics, repealing a nuclear power plant initiative, and privatizing government 
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Unlike the previous section in which innuendo and rumor surrounded the 
featured call-in show topic (the A-mei ban), 8 o’clock included video clips of 
Vice President Lu’s controversial “black face/white face” (heilian/bailian 
黑臉/白臉) utterance within its program format.36 Furthermore, in contrast to 
2100 where the moderator delivers an opening monologue to introduce the 
evening’s topic, 8 o’clock’s moderator is only required to announce the topic’s 
headline, while a 40-second video montage and voiceover summarizes the events 
and issues that inform the featured topic.37 Interestingly, 8 o’clock presented the 
Lu video clip after three guest speakers had already had an opportunity to share 
their perspectives on Lu’s “black face/white face” remarks, which I analyze later. 
The video clip captured VP Lu giving a keynote address at a women’s conference 
three days earlier on June 9th, 2000. The textual representation of the video clip is 
presented below:  
Look how remarkable our President Chen is. {Audience applause} He 
asked me to be his vice president. To play the black face (bad cop). 
{General laughter} And then he invited our Ms. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to 
be chair of the Mainland Affairs Council. (He) invited Ms. Zhong Qin 
(鐘琴) to be the spokesperson for the Executive Yuan. From now on, can 
the beautiful voices of Taiwan’s women not project forth from the 
political stage at all times?38 
                                                                                                                                     
industries. The opposition parties’ targeting of VP Lu was thus interpreted by many observers (and 
DPP supporters) as driven by partisan rather than national interests. 
36 Taiwan’s 24-hour news channels also featured the black face/white face utterance on their 
newscasts throughout the day prior to the call-in show’s broadcast later that night. 
37 For a more detailed description of the different call-in show broadcast formats, see Chapter 
Two. 
38 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 3. 
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Figure 10: Video clip of ROC Vice President Annettee Lu speaking at a national 
women’s conference where she made her controversial “black face/white face” 
utterance. 8 o’clock guest panelist Ms Peng Yen-wen watches the video clip on 
the call-in show. 
The term “black face” is roughly equivalent to the notion of “bad cop” 
while its counterpart, “white face” (bailian 白臉), is similar to “good cop.” Thus 
for VP Lu to depict herself as the heilian to President Chen’s bailian, the analogy 
suggested that Lu served as Chen’s political foil. Critics of Lu’s unorthodox 
comparison converged on the implication that Vice President Lu publicly 
expressed what Pres. Chen himself could not. Therefore, his policy 
announcements and speeches were merely a cover for his real intentions, 
intensions that Lu could articulate. 
Per 8 o’clock’s standard guest panel format, that evening’s broadcast 
featured five guests, including four male legislators representing each of the main 
political parties or coalitions.39 Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯), general manager 
                                                 
39 The four legislators represented the KMT, New Party, DPP, and Soong’s soon-to-be created 
People’s First Party. 
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(mishuzhang 秘書長)40 of a non-profit women’s organization, the Awakening 
Foundation (Funu Xinzhi Jijinhui 婦女新志基金會), was the sole female guest. 
Within minutes of the program’s opening discussion, the gender imbalance 
became apparent as Peng found herself fielding not only moderator Yu Fu’s 
pointed questions, but those posed by the four male legislators as well. Among the 
five guest panelists, however, only Peng had attended the women’s conference 
that morning and had personally heard Vice President Lu utter the now infamous 
“black face/white face” utterance. 
“Her joking has caused this situation”: editorializing VP Lu’s verbal gaffes 
In the following verbal interaction, I examine New Party Legislator Elmer 
Fung (Fung Hu-hsiang 馮滬祥) use of “snippets” of VP Lu’s previous utterances 
as persuasive evidence for his claim that her linguistic behavior is irresponsible 
and unbefitting of an ROC vice president. The New Party legislator thematically 
links the three utterances and suggests that collectively, her remarks contribute to 
increased cross-straits tensions. Fung’s use of reported speech thus serves to 
editorialize (Buttny and Williams 2000) both Lu’s original remarks and her 
person, while presenting them as “weaknesses” in Taiwan’s relations with the 
PRC. The passage with Leg. Fung’s comments follows below: 
Transc. 5.3: “These [ remarks] will all…bring about cross-straits tensions” 
1 YF41 最近  What about recent 
                                                 
40 The title can also be translated as “secretary-general.” 
41 YF represents the moderator, Yü Fu, while Fung denotes the New Party Legislator Elmer Fung. 
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2 Fung [的弱感度呢﹖ [weaknesses (in cross straits relations)? 
3  [那麼現在如果﹕-- [Then, if presently: — 
4  啊﹕她的一個﹐ uh: her (VP Lu), 
5  玩笑話啊﹐ joking (behavior) uh,  
6  造成那個情況﹐ has caused this situation,  
7  實際上不只這一次啦。 actually this isn’t the first time. 
8  (…) (…) 
9 YF 是。 Yes. 
10 Fung 啊﹕到這個“黑臉”說﹐ Ah: from this “black face” remark,  
11  從 “深宮怨婦” from “a scorned woman in the palace”42 
12  啊﹐到說 uh, to saying  
13  “江澤民只敢 “Jiang Zemin only dares to 
14  罵女人﹐ ” insult women,” 43 
15  啊這些都會啊 uh these will all uh, 
16   (xxx) (xxx)  
17  造成兩岸的緊張。 Result in cross-straits tensions. 
Clark and Gerrig (1990) claim that reporters often need only reference a 
portion or “snippet” of a previously uttered remark for listeners to grasp its 
contextual meanings: “When speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, 
they tacitly assume that their addressees share the right background to interpret it 
the same way they do” (793). By reciting in quick fashion key segments of three 
utterances that Leg. Fung reattributes to Vice President Lu—namely, “black 
face,” “a scorned woman in the palace,” and “Jiang Zeming only dares to insult 
women”44—the New Party legislator successfully reminds his fellow panelists 
and television viewers the political uproar these comments provoked at the time 
of their utterance (line 10-14). In so doing, Leg. Fung further reifies the original 
utterances such that they move from being reported speech per se to becoming 
                                                 
42 This Chinese saying roughly translates into English as “a scorned woman” or “a discarded 
woman.” VP Lu initially made this remark in reference to her position within President Chen’s 
administration (analogy to “palace”), insinuating that her role has been marginalized. 
43 Vice President Lu made this remark in response to the PRC president Jiang Zemin’s direct 
criticisms of her.  
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iconic representations of VP Lu’s perceived faux pas. Moreover, these utterances 
provide further evidence of how her verbal practices pose a threat to Taiwan’s 
national security. 
Although this is beyond the chapter’s scope of analysis, VP Lu’s original 
evocation of the proverb “a scorned woman in the palace” (shengong yuanfu 
深宮怨婦) can be regarded as a distancing move, not in the sense of quoting 
another speaker, but by using a well-known proverb as an analogy to describe her 
current situation within President Chen’s administration. This assessment 
supports Irvine’s (1993) observation of how speakers use proverbs: 
Similar to the use of quotative speech and intermediaries is the use, in 
conversation, of proverbs…and other ‘traditional’ sayings, with fixed text 
or structured format, which can be assumed to have been handed down 
from ancestral times. Again, this is a type of quotation dissociating the 
speaker from authorship of a message (126). 
Returning to Leg. Feng’s revoicing of VP Lu’s remarks, his selective 
reportings isolate recognizable portions that, not coincidentally, Taiwan’s press 
and mass media have replayed in their news coverage. By embedding the vice 
president’s words within his own editorial comments, Fung emphasizes “shared 
understandings of the way something would be said in order to imply what 
someone had said” (Shuman 1993:151). In case his listeners do not arrive at the 
same interpretation Fung does, he directly claims that VP Lu’s linguistic behavior 
will result in cross-straits tensions (line 17). Through these brief yet descriptive 
snippets, Fung “effectively and economically” revoices the three utterances as 
well as negatively assesses the original speaker, Annette Lu (Holt 1996). 
In Basso’s (1979) study of “Whiteman” joking practices among the 
Western Apache, he describes a deerskin analogy speakers use to characterize 
their social relationships. In the Western Apache culture, new and untested 
                                                                                                                                     
44 Vice President Lu made this remark in response to the PRC president Jiang Zemin’s criticisms 
of her.  
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relationships are portrayed as being “stiff” like tough deerskin and thus easier to 
tear, while longstanding and mature relationships can be “stretched” and are more 
resilient like softened deerskin (ibid:70). In depicting ROC-PRC relations under 
the new DPP ruling party, Leg. Fung makes a similar comparison. In responding 
to the moderator’s question of whether there are any “weaknesses” in current 
cross-straits relations, the New Party legislator immediately cites Vice President 
Lu’s joking behavior as the culprit in increasing cross-straits tensions. Given 
Taiwan’s precarious or stiff relationship with the PRC, and moreover, given that 
cross-straits relations have yet to “soften” to allow for such joking practices, Fung 
suggests that the vice president’s verbal behavior not only mocks the seriousness 
of Taiwan-PRC relations, but also undermines it (cf. Hill and Irvine 1993).  
Leg. Fung’s “seeing for themselves” approach (Holt 1996; Wierzbicka 
1974) strategically invites call-in participants and viewers to personally assess 
whether VP Lu’s joking behavior endangers Taiwan’s “stiff” relationship with the 
PRC, especially coming so early in President Chen’s new administration and the 
PRC ban of A-mei.45 In doing so, Fung allows listeners “to witness [the remark] 
for himself or herself, thus lending an air of objectivity” (Kuo 2001:42) to his 
own deductions. Fung’s reappropriation of VP Lu’s original utterances thus 
operates as “persuasive discourse” such that another person’s speech no longer 
represents mere “information, directions, rules, [or] models,” but moreover, 
determines “the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world” 
(Bakhtin 1981:342). In this case, Fung does not present the vice president’s joking 
as bad humor, but frames it as a serious political threat to Taiwan’s national 
security. Nonetheless, Fung’s assessment must be contextualized in relation to his 
party’s (the New Party) ideological leanings, which seeks eventual reunification 
                                                 
45 Scholars in Taiwan commented that while the DPP party had much to learn in becoming the 
ruling party, the PRC regime was facing the same situation as their interactions with Taiwan over 
the past half century has been with their longstanding nemesis, the mainland-derived KMT party. 
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with China. Consequently, Leg. Fung’s interpretation of VP Lu’s joking reflects 
and forwards his party’s worldview and cross-straits agenda. 
While I have described Leg. Fung’s speech reporting practices as 
examples of snippets of direct reported speech, I now reexamine my initial 
analysis. Returning to Tannen’s (1989) interpretation of reported speech, she 
states: “[T]aking information uttered by someone in a given situation and 
repeating it in another situation is an active conversational move that 
fundamentally transforms the nature of the utterance” (105). She consequently 
asserts that what is generally recognized as “direct reported speech,” actually 
represents “constructed dialogue.” Through this lens, Leg. Fung’s revoicing of the 
vice president’s original remarks can be regarded as “constructed” rather than 
“reported” speech. In other words, Fung’s recreations of Lu’s utterances 
deliberately abetted his pro-PRC worldview, and inversely, were not intended to 
be “faithful” reproductions of Lu’s original remarks (cf. Li 1986). 
The following verbal interaction continues this line of inquiry by 
examining call-in participants’ use hypothetical reported speech, and namely, 
utterances that purportedly have not and should not occur. 
“In the next four years, she is the vice president”: silencing and denying 
Annette Lu’s “other” voices and identities 
Most research on reported speech focuses on the reporting of another 
speaker’s words that had already been uttered or is imputed to utter. However, 
what of the speech that a person reportedly does not or should not say? In the 
following call-in excerpt, KMT Legislator Apollo Chen (Chen Shei-saint 
陳學聖)46 employs the latter form of speech reporting to strategically silence 
Annette Lu by performing what she hypothetically should not say as ROC vice 
president. That is, Leg. Chen uses hypothetical reported speech to assert that 
                                                 
46 The transliteration of Leg. Chen’s Chinese name represents his own interpretation. 
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Annette Lu’s “identity” (shenfen 身份) as the country’s second highest elected 
official cannot be “separated” (fenge 分割) from her other social and personal 
roles as a “chairperson, scholar, or woman.” 
The KMT legislator’s criticism of the vice president’s past linguistic 
behavior and his censoring of her future utterances both polices and criticizes VP 
Lu’s disregard for “social relations and social order” (Duranti 1993:25). By 
extension, Leg. Chen regards Lu’s irresponsible verbal behavior as endangering 
these social relationships given that “acts of speaking” constitute “social deeds” 
(ibid). Like Leg. Fung in the previous passage, Leg. Chen also emphasizes 
Annette Lu’s public role as ROC vice president and the responsibilities it carries, 
including upholding Taiwan’s national security. Yet, Leg. Chen’s preoccupation 
with the vice president’s linguistic behavior is concerned less with the “truth-
value” (Hill and Irvine 1993:6) of Lu’s utterances, and more with the 
consequences of her remarks as one of Taiwan’s most highly visible leaders. 
The following verbal interaction begins with the moderator asking Leg. 
Chen to respond whether Annette Lu has overstepped her rights as vice president. 
Interestingly, the KMT legislator answers by describing the linguistic or verbal 
“authority” (quan 權) VP Lu has as a public official. 
Transc. 5.4: “I feel that her joking is not appropriate…” 
1 YF 我請教這個陳委員。 Let me ask Legislator Chen.  
2  你覺得這個呂秀蓮 Do you feel that Annette Lu’s 
3  的談話有沒有  侵犯 remarks have infringed upon  
4  到這個總﹕統﹕的職權。 the Pre:si:dent’s authority?  
5  已經談到這個 (We’ve) already mentioned that such 
6  職權不容分割﹐ authority are not supposed to be 
separated,  
7  你覺得要這麼嚴重嗎﹖  do you feel it’s as serious as this? 
8 Chen 我覺得﹕她的玩笑是﹕ I feel that: her joking is:  
9  不當的玩笑。 an inappropriate(form of) joking. 
10  [因為﹕ [Because:] 
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11 YF [那-- [Then-] 
12 Chen 在之前已經有﹕ before there were: already  
13  很多的傳聞說她跟 a lot of rumors saying that she and 
14  陳水扁兩個人﹐ Chen Shui-bian the two of them, 
15  對於大陸政策﹐ regarding the mainland China policy, 
16  是兩說策略。 had two different approaches.  
17  一個扮白臉﹐ One plays the “white face,”  
18  一個扮黑臉。 the other plays the “black face.” 
19 YF [Mm-- [Mm--] 
20 Chen [所以在這時候﹐ [So at ]this moment,  
21  此時此地﹐ at this moment, 
22  她不應該開這樣的玩笑。 she shouldn’t joke around like this. 
23 YF [此時此地。 [At this moment.] 
24 Chen [她應該知道她現在 [She should know] that now  
25  做副總統以後﹐ after becoming Vice President,  
26  不僅要保持沉默﹐ not only must she remain silent,  
27  還有很多 自由 what’s more a lot of her freedom  
28  是已經失去了。 has been forfeited.  
29  她也要知道她的身份﹐ She must also know that her identities, 
30  也是不能分割的。 also cannot be separated.  
31  他不能說 She cannot say  
32  “我今天是代表某個 “Today I represent a certain 
33  基金會﹐ foundation,  
34  是董事長﹐ (I) am the chairperson of the board,  
35  或是學者﹐ or (I) am a scholar,  
36  或我是一位女性。” or I am a woman.” 
37  不要忘記﹐她永遠﹐ Don’t forget, she will always be, 
38  在這四年當中﹐ in the next four years,  
39  她是副總統。 she is the vice president.  
40  所以很多的話 So a lot of (her) remarks  
41  很敏感的。 are very sensitive. 
As in the previous example, Leg. Chen sequentially establishes his 
argument before inserting hypothetical reported speech to bolster his contention 
that Annette Lu must forfeit her other identities and remain silent as long as she is 
ROC vice president. However, rather than presenting the fictitious utterance as 
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one that Vice President Lu could have said or should say, the KMT legislator 
submits the hypothetical utterance as a statement “she cannot say” (line 31).  
In Michael’s (2000) study of Nanti speech reporting practices, he defines a 
“cannot say” form of reported speech as a “negative attribution of speech” (68), 
which he describes as “reported situations that will never transpire” (61). This 
interpretation does not apply in the present situation as the utterance that Leg. 
Chen associates with Vice President Lu has already transpired, for she already 
embodies the identities the KMT legislator hypothetically denies her as 
“chairperson, scholar, and woman” (lines 34-36). A better interpretation of 
Chen’s “cannot say” utterance can be found in Tannen’s (1989) understanding of 
reported speech as constructed dialogue. Moreover, Chen’s constructed utterance 
is determined by how he frames the imputed reported speech, and not with its 
actual past or future occurrence. 
At first glance, Leg. Chen’s insertion of constructed dialogue in his 
remarks seems to undermine his primary argument that Annette Lu cannot pursue 
social roles or identities that conflict with her duties as ROC vice president. Yet 
closer examination of his line of reasoning proves that the hypothetical utterance 
proves consistent with his remarks and highlights his main point. First, the KMT 
legislator reminds his fellow participants of VP Lu’s inappropriate verbal 
behavior by describing her “black face/white face” joke as being untimely (lines 
17-22). Moreover, the moderator’s repetition of “at this moment” (line 23) 
reinforces Leg. Chen’s assessment. Next, Leg. Chen emphasizes Annette Lu’s 
responsibilities as ROC vice president and, in particular, the sacrifices she must 
make in performing this role, such as forfeiting her freedom and remaining silent 
(lines 24-28). Moreover, in the sentence prior to the hypothetical utterance, the 
KMT legislator claims that Lu’s various identities “cannot be separated” (line 30) 
from each other, which suggests that they interfere with her ROC vice presidential 
role. 
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By the time Leg. Chen introduces his constructed utterance, he has 
established for his listeners an inherent conflict between Annette Lu’s other social 
identities and her current position as ROC vice president. Incidentally, prior to 
becoming vice president, Annette Lu’s public persona was based on the very roles 
Leg. Chen now holds against her, including her identities as a chairperson, 
scholar, and woman (lines 32-36). Moreover, Leg. Chen’s hypothetical utterance 
succeeds in questioning VP Lu’s other roles by relying on public knowledge that 
establishes the legitimacy of his imputed statement on “collective, rather than 
personal, authority” (Besnier 1986:167). As previously introduced in Chapter 
Three, Annette Lu is widely recognized as the founder of Taiwan’s women’s 
rights movement and continues to serve as an active member in many women’s 
organizations. Furthermore, Lu possesses a law degree from Harvard University 
and has published a wide range of scholarly work in both English and Chinese.47 
Ironically, Leg. Chen includes Lu’s identity as a woman in his list of roles 
that she cannot pursue. However, it can be argued that Annette Lu’s gendered 
(e.g., female) role largely defines her sociopolitical identities as a women’s rights 
advocate and as being one of two women among a total of eight individuals who 
were incarcerated in the infamous Kaohsiung Incident that occurred on December 
10, 1979.48 Thus Annette Lu’s significant contributions to Taiwan’s social and 
political development, including her advocacy for Taiwan independence, were 
among the qualifying factors that led President Chen to select Lu as his vice 
presidential running mate. 
                                                 
47 Annette Lu (1986 (1974)) is best known for her book entitled, New Feminism, which at the time 
of its initial publication, incited the ire of several conservative women’s organizations and their 
members including Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the first lady. It was reported that due to her 
unorthodox views, Lu was fired from her job at the Legal Department in the Executive Yuan (cf. 
Farris 1994). 
48 The Kaohsiung incident was initially organized as a rally to observe the United Nation’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, once government forces attempted to suppress 
the rally with the use of tear gas, the event quickly transformed into a riot. Annette Lu was one of 
the opposition (dangwai) leaders at the time who was arrested for organizing the event. 
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Given this background, Leg. Chen’s decision to restrict Lu’s social 
identities and police her activities through a hypothetical utterance appears all the 
more significant. As Annette Lu already identifies with and has performed the 
roles of chairperson, scholar, and woman, the KMT legislator strategically refutes 
and denies her these accomplishments, as well as her influence on Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical transformation from a society under martial law to its present 
democratic state, by silencing and erasing her through a constructed “cannot say” 
utterance. Leg. Chen further constrains Lu’s public identities, and hence linguistic 
agency, by naming the only role she can assume in the “next four years,” basically 
that of ROC vice president (lines 37-39).  
Although the position of ROC vice president carries certain 
responsibilities and social prestige, it is also traditionally regarded in Taiwan as a 
“puppet” (kuilei 傀儡) that adheres to the movements and speech of the ROC 
president. That it, the symbolism between silencing Annette Lu and delimiting her 
identity to the ROC vice presidency evokes stereotypes found in popular 
discourses regarding the U.S. vice presidency, including the notion that the vice 
president serves as an invisible and mute spare to the ROC president. In fact, Lu’s 
predecessors, all of whom were from the KMT, quietly fulfilled their duties as 
ROC vice president in this manner. Thus Leg. Chen’s hypothetical utterance 
transmutes Annette Lu into a persona non-grata that is in alignment to his KMT-
based political ideologies of “social relations and social order” (Duranti 1993). 
Moreover, Leg. Chen’s constructed dialogue also recalls traditional 
gendered practices, including the Confucian cultural perspective toward the 
division of labor in which “women are homemakers and men are breadwinners” 
(nu nei nan wai 女內男外).49  This analogy reinforces the relatively voiceless and 
powerless official position Vice President Lu holds, which contrasts with the 
policy-making and promulgating powers of President Chen. Here, the KMT 
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legislator’s constructed utterance reinforces the observation that “[w]ords often do 
not emanate from ‘individuals’ in the Western sense, but instead from the locus of 
a positional identity” (Hill and Irvine 1993:9). Following this line of thought, Leg. 
Chen’s final claim that many of Lu’s remarks are “sensitive” subtly underscores 
his argument she has no right to utter personal statements or opinions as long as 
she is ROC vice president (line 40-41) within Taiwan’s sociopolitical order and 
its Confucian-based cultural relations of status, power, and agency. 
“I was there in person, I heard”: summarizing VP Lu’s “black face” remark 
In comparison to the previous two examples, the following excerpt 
illustrates an instance in which a guest panelist, Ms. Peng Yen-wen, relies on 
indirect reported speech or a summary quote to defend Annette Lu’s “black face” 
utterance. In this example, I examine why Ms. Peng’s speech reporting approach 
fails to contextualize Vice President Lu’s controversial utterance, and 
subsequently, forward her argument that Lu introduced the utterance in relation to 
her speech on women’s rights. 
I observed the live broadcast of this call-in show episode in 8 o’clock’s 
studio and recall becoming increasingly disturbed and confused by why the other 
panelists’ comments so easily dismissed and overshadowed Ms. Peng’s seemingly 
cogent arguments. Several days later, I interviewed Ms. Peng at her office and 
asked her to comment on the broadcast. She frankly admitted that she had 
“performed poorly” in the call-in program (Peng Yen-wen 2000). When I asked 
why she thought so, Peng vaguely responded that due to nervousness her answers 
were unstructured and her delivery was weak. 
My initial studies of the taped broadcast shed scant light on how Peng’s 
arguments appeared less convincing and her speaking style less aggressive than 
                                                                                                                                     
49 A literal translation would be “women (work) indoors, men (work) outdoors.” 
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those of her fellow participants.50 However, once I began investigating the 
manner in which each of the panelists incorporated VP Lu’s utterances in their 
comments—either through direct, hypothetical, or indirect reported speech—I 
noticed differences in the persuasive power the various reporting practices had on 
other participants’ responses as well as on the ensuing direction and tone of the 
panelists’ deliberations.  
To elaborate, direct and indirect reported speech provide different forms 
of evidentiality. In quoting another speaker, the reporter appears to demonstrate 
concern for the integrity and authenticity of the quoted message (Vološinov 
1978). From this perspective, listeners perceive direct reported speech to be 
“more authentic” and to maintain “greater fidelity” to the original source or 
utterance (Li 1986:41). As a linear style of presenting information, direct reported 
speech keeps the author of the quote and its reporter “maximally distinct from 
each other” (Besnier 1993:162). Inversely, indirect reported speech imparts a 
pictoral style that blends the quoted utterance within the surrounding discourse 
(cf. Besnier 1993; Vološinov 1978). Indirectly reported utterances subsequently 
seem less authentic when presented by a speaker as a piece of evidence. Kuo 
(2001) confirms this finding in her study of speech reporting practices in political 
debates. She observes that candidates insert direct quotation to highlight key 
elements and present evidence, but used indirect quotes to background 
unimportant information and clarify information or correct errors (ibid:182; cf. 
Mayes 1990). 
The relative ineffectiveness of indirect reported speech as a means to 
present evidence corroborates with Ms. Peng’s speech reporting practices and 
lack of persuasiveness during call-in show deliberations. The following two 
                                                 
50 At first I concentrated on observing the manner in which male guest panelists took turns 
rebutting Peng’s explanations, including her reasoning that the media was responsible for 
dramatizing VP Lu’s “blackface” remarks and that the political arena was biased against women 
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passages illustrate instances where the introduction of direct reported speech 
could have strengthened Ms. Peng’s arguments by more vividly portraying the 
linguistic behavior she describes. In the first passage, Peng contends that the 
media has distorted Vice President Lu’s words, while in the second, she claims 
that President Chen Shui-bian’s office delivered a press release that criticized the 
vice president without attempting to contextualize her “black face/white face” 
remark.51 
Example 1: “the media…obviously twisted her words” 
Okay…in the past when Lu Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu) said anything 
[controversial], I was not present. I am not a reporter. I cannot [comment 
on that]--but this time I have personally observed that it is the media—the 
media basically twisted her words. Obviously in such a, such a large story 
what they selected was actually a little taunting, because Mainland China 
had labeled her [VP Lu] in this [negative] way, so it was a little taunting… 
Example 2: “the Presidential office…issued a news release”  
…this time the Presidential office’s reaction made me feel, that the 
[President and the Vice President’s] internal (personal) interactions 
definitely revealed some problems. Because it basical- basically today it 
[the Presidential office] issued a press release and then, uh, informed Lu 
Hsiu-lian (Annette Lu). Also, it didn’t try to understand Lu Hsiu-lian’s 
entire speech within the context [of the women’s conference]. I feel that, it 
(the press release) was a pretty disrespectful [thing] to do to the Vice 
President… 
Although Ms. Peng suggests that the media and the Presidential Office have 
mistreated Annette Lu, she omits linguistic evidence for her claims. Specifically, 
Peng omits the next step of the evidentiary process, that is, “encoding” the 
sources she presents such as “reported speech and the animate human nouns to 
whom such speech is attributed” (Philips 1986:251).52 For instance, Ms. Peng 
does not produce the names of newspapers and TV stations that misrepresented 
                                                                                                                                     
who were outspoken. However, analyzing turn-taking did not explain the argumentative 
imbalance, as the moderator provided Peng ample opportunities to rebut to criticisms of VP Lu. 
51 For the Chinese text of the following two examples, see Appendix B, Excerpts 4 and 5. 
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Lu’s words. Likewise, Peng fails to provide evidence in the form of quoted 
speech (or text) to demonstrate exactly how the media manipulated Vice President 
Lu’s keynote speech, which she again omits in the second passage when claiming 
that Chen’s office criticized VP Lu. 
Similar evidentiary omissions in the form of direct, or even hypothetical, 
reported speech occur in the following verbal interaction in which Ms. Peng 
attempts to answer moderator Yu Fu’s question of whether Vice President Lu’s 
“black face/white face” utterance endangers Taiwan’s national security. As the 
lone panelist who personally heard Annette Lu’s keynote address, Ms. Peng could 
have easily quoted portions of Lu’s speech to demonstrate that the “black 
face/white face” remark merely represented one line of the keynote address, while 
the majority focused on women’s rights advances in Taiwan and elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, Ms. Peng glosses the theme of Lu’s speech in a summary quote 
that inadvertently becomes subsumed within Peng’s own comments and thus 
conflating the two. 
Transc.5.5: “She discussed a lot of things…” 
1 YF 沒有到這個國家安全的 Has it not reached the point of where 
2  這樣地步﹖ the national security (is involved)? 
3  [地步-- [To the point where-- 
4  [我當然不覺得。我—  [Of course I don’t feel this way. I— 
5 Peng 這邊就要講就說這次談 wanted to say here that this time when 
6  的黑臉的時候﹐ “black face” was mentioned (by Lu),  
7  因為﹐這邊﹐和各人  because, this,  and each of us 
8  我想﹐都沒有參加過﹐ I think, did not attend 
9  當時的全國婦女 a today’s (this morning’s) worldwide 
Women’s 
10  國事會﹐ National Conference,  
11  以只我參加  hon.53 while I am the only one who did.  
                                                                                                                                     
52 Phillips’ observations of presenting speech reporting as evidence was conducted in the context 
of U.S. court cases. 
53 “Hon” (a nasalized vowel) represents a discourse marker that speakers commonly use in 
Taiwan. It derives from Taiwanese and does not have a Chinese character representation that I am 
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12  我在場。我聽到﹐ I was personally there. I heard,  
13  呂秀蓮四十分鐘的言講。 Annette Lu’s 40-minute speech. 
14  然後﹐她— 其實是 And then, she— actually it (the speech) 
15  暢述從聯合國的 was to thoroughly detail (the prospect 
of) 
16  婦女人權﹐ women’s rights from that in the UN54 
17  到台灣婦女的人權的遠景。 to women’s rights in Taiwan. 
18  其實﹐談的非常多。 Actually, (she) discussed a lot of 
things. 
19  然後﹐談的譬如說﹐ And then, for instance (she) talked 
about,  
20  女人不要依附 how women need not be  
21  在男人之下﹐ subordinate to men,  
22  這是我覺得最﹐ this is what I felt was the most,  
23  最鼓舞的一句話。 most inspiring statement. 
I should be noted that Leg. Fung spoke (see Example 5.3) prior to Ms. 
Peng’s turn of talk. In comparison, Ms Peng’s delivery comes across as even less 
persuasive and “authentic” following Leg. Fung’s criticism of VP Lu’s verbal 
blunders through direct reported speech. Also, by beginning her response to 
moderator Yu Fu’s question on national security with the “blackface” utterance 
(line 6), Peng unwittingly reinforces the negative impression that Leg. Fung had 
previously established regarding the controversial remark and Vice President Lu 
without first providing an alternative interpretation. Interestingly, I found that 
Leg. Fung and Ms. Peng’s different speech reporting practices foreshadowed an 
argumentative pattern that repeated itself throughout the program. 
While Peng claims in this passage that Annette Lu spent the majority of 
her 40 minute keynote address “thoroughly detailing” (line 15) the development 
of women’s rights through resolutions passed by the United Nations and those 
                                                                                                                                     
aware of. In some instances, its use is equivalent to “okay” or “right?” in American English such 
that it represents added emphasis or the present’s attempt to solicit affirmation from an 
interlocutor. In this instance, the latter explanation could be applicable. However, I find that “ho” 
occurs in ways other than what I have described and thus requires further study. 
54 The abbreviation “UN” stands for the United Nations. Due to space reasons I opted to use its 
initials instead. 
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promulgated in Taiwan respectively, Peng subsumes these points by not quoting 
even snippets of Vice President Lu’s speech to bolster her statement. Moreover, 
the introductory phrase “for instance (Lu) talked about” (line 19), prepares Peng’s 
listeners for a direct quotation. By following this opening with a summary quote 
instead—“women need not be subordinate to men” (lines 20-21)—confuses 
listeners as to whether the statement represents Peng’s opinion or a portion of the 
vice president’s speech. Consequently, what Peng describes as the “most inspiring 
statement” (line 23) of the vice president’s speech never materializes for her 
listeners in the form of a direct quotation that they can process, remember, and 
later reiterate. Peng thus fails to involve fellow call-in participants and viewers in 
her interpretation of VP Lu’s speech by providing them with direct quotations that 
they can make sense of themselves (Tannen 1989). 
This failure might not be so apparent and significant if Peng had directly 
reported VP Lu’s remarks, no matter how brief, on women’s rights in her 
recollection of the speech event. In retrospect, not taking advantage of her 
personal attendance at the conference—including Peng’s privileged access to 
other segments of the speech that the other panelists did not have—as a means to 
replace the program’s and other panelists’ preoccupation with Lu’s “black 
face/white face” utterance with something more substantial and memorable, now 
seems all the more negligent. Furthermore, in comparing Leg. Chen’s use of a 
hypothetical non-utterance to silence Annette Lu’s voice as a woman, Peng’s 
disappointing efforts to portray VP Lu as a stalwart advocate, and even the 
embodiment, of women’s rights in Taiwan also represents a lost opportunity. 
In sum, by presenting their arguments through a quotive frame (Besnier 
1993), Legislators Fung and Chen allowed “the power of another’s words…[to] 
articulate a compelling discursive position” that absolved themselves of being 
responsible for their crisis interpretations (Buttny and Williams 2000:190). The 
two legislators’ use of direct and hypothetical reported speech respectively, 
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succeeded in dramatizing and framing VP Lu’s linguistic behavior as endangering 
Taiwan’s national security and thus lent these crisis discourses greater 
“immediacy and vividness” (Kuo 2001; Tannen 1989). Inversely, Peng’s 
summary quotes of Lu’s speech appeared as subjective rather than objective 
readings of the vice president’s language use. Unfortunately, this impression 
prevented Peng’s co-participants and viewers from considering an alternative 
reading of VP Lu’s controversial remarks that Fung and Chen performed and 
perpetuated. Moreover, Peng’s less persuasive remarks impeded her ability to 
challenge dominant crisis discourses in Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment 
regarding Lu’s recent verbal behaviors and competency as ROC vice president. 
EDITORIALIZING PRC SABRE-RATTLING: TAIWAN’S PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION SHOWDOWN 
In their study of group discussions on interracial conflict, Buttny and 
Williams (2000) find that students often use direct reported speech in their 
remarks to “editorialize” both the quoted utterance and the original speaker. This 
practice allows students to assess the quoted remark as “favorable or 
unfavorable,” frame it as “serious or ironic,” and by extension, obliquely evaluate 
the individual who uttered the original statement (119). Mitchell-Kernan (1972) 
documents a similar linguistic practice in African-American speech known as 
“marking” in which “the marker attempts to report not only what was said but the 
way it was said, in order to offer implicit comment on the speaker’s background, 
personality, or intent” (176, in Clark and Gerrig 1990:81).  
In the following passage, 2100 moderator Lee Tao uses reported speech in 
a similar fashion when he editorializes PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s 
threatening remarks to Taiwan voters days before Taiwan’s second direct 
presidential elections. Early in the program, Lee Tao introduces a video clip of 
Zhu Rongji’s remarks for panelists and viewers to hear and view Zhu’s original 
words. Lee Tao revoices a segment of Zhu’s utterance later in the program when 
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he discusses the election of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian. In this passage, Lee 
Tao also animates the imaged reactions of Taiwan’s citizenry to both Chen’s 
electoral victory and Prime Minister Zhu’s threats. Despite call-in show 
producers’ clams that moderators maintain a “neutral” (zhongli 中立) or unbiased 
role on the program,55 Lee Tao manages to subtly express his personal opinions 
regarding the program’s topic, participants, and other absent figures (e.g., political 
leaders) through the linguistic resources of direct and hypothetical reported 
speech. 
“Events in the world are unpredictable”: reappropriating PRC crisis talk 
As Taiwan’s presidential election gradually approached, the PRC 
leadership increased its verbal saber-rattling through thinly veiled threats that 
reminded Taiwan’s voters to not risk endangering the precarious status quo in 
cross-straits relations.56 Two days before the elections (March 16, 2000), 2100 
featured various segments of PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s remarks in 
several short video clips spaced throughout the program. The textual 
representation of one video clip is presented below. It includes the segment of 
Zhu’s speech that Lee Tao revoices in a marathon call-in show broadcast the night 
of the election two days later. 
The citizens of Taiwan now face a critical [and] historical moment. Where 
to go and who to follow?57 Don’t do anything emotional and rash. 
Otherwise in the future you’ll cry over spilt milk.58 We believe in the 
political wisdom of Taiwan’s citizens. We believe that (our) Taiwan 
                                                 
55 In Chapter Two, Lee Tao describes his role as moderator as portraying the neutral or impartial 
voice on the call-in program. 
56 This tactic had previously been used during the 1996 presidential election, albeit accompanied 
by live military exercises. Here, the “status quo” refers to reelecting the mainland China-derived 
KMT party and thus preventing the election of Taiwan independence-minded DPP candidate Chen 
Shui-bian. 
57 A more colloquial translation would be: “Where do you go from here? Who should you listen to 
(or obey)?” 
58 This can also be interpreted as meaning, “in pursuing or dreaming of a brighter future, you may 
just lose everything (and then some) that you already have.” 
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compatriots will make an intelligent historical decision! But there still are 
three [more] days. Events in the world are unpredictable. Taiwan 
compatriots! You must beware (stay alert)!59 
To Taiwan’s citizens, Zhu’s rhetorical questions of “where do you go from 
here? Who should you listen to” is obvious; that is, Zhu’s remarks suggest Taiwan 
that its presidential election will have repercussions for both its domestic politics 
and cross-straits relations with the PRC. Similarly, Zhu’s warning to Taiwan’s 
electorate to not do anything “emotional and rash” represents a thinly disguised 
reminder not to use the election as a referendum for Taiwan independence by 
electing DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian to office.60 In expressing his faith in the 
“political wisdom” of Taiwan’s citizenry to “make an intelligent historical 
decision,” Zhu confidently declares the PRC’s belief that Taiwan’s voters will 
maintain the status-quo in cross-straits relations (e.g., vote for the KMT candidate 
Lien Chan and keep the Mainland-derived party in power). The prime minister 
adds a temporal reminder that “there are still three days (to the election)” for 
Taiwan’s voters to carefully contemplate their choices. Finally, Zhu’s depiction of 
events in the world as being “unpredictable” (nance 難測) covertly reminds its 
“Taiwan compatriots” (Taiwan tongbao 台灣同胞)61 that regardless of the 
electoral outcome, the PRC will use force if necessary to ensure that Taiwan and 
its people adhere to the “one China” principle. 
On the night of the Taiwan presidential election on March 18th, 2000, 
2100 aired a special a special four-hour live broadcast that covered the election 
                                                 
59 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 6. 
60 Under the “one China” principle, Taiwan is considered a province of China, in this case the 
PRC. Therefore, the PRC regards any election Taiwan holds, including Taiwan’s 1996 and 2000 
presidential elections, as local and not national elections. 
61 Zhu Rongji’s use of “Taiwan compatriots” is calculatedly significant in that it assumes that 
Taiwan and its citizens are the PRC’s breathen, and hence, one geopolitical entity. However, the 
notion of “compatriot” is politically marked, as I demonstrate in Chapter Seven when I examine a 
call-in saliva war between two guest panelists who debate its connotations. 
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returns.62 During the marathon telecast, Lee Tao responded to Prime Minister 
Zhu’s pre-election threats as the electoral results indicated that the DPP party and 
its candidate, Chen Shui-bian, would come away the victor over independent 
candidate James Soong, and more importantly, defeat the 51-year incumbent 
KMT party and its candidate Lien Chan. In his rebuttal to Prime Minister Zhu, 
Lee Tao referred to Zhu’s “three days time” comment during a monologue, which 
I examine below, in which he also inserted two constructed utterances. The first 
hypothetical utterance conveyed the Taiwan populace’s anxiety towards cross-
straits relations following Chen Shui-bian’s electoral victory, while the second 
reported utterance expressed the electorate’s pride in defying the PRC leadership 
by electing a pro-Taiwan independence candidate. 
Transc. 5.6: “Watch me stand up and confront you!” 
1 LT 目前可能民眾 Presently what the citizenry 
2  最關心的﹐ are perhaps most concerned about, 
3  有很多人﹐ there are many people, 
4  大概有六成以上 about 60 percent or more  
5  民眾說﹐甚至於﹐ of the citizenry (who) say, what’s more,  
6  七八成以上 說﹐ seventy to eighty percent or more ask, 
7  會不會 兩岸的問題 “Will the cross-straits problem 
8  真的發生這個 危機﹐ develop into this crisis,” 
9  像這個 四五天 like four five days (ago)63 
10  這個朱鎔基 先生的 this Mr. Zhu Rongji’s 
11  這種威:脅:﹐說﹐ in a thr:eat:ing kind of way, said, 
12  “過兩天再瞧﹗” “We’ll see in two day’s time!” 
13  那麼現在所有瞧﹐民眾﹐ But now we see, the citizenry, 
14  台灣的民眾說  —  Taiwan’s citizens saying— 
15  我展開了﹐ “I’m standing right here,  
16  我挺起腰桿來讓你瞧﹗ (just) watch me stand up and confront 
                                                 
62 In the week before the election, 2100 had also lengthened its normally one-hour long program 
to two hours. 
63 Lee Tao’s recollection that Zhu’s original utterance was made “four, five” days ago illustrates 
the “constructedness” of direct reported speech, whereby reporters rarely recall, not to mention 
reiterate, the original speech word for word (Tannen 1989). 
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you! 
17  怎麼樣﹗  What about it!” 
Clark and Gerrig (1990) argue that quoted speech are not accurate 
reproductions of an original utterance, bur rather represent verbal demonstrations 
or “selective depictions” of that utterance. Thus, although Lee Tao inaccurately  
revoices Zhu’s original utterance—he misreports Zhu’s threat as being “in two 
days time” (line 12) rather than “in three days time” (see paragraph excerpt of 
Zhu’s remarks)—the moderator nonetheless retains the utterance’s threatening 
affect through a demonstration of the utterance as a selective depiction. In other 
words, Lee Tao’s “reporting” relies less on accuracy or faithfulness than on the 
tacit assumption that call-in show participants share with him “the right 
background to interpret [the reported utterance] the same way” he does (ibid:793). 
To facilitate this reading, Lee Tao prefaces the reported utterance with the 
descriptor “this kind of threat” (line 11), thus making the crisis-laden connotations 
within Zhu’s remarks explicit. 
A closer examination, however, reveals that Lee Tao’s two hypothetical 
utterances deliberately respond to Prime Minister Zhu’s remarks as featured in the 
program’s video clip two days prior. In the first hypothetical utterance (“Will the 
cross-straits problem develop into a crisis?” lines 7-8), the moderator articulates 
the Taiwan electorate’s anxieties of a cross-straits confrontation should Zhu’s 
warning that they “must stay alert!” (see previous paragraph quotation) escalate 
into a military retaliation if they elect the wrong presidential candidate.  
However, in Lee Tao’s second hypothetical utterance, he reverses this 
tentative image of Taiwan’s populace. In responding to the PRC Prime Minister’s 
reminder to not do anything “emotional and rash”—such as electing pro-Taiwan 
independence DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian—Lee Tao portrays Taiwan’s 
citizens as exercising their sovereignty and exerting their democratic rights (“I’m 
standing right here,” line 15) by challenging the PRC Prime Minister through a 
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direct confrontation (“Just watch me stand up and confront you!” lines 16-17). 
Lee Tao’s reenactment of Zhu Rongji’s remarks through selective depiction both 
editorializes the PRC prime minister’s original utterance and portrays his 
aggressive rhetoric as a “schoolyard bully,” in this case a regional power with 
considerable military might. By performing the reported utterance with elongated 
and louder speech (lines 11-12), Lee Tao succeeds in dismissing both Prime 
Minister Zhu’s ominous rhetoric and political influence. 
In the second hypothetical utterance, Lee Tao also reveals his own attitude 
toward Zhu’s verbal threats and Chen Shui-bian’s presidential victory. As 
moderator, Lee Tao generally attempts to maintain an apolitical image out of 
deference to his guest panelists, which represent Taiwan’s political spectrum 
regarding sensitive issues such as Taiwan independence and ethno-political 
relations, as well as to attract a broad audience and high ratings for the program. 
This includes refraining from expressing his personal opinions on sociopolitical 
issues in general and the featured program topic specifically. However, in the 
above monologue, Lee Tao subtly expresses his political leanings when animating 
the collective voice of “Taiwan’s citizens” (line 14) given that he is a citizen as 
well (Livingstone and Lunt 1994; Wood 2001). Livingstone and Lunt (1994) note 
that talk show hosts usually play the romantic “hero” on behalf of the populace. 
However, Wood (2001) claims that regardless of the host’s efforts to remain 
neutral, her positioning is apparent through the management of talk during 
program deliberations. Moreover, it is telling that Lee Tao describes the electorate 
as “Taiwan’s citizens” and not “ROC citizens” given that constitutionally, the 
country is called the “Republic of China.” Thus Lee Tao’s word choice reveals his 
pro-Taiwan leanings.64 
                                                 
64 I deliberately do not state that Lee Tao has “pro Taiwan-independence” leanings as there are 
people who identify with Taiwan, but who may not support Taiwan independence. 
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Consequently, the impartial persona that Lee Tao projects is as much a 
performance as his animation of Taiwan’s citizenry through constructed 
dialogue.65 Furthermore, Lee Tao’s strategic insertion of reported speech in his 
monologue allows him to heighten the urgency surrounding the featured topic, 
without overtly appearing to do so. Speech reporting thus provides moderators a 
strategic device through which to subtly insert editorial assessments and “mark” 
or implicitly comment upon another speaker’s “background, personality, or 
intent” (Mitchell-Kernan 1972) without jeopardizing their own neutrality and 
“moderate” stance. 
 “LAYERING OF VOICES”: POLYPHONY AND CODE DISPLACEMENT 
By accompanying reported speech with marked prosodic features and 
code-switching, a speaker foregrounds the heteroglossic nature of language as 
these linguistic devices strategically enhance shifts in footing within the same 
stretch of talk. For instance, in “bracketing” speech through marked language and 
prosodic choices, a speaker is better able to establish the reported utterance as 
deviating from her own speech. As Goffman (1974) notes: 
When a speaker employs conventional brackets to warn us that what he is 
saying is meant to be taken [...] as mere repeating of words said by 
someone else, then it is clear that he means to stand in a relation of 
reduced personal responsibility for what he is saying (512). 
In particular, prosodic devices have the ability to enhance a reported 
utterance’s deictic properties, such as demonstrating behaviors or marking 
particular identities or ideologies. Coulmas (1985) finds that the intonation of the 
original utterance changes into a “speech act indicating or defining device” once it 
is recreated in its reported form (48). Prosodic mimicking can accentuate the 
evaluative effect of a reported utterance such that personal voice, stance, and 
ideology interact to reveal the techniques in which language not only reflects, but 
                                                 
65 By animating the public’s voice, however, Lee Tao is also in the position to insert words into 
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also constructs situated power alliances (Álvarez-Cáccamo 1996). In this manner, 
the intonation used in direct reported speech communicates the reporter’s own 
identity and worldview as well as evaluates the quoted utterance and the original 
speaker. 
 Moreover, prosodic techniques can enhance the “blending” between the 
animated voice and the reporter’s assessment of the portrayed speaker (Günthner 
1999). Speakers frequently supplement speech reporting with “polyphonic 
strategies” (cf. Günthner 1997) or “parodic stylization” (Bakhtin 1981:364) when 
recounting narratives as it allows the same utterance to “simultaneously belong to 
two persons (the quoted figure as well as the reporter), to be anchored in two 
‘worlds’ (the storyworld and the reporting world), and to carry two points of view 
(the quoted figure’s perspective and the ironic, mocking, evaluative perspective of 
the reporter)” (Günthner 1999:705). 
When combining speech reporting with code-switching, the reported 
utterance is infused with ideologies associated with the languages the utterances 
are reported in, a practice known as “code displacement” (Álvarez-Cáccamo 
1996). In a study on language spread and institutionalization in plurinational and 
multilingual Spain, Álvarez-Cáccamo explains that code choices are marked in 
language-mediated social relationships, particularly when used in conjunction 
with direct reported speech: 
…by assigning code choices to the characters depicted, [speakers] 
selectively draw from their own sociolinguistic knowledge in order to 
construct a possible world where characters behave discursively as they 
do, within the confines of negotiated authenticity. . .these procedures in 
themselves reflect, on the level of practice, the ideological constraints by 
which members of a given speech community at a given point in time 
associate language behaviors with socio-discursive relationships of 
camaraderie, distance, dominance, or resistance (34, original emphasis). 
                                                                                                                                     
their collective mouths. 
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Álvarez-Cáccamo summarizes this phenomenon as the “socio-indexical potential 
of language” (36), whereby reporters can linguistically negotiate the 
“authenticity” of other speakers’ identities and power relations through their 
speech reporting practices. 
Although Taiwan’s call-in shows are primarily broadcast in Mandarin 
Chinese, participants often draw from a variety of languages in their deliberations, 
most frequently from Taiwanese and English, and upon occasion other Chinese 
dialects, Hakka, and Taiwan’s aboriginal languages.66 Given Taiwan’s 
multilingual and multicultural environment, and the practice of code-switching in 
everyday interactions, this linguistic practice is not surprising. Yet, code choices 
by all call-in show participants—including moderators, guests panelists, and 
callers—remain ideologically marked in light of Taiwan’s former language 
policies, most significantly, the KMT regime’s promulgation of Mandarin 
Chinese as the “national language” or guoyu (國語). Taiwan’s linguistic 
environment thus promoted an ideological environment that encouraged speakers 
to be proficient in Mandarin as these individuals were more likely to succeed 
educationally (e.g., pass college entrance exams) and socially (e.g., entered into 
powerful government positions). 
However, benshengren or the “local Taiwanese” represent over 80 percent 
of the country’s population, with a significant proportion of this group speaking 
Taiwanese to varying degrees of proficiency. Since the lifting of martial law in 
1987, Taiwanese language use has risen in prominence and popularity, and 
                                                 
66 The 12 percent of waishengren or Mainlanders who emigrated from China between 1945 to 
1949 do not necessarily speak Mandarin Chinese as their native language. Many waishengren 
would consider their regional language or dialect (e.g., Shanghainese, Cantonese) as their “mother 
tongue” or muyu (母語). However, these mainland China “Chinese dialects,” save for Taiwanese 
or Hohlo which derives from Southern Min in Fukien province, are not incorporated in Taiwan’s 
“mother tongue” language policy. Implemented in the mid 1990s, this policy offers language 
instruction to elementary school students in their chosen mother tongue, which includes 
Taiwanese, Hakka, and Taiwan’s aborigine languages. In comparison, English-language courses 
have been mandatory in Taiwan’s schools from elementary to high school for some time now. 
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moreover, inspiring changes in Taiwan’s sociolinguistic landscape67 such that not 
having Taiwanese language proficiency is now considered a handicap. The most 
significant example can be found in the political realm as candidates of all party 
affiliations increasingly use Taiwanese in their campaign speeches in their efforts 
to attract benshengren voters. With the election of the DPP as Taiwan’s ruling 
party in 2000,68 the study, use, and prevalence of the Taiwanese language in all 
spheres of Taiwan society continues to grow through government support and 
political representation.69 
The ratio of Mandarin to Taiwanese code-switching among the different 
political TV call-in shows varies depending upon the moderator’s Taiwanese 
language skills, the guest panelists, the target audience, and the featured topic.70 
For instance, of the two moderators I include in this study, 2100’s Lee Tao is not 
a native speaker of Taiwanese while 8 o’clock’s Yü Fu is. Lee Tao rarely uses 
Taiwanese, unless it is for set phrases (such as the program’s title) or to 
distinguish his speech from its surrounding context. In comparison, Yü Fu 
occasionally poses questions to panelists in Taiwanese, but his opening and 
closing monologues are generally spoken in Mandarin. The one call-in show I 
found that makes a conscious effort to use Taiwanese is Everyone Let’s 
Deliberate (Dajia lai shenpan 大家來審判) which is affiliated with Formosa TV, 
a DPP owned TV station. Although the female moderator uses Taiwanese during 
her introductory and concluding remarks, the majority of the deliberations are 
conducted in Mandarin. 
                                                 
67 For instance, universities such as Aletheia University in 1997 and National Cheng Kung 
University in 2000 have started graduate level programs and degrees in Taiwan literature and 
languages (Taipei Journal, November 1, 2002). 
68 The DPP conducts most of its party meetings and conferences in the Taiwanese language. 
69 It should be noted that since the dangwai movement in the early 1970s, Taiwanese language use 
was already promoted by opposition party members in their party meetings and through their 
“native” or bentu (本土) platform. 
70 See Chapter Two for more background on the two moderators, 2100’s Lee Tao and 8 o’clock’s 
Yü Fu. 
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In the following passage, Lee Tao’s marked prosodic and language 
choices in combination with his use of reported speech creatively animates and 
evaluates Taiwan’s national identity crisis discourses. Together, these linguistic 
devices succeed in problematizing recent sociopolitical incidents that have 
heightened the issue’s political urgency. 
“The feeling of being ungrounded is the greatest crisis”: Taiwan’s national 
identity crisis 
The following segment aired on May 31, 2000, two weeks into President 
Chen Shui-bian’s new administration. Entitled “Big reconciliation: what is our 
(national) identity?” (大和解﹕我們是什麼人﹖),71 the episode was inspired by 
an event, a “Big reconciliation coffee” (da hejie kafei 大和解咖啡), organized by 
several high profile legislators from each of the four main political factions72 in 
the Legislative Yuan (lifayuan 立法院) earlier that same day.73 In 2100’s opening 
video clip, the legislators were captured raising their porcelain china cups, 
toasting the cameras, and drinking coffee. This televisual moment noticeably 
featured the legislators acknowledging the absent audience (i.e., television 
viewers and constituents), rather than each other, for whom the event was 
primarily staged. Framed and covered as a political spectacle, Taiwan’s news 
channels and some call-in shows headlined the “Big Reconciliation Coffee” as 
one of the top news topics of the day. 
To contextualize the legislative event, 2100 opened the episode with a 
video clip of President Chen, shown seated in the Presidential Building’s 
reception room, declaring that country’s “identity disorder problem” (rentong 
                                                 
71 Another interpretation of the program title might be “who are we?” However, as this leaves the 
underlying issue of national identity rather ambiguous, I opted to include national identity within 
my translation. 
72 This included the DPP, KMT, New Party, and members of the soon-to-be formed People’s First 
Party (PFP), namely, supporters of independent presidential candidate James Soong. 
73 The Legislative Yuan represents Taiwan’s national legislative body. 
 210
cuoluan de wenti 認同錯亂的問題) has caused “anxiety” (youxin 優心) in 
Taiwan society. The video segment ended with Chen dramatically stating that a 
“feeling of being unrooted (ungrounded) is the greatest crisis.”74  
Shortly after this video clip, and following introductory comments from 
each of the seven guest panelists, Lee Tao introduced another video segment 
which was comprised of three separate video clips. This video segment featured 
various sociopolitical leaders being interrogated on their national identity—that is, 
Do you consider yourself Chinese (Zhongguoren 中國人) or Taiwanese 
(Taiwanren 台灣人)?—and whether they supported Taiwan independence. The 
first video clip depicts a legislative interpellation session and a female KMT 
legislator interrogating Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC) chairperson, Ms. 
Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).75 The KMT legislator asks Chairperson Tsai to explain 
her claim that “as a scholar” she considers herself to be a “Taiwanren” 
(Taiwanese) and a “Zhongguoren” (Chinese), but as the MAC chairperson “it is 
not possible” (jiu buxing 就不行) to identify with both. A second video clip 
presents a male legislator in a different interpellation session demanding if an 
Chen administration official is against Taiwan independence. A long pause ensues 
before the legislator taunts, “You don’t dare say” (ni bu gan jiang 你不敢講), to 
which the official admits that “it’s very hard to say” (zhe hen nan jiang 
這個很難講). The third clip in the series captures 2100 moderator Lee Tao from a 
previously aired broadcast fielding a question from a caller who baldly asks, “Can 
you tell me that you are a Zhongguoren (Chinese)?”76 This final clip elicits 
laughter from the in-studio guest panelists in the current episode. 
                                                 
74 The original phrase President Chen used was: 沒有根的感覺就是一個最大的危機. 
75 An interpellation session involves legislators alternately inviting the various branches of the 
Executive Yuan, the ruling administration’s cabinet, to the Legislative Yuan for questioning 
regarding any topic. These sessions are usually held once or twice a year. 
76 The caller’s question in Mandarin Chinese was phrased as: “…可不可以告訴我你是中國人”. 
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As these video clips demonstrate, and 2100 calculatedly dramatizes, 
declaring one’s national identity and stance regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty as an 
independent nation-state represents a controversial and even paralyzing issue for 
the country’s sociopolitical leaders. In the following passage, Lee Tao animates 
the confusion this issue arouses in various sociopolitical figures through 
hypothetical reported speech. His remarks not only recall the three-part video 
segment, but are also inspired by them as he enhances the urgency of the topic 
through unique parodic stylization and code choices. Moreover, Lee Tao’s 
monologue strategically weaves his moderator voice in and out of the four 
segments of constructed dialogue that enhance his remarks. The voices or figures 
(Goffman 1974) Lee Tao portrays include an irate parent, a caller, a legislator, 
and an administrative official. All of the reported voices are presented in 
Mandarin, save for one brief segment of Taiwanese which then lapses into 
nonsense speech. 
Transc. 5.7: “What is your (national) identity?” 
1 LT 是。那但是﹐ Right. Then but,  
2  在目前來講﹐ currently speaking, 
3  如果說﹐ that is if, 
4  大家想基於知道, anyone wants to know,  
5  說我到底是個什麼樣的人 to ask what my (national) identity is 
6  我可以說的出口。 I can say it aloud.  
7  然後我的老  師﹕﹐ But then my teacher:,  
8  也可能--放心的去教﹐ it is perhaps--to safely teach (this issue), 
9  不要老師教完以後﹐ (And) to not have parents immediately 
10  家長馬上跑過來﹐ run over after every class, 
11  {rushed speech} {rushed speech} 
12  “你講你(是人)77 ((nonsense 
speech))﹗” 
“You say your (identity is)78 
((nonsense speech))!”79 
13  {laughter from guests) {laughter from panelists} 
                                                 
77 The italics in the Chinese text denotes that the words were spoken in Taiwanese. 
78 Spoken in Taiwanese. Speech in parentheses is unclear. 
79 Nonsense speech refers to an utterance that cannot be linked to any recognizable language. 
 212
14  罵的以後啊。 After being criticized (this way). 
15  {general laughter} {general laughter} 
16  那這個老師會得神經病的。 This teacher would go nuts. 
17  {laughter, male voice} {laughter, male voice} 
18  我都主持節目 Even when hosting a program  
19  也會被問﹕ I am asked: 
20  {falsetto, pointing at 
panelists} 
{falsetto, pointing finger at panelists} 
21  “你這個是那裡人﹖(.) “Where do you come from?(.) 
22  “你是什麼人﹖” What is your (national) identity?” 
23  {normal speaking voice} {normal speaking voice} 
24  啊﹐每個官員 Uh- when each official  
25  到立法院﹐ goes to the Legislative Yuan,  
26  {falsetto, pointing at 
panelists} 
{falsetto, pointing at panelists} 
27  “噢﹐你是什麼人﹖” “Uh, what is your (national) identity?”  
28  {general laughter} {general laughter} 
29  Uh-uh-uh﹐ Uh-uh-uh, 
30  那個官員都要拿出 the official then has to take out  
31  一個小抄本。 a notepad.  
32  {looking down, muttering} {looking down, muttering} 
33  “我是什麼時候講什麼話。” “What do I say?” 
Fónagy (1986) notes that references to previous speech acts are “always 
clearly marked by different types of interrogative intonation patterns” (259). 
While Lee Tao’s parodic stylization creates a linguistic boundary between 
reported speech and personal commentary, his strategic use of prosody also 
editorializes these hypothetical utterances and the linguistic ideologies they index. 
Lee Tao’s rapid intonational shifts animate each performed voice in a “caricatured 
way” that both weakens the boundaries between the successively voiced subjects 
while also juxtaposing them against each other (Günthner 1999). In creating a 
narrative filled with “speech interference” (Vološinov 1978), Lee Tao’s use of 
constructed dialogue anchors his monologue in two “worlds,” including the 
“storyworld” (Günthner 1999) that he creates through his personal remarks and 
the reporting world on which his performance is based, namely, the video clips 
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presented earlier in the program. A closer examination reveals when and how he 
evokes these two “worlds.” 
Lee Tao performs the first reported utterance in the voice of an emotional 
parent who confronts a teacher after school with the words, “You say your 
identity is ((nonsense speech))!” (line 12). This constructed dialogue 
communicates several messages within its code-switched and nonsensical form. It 
is inferred that this verbal attack occurs after the teacher has taught a lesson to the 
parent’s child on national identity, and moreover, that the parent is displeased 
with the way it has been taught. While Lee Tao leaves the teacher’s identity 
ambiguous, as noted by the discordant speech following “your identity is” (line 
12), he marks the parent’s identity by performing the character’s reported 
utterance in Taiwanese. 
Álvarez-Cáccamo (1996) claims that code choices in reported speech 
reveal socio-indexical relationships of “distance, dominance, or resistance” that 
can “dislocate, transform or supplant identities and local power alliances” (34). 
Here, Lee Tao’s constructed dialogue between the parent and teacher indexes 
Taiwan’s ethno-political tensions between Mainlanders (waishengren 外省人) 
and Taiwanese (benshengren 本省人) as well as Taiwan’s national identity 
discourses between being “Chinese” versus “Taiwanese.” By performing the 
former character in Taiwanese and indirectly indexing the later in Mandarin, Lee 
Tao animates language ideologies (e.g., Mandarin versus the Taiwanese language) 
and sociopolitical power imbalances (Mainlanders versus Taiwanese) in Taiwan 
society. The moderator’s linguistic choices ascribe the parent with a Taiwanren or 
Taiwanese identity and the teacher as being non-Taiwanese through his 
surrounding Mandarin-based commentary.80 Although it is possible that the 
portrayed parent is a Taiwanese-speaking Mainlander, Hakka, or from one of the 
                                                 
80 It should also be noted that Mandarin is the language of instruction in all public educational 
institutions, which for the most part is also the case in private institutions. 
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aborigine groups, the marked switch from Mandarin to Taiwanese in Lee Tao’s 
monologue, and no where else in the passage, suggests otherwise.81  
Furthermore, Lee Tao’s portrayal of a Taiwanese-speaking parent 
reprimanding a teacher also highlights the ideological orientation in Taiwan 
public school curriculum. As previously mentioned under the KMT government, 
students were inculcated with a China-based worldview from the language of 
instruction to the teaching of geography that included maps of the “Republic of 
China” as incorporating present-day PRC. Recently, however, educational 
reforms since the late 1990s have introduced a bentuhua or “Taiwanized” 
interpretation of Taiwan society, history, and geography.82 
Lee Tao’s insertion of nonsense speech in the latter half of the second 
reported utterance also proves telling.  Clark and Gerrig (1990) explain that:  
With blah, blah, blah, speakers can depict the source speaker’s intonation 
entirely decoupled from its prepositional context. . .[such that] [t]hese are 
simply supportive aspects, stand-ins for information the current speaker 
cannot or doesn’t feel the need to provide (780, original italics). 
As a “stand-in” for content that is superfluous or redundant to the work that both 
Lee Tao’s prosodic stylization and code choice (i.e., Taiwanese) provide, the 
nonsensical speech allows the listener to insert her own interpretations of the 
performed character, which may or may not expand upon the linguistic 
stereotypes that Lee Tao has already performed in a code-switch-marked 
hypothetical utterance. 
                                                 
81 Recall again that Lee Tao is not proficient in Taiwanese. Thus, he limits his use of Taiwanese 
on 2100 to several key phrases such as “thank you” (do hsia li or 多謝你 in Mandarin) and the 
title of the program “All People Open Talk” (Quanmin Kaigan 全民開講). The English 
transliterations are approximate interpretations of Romanized Taiwanese. 
82 In 1997, the first textbooks on Taiwan history, society, and culture were developed for and 
implemented in Taiwan’s middle school curriculum. 
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Figure 11: 2100 moderator Lee Tao performing a character who asks an imaginary 
interlocutor, “What is your (national) identity?” 
 In his second and third character enactments, Lee Tao reformulates and 
elaborates upon the three-part video segment described earlier in which a program 
caller and two legislators demand their interlocutors to state their identities and 
perspectives towards Taiwan’s sovereignty. Lee Tao animates these two 
characters in a high falsetto that is accompanied by hand gestures and bodily 
movement. That is, as he voices the hypothetical utterances in a high tone of 
voice, he rises from his seat, extends his right arm, and points his index finger at 
an imaginary interlocutor. His delivery is filled with repetition (“What is your 
national identity?” in lines 22 and 27) and repair, such as his frequent insertion of 
“uh” (lines 24, 27, 29). His marked speech succeeds in portraying the speakers as 
“emotional, unpredictable, and with generally negative character traits” (Besnier 
1993:175). The salience of Lee Tao’s prosodic stylization in this hypothetical 
utterance is also reflected in Fónagy’s (1986) observation that the “most essential 
vehicle of the reporter’s attitude in live speech is intonation,” and moreover, that 
prosodic features are “the most conspicuous in artistic performances” (275). 
Consequently, my indexing his shifts of frame between personal commentary 
versus constructed dialogue through the alteration of unmarked and marked 
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unmarked prosody respectively, Lee Tao makes it clear to his audience where the 
linguistic boundaries are between his personal voice and that of the social 
personas he portrays. 
In his final use of constructed dialogue, Lee Tao articulates the confusion 
an administration official experiences when facing inquiries regarding his national 
identity. At first glance, Lee Tao’s muttered hypothetical utterance—“What do I 
say?” (line 33)83—accompanied by a lowering of the head as he glances at an 
imaginary notepad, appears incongruent with the previous vignettes in which he 
portrays figures who pointedly ask, “What is your national identity?” (lines 22 
and 27). The inclusion of this final character proves significant as it rhetorically 
“responds” to the previous three hypothetical utterances. Interestingly, Lee Tao 
enacts the “feelings of unrootedness” and “anxiety” in his caricature of the 
administration official that President Chen had mentioned in the video clip 
featured earlier in the program. 
In animating socially-recognizable personalities though creatively crafted 
constructed dialogue, Lee Tao depicts the confusion surrounding Taiwan’s 
national identity as well as the competing political ideologies that struggle to 
define it. Hypothetical reported speech thus allowed Lee Tao to both articulate 
and critique these disparate discourses in a manner that both indexes and subtly 
evaluates their continued circulation. Lee Tao’s monologue succeeds in 
demonstrating that regardless if one is instigating these discourses or the target of 
them, their impact is felt at all levels of Taiwan society.  
Although Lee Tao is careful to distinguish the characters he portrays from 
his moderator’s voice through calculated prosodic modulation and code-
switching, his speech reporting nonetheless epitomizes a “concealed form of 
                                                 
83 In another reading of this utterance, the official could be consulting his notes from previous 
interpellation sessions or similar question and answer forums in order to seek a consistent 
response to his interlocutor’s identity query. Given that officials frequently have administrative 
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polyphony” (Bakhtin 1981) that blurs the line between what does and does not 
constitute reported speech. By the time Lee Tao introduces the fourth hypothetical 
voice in his monologue, the boundary between Lee Tao and his constructed 
characters has gradually become erased such that the “interrelations between 
inserted other’s speech and the rest of the speech (one’s own). . .penetrates 
through these boundaries and spreads to the other’s speech, which [can be] 
transmitted in ironic, indignant, sympathetic, and reverential tones” (Bakhtin 
1986:92-3). What this fuzzying of boundaries demonstrates is a personalization 
and personification of the call-in show topic “What is our identity?” by Lee Tao 
himself.  
Besnier (1993) captures the permeability between the voices of author and 
animator or figure in his observation that the “rhetorical style of quotes allows the 
reporter’s voice to ‘leak’ into the quote” (174-175). This understanding 
underscores the speech reporting practices I have analyzed in this chapter, 
namely, that the “leaking” between the reporter’s own voice and those which he 
revoices reveals as much about the politics of the reporter as it does about the 
original speaker’s. In the following two chapters, I continue to explore the degree 
to which call-in participants’ ways of using reported speech reflect their 
sociopolitical leanings through two mini-speech events: reconciliation (hejie 
和解) talk and saliva wars (koushui zhan 口水戰). 
 
                                                                                                                                     
aides who prepare notes for their use in anticipation of sensitive questions, this is a likely scenario.  
I thank Heng-rue Lin for bringing this to my attention. 
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Chapter Six: Reconciliation (hejie) Talk—Performing Social 
Harmony 
…you have to speak reason, you have to give—you have to let others have 
good fortune. 
Jin Xiuli, moderator  
The active pursuit of harmony ultimately aims toward a unity of 
differences, a synthesis of divergences, a confluence of contrasts. It is an 
attempt to engross all while offending none. 
Young (1994:45) 
 
 
In this chapter, I continue my investigation into call-in show ways of using 
reported speech by examining excerpts of participants engaged in the performance 
of a specific speech event: “reconciliation” or hejie (和解) talk. Participants 
engage in reconciliation talk to build rapport with other interlocutors, including 
those present in and absent from the immediate call-in show context. Call-in show 
reconciliation talk frequently relies upon hypothetical reported speech (Haberland 
1986) in order to editorialize (Buttny and Williams 2000) the original utterance 
and speaker as well as to animate voices that offer alternative readings of an event 
or issue. In addition, participants insert constructed dialogue (Tannen 1986, 1989) 
or selective depictions (Clark and Gerrig 1990) of an event or issue in order to 
mitigate a delicate topic by presenting it in a less contentious manner. 
Specifically, I explore how call-in participants use hypothetical reported 
speech to conduct “thought experiments” regarding the featured crisis topic and 
offer “counter-arguments” to fellow participants’ assertions (Myers 1999a). 
Through such speech reporting practices, participants find recourse to forward 
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“possible worlds” scenarios (Semino et. al. 1999) as well as resolve inherent 
tensions and contradictions latent within the topic or in other speakers’ 
interpretations (Myers 1999a). I also examine how participants use hypothetical 
reported speech as “hoped for speech” (cf. Cohen 1996, in Buttny 1997) in their 
construction of utterances that might have or should have been said. Lastly, I 
compare how constructed dialogue contributes towards the dramatization of 
speaker narratives by creating a dynamic interaction between the animated 
character and the storyteller, in this case, the call-in participant (Tannen 1989). 
Narratives also entice or involve the audience to actively interpret the significance 
of the voiced character and reported verbal behavior, which I argue enhances the 
collective nature of reconciliation talk. 
In terms of the call-in show’s crisis frame, participants’ reconciliation talk 
performances also contribute to the maintenance of this theme as this speech 
genre allows them to deliberately articulate and negotiate the featured topic’s 
“dangers” and “opportunities.” This chapter’s analysis of hejie talk explores how 
hypothetical reported speech facilitates participants’ abilities to entertain disparate 
readings of Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses without compromising their 
ideological perspective. In this sense, call-in participants draw upon “represented 
discourse” in order to address and reconcile sensitive, controversial issues through 
a “saying rather than doing” approach (Myers 1999a). 
Moreover, I investigate how the successful use of hypothetical reported 
speech in reconciliation talk requires on the one hand for call-in show speakers to 
deftly embed such utterances within their comments and, on the other, for 
listeners to acknowledge its use as a fictional rather than direct quotation (Myers 
1999a). The careful attention to interpersonal and sociolinguistic cues in speech 
reporting compliments the practice of harmony or he (和) in Chinese societies 
such as Taiwan. As a rapport-building practice, reconciliation talk subtly 
renegotiates relationships of power in ways that both overcome and reproduce 
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ideological beliefs and agendas. Consequently, hypothetical utterances allow 
participants to negotiate both “present” and “absent” relationships indexed within 
the speaker’s commentary or narrative (Basso 1979). It is for these social, 
cultural, and political reasons that I consider participants’ hejie performances as a 
significant form of linguistic behavior in call-in show verbal interactions. 
“GIVING OTHERS HAPPINESS”: MAINTAINING “HARMONY” AND “FACE” 
Young (1994) explains that in Chinese cultures,1 individuals attempt to 
present themselves as being non-aggressive and agreeable in order to create and 
maintain a harmonious social unit: 
The active pursuit of harmony ultimately aims toward a unity of 
differences, a synthesis of divergences, a confluence of contrasts. It is an 
attempt to engross all while offending none. It is a unity in diversity that is 
both dynamic and complex, one that works by mutual accommodation and 
adjustment. To achieve this ideal requires finding ways to creatively 
integrate differences while keeping intact the integrity of each 
participating element (45). 
The maintenance of harmony or he (和)2 denotes peace, unity, kindness, and 
amicableness (Gao 1996) and is linked with the concepts of tolerance and 
moderation (Moore 1967). In her study of the subtle linguistic devices speakers in 
Taiwan use to express dissention, Chang (2001) found that social harmony allows 
“the extensive web of interpersonal connections and hierarchical positioning [in 
Chinese societies] to be maintained with minimal discord, while at the same time 
                                                 
1 The discourse of “Chinese culture” is problematic and symbolizes the “vicissitudes of the 
material and spiritual accomplishments of the Chinese people” (Tu 1991b:1). Despite its “dynamic 
landscape,” most scholars acknowledge that societies predominantly populated by cultural and 
ethnic Chinese, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and mainland China, are based on and 
exhibit the “Chinese culture” (cf. Leung 1996; Tu 1991a; Wu 1991). I discuss this issue in greater 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
2 Chinese languages are known for having many homophones, which subsequently leads to word 
play in the search of extended connotations for a given word. Thus a homonym to “he” as in 
“harmony” (和) is the character 合, which means “integrity or wholeness.” The term is used in the 
Chinese saying “合家平安,” which means “an integrated and peaceful (harmonious) household or 
family.” This notion incorporates the notion of “harmony” explained above. 
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concealing underlying aggressiveness and ulterior motives” (155).3 In the pursuit 
of social harmony, individuals exercise etiquette (li 禮) or ritual and filial piety 
(xiao 孝) or respect to others and especially family members, behaviors which 
maintain the Confucian social theory of social relationships as being reciprocal 
yet hierarchical. From this social theory, the ethics of human relationships (lunli 
倫理) proceeds from neither society nor the individual but rather from 
interpersonal relations (Liang 1949, in Yang 1994:70). 
However, Chang (2001) argues that it is more fruitful to regard social 
harmony as an ongoing social dynamic rather than as an abstract guiding 
principle: 
Social harmony becomes an object toward which to orient, rather than a 
primary goal of interaction; it can be a ritual, a game, a performance, 
jointly realized…(ibid:161). 
This understanding of social harmony can also be applied to the performative 
orientation of call-in show verbal interactions. Goffman (1959) likewise 
champions the underlying work performance achieves in reaffirming social values 
through this observation: 
To the degree that a performance highlights the common official values of 
the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it,…as a ceremony—as 
an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the 
community. Furthermore, in so far as the expressive bias of performances 
comes to be accepted as reality, then that which is accepted at the moment 
as reality will have some of the characteristics of a celebration (35). 
Goffman’s celebratory analogy rings true in respect to the occasional 
performances of social harmony on Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows. However 
rare these instances might be, producers seek opportunities to promote 
reconciliation scenarios when possible (Lee Liguo 2000; Xi Shenglin 2000), 
while its politically-savvy participants eagerly enact them. 
                                                 
3 In Chapter Seven, I explore how disaccord or dis-harmony is negotiated through “saliva wars” or 
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In the case of call-in show verbal interactions, the values of social 
harmony—including the concepts of unity, moderation, and respect—are 
preserved through reconciliation talk, and in particular, through the creative use of 
hypothetical reported speech. For instance, participants mitigate sensitive topics 
by engaging in “thought experiments” (Myers 1999a) where the speaker presents 
a variety of perspectives without being associated with a particular view. 
Selective depictions of so-called “direct” reported speech provide room for 
participants to evaluate other speakers’ utterances while maintaining the 
semblance and negotiating the practice of social harmony.  
In an excerpt taken from a 2100 broadcast entitled, “Big Reconciliation: 
what kind of people are we?” (Da heji: women shi shenme ren? 大和解﹕ 
我們是什麼人?), I analyze a call-in panelist’s use of hypothetical reported speech 
to rhetorically reconcile Taiwan’s national identity crisis discourses. In this 
episode, 2100 invited seven legislators who had participated in a made-for-TV 
“big reconciliation coffee” (da hejie kafei 大和解咖啡) organized earlier that 
afternoon at the Legislative Yuan. Of interest to my analysis are the linguistic 
behaviors participants used to perform 60 minutes worth of televised 
sociopolitical harmony. The program’s “reconciliation” ambiance was projected 
not only through the participants’ deliberate speech and body language, but also 
with the quaint coffee cups placed before each panelist and moderator which 
reproduced and recalled the “reconciliation coffee” event. By providing a 
reconciliatory televisual moment, the program’s participants created a celebratory 
atmosphere that complimented the panelists’ political agenda and the call-in 
show’s programming goals, namely, to perform Taiwan’s disparate national 
identity discourses and temporarily resolve this sociopolitically constructed crisis. 
                                                                                                                                     
argumentative talk on call-in shows. 
 223
In my discussions with call-in show insiders, many interviewees described 
the notion of hejie (和解) or reconciliation as “supporting for the sake of 
supporting” (wei zhichi er zhichi 為支持而支持), which aptly captures how the 
value and practice of social harmony has become politicized in Taiwan’s 
increasingly mass-mediated environment. From a different angle, call-in show 
moderator Ms. Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗) of ETTV’s Always Speak Your Mind (You Hua 
Laoshi Jiang 有話老實講) offers a viewer’s perspective of social harmony. Jin 
claims that viewers prefer call-in participants who “speak reason” (jiang li 講理) 
and “give others happiness” (gei renjia fuqi 給人家福氣) (Jin Xiuli 2000). 
The fuqi (福氣) or “good fortune” that Jin speaks of can be interpreted as 
“giving others (positive) face” (gei bieren mianzi 給別人面子), that is, 
maintaining or improving another person’s image or reputation. This notion must 
be contextualized in relation to the Chinese cultural values of “lian” (臉) and 
“mianzi” (面子), which both loosely translate as “face” in U.S. culture (Hu 
1944).4 Of the two, mianzi has the longer history, appearing in ancient Chinese 
literature since the early 4th century BC (ibid). However, other scholars have 
translated mianzi as “image” (Gao et. al. 1996:289) or “social face” (Yan 
1996:167). For the purposes of this study, I will refer to mianzi as social face. 
Social face thus involves the projection and claiming of public image 
(Ting-Toomey 1988) and can be gained or lost in the “jockeying for social 
prestige and social advantage” (Yang 1994a:140). To contextualize this notion 
within U.S. cultural practices, mianzi may be equated with “the kind of prestige 
that is emphasized [in the U.S.]: a reputation achieved through getting on in life, 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, in Goffman’s (1967) writings on “face-work,” his notion of “face” as 
demonstrating the Chinese notion of mianzi or “social face” and not lian or “moral face” as in the 
following definition: “an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an 
image others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by 
making a good showing for himself” (5). 
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through success and ostentation” (Hu 1944:45). Mianzi thus connotes positive 
notions of public image or social face and represents a combined sense of moral 
imperatives, social honor, and self-respect (Yang 1994a:141). Moreover, an 
individual can borrow, struggle for, add to, and pad mianzi, activities that 
contribute to increasing an individual’s social face (Hu 1944:61). 
In comparison, lian is a relatively modern notion with its earliest reference 
cited in the K’ang-hsi Dictionary dating from the Yuan Dynasty (1277-1367) (Hu 
1944:45). Lian refers an individual with a “good moral reputation” (ibid), “basic 
moral characteristics” (Yan 1996:167), and the “public recognition of the ego’s 
moral integrity” (Yang 1994a:140). Such an individual demonstrates decency 
“under all circumstances” (Hu 1994:45) as a result of his “deep internalization” of 
a society’s fundamental code of ethics (Yang 1994a:140). Consequently, some 
scholars translate lian as “moral face” as opposed to mianzi’s “social face” (Yan 
1996:167). In this study, I also use “moral face” when referring to lian in English. 
However, individuals can also lose mianzi and lian.5 To do so carries 
strong consequences, most notably the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of 
functioning property within one’s community. For instance, Yang (1994a) goes so 
far as to claim that “the violation or loss of lian results in social ostracism and the 
collapse of the ego as a whole” (140, italics added). Moreover, once an individual 
has lost her moral or social face, it is extremely difficult to regain it.  Thus the 
pressures to maintain lian serves as “both a social sanction for enforcing moral 
standards and an internalized sanction” (Hu 1944:45), an observation that can be 
applied to the preservation of mianzi or social face as well. 
Returning to moderator Jin Xiuli’s comment that call-in show audiences 
prefer participants who “give others good fortune” over those who are “very 
annoying” (Jin Xiuli 2000), it can be extrapolated that reconciliation talk appeals 
                                                 
5 The notion of “losing” or “augmenting” one’s social and moral faces is analogous to maintaining 
a “face bank account” in one’s social interactions. I thank Dr. Boretz for this descriptive phrase. 
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to viewers as it upholds and even contributes toward call-in participants’ social 
faces or mianzi. Moreover, Jin’s assessment suggests that viewers want 
participants to maintain the sociocultural value of harmony, even in the 
performative and competitive setting of political TV call-in shows. This finding 
contradicts the image of call-in shows as purely argumentative forums where 
saliva wars (koushui zhan 口水戰) or mudslinging prevail, a linguistic behavior I 
explore in the next chapter. As I illustrate in the following excerpts, reconciliation 
talk thus constitutes plays an integral role in call-in show verbal practices in 
particular and Taiwan politics in general. In short, reconciliation talk represents 
an important compliment to call-in show verbal sparring, especially in relation to 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses. 
“SAYING RATHER THAN DOING”: PRESENTING “POSSIBLE WORLDS” 
SCENARIOS 
As one of the most extensive studies on the use of “hypothetical words 
and thoughts” in novels, autobiographies, and newspaper articles, Semino, et. al.’s 
(1999) taxonomy of hypothetical speech applies a “possible worlds”6 construct 
based on Marie-Laure Ryan’s (1991) cognitive model of fiction. Using a 
conversation analysis approach, Myers (1999a) revises and simplifies Semino 
et.al.’s possible worlds model in his examination of how speakers integrate 
hypothetical reported speech into verbal interactions and how listeners 
acknowledge its use. Myers thus suggests that for hypothetical reported speech to 
be successfully used, listeners must recognize when the speaker’s linguistic frame 
shifts from represented discourse to hypothetical discourse. 
What allows listeners to follow these shifts in frame is not logic per se, but 
being “aware of and open to hypothetical represented discourse whenever they are 
dealing with the clash of opinions” (ibid:579). Sherzer (1990) claims that 
                                                 
6 Semino et. al.’s (1999) “possible worlds” model includes five “worlds,” including knowledge 
worlds, intention worlds, obligation worlds, wish worlds, and fantasy universes. 
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competent listening and understanding involves “following the story line, 
recognizing the process of the embedding of direct quotation, and following this 
to a certain degree” (126). Achieving call-in show harmony through reconciliation 
talk thus requires not only linguistic competence in speakers who use constructed 
dialogue (Tannen 1989) and selective depictions (Clark and Gerrig 1990), but also 
in listeners who can differentiate embedded utterances from the surrounding 
discourse, as well as follow frame shifts and an evolving story line. In the 
following excerpts, I illustrate how hypothetical reported speech can be 
distinguished from the surrounding commentary through its function as a thought 
experiment, counter-argument, hoped-for-speech, or embedded narrative. 
  CONDUCTING RECONCILIATION TALK THROUGH THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 
When used to conduct thought experiments and counter-arguments, 
hypothetical reported speech can help call-in participants to negotiate the 
intricacies of Taiwan’s ideology-laden crisis topics that often degenerate into 
discursive quagmires in the form of saliva wars. By using hypothetical 
represented discourse in thought experiments, speakers can “enact tensions in 
their own thinking and…deal with opposition between possible views” (Myers 
1999a:571). That is, verbal thought experiments facilitate the outlining or 
theorizing of difficult situations and its consequences for the sake of argument. 
Consequently, this linguistic practice is “not about describing a situation, but 
about making the situation real in order to get the right rhetorical effect” 
(ibid:584). “Rhetorical effect,” in this case, refers to representing the conflict in 
the speaker’s mind by dramatizing the confusion through conversation (cf. Billig 
1987; Myers 1999a).7  
In the first excerpt, I analyze a guest speaker’s creative embedding of 
constructed dialogue throughout her commentary to facilitate and animate an 
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elaborate thought experiment on Taiwan’s vying national identity ideologies. This 
linguistic strategy allows her the latitude to present and negotiate several identity 
constructions—namely, that the people of Taiwan identify themselves as 
“Chinese” (Zhongguoren 中國人) “Taiwanese” (Taiwanren 台灣人), or both—
and in the process, expose the inherent tensions within the controversial issue. 
Inserting hypothetical utterances also provides the legislator greater flexibility to 
spontaneously rework her arguments with lowered risk of being directly held 
accountable for her words. 
“If you were asked, ‘Where were you born?’”: experimenting with Taiwan’s 
national identity(ies) 
In the first excerpt, I analyze guest panelist PFP legislator Diane Lee’s 
(Lee Ching-an 李慶安) interspersing of hypothetical reported speech within her 
commentary on 2100’s featured topic: “Who are we?” (Women shi shenme ren? 
我們是什麼人?) Legislator Lee’s adept performance of a constructed dialogue 
between anonymous speakers—who she obliquely refers to as “someone/someone 
else” (renjia 人家) and “some people” (you ren 有人) in her remarks—allows her 
to introduce alternative interpretations of the ethno-political labels “Chinese” or 
Zhongguoren (中國人) and “Taiwanese” or Taiwanren (台灣人). It should also 
be noted that Leg. Lee’s political party, the People’s First Party, carefully 
promotes itself as embodying both “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” identities as 
reflected in its party membership.8 Consequently, Leg. Lee’s creative use of 
hypothetical reported speech allows her to strategically cater to the ethno-political 
groups (e.g., waishengren and benshengren respectively) with which the two 
identities are generally associated.  
                                                                                                                                     
7 This interpretation of rhetoric differs from mainstream readings of the concept that emphasizes 
persuading listeners of a given position to further the speaker’s goals (cf. Burke 1969). 
8 See Chapter Three for greater detail on the distinctions between Taiwan’s various political 
parties and ideologies. 
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Leg. Lee’s constructed dialogue also resembles what Fónagy (1986) 
describes as “for-example quotations,” which lie on “the border-line between 
reality and fiction” (278). Here, the PFP legislator’s reliance on for-example 
utterances strategically straddles the arbitrary boundary between “real” and 
“fictional” national identities in her attempt to include all, and alienate none, of 
her listeners. This playing with real and fictional voices is evident through the 
PFP legislator’s rapid shifts between being the author and animator of her 
utterances (Goffman 1974). 9 
Transc.6.1: “I am Chinese (Zhongguoren), I am also Taiwanese (Taiwanren)”  
1 DLee 我想如果說是談到說 I think that if this is about saying  
2  你是那裡的人噢﹐ where are you from 
3  那這個問題好像現在 then this problem has now 
4  變的很 複雜 perhaps become very complex, 
5  很敏感。 very sensitive. 
6  但其實它也應該 But actually it should 
7  是很簡單阿。 be very simple. 
8  那﹕當然我會認為說﹕ So: of course I would think that: 
9  我們是中國人。 we are  Zhongguoren.10 
10  那麼如果人家問我說 Then if someone asked me 
11  國名 是 什麼﹐ “what is the name of (your) country?” 
12  我們(國)家是中華民國﹕﹐ Our country is the Republic of China:,
13  所以我們是簡稱 so we abbreviate that to 
14  中國﹕﹐中國人民﹕。 China:, Zhongguo Renmin:.11 
15  那麼﹐如果問你是﹐ So, if you were asked, 
16  生在那裡﹐ “where were you born,” 
17  那我們是﹐ then we are, 
18  我是生在台灣﹕阿。 I was born in Taiwan:. 
19  所以我就說 So I then say 
20  “我是中國人﹐ “I am a Zhongguoren, 
                                                 
9 Ethno-political terms—such as Zhongguoren, Zhongguo renmin, Taiwanren, Penghuren, and 
Jinmaren—have been left in their Hanyu pinyin form in the transcript to preserve their 
presentation as well as their ideological associations. English glosses for the terms can be found in 
the Glossary. I will also footnote the English gloss in the transcript. 
10 Meaning “Chinese.” 
11 Meaning “Chinese citizens.” 
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21  我也是台灣人。” I am also a Taiwanren.”12 
22  那當然就是說 So of course that is to say 
23  有人講說 there are some people who say 
24  “不能說是中國人。” “(You) can’t say Zhongguoren!” 
25  其實沒有不 Actually there is no reason not 
26  說中國人 的道理。 to say Zhongguoren. 
27  我們的憲法﹐ Our constitution, 
28  我們是中華民國﹕嗎﹐ we are the Republic of China: 
29  我們 終不是中國人﹖ aren’t we all then Zhongguoren? 
30  那--而且還有不要忘了﹐ So—moreover don’t forget, 
31  我們不是只有台灣﹕ we not only have Taiwan: 
32  我們有台澎金馬。 we have Penghu Kinmen Matsu.   
33  所以我們有中國人也 So we have Zhongguoren 
34  是澎湖人的﹐ who are also Penghuren,13 
35  有中國人也 there are Zhongguoren  
36  是金門人的。 who are also Kinmenren.14 
37  不能說﹐ We cannot say, 
38  “大家的全部是非得 “Everyone must be 
39  叫台灣人。 called Taiwanren. 
40  但是我是生在台灣 But I was born in Taiwan  
41  我當然是台灣人阿。” so of course I am a Taiwanren.” 
42  所以我覺得這個 問題 So I feel that this issue 
43  其實不要把它顯得 actually should not be considered 
44  那麼﹐那麼嚴﹕肅。 so, so seriously. 
45  那麼複雜。 So complicated. 
46  那麼基於說 So according to 
47  今天我們的 和﹕解 our big re:conciliation today 
48  我到不認為說﹐ I don’t believe that, 
49  一定 要在這類的 we must use this type of 
50  名詞上說﹐ terminology [and] say, 
51  “大家都要 “Everyone must 
52  有個同意 的名詞 agree upon the same term 
53  才叫 和 解。” for it to be called a reconciliation.” 
                                                 
12 Meaning “Taiwanese” or “people of Taiwan.” See Chapter Three for background on the 
difference between Taiwanren and benshengren (“people of this province,” indicating the 
province of Taiwan). 
13 Meaning “people of Penghu.” 
14 Meaning “people of Kinmen.” 
 230
Diane Lee’s commentary begins with her observing that if the topic, “Who 
are we?” (“this,” line 1), revolves around declaring “where are you from” (line 2), 
then Taiwan’s national identity issue has become “very complex, very sensitive” 
(lines 4-5). The PFP legislator explains this perspective by claiming “Actually, it 
should be very simple” and adds that “of course I would think that we are 
Zhongguoren (Chinese)” (lines 6-9). By introducing her opinion first, Diane Lee’s 
linguistic progression is consistent with Myers’ (1999a) finding that speakers 
typically “will say what the result of the thought experiment is to be, before they 
lay down the conditions” (585). The present case, the PFP legislator summarizes 
her reading of Taiwan’s national identity problem in two terse sentences. 
However, after making this declaration, Leg. Diane Lee quickly frames 
her remarks as constructed dialogue in order to rhetorically demonstrate why 
Taiwan’s national identity problem is “very simple” (hen jiandan 很簡單). Her 
introduction of constructed dialogue between a figurative “someone” (renjia 
人家) and an alternating “we” (women 我們) and “I” (wo 我) animates the 
ideological issue while rending it in hypothetical terms. Lee elaborates her “very 
simple” reading by posing a hypothetical query, “If someone asked me, “what is 
the name of (your) country?” (lines 10-11). The PFP legislator then provides the 
second pair part (Sacks et. al. 1974) to the question by answering, “Our country is 
the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國). So we abbreviate that to 
China (Zhongguo 中國), Chinese citizens (Zhongguo renmin 中國人民)” (lines 
12-14).15 Interestingly, Leg. Lee doubly emphasizes what type of “Chinese 
citizens” (Zhongguo renmin) she refers to by prefacing the identity term with the 
                                                 
15 Although Diane Lee doesn’t preface this hypothetical quote with a “saying” verb such as “I 
said,” the rhetorical response is interpreted as a hypothetical utterance given the “if” statement 
preceding the statement. 
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descriptor “China” (Zhongguo), and moreover, by elongating the second character 
“guo” (國).16 
 
Figure 12: 2100 guest panelist PFP Legislator Diane Lee addressing the topic: “Big 
reconciliation: what is our (national) identity?” 
Leg. Diane Lee’s theoretical line of inquiry continues through her 
imaginary interlocutor when the hypothetically voiced character poses a second 
question, “So if you were asked, ‘Where were you born?’” (lines 15-16). The 
legislator begins to answer in the first person-plural “we are” (line 17), but 
quickly amends her response to the first person-singular, “I was born in Taiwan” 
(line 18). This marked shift from a collective “we” to the personal “I” reveals a 
self-correction or self-repair regarding how the PFP legislator wants to frame her 
remarks, namely, should her words be presented as a “possible worlds” scenario 
through a collective “we” or should it be based on her own identity(-ies) through a 
first person “I”? By choosing to use the first person, Leg. Diane Lee personalizes 
the rhetorical question and shares with her fellow panelists and program viewers 
that she was in fact born in Taiwan. 
                                                 
16 This would be the equivalent of saying “I’m a U.S. American” (as opposed to a “Canadian 
American”) or “I’m an American American” (as opposed to a “Chinese American”). I thank 
Heng-rue Lin for pointing this out to me. 
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The next hypothetical utterance, however, signals a shift back to the 
thought experiment frame. By presenting the following statement as constructed 
dialogue, Leg. Lee neatly reconciles her earlier claim to having a “Chinese” 
citizenship despite being born in “Taiwan”—“So then I say, “I am Chinese 
(Zhongguoren), I am also Taiwanese (Taiwanren)” (lines 19-21). The 
hypothetical utterance allows the PFP legislator to embrace both terms without 
alienating listeners who identify with either one or the other (or both) identity 
markers (Myers 1998, 1999a). 
Realizing that her verbal thought experiment has reached a controversial 
juncture, Leg. Lee anticipates her imaginary interlocutor’s response and inserts a 
hypothetical protest to her declaration of being both a Zhongguoren and a 
Taiwanren with the constructed objection, “(You) can’t say Zhongguoren 
(Chinese)!” (line 24). Here, the represented utterance acts as a counter-argument 
to Diane Lee’s earlier remarks, and moreover, voices sentiments that Taiwanren-
identifying, and perhaps pro-Taiwan independence supporters, might express. 
This imaginary counterpoint is significant as it both exposes an “irreducible 
contradiction or tension” in Taiwan’s national identity struggle as well as in Leg. 
Lee’s ongoing thought experiment (Myers 1999a:580).  
In the next few lines, the PFP legislator turns to presenting several “facts” 
as a means to prove why a person in Taiwan can identify herself as a “Chinese” 
(Zhongguoren) (lines 25-26). First, Leg. Leg evokes the Republic of China 
constitution (lines 27-28) to lend credence to her declaration that “aren’t we all 
then Zhongguoren (Chinese)?” (line 29). This is next followed by a brief 
geography lesson to remind her listeners that the Republic of China includes not 
only Taiwan, but also the islands of Penghu (澎湖), Kinmen (金門), and Matsu 
(馬祖) (lines 31-32).17 By listing the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which the 
                                                 
17 The Penghu Islands (also known as the Pescadores) forms an archipelago in the Taiwan Straits 
off the southwestern coast of Taiwan. Located off the southern part of Fujian province, Kinmen is 
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ROC constitution lists as a part of Fukien province in China, Leg. Lee establishes 
the Republic of China as consisting of more than just the island of Taiwan, and 
hence, lending credence to her assertion that ROC nationals are not only 
Taiwanren or “Taiwanese.” 
After presenting this geographical evidence, Leg. Lee introduces a series 
of selective identity markers that broaden the Zhongguoren identity beyond its 
geopolitical and ideological connotations.18 She deliberately links the identities of 
Penghuren (澎湖人) and Kinmenren (金門人) with Zhongguoren to state, “So we 
have Zhongguoren who are also ‘people from Penghu’ (Penghuren), there are 
Zhongguoren who are also ‘people from Kinmen’ (Jinmenren)” (lines 33-36). 
Although these identities are not “fictitious” (Clark and Gerrig 1990) in the sense 
that the people and places do exist, Leg. Lee’s identity construction nonetheless 
creates a unified imagined community (Anderson 1991) through her deliberative 
discourse, and specifically, through her ongoing thought experiment. 
After introducing these alternative identifiers, Leg. Lee reaches the crux of 
her contemplations which coincides with a shift back to hypothetical reported 
speech. The PFP legislator’s use of a collective “we” attempts to establish a 
conciliatory frame when she asserts: “We cannot say, ‘Everyone must be called 
Taiwanren” (lines 37-38). This declaration returns Leg. Lee to her earlier 
assertion that Taiwan’s national identity should not be considered “so seriously” 
(name yansu 那麼嚴肅) and be regarded as “so complicated” (name fuza 
那麼複雜) (line 43-45). Here, Diane Lee unveils how she imagines its 
                                                                                                                                     
the ROC territory that lies closest to China. The island of Matzu is located off the northern coast 
of Fujian province. In the early 1950s, both Kinmen and Matzu were heavily fought over between 
the CCP and KMT regimes. With U.S. military aid, the KMT succeeded in retaining the islands. 
To this day, the ROC maintains its heaviest military presence on Kinmen and Matzu. 
18 As mentioned in Chapter Three, the identifier “Zhongguoren” carries symbolic meanings linked 
to a historical and mythical “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo 中國) or “China,” which includes 
obligations and loyalties of political affiliation as citizens of the Chinese state (Tu 1991b:25). I 
expand upon this concept in a saliva war between Mr. Ting and Leg. Fung in Chapter Seven. 
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reconciliation in a final hypothetical utterance: “I don’t believe that, we must use 
the terminology [of Zhongguoren and Taiwanren] and say, ‘Everyone must use 
the same term in order for it [the national identity issue] to be called a 
reconciliation’” (lines 48-53). Ironically, by voicing her conclusions through 
constructed dialogue Leg. Lee reemphasizes the issue’s sensitivity, as 
demonstrated by her avoidance in authoring the remarks. 
Myers (1999a) observes that oftentimes the use of “represented discourse” 
reflects the speaker’s “powerlessness in the situation outlined in the thought 
experiment,” thus leading the individual to resolve it through “saying rather than 
doing” (585). To voice the more sensitive portions of her commentary regarding 
Taiwan’s national identity as the author and not the animator, which she elects to 
do here through hypothetical reported speech, could have jeopardized her social 
face in Taiwan’s ethno-politically cognizant landscape. It can be assessed that the 
PFP legislator’s objective in this passage focused upon “saying” rather than 
“doing” the reconciliation she proposed. That is, Diane Lee seemed less 
concerned about describing steps to resolving the crisis, and more interested in 
performing “reconciliation talk” that was believable to her co-participants and 
program viewers as well as enhanced to her credibility as a politician who 
represented all of Taiwan’s people. 
Myers (1999a) recognizes the strategic value and convenience of 
hypothetical reported speech when he notes: 
When [speakers] use represented discourse to position themselves, 
represented speech and represented thought are often interchangeable. . 
.The functions of represented discourse…emerge only if we see the 
interactions as rhetorical (ibid:587). 
He adds that this linguistic device allows speakers to “experiment with [the] 
wording and rewording” of knotty issues (ibid:581). Consequently, Leg. Lee’s 
repeated insertion of constructed dialogue in her commentary provided her the 
political opportunity through a safe discursive avenue (e.g., a thought experiment) 
 235
to contemplate and theorize Taiwan’s national identity crisis. Overall, Diane 
Lee’s creative merging of commentary and thought experiment, as well as her 
alternation between opinion and hypothetical reported speech, demonstrates how 
crisis discourses can be redressed through reconciliation talk on political TV call-
in shows. 
RECONCILING “PRESENT” AND “ABSENT” RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH 
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
Call-in show participants also use constructed dialogue as a counter-
argument to the surrounding discussion in order to present alternative or opposing 
perspectives in relation to those already expressed. In the next example, a guest 
panelist uses hypothetical reported speech to selectively depict and tactfully 
assess another guest’s remarks regarding the increased reliance on ethnic 
sentiments as a campaign tactic during Taiwan’s recent national elections. By 
turning to hypothetical reported speech, the panelist has greater leverage to 
alleviate “irreducible contradiction or tension” underlying this sensitive issue 
(Myers 1999a:580). In particular, I explore how the panelist ascribes hypothetical 
utterances to a generic Taiwan populace to portray a unified and content citizenry. 
In doing so, the speaker attempts to demonstrate the complex laminations latent 
within benshengren and waishengren tensions. 
Basso’s (1979) seminal study of linguistic play among the Western 
Apache also informs the following analysis. In particular, I apply his 
interpretation that every joke indexes two sets of relationships, including a present 
relationship between the speaker and the object of the joke, as well as an absent 
relationship on which the present on is modeled (16). Although the next call-in 
show passage does not feature joke telling but rather reconciliation talk, this 
comparative relationship remains useful in comprehending the dual (or multiple) 
messages that hypothetical reported speech communicates. Specifically, I 
investigate how a call-in participant’s animation of hypothetical utterances also 
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captures multiple relationships including those manifest and latent to the ongoing 
discourse. In the following excerpt, a guest panelist uses hypothetical reported 
speech to forward a counter-argument to a previous speaker’s comments. 
Moreover, the panelists’ hypothetical utterance indexes two interdependent 
relationships, namely, benshengren/waishengren relations—which represents the 
present relationship and the call-in show’s main topic—as well as Taiwan- China 
cross-straits relations—which constitutes the absent relationship that has thus far 
remained unaddressed in the program’s deliberations. I consequently explore how 
the panelist strategically inserts constructed speech to forward that Taiwan’s 
shengji qinjie (省籍情結) or ethno-political crisis may one day be subsumed, and 
even be erased, by a greater threat from China as a result of cross-straits tensions.  
“Why do we divide ourselves like this?”: exposing contradictions in the 
“emotional problem” of bensheng/waisheng relations 
The following three excerpts are all taken from a 2100 episode entitled: 
“Bensheng, waisheng, is there still a distinction?” The episode was broadcast on 
May 2, 2000, in the interregnum between the presidential election on March 18 
and the presidential inauguration on May 20, 2000. The featured guests included 
former independent vice presidential candidate and current vice chairman of the 
newly formed People’s First Party Chang Chau-hsiung (張昭雄),19 DPP legislator 
Lee Ying-yuan (李應元), media producer Tang Xianglong (唐湘龍), and 
National Taiwan University history professor Li Yongzhi (李永治). The episode’s 
topic focused on ethno-political relations (shengji qingjie 省籍情結), which 
                                                 
19 Chang Chau-hsiung was independent presidential candidate James Soong’s running mate in the 
2000 presidential elections. At the time of the broadcast, he had recently been appointed the PFP 
vice chairman, which was comprised of Soong-Chang supporters. 
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moderator Lee Tao introduced as perhaps having “always existed in our society, 
but people very rarely speak of it.”20  
Given Taiwan’s recent presidential election, ethno-political relations had 
attained greater prominence as various political parties decried the manner in 
which voting had supposedly occurred along ethno-political lines. Election results 
revealed that the DPP garnered the majority of the benshengren votes while the 
KMT and NP earned most of the waishengren votes. Independent candidate 
James Soong, however, attracted significant numbers of both benshengren and 
waishengren votes. 
In the second excerpt, I examine guest panelist Tang Xiang-long uses 
hypothetical reported speech as a counter-argument to the other panelists’ 
comments. As previously mentioned, ethno-political voting practices are closely 
tied to a political party’s cross-straits policy, namely, whether the party advocates 
eventual reunification with China or Taiwan independence. Appearing near the 
end of the hour-long program, Tang’s remarks offer an alternative view of the 
dangers and opportunities ethno-political tensions pose to Taiwan and its people. 
In particular, the media producer argues that Taiwan’s preoccupation with 
benshengren/waishengren tensions will eventually undermine the country’s 
national security, leaving it vulnerable to invasion by China. Tang demonstrates 
this point through two hypothetical utterances that depict Taiwan’s citizenry as 
being satisfied with their lifestyle and finding the country’s ethno-political 
divisions as being meaningless. I examine how Tang’s hypothetical reported 
utterance refocuses the call-in show’s present discussion regarding Taiwan’s 
domestic political sphere by calling attention to an absent relationship, that is, 
cross-straits relations. 
                                                 
20 Lee Tao’s remarks in Chinese were: “可能一直都存在我們這個社會裡面﹐ 
但是大家都很少去談 .” 
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Transc. 6.2: “There is no meaning to our discrimination” 
1 Tang 那今天﹐在說 So today, when talking about  
2  本省人跟外省人 benshengren and waishengren 
3  這麼簡單的 such a simple  
4  兩人對立﹐ confrontation between two people (groups), 
5  非常不理性的區分。 a very unreasonable distinction. 
6  是不是要非到等 Does it have to reach the point where 
7  到那一天中共 one day after Communist China has 
8  打過來之後﹐ fought its way over here, 
9  大家發現說﹐ everyone will then realize and say, 
10  “其實我們生活 “Actually our lifestyle 
11  在這邊很好。 (on this side) is very good. 
12  我們為什麼 Why do we 
13  要這樣去區分呢﹖” divide (ourselves) like this?” 
14  這種感情的問題 Actually it is worthwhile for the 
15  其實是很值得 populace to address 
16  人民去對待。 this emotional problem. 
17  但是它裡面有 But within this there is  
18  這樣一個矛盾。 a kind of contradiction. 
19  非要鬥﹐鬥﹐鬥﹐ One must fight, fight, fight, 
20  到最後有一個外來 to where in the end a foreign 
21  的統治者進來之後﹐ ruler enters (Taiwan) and afterwards, 
22  大家才常常發現說﹐ everyone will come to realize and say, 
23  “其實我們這樣區分 “Actually, there is no meaning in 
24  是沒有意義的。” distinguishing ourselves like this.” 
The excerpt begins with Mr. Tang declaring that the face-off between 
benshengren and waishengren is a “very unreasonable distinction” (feichang bu 
lixing de qufen 非常不理性的區分) (line 5). Tang then introduces an extreme 
case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) that Taiwan’s concern with shengji qinjie 
relations leaves it vulnerable to invasion from “Communist China,” such that one 
day the country will wake up and discover that the PRC has already succeeded in 
“fight[ing] its way over here” (line 8). With this statement, Tang succeeds in 
shifting the focus of the discussion from the present or current call-in show topic 
of benshengren/waishengren relations to the thus far unspoken and absent issue of 
cross-straits relations. Tang then dramatizes the opportunities and dangers ethno-
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political and cross-straits tensions pose to Taiwan by voicing a surprised and 
enlightened citizenry’s discovery that, “Actually, our lifestyle here (in Taiwan) is 
very good. Why do we divide ourselves like this?” (lines 10-13). Tang’s use of 
hypothetical reported speech acts as a counter-argument to the other call-in 
participants’ portrayals of waishengren as having “feelings of crisis” (weijigan 
危機感)21  and “feelings of loss” (shiluogan 失落感) earlier in the program.22 
Tang’s counter-argument also represents an attempt to alleviate the 
surmounting contradictions and tensions undermining waishengren/benshengren 
relations by depicting a populace that is not in “crisis,” but rather finds their 
lifestyle “very good” (line 11). Tang refers to shengji qinjie relations as an 
“emotional problem” (line 16), and moreover, that “a kind of contradiction” exists 
within the issue (lines 17-18). He then predicts that Taiwan’s concern with ethno-
political inequalities will only cease when a “foreign ruler” (wailai de tongzhizhe 
外來的統治者) (line 20-21) invades and conquers Taiwan, an oblique yet 
recognizable reference to the PRC.  
The media producer further dramatizes the urgency of the situation by 
inserting another hypothetical utterance, which he again presents as the voice of 
Taiwan’s citizenry. Here, Tang portrays the public as suddenly realizing that, 
“Actually, there is no meaning to dividing ourselves like this” (line 23-24). The 
resemblance between the two hypothetical reported utterances in Tang’s brief 
remarks emphasizes the inherent contradictions in the possible-worlds scenario he 
presents in which the PRC successfully invades Taiwan (Semino et. al. 1999). 
That is, while Taiwan’s political parties engage in an ethno-political power 
struggle, they concurrently weaken the country’s ability to defend itself from 
“Communist China.” In short, Tang’s use of constructed dialogue warns that 
                                                 
21  I discuss this notion in greater detail in the next excerpt. 
22 These phrases were used by both guest panelist and DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan as well as 
moderator Lee Tao in this episode.  
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should ethno-political tensions consume Taiwan’s domestic sphere, the country’s 
current sociopolitical problems will pale in comparison to what their lifestyles 
will be like under PRC rule. 
I consider this passage as a performance of reconciliation talk insofar as 
Tang’s remarks seek to regain a semblance of harmony in Taiwan society by 
reminding his colleagues and viewers that Taiwan by and large enjoys a 
harmonious sociopolitical environment with a populace that is unified under a 
democratic government. By turning to constructed dialogue, Tang articulates the 
dangers and opportunities latent within benshengren/waishengren tensions. To 
him, a potent danger lies in becoming too engrossed with domestic power 
struggles and leaving the country vulnerable to invasion by China. Tang thus 
suggests that the citizenry should take the opportunity to address their “emotional 
problems” (ganqing de wenti 感情的問題) as well as appreciate their 
comparatively harmonious environment in Taiwan for what it already offers. Thus 
Tang’s remarks suggests that he considers Taiwan’s ethno-political crisis as 
reconcilable, particularly in comparison to cross-straits tensions. 
RECONCILIATION TALK AS “HOPED FOR SPEECH” 
The third excerpt investigates how a guest speaker uses reported speech to 
reappropriate or “replay” a previous panelist’s remarks in a manner that 
selectively depicts and editorializes the original utterance. A “replaying” serves to 
link the reporter’s interpretation of the original utterance and the utterance itself 
such that it: 
…appears to establish a personal perspective and temporal starting point 
of an anecdote, such that any quoted statement which follows can 
somewhat serve as the concluding part of a temporally developed two-part 
story, in this way providing a replaying of sorts (Goffman 1974:506; 
original italics). 
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By revoicing another speaker’s utterance, call-in participants recreate its content 
and even reorient its discursive target. The following excerpt demonstrates how 
participants can selectively depict another speaker’s remarks, including switching 
the subject and object of an utterance and thus producing an opposite reading of 
the deliberated crisis scenario. 
The passage also illustrates how hypothetical reported speech can serve as 
an “apocryphal quotation” (cf. Payne, n.d., in Buttny 1997) or “hoped for speech” 
(cf. Cohen 1996, in Buttny 1997). In this manner, hypothetical utterances enact 
what “could or should have been said” or even thought (Buttny 1997:486). Call-in 
show speakers often use and attribute constructed dialogue to self and other 
speakers in order to demonstrate alternative linguistic behavior from that already 
expressed. In this case, a panelist models hypothetical thought that he attributes to 
others, in this case other politicians, in order to illustrate how a conciliatory 
attitude can contribute to reducing Taiwan’s ethno-political tensions. 
 “Is there some way to get these ethnic groups to vote for me?”: expressing 
“hoped for speech” 
The excerpt begins with PFP vice chairman Chang Chau-hsiung producing 
three instances of hypothetical reported speech, which he uses to critique 
Taiwan’s political parties and their preoccupation with Taiwanese vs. Mainlander 
voting patterns. Chang’s remarks represent a response to DPP legislator Lee 
Ying-yuan’s earlier comment that independent presidential candidate James 
Soong, Chang’s former running mate, had attracted 80 to 90 percent of the 
waishengren vote in the recent presidential election. The crux of Leg. Lee Ying-
yuan’s remarks are as follows:  
Right now the problem is, the feeling of crisis among waishengren, is so 
strong that approximately 80 to 90 percent (of their votes) were 
concentrated on James Soong.23 
                                                 
23 See Appendix B, Excerpt 7 for Chinese transcription. 
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As a former vice presidential candidate, Chang responds to Leg. Lee 
Ying-yuan’s allegations by first revoicing and rephrasing the DPP legislator’s 
original remarks. Chang then offers an alternative reading of the situation, which 
he presents through two hypothetical utterances. Chang’s use of direct reported 
speech serves to editorialize the original utterance, while the insertion of 
hypothetical reported speech as a form of “hoped for speech” (Buttny 1997) 
places the onus of diminishing ethno-political biases on Taiwan’s politicians, and 
particularly, on President-elect Chen Shui-bian. 
Transc. 6.3: “…is there some way to get these ethnic groups to vote for me?” 
1 Chang 所以剛才提到呢﹐ So just now it was raised that,  
2  這個事情就是說﹐ this incident that is to say, 
3  我們民進黨朋友 our Democratic Progressive Party friend 
4  說﹐“外省籍十percent, said, “Ten percent of waishenji,24 
5  只有十percent 投我﹖” only ten percent vote for me?” 
6  我覺得反而我們應該 Rather, I feel that we should 
7  要去想想﹐是不是 think about this, shouldn’t 
8  應該在這個時候要 (we) at this time need to 
9  去想說﹐ think and say, 
10  “我能夠﹐有沒有什麼 “Can I, is there some 
11  辦法﹐讓這些族群 way,  that I can get these ethnic groups 
12  能夠來投我。” to vote for me?” 
13  (…) (…) 
14  所以這個事情就 So this situation should be 
15  是我們怎麼來努力。 how hard do we work for it. 
16  那很重要的是﹐ So what is important is, 
17  政治人物是很重要。 politicians are very important. 
18  尤其這次陳水扁 Especially Mr. Chen Shui-bian 
19  先生他當選了以後﹐ after becoming elected, 
20  我想想他不要 (…), I believe that he should not (…), 
21  不要一直掛念這說﹐ shouldn’t be concerned about this and say, 
22  “啊﹐這一群人只十 “Ah, this group of people only 
23  percent 投我﹐所以 ten percent voted for me, so  
24  我就不理。” I will then ignore them.” 
                                                 
24 Meaning, “people from outside the province” or “Mainlanders.” 
 243
25  那這個就很糟糕。 This would be very unwise. 
Chang’s calculated juxtaposition of direct and hypothetical reported 
speech in this brief stretch of talk accomplishes two tasks: first, to mitigate his 
criticism of Leg. Lee Ying-yuan’s preceding remarks, and second, to address the 
issue of ethno-political tensions. When Chang reassesses the DPP legislator’s 
comment that presidential candidate James Soong garnered the majority of 
waishengren (Mainlander) votes, he does so in a circumspect and amiable manner 
by referring to Legislator Lee Ying-yuan as “our Democratic Progressive Party 
friend” (line 3). This friendly overture serves to introduce Chang’s following 
remarks, including his revoicing and editorializing of the DPP legislator’s earlier 
comments. 
Interestingly, when Chang “replays” the DPP legislator’s observation of 
Taiwan’s voting patterns, he selectively emphasizes the Democratic Progressive 
Party (rather than James Soong as depicted in Leg. Lee’s original utterance) as 
being the recipient of waishengren (Mainlander) votes. That is, while Leg. Lee 
cited presidential candidate James Soong (Chang’s former running mate) as 
receiving 80 to 90 percent of the Mainlander vote in the last election, Chang 
revises the voting behavior from the opposing perspective in the following 
reported utterance: “Why is it that ten percent of waishengji (Mainlanders), only 
ten percent vote for me (the DPP)?” (lines 4-6). In other words, Chang succeeds 
in “reclassifying” the message of Leg. Lee’s original remarks (Shuman 
1993:145). Specifically, Chang reclassifies the beneficiary of waishengren votes 
from James Soong to the DPP. In addition, he redirects the issue of Taiwan’s 
voting practices away from waishengren voters and their “feelings of crisis” 
(weijigan 危機感) and towards the DPP and their complaint of only garnering ten 
percent the waishengren vote. In this sense, Chang’s use of reported speech 
resembles “selective depiction” more than “direct quotation” (Clark and Gerrig 
1990). 
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Chang next uses hypothetical reported speech to illustrate through a 
thought experiment the suggestion that Taiwan’s politicians, including those on 
the call-in program, should reconsider the voting patterns that Leg. Lee has raised 
(lines 6-7). Here, the PFP vice chairman performs the voice of a self-reflecting 
politician who ponders what he can do to redress ethno-political voting biases, 
“Can I, is there some way that I can get these ethnic groups to vote for me?” (lines 
10-12). When evaluating a speaker’s remarks, assessments can arrive 
“prepositioned,” “postpositioned,” or embedded within the reported utterance 
(Buttny 1997:501). In this passage, Chang embeds his critique of Leg. Lee’s 
earlier remarks within his commentary. 
Chang’s insertion of a hypothetical quotation in the midst of his 
commentary acts as a demonstration, in the sense that “quotations are 
demonstrations that [themselves] are component parts of language use” (Clark 
and Gerrig 1990:769). In this instance, Chang demonstrates what Taiwan’s 
politicians (including himself) can do to overcome ethno-political relations. The 
PFP vice chairman’s use of a hypothetical utterance articluates “hoped for 
speech” that “shows what could or should have been said” by DPP Leg. Lee 
Ying-yuan in his earlier comment on waishengren voting practices (Buttny 
1997:486). Later, Chang reiterates his hopeful attitude when he suggests that 
reconciling Taiwan’s ethno-political differences depends upon the efforts 
politicians dedicate toward this goal (line 15) as they are central to improving this 
issue (line 17).  
The vice chairman attributes his next and final use of hypothetical 
reported speech to President-elect Chen Shui-bian, whom Chang regards as 
critical to ameliorating waishengren and benshengren relations (lines 18-19). 
Myers (1999a) finds that most “instances of hypothetical represented discourse 
are not marked as imaginary, but as possible or conditional” (576). Moreover, 
reported speech and reported thought are often interchangeable, as demonstrated 
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in Chang’s performance of a hypothetical utterance, or rather a hypothetical 
thought, which he describes as “very unwise” (line 25) should President-elect 
Chen utter or think it.  
In this hypothetical utterance, Chang advises the DPP president to not 
dwell upon, and moreover, retaliate for the fact that only ten percent of 
waishengren voted for him (lines 22-24). Here, Chang uses hypothetical reported 
speech to model what President-elect Chen should not do once taking office, 
namely, ignore this segment of the population (line 24). Moreover, the PFP vice 
chairman presents alternative approaches to a situation “in which there are always 
potentially opposing views” (Myers 1999a:580). Chang’s hypothetical utterance 
thus reminds President-elect Chen that there are many ways to address 
waishengren/benshengren relations aside from categorizing voting practices and 
reifying ethno-political differences, which Taiwan’s political leaders have 
repeatedly done in the past. 
As an example of reconciliation talk, Chang’s adept juxtaposition of direct 
and hypothetical reported speech in his comments performs and advocates an 
apolitical approach to ethno-political tensions. Namely, he directs his speech 
reporting performances at his former political opponent, President-elect Chen 
Shui-bian, and his fellow panelist, DPP Leg. Lee Ying-yuan. Moreover, aside 
from advising Chen and Lee to take a reconciliatory approach, Chang himself 
does so in his own speech. This is demonstrated in Chang’s tactful editorialization 
of Leg. Lee’s earlier remarks through selective depiction, which reevaluates the 
utterance in a manner that preserves the DPP legislator’s social face or mianzi. In 
other words, rather than overtly criticizing Leg. Lee, the PFP vice chairman 
“gives him (positive) face” (gei ta mianzi 給他面子). Moreover, Chang’s advice 
for President-elect Chen regarding what should not do if he wanted to redress 
ethno-political voting biases has the potential of elevating both Chen and the 
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DPP’s mianzi should Chang’s suggestions succeed in improving, or at least not 
worsen, benshengren/waishengren relations. 
Sternberg (1982) observes that “tearing a piece of discourse from its 
original habitat and recontextualizing it within a new network of relations cannot 
but interfere with its effect” (108). Consequently, by revoicing and rephrasing 
Leg. Lee’s initial comments, Chang recontextualizes its original “effect” of 
blaming waishengren voters for exhibiting “feelings of crisis” and transforms it 
into “hoped for speech” that forwards a “shouldn’t we say” approach to challenge 
politicians to rethink their methods of appealing to voters (Buttny 1997). 
Furthermore, in forwarding a reconciliatory approach, Chang foregrounds the 
opportunities and dangers that await not only President-elect Chen Shui-bian, but 
all of Taiwan’s sociopolitical leaders as well should shengji qingjie biases remain 
unaddressed. As in an earlier excerpt in which PFP Leg. Diane Lee relied upon 
constructed dialogue to create a “possible worlds” scenario to reconcile Taiwan’s 
national identity problem, PFP vice chairman Chang’s use of hypothetical 
utterances models linguistic behavior in a world where benshengren/waishengren 
distinctions should not matter. 
REVISITING LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES THROUGH NARRATIVES 
The final excerpt in this chapter appears in the same episode as the 
previous two examples and features a caller who recounts a personal experience 
through a brief 20-second narrative. Tannen’s (1986) research on constructed 
dialogue in conversational and literary narratives finds that “the creation of drama 
from personal experience and hearsay is made possible by and simultaneously 
creates interpersonal involvement among speaker or writer and audience” (312). 
In the next passage, I examine how a single line of dialogue effectively recaptures 
and vividly dramatizes a confrontation involving language choice. Although the 
narrative depicts the confrontation as occuring between the caller and his recalled 
interlocutor, the recounting also indexes Taiwan’s language ideologies regarding 
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the “national language” or guoyu (國語), more commonly known as Mandarin 
Chinese, and the Taiwanese language, also known as Taiyu (台語) or Hohlo. 
Moreover, the caller’s insertion of a “snippet” of constructed dialogue represents 
the moral of his story as it “expresses the relationship not between the quoted 
party and the topic of talk but rather the quoted party and the audience to whom 
the quotation is delivered” (Tannen 1989:109). 
In Sherzer’s (1990) examination of Kuna public oratory, he claims that 
recited words are understood by the audience as belonging not to the orator, “but 
rather as quotes of other, previous times and places, of other speakers and 
voices…or of future times, places, and voices” (124). In the present case, the 
caller’s association of the reported utterance to another speaker likewise 
represents and epitomizes numerous other verbal interactions between guoyu and 
Taiyu speakers in Taiwan. The importance and value of the caller’s anecdote thus 
resides in its references to other speakers, times, and contexts where Taiwan’s 
language ideologies have played out in both public (e.g., call-in shows) and 
private (e.g., everyday language use) spaces. Conseequently, I regard the caller’s 
narrative as performing reconciliation talk insofar as Taiwan’s language 
ideologies are discursively overcome and temporarily resolved through the 
creative use of constructed dialogue. 
“Speak the ‘national language’ (guoyu), okay?”: a narrative of past and 
future times, places, and voices 
The caller, a Mr. Wu from Tainan, a city in southwestern Taiwan, begins 
his call by announcing he has a story to share. Wu situates his narrative during his 
military service, which is mandatory for all males in Taiwan.25 In the story, Wu 
describes himself addressing a “mountain aborigine (or indigenous person)” 
                                                 
25 Recently, Taiwan’s conscription law was amended to allow certain individuals for approved 
reasons (e.g., medical clearance, conscientious objector) to fulfill their military service 
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(shandi yuanzhumin 山地原住民) in Taiyu or Taiwanese. Wu then portrays his 
interlocutor as demanding, “speak guoyu (the national language) okay?” As the 
only line in the narrative that Wu presents through constructed dialogue, the 
reported utterance becomes the focal point of his story. This interpretation is 
corroborated at the end of Wu’s narrative when he forwards that speaking guoyu 
should be considered a “communication tool” (goutong gongju 溝通工具). 
As in previous excerpts, I have deliberately left certain Mandarin terms in 
their pinyin form (e.g., Taiyu, guoyu, waishengren, and Shanghaihua) to preserve 
their sociolinguistic and contextual significance in the narrative. The entire caller 
segment is presented below. 
Transc. 6.4: “I feel that speaking the “national language” (guoyu) is a kind of 
communication tool” 
1 Wu 阿唯? 你好。  Eh, hello? How are you. 
2  我想講一個故事啊。 I would like to tell a story. 
3  我在軍中當兵的時候 When I was serving in the military 
4  我有用台語跟那個-一個 I used Taiyu to speak with that- a 
5  山地原住民講話啊。 mountain aborigine. 
6  他很不客氣就跟我講說 He then very impolitely said to me 
7  “你講國語好不好啊? ”  “(You) use guoyu okay?” 
8  那現在-在台灣裡面hon,26 So now—inside Taiwan uh, 
9  我覺得講國語是一種， I feel that speaking guoyu is a kind  
10  溝通工具。  of communication tool. 
11  你:，不要每次到 You:, it isn’t necessary that each time 
12  這邊都一定要用 (you) come to this place (you) must  
13  台語講話。 speak Taiyu. 
14  然後外省人也要， And so waishengren also must, 
15  外省人他學的國語﹐ the guoyu that waishengren learn, 
                                                                                                                                     
requirement by participating in humanitarian projects. However, choosing this option required two 
years of service as opposed to the requisite 18 months. 
26 I have interpreted the Taiwanese discourse marker “ho” as “uh” in this instance, but it could 
also be represented by “um” or any comparable space holder as might be used in English. It 
should be noted that the use of “hon” is particular to Taiwan speakers of Mandarin Chinese, and 
especially those who also speak Taiwanese. I thank Heng-rue Lin for assisting me in this 
translation. 
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16  我們是也要學他們 Do we also have to learn their 
17  的上海(話)？ Shanghai(hua)? 
To understand the caller’s comments requires background knowledge of 
Taiwan’s language policies and linguistic diversity. The marked linguistic 
moniker “guoyu” or “national language” captures the ideological relationship 
between language and nation-building that the former KMT ruling party imposed 
on the local Taiwan populace. In the early 1950s, the KMT introduced a national 
language policy that mandated only Mandarin would be used as a language of 
instruction.27 By 1964, the KMT implemented another law that banned the use of 
Taiwanese, as well as the other local languages in Taiwan (e.g., Hakka and the 
aborigine languages), in schools and official settings (Wachman 1994).  
Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, speakers have increasingly use 
Taiwanese in various daily interactions such that it is now socially fashionable 
and politically beneficial to do so.28 Moreover, with President Chen Shui-bian’s 
election in March 2000 and the rise of the local Democratic Progressive Party as 
Taiwan’s ruling party, Taiwanese will grow in prestige and use in a wider array of 
sociopolitical contexts.29 Taiwanese has also become necessary in the business 
world as commercial transactions and negotiations are increasingly conducted in 
the language, a practice that occurred even before the lifting of martial law in 
1987. More significantly, the Taiwanese language is emblematic of a coalescing 
Taiwanese nationalism that promotes an independent Taiwan nation-state distinct 
                                                 
27 Prior to the KMT regime’s arrival in 1945, Taiwan had been a Japanese colony from 1885-1945 
during which time Japanese was mandated in schools and official settings throughout Taiwan. For 
fear of lingering Japanese sentiments and patriotism, the use of Japanese was forbidden by the 
KMT government. Thus the Mandarin-only language policy not only replaced Japanese as the 
language of instruction, but also ensured that Mandarin, and not Taiwanese or any of the other 
local languages, would become Taiwan’s new official language.  
28 The general use of Taiwanese in the business world occurred before the lifting of martial law 
and prior to its popularity in the political arena. This is primarily due to the fact that over 80 
percent of the population are of benshengren decent. Consequently, a majority of benshengren 
speak Taiwanese in their daily lives, including when conducting business transactions. 
29 As with former President Lee Teng-hui, the previous ROC president, current President Chen 
Shui-bian is a fluent Taiwanese speaker. 
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from the PRC and a China-based worldview. Given that Mandarin Chinese is 
based on the Beijing dialect in northern China, the strategic choice by pro-
independence advocates to use Taiwanese rather than Mandarin is readily 
apparent.30 Despite these recent changes to Taiwan’s sociolinguistic environment, 
Mandarin remains the country’s lingua franca and dominant language in the mass 
media, schools, government, and business. 
For these reasons, Mr. Wu’s narrative recollection of himself using Taiyu 
to a person of aboriginal decent indexes many of the ideological associations 
listed above. The caller’s initial choice to not speak guoyu to an individual whose 
native language or “mother-tongue” (muyu 母語) most likely is not Taiwanese, as 
each aboriginal group has their own indigenous language, is notable for its 
ideological significance, and moreover, its own form of linguistic oppression. Mr. 
Wu highlights this moment by animating his interlocutor’s response through 
reported speech, “(You) speak guoyu okay?” (line 7), which the caller describes 
as being spoken in a “very impolite” (hen bu keqi 很不客氣) manner. 
Wu’s insertion of constructed dialogue forms the crux of the narrative for 
several reasons. Tannen (1986) claims that speech is rarely represented in oral 
storytelling exactly as initially spoken by the original speaker. Thus Mr. Wu’s 
recollection and reporting of the aboriginal speaker’s words constitutes a 
reconstruction of the original utterance in a way that meets the objectives of the 
present narrative. For instance, the caller’s deliberate depiction of the aboriginal 
speaker’s linguistic behavior as “very impolite” carries sociocultural 
connotations. Within Chinese-based societies, keqi (客氣) meaning “to be polite” 
or “politeness,” represents a highly valued practice in all interpersonal 
interactions (Gao et. al. 1996). A host demonstrates keqi by performing acts that 
                                                 
30 Some speakers in Taiwan refer to Mandarin as “the Beijing language” (beijinghua 北京話) 
rather than guoyu in order to linguistically and politically mark the language or dialect as from 
China and thus foreign to or “outside of” (wailai 外來) Taiwan. 
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makes the guest feel at home or treats her as “one of us” (ziji de ren 自己的人), 
while the guest returns keqi by trying not to impose on the host. The ritual of keqi 
between host-guest interactions thus generally follows a pattern of “offer-decline-
offer-decline-offer-accept” (ibid). 
Wu’s portrayal of the aboriginal speaker’s request to “speak guoyu” as 
being impolite is consistent with the conspicuous absence of the word “please” or 
qing (請) in the reported utterance. The caller establishes the aboriginal speaker as 
bluntly demanding that Wu use a “foreign” or “outside” (wailai 外來) language, 
namely, guoyu. This selective reenactment recalls the KMT’s hegemonic 
imposition of guoyu on the local population in Taiwan. However, the primary 
characters in this interaction are incongruent with ideological associations of 
guoyu with Mainlander or waishengren speakers. For instance, the caller portrays 
one minority group speaker (the mountain aborigine) as requesting another (Mr. 
Wu who is a Taiwanese speaker) to use a “foreign” language. 
In the latter of half of his remarks, the narrative shifts into commentary as 
Wu explains the moral of his story. That is, the caller advocates that speakers in 
Taiwan should regard guoyu as a facilitator instead of as a barrier to linguistic 
interactions. This interpretation can be gleaned from the caller’s statement that, 
“So now—inside Taiwan…I feel that speaking guoyu (the national language) is 
like a communication tool” (lines 8-10). Mr. Wu’s analogy of guoyu as 
“communication tool” (goutong gongju 溝通工具) represents one I have heard 
other speakers express in Taiwan. In my interviews with various individuals—
including politicians, scholars, students, as well as call-in show producers and 
viewers—similar if not the same linguistic comparison was voiced on several 
occasions.31  
                                                 
31 The topic of Taiwan’s languages and ideologies would arise during personal interviews as I 
would ask why most call-in shows were broadcast in Mandarin Chinese. I also asked call-in 
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Commonly translated into English as “to connect,” the notion of 
“goutong” proves complicated as it involves more than connecting with another 
individual or interlocutor. Some scholars suggest that goutong “articulates the 
nature, purpose, and characteristics of communication” as well (Gao et. al. 
1996:281). From this reading, goutong involves the act of understanding others 
and being understood in return. Consequently, goutong also proves 
complementary to the notion of harmony or he (和). Mr. Wu’s deliberate 
description of guoyu as a “communication tool” thus alters the language’s 
ideological associations and offers guoyu as a vehicle for greater interpersonal 
understanding, including the reconciliation of Taiwan’s ethno-political and 
linguistic differences. 
Mr. Wu’s final rhetorical question seeks to demonstrate that guoyu not 
only constitutes a foreign language to those who already resided on Taiwan before 
the KMT’s arrival, but for many Mainlanders as well. This interpretation is 
conveyed in Wu’s observation that waishengren (Mainlanders) also had to learn 
guoyu (national language) (line 15), which was not the mother tongue of many 
waishengren, when they arrived in Taiwan (“to this place,” line 12). 
Consequently, Wu suggests that imposing Taiyu on non-Taiwanese speakers 
would be equivalent to requiring those speakers referenced in his use of “we,” 
namely Taiyu speakers such as himself, to learn “their” Shanghaihua 
(Shanghainese) (lines 16-17),32 with “their” referring to waishengren. Wu’s 
concluding comments thus uses guoyu to unify all speakers in Taiwan, though in a 
way that differs from the KMT’s original intention. That is, Wu finds common 
ground by presenting guoyu as a “foreign” language to everyone in Taiwan. From 
                                                                                                                                     
participants when they would choose to speak in Mandarin, Taiwanese, or another language (e.g., 
English and occasionally Hakka) on the programs. 
32 Shanghainese is a Chinese dialect and derives from Shanghai, a city in China. It’s use here also 
carries derogatory ideological implications as it is associated with Mainlanders, and hence, China-
based worldviews. 
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this perspective, Wu succeeds in portraying benshengren, waishengren, and even 
his aborigine interlocutor as linguistic equals.  
In sum, this excerpt hinged upon the caller’s effective use of constructed 
dialogue to forward the argument that Taiwan’s ethno-political and language 
differences can and should be reconciled. Mr. Wu’s narrative construction and use 
of reported speech required listeners to participate in “sense-making” by 
interpreting the narrative for applicability in their own lives and interpersonal 
interactions (Tannen 1986:324). In addition, constructed dialogue allowed Mr. 
Wu, a Taiwanese speaker, to advocate the use of guoyu through a generalizable 
personal experience—that is, negotiating language choice in social interactions—
that most Taiwan residents are already familiar with or will eventually encounter. 
Mr. Wu’s use of reported speech also acts as a counter-argument to 
previous callers who exhibited ethno-political bias in their remarks. For instance, 
preceding Mr. Wu’s turn, a female caller, a Ms. Hsu from Taoyuan (a city in 
northwestern Taiwan), suggested that “first generation Mainlander grandfathers” 
(waisheng lai de diyi dai lao beibei 外省來的第一代老伯伯)33 should not be 
allowed to speak in the media due to their “problems with sorrow” (beiqing de 
wenti 悲情的問題), an oblique reference to their yearning for China.34 
Most significantly, the caller’s use of constructed dialogue affirms the 
observation that “[q]uoting is also a most effective way to demonstrate that 
knowledge has indeed been acquired” by the speaker (Sherzer 1990:125). In this 
case, the knowledge gained and imparted by Mr. Wu includes the recognition that 
past linguistic ideologies surrounding guoyu have no role in a contemporary, 
democratic and multilingual Taiwan society. By inserting this moral lesson 
through reported speech, the caller allows his listeners to interpret and apply his 
                                                 
33 The caller’s use of “beibei” in Mandarin for “grandfather” is an example of Taiwanese 
Mandarin as the word originates from the Taiwanese term for the same person “a-peh” (阿伯). I 
thank Dr. Boretz for bringing this to my attention. 
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account to their past, present and future interactions. In sum, Mr. Wu’s 
constructed dialogue as commentary neatly reconciles Taiwan’s language 
ideologies through a personal narrative. 
CONCLUSION 
Reported speech, as both direct and hypothetical utterances, contributed 
significantly to call-in participants’ reconciliation talk performances in this 
chapter’s four examples. Reconciliation talk as embellished by reported speech 
offered participants the means to theoretically contemplate and hypothetically 
animate the dangers and opportunities latent in the crisis topics they deliberated. 
By pursuing reconciliation talk through “saying rather than doing,” participants 
found a discursive space where contradictions were negotiated and knowledge 
was shared through constructed dialogue.  
Despite the self-congratulatory performance of harmony through staged 
call-in show productions, as epitomized by the episode entitled “Big 
Reconciliation Coffee,” this chapter’s examination of reconciliation talk 
demonstrated that hypothetical reported speech offers participants the means to 
consider and introduce alternative, “possible worlds” scenarios by voicing what 
could and should be said, and not merely what was said. Reconciliation talk and 
its premise of upholding harmony thus contrasts markedly from call-in show 
verbal sparring, otherwise known as saliva wars, a speech genre I examine in the 
following chapter. 
                                                                                                                                     
34 To read the entire caller passage see Appendix B, Excerpt 8. 
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Chapter Seven: “Saliva Wars” (koushui zhan)—Call-in Show 
Verbal Sparring 
I think no person would willingly allow himself to be perceived with a 
saliva war (koushui zhan) image. 
Lee Liguo, guest panelist 
[The guests] are arguing. They are not performing for you to watch, they 
are really, really arguing. 
Yü Fu, 8 o’clock moderator 
 
George Orwell (1946) once wrote that “political speech…[is] largely the 
defense of the indefensible” (87). Orwell’s observation applies equally well to this 
chapter’s exploration of call-in show verbal sparring in the form of “saliva wars” 
(koushui zhan 口水戰). Call-in show saliva wars frequently occur when 
participants present competing arguments for sensitive sociopolitical issues and 
controversial events that do not readily offer straightforward answers or 
interpretations. When engaged in argumentative talk, participants often evoke the 
words of another to challenge the evidentiality (Besnier 1993; Hill and Irvine 
1993) and sources (Pomerantz 1984) of the quoted utterance. However, speakers 
also use reported speech, generally direct and hypothetical reported speech, as 
claims of entitlement (Shuman 1993) to insider knowledge of confidential 
information and obscure events. Call-in show verbal sparring, however, also 
demonstrates that “knowledge” constitutes a social phenomenon that is 
constructed and recreated through social interaction (Du Bois 1986). 
 Given the rapid pace of call-in participants’ saliva war confrontations, 
reported speech serves as an economical and efficient device for the disputants. 
As Holt (1996) observes, “not only does [reported speech] avoid the need for 
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glossing or summarizing what was said, it also conveys diverse kinds of 
information at once and can perform tasks in the current conversation as well as 
portraying a previous one” (241). Saliva war participants thus frequently use 
reported speech in their arguments in place of cohesive, in-depth responses to 
moderator questions and panelist accusations. As an added benefit, speech 
reporting absolves the participant from taking responsibility for the quoted 
utterance and its associated connotations (Sherzer 1983). 
Goodwin’s (1990) account of “he-said-she-said” dispute practices among 
African American children inspires my examination of call-in participant saliva 
wars, which I similarly dub as “I-said-you-said” verbal duels. I also compare call-
in show saliva wars to “character contests” (Goffman 1967:239-258) given the 
manner participants alternately establish and question each others’ values and 
allegiances to present and absent participants (Basso 1979). Participants’ mock 
verbal warfare is representative of what Goffman (1974) regards as 
“transformations” of serious actions (41). Similarly, Clark and Gerrig (1990) 
regard speech reporting practices as the epitome of “nonserious” actions as 
reported utterances merely demonstrate what an individual said or did. Given 
these perspectives, I examine how call-in participants’ saliva wars perform 
nonserious doings of “real” or serious wars (e.g., ROC-PRC cross-straits tensions) 
with an arsenal of linguistic weapons that includes reported speech. Call-in show 
saliva wars thus perpetuate Taiwan’s crisis discourses by foregrounding and 
enacting sociopolitical tensions in the form of “incipient violence,”1 which has the 
potential to exacerbate and evolve into broader confrontations in society. 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the role of harmony in Chinese-based 
societies such as Taiwan’s and demonstrated how call-in participants’ 
performances of reconciliation talk contribute to its maintenance. However, rather 
                                                 
1 I thank Dr. Avron Boretz for linking call-in participants’ saliva war practices with this 
descriptor. Any expansion on the notion is my own, however. 
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than regarding participants’ saliva wars as merely fomenting dis-harmony, a more 
accurate assessment of the role verbal sparring plays on call-in shows can be 
found in the following observation. 
Arguments may not shut down conversation, it may make for “the best 
conversations”. . .And it may well be that various characterizations of who 
the participants are, is specifically relevant to the usability of argument as 
a technique for generating happy conversations (Sacks 1992:707). 
The notion that arguments generate “happy conversations” serves as the 
overarching premise in my examination of call-in participant saliva wars. In the 
following excerpts, I demonstrate that saliva wars play an integral role in not only 
political TV call-in shows, but also in perpetuating Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis 
discourses.2 In short, participants’ verbal disputes provide a valuable discursive 
space and opportunity for the presentation, contestation, and negotiation of 
Taiwan’s contending sociopolitical ideologies. 
 “EXPERIENCE NEAR” UNDERSTANDINGS OF SALIVA WARS 
Hymes (1995 (1962)) acknowledges that “[o]ne good ethnographic 
technique for getting at speech events3. . .is through words which name them” 
(110). Both critics and fans of political call-in shows describe its confrontational 
verbal format as as koushui zhan, which I translate as “saliva wars.” I decided to 
translate “koushui” as “saliva” rather than “spitting,” even though both English 
glosses can be used for the Mandarin Chinese term, in order to avoid competitive 
and negative connotations associated with “spitting.” However, I regard saliva 
                                                 
2 Due to the greater time allotment (approximately 6:1) to guest panelist deliberations over caller 
commentary, the excerpts in this chapter only focus on panelist saliva wars. 
3 I regard saliva wars as a speech event according to Hymes (1972b) understanding as a bounded 
social activity that participants mostly, but not exclusively, engage in through linguistic 
performance. 
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wars as having both positive and negative associations in Taiwan’s call-in show 
and political arenas.4   
A comparable term to saliva wars in U.S. culture would be “mudslinging” 
given its associations with politics, and specifically, the verbal blustering that 
characterizes political language (cf. Hart 2001; Jamieson 1992). However, call-in 
show saliva wars also recall Goodwin’s (1990) observations of “argumentative 
talk” among African-American children in which “talk is used to build [a] local 
social world” (142). Like Goodwin, my examination of call-in show saliva wars 
attends to both the linguistic process itself as well as the linguistic competencies 
participants exhibit “to build the dispute as a coherent, culturally, appropriate 
object in the first place” (ibid:142).  
Moreover, my investigation of koushui zhan continues the dissertation’s 
objective to explore ways of talking that are unique to Taiwan’s political TV call-
in shows.5 To situate call-in show saliva wars, I begin by turning to Taiwan’s 
political arena. When Taiwan began experimenting with democracy in the late 
1980s, lawmakers frequently engaged in verbal and even physical brawling on the 
legislative floor. These parliamentary confrontations provided ample “desired 
televisual moments” (Wood 2001:87) for Taiwan’s news stations, who eagerly 
captured and rebroadcast them on the nightly news. 
Present-day call-in show saliva wars represent subdued versions of these 
early “deliberative” practices that could be found in city councils across the 
country and even in Taiwan’s highest parliamentary body, the Legislative Yuan 
(lifayuan 立法院). To some extent, the accusation-and-denial format of call-in 
show verbal sparring transfers the Legislative Yuan’s question-and-answer 
                                                 
4 See footnote 37 in Chapter One for a more detailed discussion of suggestions for comparable 
English translations of “koushui zhan.” 
5 I should add that the term “koushui zhan” is also used by Mandarin speakers in China. However, 
how this linguistic practice is similar to or differs from Taiwan requires further examination. I 
thank Dr. Qing Zhang for brining this to my attention. 
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interpellation sessions onto a more public and performative stage. This chapter’s 
examination of call-in show koushui zhan considers and situates this linguistic 
practice within Taiwan’s democratic process where expressions of dissent through 
attention-getting verbal behaviors continue to mature. As a result, the use of 
reported speech, rather than a speaker’s podium, as an attack strategy represents 
one manifestation of Taiwan’s sociopolitical democratization.6 
The ethnographic practice of “informant labeling” (Irvine 1993) offers 
another means to acquire a local understanding of sociolinguistic processes. 
Irvine’s research on insult practices through xaxaar performances in a Wolof 
village used this approach to mitigate as much as possible ethnographer-imported 
readings and generalized understandings of this linguistic phenomenon. She 
consequently recognized that invoking informant labeling “is essential if we are 
not simply to import our own notions of defamatory content and find them 
everywhere” (ibid:111).  
In my interviews with call-in show participants, I frequently heard koushui 
zhan depicted as “attacking for the sake of attacking” (wei gongji er gongji 
為攻擊而攻擊) or “opposing for the sake of opposing” (wei fandui er fandui 
為反對而反對). Call-in participants’ use of koushui zhan in their verbal 
interactions proves consistent with these understandings. For instance, a guest 
panelist Professor Liu Yijun (劉義鈞) uses “koushui zhan” to describe the 
unrelenting “pondering” or “deliberating” (zhuomou 琢磨) by his fellow panelists 
regarding President Chen Shui-bian’s recently appointed cabinet members. The 
panelists’ primary point of contention focuses on the cabinet appointees’s 
                                                 
6 My analogy albeit intended to be humorous nonetheless draws from actual incidents. In the past, 
legislators have been known to overturn podiums while an opposition member was speaking as a 
form of protest. Just recently, in December 2001, PFP legislator Diane Lee was attacked by an 
independent legislator (Lo Fu-chu 羅福助) in the Legislative Yuan and sustained a neck injury. 
Legislator Lo was later censured by the Legislative Yuan for misconduct as well as made a public 
apology to Leg. Diane Lee. 
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nationalities, and namely, whether they are “foreign” (wailai 外來), with the 
implication being that the cabinet appointees are not Taiwan citizens.7 Professor 
Liu’s reaction to this discursive wrangling is as follows: 
Like right now, our Taiwan has a problem. This time we have Mr. Chen 
Shui-bian announcing the people in his cabinet.  . .In the past, these people 
all had U.S. citizenship. . .Today, do these people, have this kind of US 
imperialism. . .that is to say, do we consider them as being foreign. 
Because, if we thoroughly think about this…if you go investigate their 
children. They are most likely all American citizens. ((louder speech)) 
Does this count as being foreign? ((faster speech)) I believe that, if 
we…deliberate this too much we will feel that, this is really (just) a saliva 
war. It’s not worthy of you deliberating (it).8 
Professor Liu argues that to belabor whether Chen’s cabinet members are 
“foreign” bogs the discussion into a verbal quagmire. Consequently, he equates 
his call-in show colleagues’ persistent exchanges as a “saliva war,” that is, 
“arguing for the sake of arguing.” Liu emphasizes the uselessness of the debate by 
concluding that topic is “not worthy of deliberation.” 
Comparisons between the overt performance of verbal sparring and its 
concerted avoidance through consensus-building (e.g., reconciliation talk) also 
offer insightful readings into the role saliva wars play in call-in show verbal 
interactions. The following explanation by KMT news division head Lee Liguo 
(李立國), a frequent call-in show guest panelist, captures the approach-avoidance 
attitude participants have toward koushui zhan practices (Lee Liguo 2000):  
I believe that the guests who appear on call-in shows, or the moderator 
himself, they don’t necessarily hope that they only become a saliva war 
broadcaster. Because the people who appear on call-in shows, whether he9 
is a formal party representative, a scholar, or a public servant, I think that 
they all need to, during the course of a call-in show, create an image for 
                                                 
7 Excerpt from TVBS 2100: All people open talk episode that aired on April 25, 2000, entitled 
“President Lee: removing foreign political sovereignty. Is this reconciliation? Provocation? or 
ethnic relations?”  (李總統﹕終結外來政權/ 融合﹖挑撥﹖族群) 
8 Author’s emphasis in bold. For Chinese text see Appendix B, Excerpt 9. 
9 The Mandarin term “ta” (他) is translated as “he” and “him” through out the quote. 
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society. So, therefore I think no person would willingly allow himself to 
be perceived with a saliva war image.10 
Lee’s image-conscious comments highlight the ambivalent relationship call-in 
show participants have with entering into saliva wars on the programs. His 
suggestion that participants need to create an “image for society” alludes to 
providing a good example to viewers.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter on reconciliation talk, the concept 
and value of mianzi involves individuals presenting and claiming a positive social 
image for themselves through public comportment (Ting-Toomey 1988). 
Consquently, participating in saliva wars can potentially damage a panelist’s 
moral face (lian 臉) and/or social face (mianzi 面子) as viewers may regard such 
verbal behavior as socially unacceptable, and moreover, flaunting the value of 
harmony (he 和) in social interactions. In other words, they jeopardize presenting 
themselves as “buyao lian” (不要臉), meaning “not wanting or needing (moral) 
face,” or “buyao mianzi” (不要面子) or “not wanting or needing (social) face.” 
These two expressions directly condemn an individual’s lack of personal integrity 
and moral character, as well as a lack of consideration for preserving one’s 
(positive) social face, respectively (Gao 1996:94).  
Saliva wars thus involve a complex dance between maintaining and 
flouting these two Chinese sociocultural maxims. On the one hand, call-in show 
participants avoid engaging in koushui zhan as it diminishes the speaker’s prestige 
or social face, which guest panelist Lee Liguo neatly summarizes this sentiment 
when he states, “no person would willingly allow himself to be perceived with a 
saliva war image.” On the other hand, saliva wars also encourage verbal 
aggressiveness on the part of guest panelists, which some viewers enjoy. 
Consequently, some moderators may attempt to deliberately provoke a heated 
                                                 
10 Author’s emphasis in bold face type. Interview was conducted in Mandarin. Translation into 
English by author. 
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response from a panelist in order to instigate a similar reaction from another 
participant. 
Although I do not directly equate call-in show koushui zhan with Katriel’s 
(1986) study of dugri speech or “straight talk” in Israeli Sabra culture, there are 
some similarities that reveal the cultural significance of the two linguistic 
behaviors. Hebrew speakers use dugri speech to express sincerity, assertiveness, 
naturalness, and solidarity. In this sense, the linguistic practice involves “a 
conscious suspension of face-concerns so as to allow the free expression of the 
speaker’s thoughts, opinions, or preferences that might post a threat to the 
addressee” (ibid:111).11 Similar to a Hebrew speaker’s use of dugri speech, call-in 
show koushui zhan suspend the Chinese cultural values of lian (臉) or moral face 
and mianzi (面子) or social face 
Given the symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991) in Taiwan society of 
preserving and upholding one’s moral and social faces in interpersonal 
encounters, and especially in public forums, why do call-in shows encourage 
saliva wars, and more significantly, why do speakers continue to participate? 
Katriel’s (1996) finding that Arab speakers, in contrast to Hebrew speakers, use 
dugri speech to convey information truthfully without undue artifice or 
embellishments may partially explain the importance of koushui zhan on call-in 
shows in particular and in Taiwan society in general. This reading can be verified 
by Yü Fu, moderator of 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices, who characterized verbal 
disputes as confirming the call-in show’s argumentative authenticity (Yü Fu 
2000): 
Some people ask me,“ (…) on the program you fight so fiercely. Are you 
still arguing during the commercial breaks?” I say, “[The guests] are 
                                                 
11 In contrast, Arab speakers use dugri speech to demonstrate honesty and to convey information 
truthfully without concealments and embellishments. I elaborate upon this later in the chapter. 
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arguing. They are not performing for you to watch, they are really, really 
agitated.”12 
Are saliva wars then a means for Taiwan’s public figures to escape from 
the social constraints that lian and mianzi generally impose, and consequently, to 
openly voice what they really think? In other words, are call-in show koushui 
zhan exempt from maintaining moral standards and personal restraint (lian) as 
well as excused from the need to project and claim a positive social face (mianzi)?  
A better cultural explanation for the acceptance of saliva wars in public 
forums such as call-in shows, however, might be found in the narrow definition 
social harmony (hemu 和睦) carries in Chinese cultures. That is, social harmony 
mainly applies to and is bounded by the family structure (Chang 2001).13 For this 
reason, it is more acceptable to express aggression toward out-group members, 
and particularly, one’s opponents. However, the tendency to clearly distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders undermines the Confucian ideal of social harmony 
and differs from the reality of everyday life. Ironically, or perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the constraints of a deference-oriented, hierarchical society require individuals to 
“cultivate skillful forms of verbal play to compete and negotiate with, criticize, 
and even ridicule others” (ibid:159). The discourse of social harmony can thus 
intensify the need for alternative modes of (dis-)harmonious expression. For these 
reasons and others, political TV call-in shows offer Taiwan’s sociopolitical elite 
and public the opportunity to engage in speech play that criticizes and ridicules 
their leaders and peers in a way that is not only publicly sanctioned, but also 
encouraged. 
                                                 
12 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 10. 
13 The concept of “family” within Chinese society does not only refer to kinship ties, but also 
close friends and colleagues who are considered as family, as evidenced with the widespread use 
of family address titles (e.g., “aunt,” “uncle,” “brother,” or “sister”) to individuals with whom one 
has a close relationship. The terms are also used to create an “intimate” impression that the 
addressee is considered part of the “family,” namely, as a means to bridge social distance. 
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My subsequent analysis of call-in participants’ use of reported speech 
while engaged in saliva wars explores how this linguistic device both absolves 
speakers of being responsible for their reported utterances, while also providing 
them the means to evaluate other speakers’ words as well as negotiate self and 
other social and moral faces. 
SEEKING EVIDENCE AND PRESENTING SOURCES IN VERBAL DISPUTES  
In the first saliva war, I examine how participants use reported speech as a 
form of “evidentiality” (Besnier 1993), and in particular, as “the kinds of evidence 
a person has for making factual claims” (Anderson 1986:273, in Besnier 
1993:164). Evidence as evoked through reported speech is often presented as 
one’s “sources or bases” (Pomerantz 1984), whereby the direct or hypothetical 
quotation validates the individual’s “entitlement claim” to the ownership of talk 
as well as experience (Shuman 1993:135). Expanding upon my analyses in 
previous chapters, I also explore how call-in show participants as verbal 
disputants present reported speech as evidence, while at the same time clearly 
establish that they bear no responsibility for the quoted utterance and its 
connotations (Hill and Irvine 1993). 
Yet, presenting reported speech as evidence does not constitute a failsafe 
linguistic strategy as other panelists and even the moderator can challenge and 
even discount its validity. For instance, a panelist can question the character of the 
reporter and thus undermine the credibility of both the utterance and reporter. 
Moreover, speakers can judge certain forms of reported speech as being more 
believable than others. In extending my comparison of direct and indirect reported 
speech as argumentative tools, my analysis of call-in participants’ saliva wars 
confirms the finding that in comparison to direct reported speech, summary 
quotes prove to be less effective and efficient as a form of persuasion. 
Call-in participants’ speech reporting practices during saliva wars likewise 
foregrounds Du Bois’ (1986) observation that “knowledge” constitutes a social 
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phenomenon, and subsequently, derives from and is developed through social 
interaction. This finding proves particularly salient when verbal confrontations 
revolve around the issue of who is entitled to speak, and furthermore, for whom. 
Similar to Philips’ (1993) study on how U.S. courts determine “what happened” 
by relying upon highly codified and specific evidentiary standards, my 
examination of call-in show saliva wars also explores “how evidence is presented, 
what evidence can be presented (content), who can present evidence, and how 
evidence can be interpreted” (249; original italics) in order to investigate how 
participants present and contest crisis interpretations of controversial 
sociopolitical issues and events. 
The  following three saliva wars feature participants using reported speech 
to forward and defend their entitlement claims, and inversely, criticize and even 
ridicule their interlocutors’ counter-evidence. In the first example, I demonstrate 
how speech reporting can be both advantageous and detrimental to reporters in a 
saliva war-cum-character contest (Goffman 1967) as they engage in an “I-said-
you-said” verbal dispute to alternately protect their own and disparage their 
opponents’ moral face. In the second passage, I contrast the impact “snippets” of 
direct reported speech and summary quotes have as forms of evidence. In the third 
and final saliva war, I explore the demonstrative function of reported speech in 
terms of allowing call-in participants to engage in nonserious doings of serious 
actions. 
SALIVA WARS AS CHARACTER CONTESTS AND MORAL GAMES 
Goodwin’s (1982, 1990) research on how children facilitate the 
transmission of gossip and rumor through “he-said-she-said” reporting practices 
informs my analysis of the following saliva war between two legislators who 
contest rumors surrounding the PRC authorities’ reported ban of A-mei’s products 
and future concert appearances in China. Given the absence of verifiable 
information regarding the A-mei ban, the two saliva war disputants resorted to 
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presenting evidence through the voice of another in order invoke a “coherent 
domain of action…that includes identities, actions, and biographies for the 
participants within it, as well as a relevant past that justifies the current 
accusation” (190). In my analysis, I focus on the credibility of the participants’ 
allusions to past reputations, behaviors, and associations indexed in the saliva 
war, and particularly, the manner in which these verbally constructed histories 
both inform and weaken the disputants’ claims and counter-arguments. 
At the participant level, call-in show saliva wars can be regarded as 
interpersonal contests that generally involve only two speakers who present 
competing interpretations of an event or issue. Yet, aside from contesting the 
issue in question, these verbal disputes also question the disputants’ characters 
and social relationships, including those present in and absent from the call-in 
show context. Goodwin (1990) claims that argumentative practices provide 
speakers the opportunity “to display character and realign the social organization 
of the moment through opposition” (142). This understanding is similar to 
Goffman’s (1967) notion of character contests, which are “incidentally concerned 
with establishing evidence of strong character” (240). Character contests, 
moreover, only occur at the expense of other participants’ characters and not 
one’s own. However, the “field” or resource that individuals use to demonstrate 
and challenge another’s character often draws from that person’s “character 
expression” (ibid). In terms of call-in show saliva wars, I consider reported speech 
as one “field” on which participants express and establish evidence of “strong 
character.” In other words, it is through reported speech that disputants monitor, 
evaluate, and criticize the morality of another speaker and his utterances.  
Aside from being character contests, saliva wars also represent “a special 
kind of moral game” (ibid:240). Like the style of play a chess player uses, the 
linguistic strategies a speaker employs (e.g., reported speech) reveals much about 
his and other participants’ “style of conduct” in the social interaction (ibid:237). 
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My examination of the following verbal duel demonstrates how reported speech 
can both abet and hinder a speaker’s relationship claims and subsequent 
interactions. Specifically, I illustrate how speech reporting can unwittingly draw 
attention to “some of the gray areas” in the accuracy and authority of the 
presented reported utterance (Shuman 1993:136). 
“This is a misunderstanding”: sifting evidence from rumor in an “I-said-you-
said” dispute 
Taken from the third of three episodes 2100 devoted to the PRC’s ban of 
Taiwan pop singer A-mei,14 the saliva war features DPP legislator Yen Jinfu 
(顏錦福) and New Party legislator Elmer Fung (馮滬祥) as the primary 
disputants. The verbal dispute is inspired by a comment Leg. Fung had made prior 
to the actual saliva war excerpt I later analyze, in which he argues that the 
rumored A-mei ban stems from a “misunderstanding” (wujie 誤解). However, 
Leg. Yen refutes this assessment, which then initiates the eventual verbal sparring 
over what has and has not been misunderstood. Interestingly, in an impromptu 
press conference earlier that same day, A-mei had also described the ban as a 
“misunderstanding,” 2100 shows an edited segment of her remarks,15 but after the 
saliva war between Fung and Yen. The text of edited A-mei news conference can 
be found in Chapter Five.16 
The press conference captures a casually attired A-mei with a black 
baseball cap over her ponytail coiffed hair as she speaks to a waiting press corps 
at the Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) airport.17 The call-in show sound bite version 
                                                 
14 I provide background information on this incident in Chapter Five. 
15 I was present in the video editing room when this video segment was made by a 2100 
production member. The “video clip” is actually comprised for three discontinuous segments of 
A-mei’s press interview that were spliced together to form a coherent whole for the purposes of 
the program. The editing process itself represents a form of “reported speech” which I discuss in 
Chapter  Two. 
16 For the Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 2. 
17 A-mei was just returning from an overseas trip. 
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focuses on A-mei’s explanation that the invitation to sing the ROC national 
anthem at President Chen’s inauguration ceremony was “really very simple” (hen 
danchun 很單純). She explains that she performed the ROC national anthem in 
the role of a singer, thus indirectly refuting allegations that she participated in the 
event as a political activist. The crux of her comments come at the end of the 
video segment when A-mei describes the furor surrounding the PRC ban as “a 
little politicized” (you yidian zhengzhihua 有一點政治) and concludes with her 
attributing the entire incident to a “misunderstanding” (wuhui 誤會). 
In moderator Lee Tao’s program introduction, he situates A-mei’s 
“misunderstanding” interpretation as an optimistic assessment of the rumored ban. 
However, he counterbalances this positive evaluation with the sobering 
suggestion that the rumors could be the “actual situation.” I provide this portion of 
Lee Tao’s comments below: 18 
 …is it possible that Mainland China will provide a so-called goodwill 
response to allow Taiwan’s citizens to understand that this is-is an actual 
situation, or else that it is a misunderstanding. But until now what is it?19 
Aside from presenting an inherent tension between rumor and fact, Lee Tao’s 
introductory statements also establish A-mei’s “misunderstanding” remarks as the 
focus of that nigiht’s deliberations, which the program later reemphasizes by 
playing clips of her interview. However, it is possible the four guest panelists had 
already heard A-mei’s “misunderstanding” utterance before appearing on the 
program that evening on Taiwan’s 24-hour news channels throughout the day.20 
Selected as the first speaker in that night’s episode to address the PRC’s 
intentions to ban A-mei, Leg. Fung replies that according to his understanding and 
                                                 
18 The following passages of moderator Lee Tao and guest panelist Legislator Fung Hu-Hsiang 
are presented in quoted form in order to provide the content, but not a detailed analysis, of their 
remarks. 
19 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 11. 
20 It is also possible that the guests had prepared notes prior to appearing on the show after the 
producers had informed them of the evening’s topic by late afternoon. 
 269
investigations into the matter a misunderstanding has occurred. The NP legislator 
adds that Taiwan’s citizenry has also been misled by the local media coverage of 
the rumored ban. Fung next uses a hypothetical “negated quotation” (Fónagy 
1986:279)—that is, he voices what the PRC authorities have not said, not what 
they have said—to animate the voice of a PRC government department in order to 
lend greater credence to his misunderstanding interpretation. The relevant 
segment of Fung’s aforementioned remarks is as follows:21 
Ah, according to my understanding and investigations these past two days, 
ah, it is obvious that there is a misunderstanding here. So then there is also 
a misunderstanding on the Mainland. Ah, A-mei—So what we have 
here—Taiwan’s readers and viewers ah, from the media coverage, also 
have partly misunderstood. Because a counterpart department on the 
Mainland, they actually haven’t said, ah, “Because A-mei sang the 
Republic of China national anthem, therefore, we will ban her songs, we 
will ban her commercials.” Rather it is their overall impression that has 
misconstrued A-mei as supporting Taiwan independence, as supporting 
Chen Shui-bian, as praising him. So then, we of course must clarify this 
misunderstanding in order to get to the truth.22 
In the saliva war passage between legislators Fung and Yen that follows, 
Fung’s representation of the PRC through hypothetical reported speech becomes a 
point of contention when DPP legislator Yen Ching-fu recalls and questions the 
utterance. Specifically, Leg. Yen challenges Fung’s declaration that Taiwan’s 
readers and viewers are partly to blame for the so-called “misunderstanding.” The 
resulting saliva war evolves into an accusation and denial sequence between the 
two legislators and is filled with direct and indirect references to Leg. Fung’s 
remarks as presented above. 
My analysis concentrates on how Leg. Yen discounts the NP legislator’s 
entitlement claims of insider PRC knowledge by recalling a “snippet” (Clark and 
Gerrig 1990) of Fung’s original utterance. I approach my analysis of this saliva 
                                                 
21 I underline the negated preface to the hypothetical quotation for easier identification. 
22 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 12. 
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war as a character contest that involves the two legislators in a vituperative “I-
said-you-said” exchange as each disputant alternately defends their own and 
challenges the other’s allegiance to Taiwan. The saliva war ends when moderator 
Lee Tao interrupts to announce a commercial break. The dyadic verbal 
confrontation spans 23 turns of talk (12 turns for Yen, and 11 turns for Feng). I 
present most of the exchange below. 
Transc.7.1: “Now you have misunderstood” 
1 Yen 不過 我不讚同 However I don’t agree with this  
2  這個馮滬祥 先生他-- Mr. Fung Hu-hsiang his— 
3  一直的解釋說﹐ persistent explanation that,  
4  這個是誤解。  this is a misunderstanding.  
5  (…) (…)23 
6  我覺得這坐在 I feel that sitting here 
7  旁邊的是不是國- at my side is this a Kuo-24 
8  中共的哈﹐代言人哈。 Communist China ah, spokesperson ah. 
 Feng {speaking quickly} {speaking quickly} 
9  這個﹕扣帽子 This is: an act of labeling. (You are 
labeling me.) 
10 Yen [不是﹐不是-]  [No, no-] 25 
 Feng {spoken quickly} {spoken quickly} 
11  [就不夠理性。] [This is unreasonable.] 
12 Yen [不是﹐我不] [no, I’m not] 
13  口帽子。 labeling (you). 
 Feng {speaking quickly and 
loudly} 
{speaking quickly and loudly} 
14  [我講得是事實的啊。] [I’ve been telling the truth.] 
15 Yen [因為你解釋﹐] [Because your explanation , ] 
16  如果今天是一個事實﹐ if this is true today, 
17  沒錯﹐ correct, 
18  應該這幾天 (then) these past few days  
19  中共當局 Communist China’s authorities  
                                                 
23 Skipped text. 
24 It appears that the partial word “Kuo” represents the first character for “Kuomintang” or the 
Nationalist Party. See text for a more detailed analysis. 
25 Indicates overlapping speech with the following two lines of Yen’s utterance (lines 6-7). 
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20  要馬上跟  should have immediately  
21  我們這裡回應嘛 … responded to us on this... 
 Fung {speaking quickly} {speaking quickly} 
22  [它已經否認了] [It has already denied (it)] 
23 Yen [它沒有﹐eh﹐它沒有。。] [It didn’t, eh, it didn’t..]   
24 Fung [。。國臺辦 [..the Taiwan Affairs Office and the 
25  海協會  Association for Relations Across  
26  都否認了。] the Taiwan Straits both denied it.] 
27 Yen [它如果否認了時候﹐] [But if and when it had denied it, ] 
28  那應該說 then they should have said  
29  你剛才講的﹐ what you just said, 
30  阿妹那項在可口可樂 “A-mei’s Coca-Cola  
31  的宣傳﹐ advertisement”— 
32  那它也﹐ so it also,  
33  真的把它禁止了嘛。 really did ban it. 
34 Fung [你-- [You--]  
35 Yen [對﹐] [Right, ] 
36 Fung 所以唱片沒有禁止 阿] so no records26 were banned 
37 Yen 對﹐那麼就是說 right, then that is to say it 
38  有一陣禁止﹐ was banned for a period of time,  
39  那麼如果說 then if let’s say  
40  它每一樣都沒有禁止﹐ that it didn’t ban every item,  
41  那麼我們今天在這裡 then today if it is 
42  是我們是誤解嘛。 we who have misunderstood.  
43  那這個不能是誤解。 So this cannot be a misunderstanding. 
44  那事實上已經做了嘛。 So in actuality it has already been done.  
45  [那麼做了後﹐後來— ] [So after doing it, afterwards—] 
 Fung {speaking quickly } {speaking quickly} 
46  [(xx) 做了﹐我們要 [(xx)27 was doing, we need to  
47  看他們的政策。] look at their policy.] 
48  是不是它的 Did the order (command) come  
49  [命令.] [from them (it).] 
50 Yen [所以] [Therefore] 
51  你不必要﹐  you don’t need to, 
52  你應該--要是這個非常 you should--if this is deliberated very 
53  公正理性 的來講﹐ fairly and reasonably,  
                                                 
26 Refers to compact discs. 
27 Unintelligible speech. 
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54  而你不能自己說﹐啊, then you yourself cannot say, ah, 
55  在那邊 講了那麼多﹐ having already said so much over there,  
56  [因為﹐ 全台-] [because, all of Tai-] 
 Fung {speaking quickly} {speaking quickly} 
57  [我沒有替他們講話。] [I do not speak for them.] 
58  我也講說這是  錯的。 I have also said that this is wrong. 
 Yen {louder speech} {louder speech} 
59  [你﹐你現在, 你現在, [You, now you, now you, 
60  你現在=] now you=28] 
 Fung {speaking quickly, louder} {speaking quickly with louder speech} 
61  [請你用理性。] [Please (you) use reason.] 
62  [不要扣帽子。] [Don’t label (me).] 
63 Yen [=說他們誤解啊。] [=say that they have misunderstood..]  
64  我們﹐阿﹐那你- We, ah, then you— 
65  我們整個台灣人就是 are all of us Taiwanren  
66  通通那麼沒有智慧嗎﹖ without any intelligence whatsoever?  
67  通通把人家 Have (we) completely29 
68  誤解了嗎﹖ misunderstood them?                                     
69  那我們也是經過—  So we have also gone through— 
70  各方面﹐阿﹐得來真正 all kinds of, ah, received true  
71  的消息嘛﹐那麼﹐ and accurate information, so,  
72  我們台灣人 Us Taiwanren 
73  現在的憤慨﹐ (our) current anger , 
74  我們的憤怒﹐是不是 our current indignation, is it also  
75  也是  我們沒有理性﹐ because we are not being reasonable,  
76  我們一直在誤解﹐ that we have continuously misunderstood, 
77  你不能用這樣的話來說。 you can’t say these kinds of things. 
78  (xxxx)  (xxxx)30 
79  我們通通誤解掉了。 (that) we have completely misunderstood. 
 Fung {speaking rapidly} {speaking rapidly} 
80  我想您扣帽子 I think that your act of labeling,31  
82  [就是誤解。] [is a misunderstanding.] 
83 Yen [沒有﹐ 沒有﹐ ] [No, no,] 
                                                 
28 The “=” refers to continuous, unbroken (unpaused) speech. 
29 The Chinese term “renjia” (人家) can also be translated as “others” but in this context “them” 
provided a more colloquial reading in English. 
30 Unintelligible speech. 
31 Fung uses the plural or formal (polite) form of “you” (您) here. 
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84  我們沒有扣帽子。 we haven’t been labeling (you). 
85  因為你-因為你講, Because you-because you have spoken, 
86  [解釋的太清楚了。] [explained (everything) so clearly.] 
 LT {speaking loudly} {speaking loudly} 
87  [我們稍後再進行。 [We will continue in a moment. 
88  謝謝。] Thank you.] 
The saliva war begins with Leg. Yen directly stating that he doesn’t agree 
with Leg. Fung’s assessment that the PRC ban of A-mei is a misunderstanding 
(lines 1-4). In revoicing Fung’s “misunderstanding” utterance (see previous 
quoted passage), the DPP legislator revoices and editorializes a snippet of Fung’s 
statement. Holt (1999) claims that reported speech is “bivalent” and “can be used 
to fulfill a range of tasks in the current conversation” (ibid:527). In this example, 
Fung’s “misunderstanding” utterance carries not just bivalent, but multivalent 
meanings. Aside from indexing A-mei’s earlier “misunderstanding” utterance, the 
two legislators’ separate reportings of the pop star’s original utterance throughout 
the verbal dispute function as the following: (1) an entitlement claim by the NP 
legislator that he has insider knowledge regarding the A-mei ban; (2) counter-
evidence as used by Leg. Yen to demonstrate that Fung has suspiciously close 
relations with PRC authorities; and (3) a trope for Yen’s and Fung’s “I-said-you-
said” dispute that revolves around who has misunderstood, and inversely, has 
been misunderstood by, whom.  
Following Leg. Yen’s voiced disagreement to Fung’s analysis of the A-
mei/PRC situation, Yen proceeds to disparage Fung by rhetorically asking 
whether he is seated next to a spokesperson for the Communist Chinese 
government (lines 6-8).32 Leg. Yen’s open questioning of Leg. Fung’s loyalty to 
Taiwan causes the New Party legislator to immediately protest Yen’s “act of 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that DPP legislator Yen began to refer to the New Party Legislator as a 
“Kuomintang” (Nationalist Party) spokesperson (line 7), but quickly amended his speech to 
“Communist China.” Leg. Fung was originally a KMT party member, but left the party along with 
several other KMT defectors to found the New Party in 1994. 
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labeling” (kou maozi 扣帽子) (line 9). Leg. Fung then declares that Yen’s 
accusation is “unreasonable” (line 11) and emphasizes that he has been telling the 
truth (line 14). In response to these counterarguments, Leg. Yen denies that he is 
labeling the New Party legislator (lines 10, 12-13). 
 
Figure 13: DPP Legislator Yen Jinfu and New Party Legislator Elmer Fung (Fung Hu-
hsiang) engage in an “I-said-you-said” saliva war while addressing whether the PRC’s 
ban of Taiwan pop star A-mei is a “misunderstanding.” 
Although I have translated Leg. Fung’s counter-accusation as, “This is 
labeling” or “You are labeling me” (line 9),33 a direct translation of this phrase 
would be “to put a hat on (someone)” (kou maozi 扣帽子). Interestingly, this 
descriptive turn of phrase captures the tenor of the two disputants’ 
“misunderstanding” saliva war. As I later illustrate, the more stringently Leg. Yen 
attempts to discredit Leg. Fung’s labeling of the PRC ban of A-mei as a 
“misunderstanding,” the more adamant Fung becomes in his repeated accusations 
that Yen is labeling him in return. Thus, the “act of labeling” or “putting on of 
                                                 
33 A more colloquial translation might be, “You’re labeling me.” However, as the Chinese phrase 
Leg. Fung uses does not have an overt subject (e.g. ‘you’) and object (e.g. ‘me’), I decided to 
represent the phrase in the passive voice. 
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hats” is and reciprocated by both parties and represents the crux of the “I-said-
you-said” saliva war. 
In returning to the topic of the disagreement, the A-mei ban, it is important 
to recall that the ban was based primarily on hearsay given that Taiwan’s mass 
media and government had little information on which to base the rumored act. 
Philips (1993) describes “hearsay” as “anything said by another that the witness 
heard said” (254). Hence, with the PRC authorities offering neither verification 
nor denial of the rumored ban,34 Leg. Yen challenges Leg. Fung to provide 
concrete evidence for his interpretation that the alleged ban is a 
“misunderstanding.” Goodwin (1982) notes that in rumors, “the principal 
character in the story is a party who is not present” (804). Given that the principal 
figure in this narrative is the PRC authorities, it is interesting to note that Leg. 
Yen strategically establishes Leg. Fung as a “proxy” voice for Communist China 
(lines 6-8). 
Once Yen has named the New Party legislator as the PRC’s spokesperson, 
the onus now lies with Fung to present the requisite evidence to confirm or refute 
the alleged ban. Thus the NP legislator attempts to do so by declaring that the 
PRC has already denied the ban (line 22). When Yen refuses to accept Fung’s 
claim (line 23), Fung quickly lists two PRC agencies—the Taiwan Affairs Office 
(國臺辦) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) 
(海協會)35—as the principle sources for his informed assertion (lines 24-26). 
                                                 
34 Some would argue that the PRC government and media are one and the same. 
35 Given the lack of formal and official interactions between the ROC and PRC, what limited 
contact the two entities do have occur through “non official” agencies or organizations. ARATS 
represents the PRC government agency that interacts with the ROC’s non-profit organization, the 
Taiwan Straits Foundation (TSF). Wang Daohan (汪道涵) is the chair of ARATS while Koo 
Chen-fu (辜振甫) is the chair of TSF. The last time the two men met was in China in the fall of 
1994. The ROC government has extended several invitations to Wang to visit Taiwan, but each 
proposal has been postponed for one reason or another. 
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However, in so doing, Leg. Fung confirms Yen’s earlier accusation that the New 
Party legislator represents the PRC’s spokesperson. 
Yet, Leg. Fung’s tactic also allows him to defend his “misunderstanding” 
interpretation as well as to convince Leg. Yen (and other listeners) that his 
information regarding the A-mei ban is accurate and legitimate (Pomerantz 1984). 
As the sources Fung name are recognizable and authoritative PRC government 
divisions, Yen does not question Fung’s claim. Rather, Yen undermines Fung’s 
credibility through a different tactic by strategically recalling a “snippet” (Clark 
and Gerrig 1990) or “sketchy reenactment” (Haberland 1986) of Fung’s earlier 
hypothetical utterance, which I introduced before the saliva war excerpt. Yen thus 
recalls the hypothetical utterance (“’A-mei’s Coca-Cola advertisement”, lines 30-
31) to argue that if Fung’s “misunderstanding” interpretation is correct then the 
PRC authorities “should have said what you just said” (lines 27-29). 
By strategically reappropriating Fung’s hypothetical voicing of the PRC, 
Yen exposes the “gray areas” (Shuman 1993:136) in the NP legislator’s portrayal 
of and authority to speak for the PRC. In fact, Leg. Yen elaborates upon his early 
suspicion that Fung is a spokesperson for Communist China (lines 6-8) by 
evaluating Leg. Fung as an unreliable source whose version of the events 
surrounding the alleged A-mei ban is questionable. Combined with Fung’s earlier 
introduction of a hypothetical negated quotation—recall that he depicted what the 
PRC did not say, not what they did say—the New Party legislator’s entitlement 
claim appears even more dubious such that it now reads as a “guess or inference” 
(Pomerantz 1984:624). 
Leg. Fung attempts to regain this loss of social face or mianzi (面子) to his 
personal character and political credibility by providing the DPP legislator with 
supplementary evidence that a “misunderstanding” has indeed occurred, namely, 
that A-mei’s records (i.e., compact discs) have not been banned in China (line 
30). Although Yen concedes that perhaps not all of A-mei’s records were banned, 
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he continues to undermine Fung’s credibility by presenting an even more reliable 
source, namely, the people of Taiwan (line 42). Leg. Yen emphasizes the 
citizenry’s credibility, and thus accurate interpretation of the ban, by stating it is 
impossible that “we (the people of Taiwan)…have misunderstood” (line 42) and 
therefore the ban “could not have been a misunderstanding” (line 44). Here, the 
DPP legislator’s direct comparison of Fung and the people of Taiwan overtly 
evaluates each source as either “good or bad,” an evaluation that subsequently 
“bears on whether the version in question is believed or not” (Pomerantz 
1984:624). In short, by alluding that Fung’s negated quotation is at best “hearsay” 
(Philips 1993), and hypothetical at best, Yen strategically establishes Fung to be a 
“bad” source and “we” the Taiwan citizenry as a “good” source and thus 
believable. 
In the second half of the passage, the saliva war intensifies considerably 
when Fung takes personal affront to Yen’s oblique disparagement of another 
aspect of his character, in this case, his “moral face” or lian (臉). Specifically, the 
DPP legislator criticizes Fung by declaring that the A-mei ban needs to be 
“deliberated very fairly and reasonably” (lines 53). Leg. Yen’s statement 
disparages Fung’s moral face by blatantly suggesting that the NP legislator has no 
political mores given his loyalty to the PRC. The DPP legislator supports his 
accusation of Fung’s suspect intimacy or “closeness” (qin 親) with the PRC by 
drawing attention to Fung’s linguistic behavior, in this case, his conversations 
with PRC authorities “over there” (nebian 那邊) (line 55). 
At this point, it is necessary to recall that Taiwan’s political continuum 
(from right to left) ranges from China reunification to Taiwan independence 
ideologies. In this environment, New Party is regarded as the political party that 
advocates reunification the most, and therefore, is considered to be “close to 
Mainland China” (qin dalu 親大陸). Furthermore, pro-Taiwan independence 
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advocates, such as the DPP, frequently warn Taiwan’s populace that the New 
Party will “sell out Taiwan” (chumai Taiwan 出賣台灣) to the PRC in pursuit of 
unifying the two “Chinas.” In contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party occupies 
the opposite end of this ideological spectrum with its party constitution listing 
Taiwan independence as one of its platforms.36 
Thus Leg. Yen introduces the NP legislator’s “relevant past,” including 
Fung’s frequent trips to the PRC and his pro-unification political stance, provides 
further verification of his disparagement of Leg. Fung’s political agenda given the 
current cross-straits “crisis” and dispute (Goodwin 1990:190). Fung, however, 
contests Yen’s defamation of both his personal character and political image by 
declaring, “I am not speaking for them [the PRC authorities]. I have also said this 
[the A-mei ban] is wrong” (lines 57-58). The NP legislator’s sudden admission 
that the PRC’s recent actions are wrong seeks to both regain his moral face (lian) 
and improve his social face (mianzi) by realigning his assessment of the A-mei 
ban with the majority of Taiwan’s citizenry, and more importantly, to demonstrate 
that he allies himself with Taiwan. In her study of children’s verbal disputes, 
Goodwin (1990) explains that when charged with an offense, defendants often 
“attempt to restore the expressive order by reframing the event being challenged” 
(207). Here, Leg. Fung attempts to do so by reframing Leg. Yen’s interpretations 
of his political behavior and personal values. 
The saliva war’s sudden change in direction from debating the PRC’s A-
mei ban to Legislator Fung’s political bias towards the PRC represents a 
“metacommunicative shift in discourse” that indexes a move “from the topic of 
conversation to conversation as a topic” (Shuman 1993:155). By shifting the 
verbal dispute’s focus, Yen effectively undermines both Fung’s credibility as a 
                                                 
36 As previously stated in Chapter Three, since becoming the ruling party, the DPP under 
President Chen Shui-bian has moderated its pro-independence stance in order to maintain stability 
in cross-straits relations as well as in Taiwan’s domestic sphere. Consequently, the Taiwan 
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politician concerned with Taiwan’s welfare and casts aspersions on his 
entitlement claims to insider PRC knowledge of the A-mei ban. In her 
observations of fight stories among female high school students, Shuman notes 
that one’s proximity to an event relies more on “entitlement rather than accuracy” 
(ibid). Although Yen doesn’t challenge the accuracy of Fung’s alleged 
information, he does question the NP legislator’s acquisition of it. In this case, the 
NP legislator’s knowledge claims as presented through a hypothetical and negated 
quotation (e.g., “they did not say”) serves as a liability rather than an asset in this 
saliva war. 
Leg. Fung’s defensive “I have also said” rebuttal (line 57) initiates a 
modified version of a “he-said-she-said” verbal dispute (Goodwin 1982, 1990), or 
what this study considers to be an “I-said-you-said” saliva war. In response, Leg. 
Yen provides the second pair part (Sacks et al. 1974), that is, the “you said” 
component, to this dispute sequence by referring back (lines 59-60) to what the 
New Party legislator said earlier in the discussion. In turn, Fung reciprocates with 
another accusation by protesting, “(You) please use reason” (line 61).  
However, Yen responds to Fung’s call for “reason” (lixing 理性) as an 
offense to the moral face (lian 聯) of “all of us Taiwanren” (line 65).37 
Furthermore, in interpreting Fung’s call for “reason” as a criticism of “us 
Taiwanren’s” lack of “intelligence” (line 66), Legislator Yen privileges the 
emotional “anger” and “indignation” (lines 73-74) that “us Taiwanren” feel 
toward the PRC as a result of the A-mei ban, and subsequently, establishes it as 
being more authentic than any “reasoning” Fung could offer.  
                                                                                                                                     
Solidarity Union (TSU), which was established after the 2000 presidential election, now 
represents the most vocal advocate for Taiwan independence. 
37 It is noteworthy that Yen uses “Taiwanren” (台灣人) rather than the more exclusionary 
benshengren (本省人) here, which suggests that Yen is making an attempt to include both 
benshengren and waishengren through a collective “all of us” identifier. 
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The saliva war returns to the earlier “I-said-you-said” format when Fung 
states that Yen’s act of labeling is itself a misunderstanding (lines 80-82). 
However, Leg. Yen manages to have the “last word” before the commercial 
break, by again denying that he or anyone else (e.g., “we”) is labeling the New 
Party legislator (line 84). Moreover, Yen summarizes his argument through 
another reference to Fung’s remarks by claiming that Fung has explained his 
position so well that he has established his own complicity with the PRC 
authorities irrespective of Yen’s accusations (lines 85-86).  
Recalling Rymes’ (1996) observation that naming constitutes a social 
practice that has “multiple generations of meanings,” this saliva war over who is 
labeling whom, and specifically, who is misunderstanding of has been 
misunderstood by whom, illustrates the degree to which an act of labeling or the 
“putting on of hats” is actively resisted and contested by the accused and the 
alleged accusers. The multiple generations of labeling that arises in this saliva war 
includes present parties, namely, legislators Yen and Fung, as well as absent 
entities such as the PRC and A-mei. Subsequently, while this verbal dispute 
confirms the observation that labeling represents a “socially significant and 
contested practice” (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1995), however, this analysis 
finds that acts of labeling are “endowed” (ibid) with as much, if not more, 
meaning in rumored situations and with alleged perpetrators as they are in “real” 
events and with “real” persons. 
In summary, this saliva war between legislators Yen and Fung 
corroborates Shuman’s (1993) observation that “he-said-she-said” routines do not 
necessarily lead to diplomacy, but rather are incorporated into a fight sequence 
(155-56). In the present “I-said-you-said” saliva war, the two disputants 
abandoned “rational” language and “reasonable” methods in favor of denigrating 
each other’s characters (e.g., moral face (lian 臉) and social face (mianzi 面子)) 
and refuting each other’s entitlement claims and evidentiality. These labeling and 
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counter-labeling practices thus contributed to heightening rather than redressing 
the crisis topic, namely, the A-mei ban. Moreover, given that the ban was based 
largely on rumor and gossip where evidence and entitlement claims were highly 
negotiable, the legislators’ calculated use of hypothetical negated quotations and 
“snippets” of direct reported speech respectively, illustrates the interactive and 
collaborative construction of social knowledge. 
My examination of this saliva war sequence demonstrates that reported 
speech can both reveal and conceal information. In other words, speech reporting 
is vulnerable to “leakage” such that interlocutors can “‘see through” the framing 
of a reported incident (Hill and Irvine 1993:13). In this exchange, Leg. Yen is 
able to “thin out” Leg. Fung’s hypothetical negated quotation and “distribute” his 
alternative interpretation to successfully refute Fung’s evidentiality claims and 
interpretations (ibid:13). In sum, this d dispute highlights that “firsthand 
experience” and knowledge is not an observable “fact” but rather a negotiated, 
socialized phenomenon (Shuman 1993:150). 
A SALIVA WAR BETWEEN “SNIPPET” AND SUMMARY QUOTES 
In the second saliva war excerpt, I analyze a dispute between three guest 
speakers in an 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices episode entitled, “Should Vice 
President Lu be recalled?” As introduced in Chapter Five, the program topic 
addresses Vice President Annette Lu’s linguistic behavior, and in particular, her 
use of the terms “black face” (bad cop) and “white face” (good cop) in reference 
to herself and President Chen Shui-bian, respectively.  
The following verbal dispute illustrates that in the rapid dialogue of saliva 
wars, the use of brief reported speech allow disputants to efficiently recall an 
individual, event, or context. The saliva war also demonstrates how even 
“snippets” of reported speech can enhance solidarity between call-in participants 
and viewers. In this case, a participant’s careful selection of key portions of an 
utterance assumes and emphasizes a shared perspective with listeners (Clark and 
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Gerrig 1990:793) as well as engages them in collaborative “sense-making” of the 
original utterance (Tannen 1989). Inversely, the following verbal dispute also 
demonstrates how the use of indirect reported speech or “summary quotes” 
(Buttny and Williams 2000) dilutes a message’s content, and moreover, the 
speaker’s credibility. As a result, use of summary quotes leaves the speaker 
vulnerable to disbelief and ridicule, and thus, undermining the proffered evidence. 
This saliva war likewise investigates the notion of harmony in Chinese-
based cultures, and specifically, the manner in which speakers resort to creative 
forms of speech play when criticizing and even ridiculing others (Chang 2001). In 
the excerpt, KMT legislator Chen Shei-saint (陳學聖) and PFP legislator Chou 
Hsi-wei (周錫瑋) use snippets of reported speech to not only criticize the topic’s 
principle figure, VP Lu, but also ridicule both the vice president and another 
panelist, Ms. Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯), presented earlier in Chapter Five. Through 
repetition and speech reporting, the two legislators succeed in discrediting Ms 
Peng’s suggestion that VP Lu is a victim of mass media and political 
machinations. However, the legislators’ argumentative success also derives in part 
from Ms. Peng’s vaguely framed claims, which she presents through indirect 
reported speech.38 
“What do you mean, smearing?”: revoicing and ridiculing summary 
evidence 
The following saliva war begins with KMT legislator Chen Shei-saint 
questioning who Vice President Lu’s heilian/bailian analogy references and 
evaluates her choice of words as being inappropriate given her elected position. In 
comparison, Ms. Peng has difficulty convincing her fellow participants that 
                                                 
38 See Chapter Five for a more detailed analysis of Ms. Peng’s frequent use of indirect rather than 
direct reported speech in her arguments. For examples, see Appendix B, Excerpts 4 and 5. 
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Taiwan’s mass media has maligned or mohei (抹黑),39 meaning to “smear black,” 
Lu’s image. Following this declaration, both legislators Chen and Chou 
laughingly echo Peng’s “mohei” utterance. In turn, moderator Yu Fu asks Peng to 
clarify her statement. Peng, however, fails to provide concrete evidence to support 
her claim, which causes the legislators to ridicule Peng’s unsubstantiated 
suggestion. Once again, Peng is stymied from convincing her interlocutors of her 
argument, which I attribute to her reliance on summary quotes rather than direct 
reported speech as a form of evidentiality. 
Transc. 7.2: “I’m not smearing her” 
1 Chen 我-我要請教 I—I want to ask 
2  彭秘書長 general manager Peng 
3  一件事情。 one thing. 
4  那-那﹐黑臉 So-so, black face 
5  這個三個字 (.) these three words.40 (.) 
6  是什麼意思﹐ What does it mean,  
7  你會告訴我們﹖ can you tell us?  
8  如果這是一個玩笑﹐ If this is a joke, 
9  那想傳出去﹐ that will be disseminated, 
10  這是什麼樣﹖ what kind of thing is this? 
11  [那誰扮白臉﹖ [So who plays the white face? 
12 Peng [我覺得這裡特別 [(I feel that) here there are  
13  有很多(詮釋)。 a lot of (interpretations). 
14 Chen 對。那你可不可以 Right. So can you 
15  告訴我們。 tell us (what they are). 
16 Peng [對。譬如說-- [Right. For example-- 
17 Chen [她-她--指是誰 [She-she- who does she refer 
18  在扮-- to that’s playing-- 
19 Peng [譬如說女人﹐ [for example women, 
20 Chen [白臉﹖ [the white face? 
21 Peng 她-這些-- she- these things— 
22  我們大家都在— we are all— 
                                                 
39 Ms. Peng’s choice of words is ironic, given that the panelists are currently deliberating whether 
VP Lu has smeared President Chen with a “white face” label. 
40 Leg. Chen misspoke here. See analysis below. 
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23  我們大家都在抹黑她﹐ we’re all smearing her, 
24  我們都在強迫她— we’re all forcing her— 
25 Chou [抹黑她 {laughingly} [Smearing her. {laughingly} 
26 Peng [扮這些— [to play these— 
27 Chou [抹黑她 {laughingly} [Smearing her. {laughingly} 
28 Chen 我不是抹黑她。 I’m not smearing her. 
29  {laughter} {laughter} 
30 Peng {loudly} 所有的人— {loudly} All people— 
31  我覺得﹐不管是 I feel, whether it 
32  [媒體= [is the media = 
33 YF [這麼說﹐抹黑呢﹖ [What do you mean, smearing? 
34 Peng =或者是男性 = or whether it is male 
35  政治人物= politicians= 
36 YF 是。 Right. 
37 Peng =基本上﹐都﹐是一種﹐ = basically, all, are kind of, 
38  有一點(xxxx)﹐ have a little (xxxx),41 
39  嘲諷的態度 sarcastic type of attitude 
40 Chou 我沒有。  I don’t. 
41 Peng 對待 towards 
42  [他的﹐ [her, 
43 Chou [我-我-完全不能同意 [I-I- completely disagree 
44  (這樣子。) (with this) . 
45 Peng 她的發言。 her words. 
46 Chen {laughs} {laughs} 
The KMT legislator begins his comments by immediately 
recontextualizing VP Lu’s black face/white face utterance a manner that alters its 
situated use (e.g., within the context of the women’s conference) and “immediate 
interactional goal” (Tannen 1989:105). In his study of language and persuasion, 
Sornig (1989) states that “it is not the verifiable truth of a message which is 
relevant and likely to impress an audience…[but rather] it is the way things are 
said (or done), irrespective of the amount of genuine information carried by an 
utterance” (95; original italics). Hence, by questioning whether Lu’s 
                                                 
41 The insertion of (xxx) represents unintelligible speech. 
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helian/bailian utterance as a joke (lines 8-10), Leg. Chen succeeds in negatively 
framing both the utterance and speaker. 
 
Figure 14: Ms. Peng Yen-wen and KMT Legislator Chen Shei-saint engage in a 
saliva war regading VP Annette Lu’s controversial “black face/white face” 
utterance. The text on the screen below their images show the results of a phone-
in poll asking, “Scholars recommend recalling the vice president, do you?” Most 
callers agree with the recall vote. 
In decontextualizing VP Lu’s remarks through selective depiction, the 
KMT legislator does not produce a passive act of “reporting” per se, but rather 
“an active one of creating an entirely new and different speech act, using the 
‘reported’ one as source material” (Clark and Gerrig 1990:108). In this case, the 
KMT legislator recreates Lu’s “black face/white face” utterance as a joke and 
demands to know who plays the “white face” in her analogy (lines 8-11). Leg. 
Chen’s inaccurate reference to “black face” or heilian (黑臉) as “these three 
words” (lines 4-7), rather than two, provides further evidence of how his 
revoicing of this “snippet” of Lu’s original utterance represents a recreation.42  
                                                 
42 The three words Leg. Chen refers to could be “ban heilian” (扮黑臉), which means “to play the 
black face” or “to play the bad cop.” 
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In attempting to respond to Leg. Chen’s question, Ms. Peng finds her 
words overlapping with those of the KMT legislator, and specifically, his double 
repetition of the question “who plays the white face?” (lines 11, 17, 20). Although 
she initially attempts to present her interpretation from a female perspective (line 
19), Peng abruptly changes tactics mid-sentence to declare that “we’re all 
smearing her, we’re all forcing her” (lines 22-24). Before she has time to expand 
upon her interpretation, Peng’s comment is interrupted by PFP Legislator Chou 
Hsi-wei’s incredulous laughter and repetitions of Peng’s “smearing her” remark 
(lines 25, 27), which is closely followed by Leg. Chen’s equally skeptical laughter 
and outright denial that he isn’t besmirching VP Lu (line 28). 
Tannen (1989) reports that the use of repetition reveals a speaker’s attitude 
towards an utterance and the ongoing discourse. In this instance, Leg. Chou and 
Leg. Chen’s repetition of Peng’s “parts of prior talk” appear “not as mindless 
mimics,” but rather as creations of new and even reverse meanings (ibid:96). Leg. 
Chou’s mocking echoes of “smearing her,” which he voices not once but twice, 
reframes the utterance such that it departs from Peng’s original use and serious 
presentation. In this sense, Leg. Chou’s facetitous revoicings represent ironic 
distortions or “twisted quotations” (Fónagy 1986: 281-2). The PFP legislator’s 
parody of Peng’s “smearing her” remark also condenses and exaggerates the 
utterance’s surface form, as well as completely alters and even reverses its 
contextual meaning. In effect, Chou’s reported speech “parodying” ridicules 
rather than merits Peng’s statement (ibid). Similarly, Leg. Chen’s denial of 
smearing (“I’m not smearing her,” line 28) further undercuts Peng’s mohei 
uttearance and its accusatory clout.  
Moreover, Legislators Chen and Chou’s repetitious revoicing of 
“smearing” three times in rapid succession reshapes Peng’s remark to “set up a 
paradigm” for a new application (Tannen 1989:48). In fact, by the time moderator 
Yu Fu seeks clarification from Peng for her pronouncement (line 33), his query 
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inadvertently validates the two legislators’ alternative mohei paradigm as a 
dubious and ungrounded declaration as well as introduces another one in the form 
of a query. Although the three speakers individually and separately reiterate 
Peng’s mohei utterance, their revoicings collectively rob Peng of her argument 
and even her original use of the word. 
Following these unfavorable reactions, Ms. Peng attempts to clarify her 
remarks (lines 30-32) by claiming that the media (line 32) and male politicians 
(lines 34-5) have a “sarcastic type of attitude” (lines 34-35) toward Vice President 
Lu. Her vague depiction, however, undermines her credibility. Here, the absence 
of direct reported speech to evidentiate her argument through demonstrations 
(Clark and Gerrig 1990), vividness (Tannen 1989), or sources and bases 
(Pomerantz 1984) weakens Peng’s argument. Moreover, Peng leaves herself 
vulnerable to criticism by not displacing responsibility for her assessment through 
a direct quotation (Shuman 1993). As a result, her co-participants exhibit 
disbelief, express denial, seek clarification, and display mockery to her assertion. 
Pomerantz (1984) observes that providing sources for one’s claims represents an 
attempt to defend one’s perspective as well as to convince others that one’s view 
is correct. Thus for Peng to omit such information, she unwittingly presents her 
mohei declaration as unsubstantiated, and moreover, herself as having no 
credibility. 
I also consider Peng’s reliance on summary quotes as an argumentative 
style as being representative of “powerless” language use. This reading contrasts 
with Buttny’s (1997) observation that the use of direct reported speech to contest, 
challenge, or criticize problematic events reflects the speaker’s “sense of 
powerlessness” for being unable to affect change or improve her immediate 
environmental conditions (e.g., race relations) (502). However, my evaluation of 
Peng’s speech reporting practices supports Álvarez-Cáccamo’s (1996) finding 
that users of direct quotations achieve “conversational power” through “the 
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dialectic relationship between reporter and audience in the negotiation of the 
definition of the reported speech” (56). In this saliva war, Legislators Chen and 
Chou wield more conversational power than Peng by successfully revoicing and 
reframing her mohei utterance through twisted quotations. My analysis also draws 
from Lakoff’s (1982) understanding that power derives from the speaker who can 
“motivate the discourse in a certain direction, [as well as] begin or terminate it 
explicitly” (32). In short, this verbal dispute demonstrates that even “snippets” of 
direct reported speech have greater influence in maneuvering the course of call-in 
show saliva wars—including their initiation, direction, and termination—than 
indirect reported speech.  
Lastly, this saliva war passage illustrates how call-in participants use 
reported speech to openly criticize and ridicule other speakers while still 
upholding the social more of maintaining interactional harmony (Chang 2001). I 
interpret the call-in participants’ momentary display of disharmony as consistent 
with distinctions between in-group versus out-group behavior. To elaborate, Ms. 
Peng’s accusation that male legislators and the media had denigrated VP Lu 
created a division between herself and her co-participants along two lines. Most 
obviously, the remark distinguished and distanced Ms. Peng from her co-
participants in terms of gender. Second, as a representative from a non-profit 
organization, Peng was also marked as the sole non-politician/legislator on the 
panel. Thus by launching the “mohei” accusation, Peng established a “me/you” 
dichotomy between herself and her male co-participants.  
Moreover, by violating the social and moral faces of her colleagues first, 
Peng’s targets retaliated in kind by mocking her accusations and causing her to 
lose social face on the program. Interestingly, her male co-panelsits used Peng’s 
own words in the form of twisted quotations to reverse her finger pointing back 
onto herself. Finally, by not couching her remarks within the guise of direct 
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reported speech, Peng alone was accountable for her remarks and thus left herself 
vulnerable to rebuke from the other participants. 
SALIVA WARS AS NONSERIOUS DOINGS OF SERIOUS ACTIONS 
In the third and final example, I demonstrate how call-in show saliva wars 
constitute “play” or “nonserious doings” in the sense that the verbal dueling is 
regarded as “not literally or really or actually occurring” (Goffman 1967:47). 
Linking nonserious actions to reported speech, Clark and Gerrig (1990) propose 
that speech reporting constitutes a demonstration of what a person did in saying 
something.43 Moreover, reported speech can “denote events, states, processes, or 
objects, and allow for both generic and specific referents” (Clark and Gerrig 
1990:770). From these perspectives, I regard participants’ saliva wars speech 
reporting practices as being nonserious given that both the linguistic device and 
the speech event they participate in playfully demonstrate “real” or serious 
confrontations, such as general sociopolitical tensions or a potential cross-straits 
war. 
However, does my assessment of saliva wars as nonserious doings counter 
moderator Yü Fu’s comment that call-in show panelists are “really, really 
arguing”? To reconcile the “realness” of saliva wars from its play characteristics, 
I again draw from Basso’s (1979) understanding of Western Apache tongue-in-
cheek portrayals of the “Whiteman” as “diminutive dramas” that are not 
necessarily a product of the speaker’s imagination, but rather patterned on “slices 
of unjoking activity” (41). Basso’s analysis informs my analysis of call-in show 
saliva wars as exhibiting concurrent laminations of play and “unjoking” activities. 
Be it a joke or mock (saliva) warfare: 
[A]ny actual performance may be said to consist in the construction and 
presentation of a secondary text that is intended to be understood as a 
                                                 
43 The scholars’ interpretation draws from Grice’s (1957, 1968) inquiry into what methods 
individuals use to perform communicative acts. 
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facsimile or transcripted copy of the primary text on which it is patterned. 
This, of course, is not made explicit by the [speaker] because the success 
of his performance—how well it “comes off”—depends upon his ability to 
persuade the [other interlocutor] to play along, that is, to pretend with him 
that the facsimile he has constructed is not a facsimile... (Basso 1979:41; 
italics added) 
I thus illustrate that although call-in show saliva wars are often regarded as 
superficial, linguistic reenactments of ideological tensions culled from the 
geopolitical stage, participants’ verbal disputes nonetheless have real 
consequences just as PRC military exercises and presidential elections do. 
Furthermore, the “pretending” that call-in participants perform through 
hypothetical reported speech constitutes more than a “mock-up” of reality. Rather, 
saliva wars represent an equally informative mass-mediated and discursive 
representation of Taiwan’s sociopolitical landscape. Specifically, I examine in the 
following passage a saliva war over the notions of “compatriot,” “nation,” and 
“sovereignty” that simultaneously performs a secondary text (the call-in show 
saliva war) and two intertwined primary texts (cross-straits tensions as well as 
different political party ideologies). 
In addition to reported speech, code-switching figures prominently in the 
following passage. Blom and Gumperz (1972) suggest that the social meanings 
communicated by language shifts represent reflexive statements about the 
organization of face-to-face encounters, as well as the structure and content of 
interpersonal relationships. In other words, code-switching serves as a form of 
indirect social commentary. In this saliva war, I analyze a guest panelist’s 
insertion of English loan words as a calculated move that negotiates the sensitive 
topic within the call-in show context and its associated ramifications for cross-
straits relations. 
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“He basically has confused ‘compatriot,’ ‘nation,’ and sovereignty’”: 
(non)serious playing with words 
The following saliva war comes from the second of three successive 2100 
episodes that deliberated the PRC ban of pop star A-mei. Broadcast on May 25, 
2000, the episode was entitled, “The (ROC) President expresses regret: Does 
Communist China regard compatriots as the enemy? (Zongtong yihan: 
Zhonggong jiang tongbao dang diren? 總統遺憾﹕  中共將同胞當敵人﹖ ). The 
main participants in the verbal confrontation include DPP Legislator Lin Cho-shui 
(林濁水) and Taiwan Gallup chairman and political analyst Mr. Tim T. Y. Ting 
(Ting Tingyu 丁庭宇) with moderator Lee Tao occasionally facilitating the 
dispute.  
As with the previous two saliva war examples, an edited video clip 
inspires the verbal dispute, which appears at the beginning of the program and 
before the examined exchange between Leg. Lin and Mr. Ting. The video 
segment features recently inaugurated President Chen Shui-bian commenting that 
the PRC’s ban of A-mei as equivalent to treating Taiwan as the enemy.  The text 
of the video clip is provided below: 
As a citizen of the Republic of China, on the homeland of the Republic of 
China, to sing the Republic of China’s own national anthem, and to still 
suffer, suppression, I would never have thought, this could be aimed at, a 
compatriot, or a brother, or a sister, to have … is this the right way to 
show your hospitality? This is strictly treating us like the enemy, I feel 
saddened [by this]…44 
In an oblique reference to the PRC ban of A-mei, the video segment captures 
President Chen proclaiming his surprise that the PRC government would suppress 
(daya 打壓) its “compatriots” (tongbao 同胞), “brothers” (xongdi 兄弟), and 
“sisters” (jiemei 姊妹) across the straits for singing the ROC national anthem. 
                                                 
44 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 13. 
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President Chen then culminates his remarks by claiming that the PRC is treating 
ROC citizens like the “enemy” (diren 敵人). 
In the remainder of the program, the moderator and guest panelists 
frequently revisit this video clip, and specifically, revoice President Chen’s 
remarks as they deliberate the significance and appropriateness of his use of 
“compatriots” in portraying of the relationship between the people of Taiwan and 
China. The following saliva war focuses on the connotations of “compatriot” and 
the associated notions of “country” and “sovereignty.” Immediately prior to the 
verbal dispute I examine, Mr. Ting comments on the notion of being “Chinese” 
and “one China,” which I represent below: 
…Today [if] Chen Shui-bian, is not bestowing prosperity and growth on 
the Republic of China and instead he identifies himself as Chinese 
(Zhonggonren). [Then] like what Legislator You just said, if the People’s 
First Party, New Party, Democratic Progressive Party, Kuomintang, all 
supported Taiwan, you only have to identify [yourself] as “We are 
Chinese, we are one China.”…45 
Here, Mr. Ting recalls several of President Chen’s recent verbal and symbolic 
gestures, including congratulating or “bestowing prosperity” on the ROC nation 
and publicly identifying himself as a “Chinese” (Zhongguoren 中國人).46 Ting 
then argues that if all of Taiwan’s political parties wanted to demonstrate their 
support for Taiwan, they would do so by stating “We are Chinese, we are one 
China.” By making this statement, Ting establishes himself as advocating a 
“China” worldview, a verbal gesture that is significant for the following saliva 
war with DPP Leg. Lin. 
                                                 
45 For Chinese text, see Appendix B, Excerpt 14. 
46 Recall that President Chen Shui-bian is from the Democratic Progressive Party, which 
advocates Taiwan independence. Although Chen mitigated his Taiwan independence rhetoric 
during the presidential campaign, his campaign commercials, speeches, and products clearly 
situated Chen’s allegiance and identity with “Taiwan, this piece of land” (Taiwan zhe kuai tudi 
台灣這塊土地). 
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In the saliva war between Legislator Lin and Mr. Ting, I focus upon the 
verbal strategies the disputants’ use to present their interpretations of 
“compatriot” (tongbao 同胞),47 “country” (guojia 國家), and “regime” 
(zhengquan 政權). Initially, Mr. Ting provides their English translations (e.g., 
“race,” “ethnicity,” and “statehood”) to establish, differentiate, and even mitigate 
their ideological meanings. Ting later inserts “snippets” of President Chen’s 
“compatriot” utterance to bolster his interpretations. However, Leg. Lin finds 
Ting’s speech reporting tactics unsatisfactory and demands that the political 
analyst speak in his own words. After several attempts to articulate the 
problematic notions without drawing from President Chen’s remarks, Ting 
resignedly concludes that he is unable to do so. 
Although Lin and Ting’s saliva war primarily revolves around divergent 
interpretations of the aforementioned terms, the dispute’s primary text stems from 
their different stances toward Taiwan’s national identity. As a DPP legislator, Lin 
Cho-shui advocates an independent and sovereign Taiwan. Inversely, political 
analyst Mr. Ting leans towards the KMT and a pro-unification stance, as 
demonstrated in the above excerpt.48 Consequently, Leg. Lin faults Mr. Ting for 
confusing the concepts of “compatriot,” “nation,” and “regime,” and specifically, 
for promoting the view that as “compatriots” Taiwan and China are therefore the 
same country. 
The entire saliva war spans 22 turns of talk, with four turns coming from 
the moderator Lee Tao and the remaining 18 turns being evenly divided between 
the main protagonists, Leg. Lin and Mr. Ting. As in previous excerpts, certain 
Mandarin Chinese terms are left in their Hanyu Pinyin form in the English text in 
                                                 
47 In Mandarin Chinese, singular and plural nouns are not linguistically differentiated. In the 
English text of Mr. Ting’s remarks I translated “tongbao” as the plural “compatriots” for a more 
colloquial reading. However, “tongbao” also represents the singular “compatriot.” 
48 In the past, the Taiwan Gallup chairman has conducted public opinion polls for the KMT during 
national and regional elections. 
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order to preserve its original meaning as much as possible. Glosses for the terms 
can be found in the footnotes or the glossary at the end of the dissertation. 
Transc. 7.3: “I don’t know how to say it” 
1 Lin 我認為丁庭宇先生 I believe that Mr. Ting Tingyu  
2  他基本上 that he basically has confused 
3  同胞﹐國家跟 compatriot, nation, and 
4  政權三種 regime these three 
5  認同混為一談。 identities into one. 
6  我認為這個制式 I believe that once this concept 
7  一亂﹐越搞 is confused, it becomes more  
8  越混亂。 and more confusing. 
9  那麼如果是這樣子的話﹐ So if it is like this, 
10  我們是不是真的對﹐ do we really have toward, 
11  阿﹐新加坡的 uh, Singapore’s 
12  華人沒有同胞的感覺呢﹖ Huaren49 no compatriot affections? 
13  至少-以我的經驗 At least—in my experience  
14  是有的。 (we) do. 
15  (…) (…) 
16  所以我認為﹐ Therefore I believe,  
17  中國人﹐ if Zhongguoren, 
18  或者華人 or else Huaren 
19  要現代化﹐ want to modernize, 
20  拜託拜託﹐ please please, 
21  把政權的認同﹐ let regime identity, 
22  國家的認同﹐ national identity, 
23  跟同胞的認同﹐ and compatriot identity, 
24  文化的認同做一個釐清。 cultural identity be clarified and 
distinguished. 
25  那麼水乳 So that water and milk 
26  自然可以交融 can naturally blend together.50 
27  [xx]-- [xx]-- 
28 LT [這是] 林濁水委員強調 [This is] Leg. Lin Cho-shui’s 
                                                 
49 The identifier “Huaren” (華人) generally refers to the “Chinese” people but more specifically 
Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in greater China. The term is more commonly used in 
Singapore than in Taiwan or China. See explanation in the textual analysis of this excerpt. 
50 Meaning, in perfect harmony. The analogy is similar to the English analogy of water and oil 
mixing (or not mixing) well together. 
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emphasis. 
29  但是有一個定義的。. But there is a definition. 
30 Ting [同胞是有] [Compatriot--] 
31 LT 是。 Right. 
32 Ting 同胞﹐同胞當然 Compatriot, compatriot of course  
33  同一個國家﹐ (is) the same country, 
34  我覺得你弄混了﹐ I feel that you have it mixed up, 
35  一個是race﹐ one is race,51 
36  就是一個種族﹐ which is a race, 
37  一個ethnicity, one is ethnicity,   
38  就是文化的認同﹐ that is cultural identity, 
39  一個statehood﹐ one is statehood, 
40  是國籍。 that is nationality. 
41  同胞當然 Compatriot of course 
42  同一國﹐ (refers to) the same country, 
43  同胞如果 if compatriot does 
44  不同國﹐ not (refer to) the same country, 
45  這個同胞就 then this compatriot  
46  沒有意義了。 has no meaning. 
47 LT 您林濁水講說同胞 Then Lin Cho-shui is saying 
compatriot 
48  是可以的﹐ is okay, 
49  但是是這兩個不同的國家。 But it is two different countries. 
50 Lin 那如果,如果是這樣﹐ Then if, if this is the case,  
51  那麻煩大啦。 then the trouble (problem)52 is (even) 
greater. 
52 Ting 但是這是你認為的。 But this is what you believe.  
53  陳水扁認為﹐ Chen Shui-bian believes, 
54  陳水扁說是不是說 didn’t Chen Shui-bian say, 
55  “同胞也好﹐” “Whether as a compatriot,” 
56  不是我說的 it wasn’t me who said (it) 
57  是他說的。 it was he who said it. 
58  哎﹐我問問看法律 Hey, let me ask law 
59  專家尤教授﹐ expert Professor You,  
60  同胞是不是 are compatriots 
61  同一個國家﹖ from the same country? 
62 Lin 我先跟你講﹐ Let me first say to you, 
                                                 
51 Terms in Arial font were spoken in English. 
52 Meaning that the confusion is even greater. 
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63  [如果你這個觀念﹐] [f this concept of yours,] 
64 LT [對不起..] [Excuse me..] 
65 Lin 你馬上要處理 You need to immediately resolve 
66  這個問題﹐ this problem, 
67  那你是不是要讓 so do you want to let 
68  西藏獨立﹖ Tibet to become independent? 
69  你可以說西藏(人)  Can you say that a Tibetan 
70  是同胞嗎﹖ is a compatriot then? 
71  他跟你是 Are you and he53 
72  同一國阿﹖ from the same country? 
73  那你是不是要讓﹐讓 So do you want to let, let 
74  內蒙古獨立 Inner Mongolia to become 
75  出去﹖你是不是要 Independent? Do you want 
76  讓新疆維吾 to let the people from the 
77  爾族的人 Xinjiang Uighur ethnic group 
78  獨立出去﹖ become independent? 
79  你是不是要把 Do you want to let the 
80  西南的那個﹐那個 Southwest’s that, that  
81  [那夷族獨立 [that Yi ethnic group become  
82  出去﹖] independent?] 
83 Ting [我覺得﹐我覺得] [I feel, I feel that] 
84  同胞當然是 compatriots are of course from 
85  同一國﹐ the same country, 
86  這個是陳水扁講的 this is what Chen Shui-bian said 
87  不是我講的啊。 it wasn’t me who said it. 
88  同--陳水扁說﹐ Com--Chen Shui-bian said, 
89  “同胞也好﹐” “Whether as a compatriot,” 
90  同胞當然 compatriots are of course from 
91  同一國啦。 the same country. 
92 Lin 我們現在在講你的﹐ We are now talking about your 
(explanation). 
93  我們是評論你的﹐ We are now discussing your 
(remarks). 
94 Ting 我認為同胞 I believe compatriots are  
95  當然 of course  
96  同一國. from the same country.. 
97 Lin 你認為--好. You believe –okay. 
                                                 
53 The third person singular “he” or “ta” (他) is sometimes used to refer to a group or the third 
person plural “they” (tamen 他們). 
 297
98  那你就是主張 Then you are advocating 
99  西藏獨立啦. Tibetan independence. 
100 Ting 我怎麼會主張 How could I be advocating 
101  西藏獨立呢﹖ Tibetan independence? 
102 Lin 他跟你有 He and you have 
103  血緣關係啊﹖ consanguinity (blood ties)? 
104 Ting 同胞不一定要有 Compatriots don’t necessarily 
105  血緣關係. have consanguinity. 
106  他同胞是[同一個]-- His compatriot is [the same]-- 
107 Lin [同胞是] [Compatriot is]  
108  同一個胞胎﹐ the same fetus, 
109  [同一個國家.] [The same country.] 
110 Ting [不對﹐不對-] [That’s not right, that’s not right--] 
111 Lin [同一個子宮﹐ [The same womb, 
112  叫著同胞﹐拜託..] means compatriot. Please..] 
113 Ting 我真的- I really--- 
114  不對。 That’s wrong. 
The passage begins with Leg. Lin challenging Mr. Ting’s use of the terms 
“compatriot” (tongbao 同胞), “nation” (guojia 國家), and “regime” (zhengquan 
政權) by claiming that Ting has mistakenly confused the words as being one and 
the same (lines 1-5).  The DPP legislator expands upon this assessment by asking 
whether Ting’s conflation of the three terms infers that “we” (women 我們), 
meaning Taiwan, have no “compatriot affections” (tongbao de ganjue 
同胞的感覺) toward Huaren (華人), people of Chinese descent, in Singapore 
(lines 9-12). 
Here, Leg. Lin’s use of the identifier “Huaren” is significant for several 
reasons. First, the term Huaren generally refers to culturally ethnic Chinese. 
Moreover, the descriptor avoids connotations to geopolitical affiliations, including 
citizenship or country of residence, and thus encompasses Huaren from the PRC, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere (Ong 1999; Wu 1991). As Tu 
(1991b) explains, the identifier and notion of Huaren is not geopolitically 
centered. Consequently: 
 298
…the deliberate use of Huaren (people of Chinese origin) rather than 
Zhongguoren (citizens of the Chinese state) to designate people of a 
variety of nationalities who are ethnically and culturally Chinese. . . 
indicates a common ancestry and a shared cultural background, whereas 
Zhongguoren necessarily evokes obligations and loyalties of political 
affiliation and the myth of the Central Country.54 (ibid:25; original italics) 
Leg. Lin’s comments thus indexes the ethnic and cultural meanings Tu details 
above. This is evidenced in Lin’s self-repair (lines 17-18), in which he replaces 
his initial use of “Zhongguoren” (line 17) to “Huaren” (line 18). In so doing, Leg. 
Lin uses “Huaren” to argue for a united and modernized Chinese community (line 
19) based on “a common ancestry and a shared cultural background,” as Tu 
described earlier. In sum, Lin’s conscientious use of the word “Huaren” evokes a 
pan-Chinese community.55  
However, should Leg. Lin have continued to use the term 
“Zhonggruoren,” he would have inadvertently forwarded a “one China” 
worldview that is antithetical to his party’s (the DPP) Taiwan independence 
platform. Wu (1991) explains that the term “Zhongguoren” “carries the 
connotation of modern patriotism or nationalism…a connectedness with the fate 
of China as a nation” (149). By amending his word choice from “Zhongguoren” 
to “Huaren,” Leg. Lin preserves and indirectly emphasizes an independent and 
distinct Taiwan identity. At the same time, he opens the discursive space for the 
realization of a pan-Huaren community that “we” Taiwan are a member of and 
whose compatriots include Huaren in Singapore and around the world. 
                                                 
54 Tu’s use of “the Central Country” represents one translation of the Mandarin Chinese characters 
“Zhongguo,” which is more commonly known as “China.” Another translation of “Zhongguo” is 
“the Middle Kingdom.” Both “Central Country” and “Middle Kingdom” refer to a Chinese 
worldview and philosophy that establishes “Zhongguo” as “an imagined universally recognized 
cultural center” (Tu 1991a:vi). 
55 For example, “overseas Chinese” are commonly referred to as “Huaqiao” (華僑), which again 
is based on a “Hua” worldview. More recently, Huaqiao have come to “define themselves as 
members of the Chinese ‘diaspora,’ meaning those who have settled in scattered communities of 
Chinese far from their ancestral homeland” (Tu 1991b:13). 
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Another reason Leg. Lin’s use of Huaren is marked in this context derives 
from its infrequent use in Taiwan. In comparison, the terms Huaren and Huayu 
(話語) or the Hua language (meaning Mandarin), are more commonly used in 
Singapore, as well as by overseas Chinese who wish to associate themselves with 
this transnational community. How each Han Chinese individual describes 
herself, and even the language she uses, represents an “act of identity” (Le Page 
and Tabouret-Keller 1985) and reflects her sociopolitical ideologies.  
For instance, the Mandarin Chinese language is referred to as “Huayu” 
(華語) in Singapore, again reflecting the Han Chinese community’s and its 
members’ “Hua” or pan-Chinese worldview. In contrast, Taiwan residents have 
been inculcated under the former KMT regime since the late 1940s to refer to 
Mandarin as “guoyu” (國語), which literally means the “national language.” 
However, speakers in Taiwan who resist this sociolinguistic worldview 
subversively use “Beijinghua” (北京話), meaning the “Beijing language,” instead 
as a means to reestablish the language’s China-based origin and to renounce its 
nationalistic resonances. In China and Hong Kong, however, the same language is 
called “putonghua” (普通話) or “the common language,” thus reflecting the 
Chinese Communist Party’s ideology of equality. Returning to Leg. Lin’s 
deliberate introduction of “Huaren” in the saliva war, the aforementioned 
distinctions between Huaren versus Zhongguoren identities demonstrates a 
concerted effort on the DPP legislator’s part to index and affirm non-political 
“compatriot” relations with fellow Huaren outside of Taiwan. 
To reiterate his earlier criticism of Mr. Ting’s remarks, Leg. Lin concludes 
his turn of talk by dramatically pleading (“please, please” line 20) that the terms 
“regime identity” (zhengquan de rentong 政權的認同), “compatriot identity” 
(tongbao de rentong 同胞的認同), “national identity” (guojia de rentong 
國家的認同), and “cultural identity” (wenhua de rentong 文化的認同) be 
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distinctively clarified (lines 21-24). He then argues that in doing so, this will 
allow these identities to exist in perfect harmony, which he poetically expresses as 
“water and milk naturally blend[ing] together” (lines 25-26). This metaphorical 
image suggests that Leg. Lin regards these concepts as being distinct from, yet 
complementary to each other. That is, the legislator’s “water and milk” analogy 
seeks to capture Taiwan and Singapore’s different geopolitical statuses on the one 
hand, while emphasizing their sociocultural similarities as modernized Huaren 
societies on the other. 
Following Leg. Lin’s remarks, 2100 moderator Lee Tao clarifies that this 
is what the legislator wishes to emphasize regarding the sociopolitically sensitive 
terms (lines 28). However, Lee Tao then suggests that the term “compatriot” 
(tongbao 同胞) does have a definition (line 29). Before Lee Tao can elaborate 
upon this comment,56 Mr. Ting interjects to clarify his interpretation of 
“compatriot” by stating “of course” compatriot refers to “the same country” (lines 
32-33). Ting following his assertion by claiming that it is Leg. Lin who has the 
concept “mixed up” (line 34). 
Interestingly, Ting defines the three terms with the aid of English loan 
words. Ting’s marked code-switch from Mandarin to English reflects the unique 
topic of this verbal exchange, namely, a metalinguistic saliva war over 
ideologically-laden terminology. The significance of code-switching or “language 
alterations” in socially-sensitive situations is noted by Basso (1979) when he 
states: 
If it is useful to understand that language alterations convey messages 
about what is ‘present’ in social situations, it is equally important to 
recognize that they may convey messages about what is ‘absent’ from 
them as well (11). 
                                                 
56 The moderator’s remarks can also be interpreted as a calculated move to invite another speaker 
to offer an alternative definition to would differ from Leg. Lin’s understanding. 
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Here, Ting’s introduction of the English terms “race” (line 35), “ethnicity” (line 
37), and “statehood” (line 39) represents a concerted attempt to establish 
definitions for the words while diminishing their ideological associations in 
Mandarin Chinese. The loan words also offer him an alternative route to negotiate 
a “real” war and sociopolitical tensions between absent parties. This includes the 
cross-straits war between Taiwan and the PRC as well as ideological differences 
between Taiwan’s political parties and factions, most notably between the ruling 
DPP party and the former KMT party and its splinter parties, the New Party and 
People’s First Party. 
It is important to note that Mr. Ting’s linguistic competency in English is 
greater than Leg. Lin’s, partly due Ting’s graduate studies in and degree from the 
U.S. In comparison, the DPP legislator did not pursue academic studies in an 
English-speaking environment.57 On a related note, many former and present 
high-ranking KMT leaders earned graduate degrees in the United States, 
including former President Lee Teng-hui, former Taiwan governor and current 
PFP chairman James Soong,58 KMT chairman Lien Chan, and Taipei Mayor Ma 
Ying-jeou.59 In comparison, many senior DPP leaders have not studied abroad, 
most notably current DPP chairman and ROC president Chen Shui-bian, who 
earned his law degree in at National Taiwan University (Taiwan Daxue 
台灣大學), the country’s most prestigious university. One prominent exception is 
                                                 
57 All students in Taiwan are required to study at least six years of English from 7th to 12th grade. 
Moreover, Taiwan’s college entrance exam includes an English proficiency section, which all 
prospective college students must take. 
58 James Soong left the KMT party in December 1999 in order to run as an independent 
presidential candidate in the 2000 elections after being denied the KMT nomination. Then KMT 
vice chairman Lien Chan was nominated as the KMT candidate instead. 
59 President Lee earned a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from Cornell University, PFP chairman 
Soong earned a Ph. D. in philosophy from Georgetown University, KMT chairman Lien Chan is a 
Ph.D. graduate of the Univ. of Chicago in political science, while Taipei Mayor Ma earned a Ph.D. 
in law from Harvard University (Who’s Who in the ROC, 2000). Shortly after Lee Teng-hui 
became ROC president in 1988, Time magazine noted that the ROC had one of the highest 
percentages of U.S.-educated presidential cabinets in the world. It should be noted that at the time, 
the ROC’s central government was comprised of predominantly, if not only, KMT members. 
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ROC vice president Annette Lu, who earned her law degree from Harvard Law 
School. Consequently, Ting’s introduction of English could be interpreted as a 
move to establish his U.S.-derived education and stronger English competence 
and thus indirectly highlight Leg. Lin’s lack thereof. However, the fact that most 
of 2100’s viewers are not as educated as its guest panelists,60 it is possible that 
they were unable to understand, not to mention appreciate, Ting’s sociolinguistic 
strategy. 
In this sense, Ting’s use of English may have complicated rather than 
facilitated the metalinguistic disagreement over the aforementioned terms. 
Moreover, the Ting-Lin saliva war is further complicated by the fact that even the 
Chinese representations for the words “race,” “ethnicity,” and “statehood” are 
“foreign” to the Chinese language, having been introduced to the Chinese 
language through contact with Western societies. As Wu (1991) explains:  
In order to create a modern identity to cope with conditions created by 
China’s confrontation with the Western world, the Chinese were obliged 
to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation, state, sovereignty, 
citizenship, and race; more recently, with cultural and ethnic identity 
(148). 
While the English term “race” can be glossed in Mandarin Chinese as “zhongzu” 
(種族), Ting’s use of the English words “ethnicity” and “statehood” as linguistic 
equivalents for the Mandarin terms “wenhua” (文化) and “guoji” (國籍) 
respectively are inaccurate, and moreover, problematic. For instance, in the above 
excerpt, I interpreted Mr. Ting’s use of “wenhua de rentong” (文化的認同) as 
“cultural identity” (line 38). However, he associated the English term “ethnicity” 
with the Chinese notion of “wenhua de rentong.”  
Similarly, Ting’s association of the English word “statehood” with “guoji” 
(國籍) represents one English gloss for this Chinese notion. Earlier, I glossed 
                                                 
60 From personal discussions with 2100’s staff, I learned that most of its viewers’ have a high 
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Leg. Lin’s use of “guo” (國) for “guojia” (國家) and “guojia rentong” 
(國家認同) as “nation” and “national identity.” However, the same term (guo 國) 
has also been associated with “kingdom” as in “the Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo 
中國), more commonly known as “China.”61 Consequently, merely providing 
English glosses “race,” “ethnicity,” and “statehood” for the Chinese terms 
“zhongzu” (種族), “wenhua” (文化) and “guoji” (國籍) respectively, doesn’t 
adequately explicate their definitional differences, especially for a Chinese62 
speaking audience. Nor do does Ting’s English loan word explanations refute 
Leg. Lin’s claim that he has confused the terms. Thus the English-Chinese 
translation issues discussed here reflect sociolinguistic difficulties in conveying 
concepts and worldviews within one language and culture to another (cf. Whorf 
1956).63 
However, Ting culminates his definitional explanation by reiterating that 
“of course compatriot refers to the same country,” and if it does not, then “this 
compatriot has no meaning” (lines 41-46). While Ting’s repetitive utterance 
emphasizes his opening statement in this turn of talk, it can also be interpreted as 
an effort to “produce language in a more efficient, and less energy-draining way” 
(Tannen 1989:48), by reusing a previous remark. This strategy also facilitates 
speakers’ verbal attacks when engaged in a saliva war. 
                                                                                                                                     
school level of education. 
61 Wu (1991) explains that the notion of the “Middle Kingdom” reflects a traditional view among 
“Chinese” peoples that represents an important aspect of “being Chinese.” Moreover, he states that 
this “anthropocentric view is based on a deep-rooted sense of belonging to a unified civilization 
that can boast several thousand years of uninterrupted history” (149). 
62 I deliberately use “Chinese” to refer to all Chinese languages, including Mandarin, Taiwanese 
(Hohlo), Shainghainese, Fukienese, etc. 
63 Whorf makes the link between language and thought (or worldview) when he states that human 
beings “are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of 
expression for their society.  It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially 
without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific 
problems of communication or reflection.  The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a 
large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group” (134). 
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Figure 14: In pointing away from his body, political analyst Mr. Tim Ting 
demonstrates through a hand gesture that it was President Chen Shui-bian who 
used the word “compatriot.” Meanwhile, Leg. Lin Cho-shui demands that Ting 
provide his own understanding of the term. 
 
Figure 15: Here, Mr. Ting indicates that he did not utter the word “compatriot,” 
which he emphasizes by pointing to  himself, while DPP Legislator Lin continues 
to insist on hearing Ting’s interpretation of the term. 
Following Ting’s metalinguistic rationalization, Lee Tao attempts to direct 
the discussion back to Leg. Lin’s “compatriot” analogy between Singapore and 
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Taiwan (lines 47-49). Before he can direct the discussion back to this point, Leg. 
Lin interjects to declare that Mr. Ting’s explanation is unsatisfactory as it makes 
the “trouble” or “confusion” surrounding the terms even greater (lines 50-51). 
Ting promptly responds that this is the DPP legislator’s opinion (line 52). 
However, Ting emphasizes that President Chen Shui-bian had used the term 
“compatriot” in his remarks, and therefore, it was President Chen (“he,” line 67), 
and not Ting (“me,” line 56). Mr. Ting accompanies the deictic referents “me” 
and “he” with hand gestures that alternatively point to a bodily present “me” (his 
chest) and an absent “he” (pointing away from his body and to his right) (See 
Figures 15 and 16). 
Interestingly, this gestural distinction between the pronouns “me” and 
“he” is not arbitrary. In other words, in pointing to his right (the viewers’ left), 
Ting is using a concrete object as his referent. Having observed the live broadcast 
in the studio, I understood Ting’s gesture for “he” as pointing to the closed-circuit 
TV monitor, which was located to the right of the guest panelist table, on which 
program video clips are played for the in-studio participants. Recall that prior to 
Lin and Ting’s saliva war, the program had played a video clip of Pres. Chen 
making his “compatriot” remark as a means to situating the featured topic. Thus, 
for Ting, the TV monitor embodied President Chen Shui-bian or “he,” thus 
providing a convenient and temporary object toward which he could orient his 
deictic “me” versus “he” distinctions and gestures. In fact, later in the saliva war, 
Ting again uses the same pair of gestures, albeit this time with his right index 
finger, to identify and index Pres. Chen as the original speaker of the 
“compatriot” utterance that he (Ting) is merely revoicing. 
Returning to Ting’s use of reported speech, he proffers evidence for 
President Chen’s “compatriot” utterance by repeating a snippet of the president’s 
remarks from the video clip (line 55). At first glance, this may not appear as 
substantial evidence for Ting’s claim that “‘compatriot’ refers to the same 
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country.” However, using Clark and Gerrig’s (1990) argument that “quotations 
are demonstrations of component parts of language use” (769), the embedding of 
Pres. Chen’s utterance within Ting’s remarks represents a communicative act 
(Grice 1968) or speech act (Searle 1969) that associates his use of “compatriot” 
with Pres. Chen. In this case, Ting reappropriates Pres. Chen’s remark that the 
PRC is suppressing its “compatriots” in Taiwan. Regardless if President Chen’s 
“compatriot” remark is actually a declaration of a shared Taiwan-PRC national 
identity, Mr. Ting effectively creates this impression when he links Pres. Chen’s 
utterance which his earlier remarks regarding the terms “ethnicity,” “race,” and 
“statehood.” As Tannen (1989) notes, “when speech uttered in one context is 
repeated in another, it is fundamentally changed even if ‘reported’ accurately” 
(110). 
Despite Mr. Ting’s economical and efficient use of reported speech in his 
rebuttal (Holt 1996), speech reporting proves only as persuasive and effective as 
the listener’s ability and willingness to recognize the reporter’s intentions (Grice 
1968). In the present scenario, Leg. Lin rejects the political analyst’s reported 
source not once, but twice. First, Lin discounts Ting’s explanation as being 
inadequate and chastises Ting to “immediately solve this problem” (line 65-66). 
As for what this “problem” (wenti 問題) entails, Leg. Lin provides a lengthy 
explanation, punctuated with a rising tone of voice, in which demands if Ting 
considers Tibetans to be compatriots, and moreover, if he advocates that Tibetans, 
Inner Mongolians, Uighurs, and the Yi ethnic group declare independence (lines 
67-82).  
Leg. Lin’s line of questioning is ideologically-marked as each of these 
ethnic groups has struggled over the past 50 years to gain independence from the 
PRC. In naming this minority groups, Lin indirectly evokes similarities to 
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Taiwan’s controversial nation-state status vis-à-vis the PRC.64 Leg’s listing of 
these particular groups and geographic entities is significant for another reason as 
well. Under the Republic of China constitution, these lands are regarded as 
territories of the ROC, just as “Taiwan” is recognized as a “province” and not a 
nation. Moreover, Lin’s inclusion of Inner Mongolia represents a deliberate jab at 
Ting and his China-based worldview. For while this “province” has been an 
independent country since the mid-20th century, the ROC continues to consider 
Inner Mongolia as a part of its geographical jurisdiction as captured on national 
(and world) maps produced by the government. This worldview is telling 
displayed on the inside front cover of the 2000 Republic of China Yearbook, an 
official publication of the Government Information Office (GIO), in which a map 
of the Republic of China includes “Mongolia.”65 
However, the DPP legislator’s comparison of Tibet and Taiwan’s 
identities as “compatriots” is as convincing to the political analyst as Ting’s 
“same country” interpretation is persuasive to Leg. Lin. In other words, Leg. Lin’s 
rhetorical commentary does not disrupt Ting’s line of thinking. In fact, Ting 
reiterates his previous responses, including his use of President Chen Shui-bian’s 
“compatriot” utterance to argue that “compatriot” refers to “one country” (lines 
83-91). Ting’s use of repetition both emphasizes his main point as well as serves 
as an “evaluative” function of Leg. Lin’s remarks through Pres. Chen’s original 
“compatriot” utterance (Labov 1972:354-96). Moreover, reiteration of previous 
statements also strategically produces “ample talk” even when there might not be 
                                                 
64 A significant difference between the listed territories and ethnic groups, however, is that they 
are de facto and de jure provinces or territories of the PRC, while Taiwan de facto constitutes an 
independent country. This distinction becomes complicated, however, when considering that the 
majority of the world’s governments (including the U.S.) do not officially recognize Taiwan as a 
sovereign nation-state. This area of inquiry goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. For further 
reading, please see Chapter 3 in Joei’s (1997) In Search of Justice: the Taiwan story; Chapter 9 in 
Maguire’s (1998) The rise of modern Taiwan; and Wachman’s (2000) “Taiwan: parent, province, 
or blackballed state?” in Taiwan in Perspective. 
65 Interestingly, a smaller map of the same region appearing in the lower left hand corner 
depicting the “area under Chinese Communists’ control” includes neither “Mongolia” nor Taiwan. 
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much to say (Tannen 1989:48). As previously mentioned, Ting accompanies his 
distinction between what President Chen said (lines 86, 88) and what Ting 
himself did not say (“it wasn’t me,” line 87) with hand gestures that alternatively 
point away and at himself. 
The crux of Ting and Lin’s saliva war arrives when the DPP legislator 
directly and dismissively rejects Ting’s reference to Pres. Chen’s utterance a 
second time (lines 92-93). In this case, Leg. Lin denies Ting’s “entitlement claim” 
as an authorized messenger and authoritative interpreter of Pres. Chen’s original 
remarks (Shuman 1993). The DPP legislator’s linguistically disarming move 
partly relies upon Leg. Lin and Pres. Chen’s in-group relationship as members of 
the DPP party. That is, Leg. Lin regards himself as a more reputable evaluator of 
Chen’s “compatriot” utterance in comparison to the KMT/PFP-leaning Mr Ting. 
Leg. Lin thus rejects Ting’s reading and revoicing of the president’s words as an 
outsider’s understanding, and therefore, discountable. 
Thus, Leg. Lin’s refutation of Ting’s use of reported speech initiates a 
series of quick verbal exchanges that leads to the saliva war’s eventual and rapid 
conclusion. For instance, when Leg. Lin exhorts Ting to proffer an interpretation 
of “compatriot” in his own words, which Ting does by claiming “of I believe 
compatriots are course from the same country” (lines 94-96), the DPP legislator 
turns Ting’s admission into a declaration of Tibetan independence (lines 98-99). 
When Ting retorts, “How could I be advocating Tibetan independence?” (lines 
100-101), Leg. Lin quickly asks whether Ting shares “blood ties” with Tibetans 
(lines 102-103). At this point, Ting is stymied from producing any acceptable 
counterarguments to the DPP legislator’s increasingly metaphorical arguments. 
Despite Ting’s denial that compatriots have blood ties (lines 104-105), 
Leg. Lin expands upon his consanguinity line of reasoning by engaging in a bit of 
speech play. That is, the legislator’s explanation takes the form of a children’s 
word game as he takes the second character in the Chinese word for “compatriot” 
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(tongbao 同胞) (line 107), the ideogram “bao” (胞), to create a different word 
that begins with the same character, in this case, “baotai” (胞胎) (line 108).66 
Lin’s word play results in a word—“baotai”—that does not exist in the 
conventional (e.g., dictionary) sense. However, his implications in coining the 
word are clear, to emphasize his argument that compatriots, which he shortens 
into “bao” (胞) and which also means “deriving from the same set of parents,” 
share the same fetus, that is “tai” (胎), and thus have consanguinity ties.67 
Although Ting directly refutes Leg. Lin’s interpretation of “compatriot” 
necessarily denoting “blood ties” by stating “That’s not right” (line 110) and 
“That’s wrong” (line 114), Ting does not elaborate upon why the DPP legislator’s 
claims are incorrect. It is worthy to contemplate why Ting did not clarify his 
interpretation of “compatriot” as referring to residents from the same country, 
either in his own words or in the form of another reported utterance. One 
explanation might be found in Haberland’s (1986) assessment on speech 
reporting: 
 …it is wiser to commit oneself to something true than something false. In 
the same way, it is wiser to commit oneself to somebody else having said 
something which that person actually has said than to somebody else… 
(223; original italics). 
                                                 
66 I recall seeing this word game as a child in a children’s newspaper in Taiwan, 國語日報 
(Guoyu Ribao) and in the form of written exercises when I took Chinese language courses (the 
newspaper also had a language institute). The word game challenges the language learner or 
linguaphile to link random words in novel ways through a process of word or character 
association. For instance, in taking the second character “wen” (文) of the word lunwen (論文), 
meaning “dissertation,” one would then form another word that began with the same character 
such as “wenzhang” (文章), meaning “a written article.” Similarly, the second character of 
“wenzhang,” zhang (章) , would then serve as the first character of another word, such as 
“zhangji” (章魚), meaning “octopus,” and so on.  
67 Leg. Lin’s speech play also demonstrates the strategic creativeness that participants display not 
only in saliva wars but during call-in show deliberations as well. I often heard call-in participants 
(and speakers in Taiwan more generally) engage in this kind of word play due in part to the highly 
homophonic nature of the language. 
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In the present case, Ting’s linguistic behavior suggests he found it “wiser” to 
attach himself (and by extension his argument) to what someone else (i.e., 
President Chen) actually said than to “something else,” such as his own words. In 
weighing the risks of presenting his own definition to reproducing another 
speaker’s utterance, Ting sought safety in something “true” (e.g., Pres. Chen’s 
comments), in order to reduce the risk of providing a personal interpretation that 
could be judged by Leg. Lin as being “false.”  
Unfortunately for Ting, by forgoing the opportunity to elaborate upon his 
understanding of “compatriot” as being “from the same country” (lines 94-96), 
Leg. Lin recontextualized Ting’s remarks to coincide with his own political 
agenda. That is, Leg. Ling reframed Ting’s utterance as an admission for Tibetan 
independence, which obliquely suggests that Ting is also advocating Taiwan 
independence per the above discussion. Having introduced this notion, Leg. Lin 
complicates the metalinguistic debate by introducing a novel understanding of 
“compatriot” as being linked to “blood ties.” Finally, the saliva war ends with 
Lin’s “consanguinity” argument and last refuting rebuttal from Ting. 
In sum, Ting and Lin’s saliva war over the terms “compatriot,” “nation,” 
and “race” exposes the fallacy that words assume static definitions. Rather, this 
metalinguistic saliva war highlights the negotiability of the use and meaning of 
words. Sornig (1989) notes: 
One should not forget that the idea of stability in meaning in words and 
phrases is really fictitious and results from wishful thinking on the 
semanticist’s part. In reality, meaning, i.e., semantic content, is 
continuously modified: decreased or increased in range and intensity, 
replenished or deflated in order to meet the requirements of a given 
situation (98). 
Yet, aside from the connotations and ideologies these terms reference, it is their 
associations with and applications to Taiwan-China relations that fuels Leg. Lin 
and Mr. Ting’s saliva war. Reported speech thus provides the panelists an oblique 
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avenue through which to forward and contest “sovereign” versus “province” 
sociopolitical ideologies regarding Taiwan’s nation-state status. 
In contrast to the previous saliva war example in which even the use of a 
“snippet” of reported speech proved effective in denigrating an absent principle 
figure and weakening a fellow participant’s argument, this saliva war reveals that 
presenting direct reported speech as a form of evidence can also be undermined if 
an interlocutor discredits the reporter’s interpretation of the original utterance and 
representation of the original speaker. Here, Leg. Lin refuses Ting’s interpretation 
of Pres. Chen’s “compatriot” remarks by drawing upon his in-group association 
with Pres. Chen as DPP party members. 
Overall, this passage illustrates that even nonserious saliva wars 
demonstrate serious actions. In this case, the disputants enacted conflicting 
political ideologies and worldviews regarding Taiwan’s national identity and 
sovereignty. This secondary text or “diminutive drama” of Leg. Lin’s and Mr. 
Ting’s metalinguistic saliva war performs an “unjoking activity” of a primary text 
whereby terms such as “compatriot,” “nation,” “regime,” and “statehood” 
represent not only words, but also metadiscursive, political agendas. In this 
passage, the figurative distance between a call-in show saliva war and an ongoing 
cross-straits civil war is only as far apart as that between “play” and reality. That 
is, the significance of this saliva war and others like it resides in the moments 
when “the secondary text [becomes] a primary one, and that the whole affair is 
not a mock-up of some precedent reality, but that reality itself” (Basso 1979:41). 
CONCLUSION 
In my exploration of call-in show koushui zhan, I have illustrated that 
participants’ argumentative talk reflect social practices of displaying disaccord (or 
dis-harmony) through the creative use of verbal play to “compete and negotiate 
with, criticize, and even ridicule others” (Chang 2001:159). The primary form of 
speech play explored here focused on speech reporting including direct, 
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hypothetical, and indirect reported speech. The quoting of another not only 
strategically provides sources or evidence to support a reporter’s entitlement 
claims to lambaste a call-in show colleague, but also offers protection by 
disassociating the reporter from the original utterance. However, the insertion of 
quoted speech does not guarantee that a reporter’s interpretation of an event or 
issue will be accepted by other interlocutors. Despite its versatility and concise 
summary of complex arguments, speech reporting can nevertheless leave an 
individual open to attack, ridicule, and disbelief. 
Furthermore, the verbal artistry of saliva wars resides not so much within 
its “spectacle of confrontation” (Livingstone and Lunt 1994) or “confrontation as 
a spectacle” (Hutchby 2001) appeal, but rather in its requirement that participants 
proffer evidence for their stances as they engage in argument-building. In other 
words, the “alignment-saturated” orientation of call-in show “crisis” topics 
depends upon the presentation, negotiation, and contestation of entitlement claims 
and evidentiality. Participants’ speech reporting practices represent one linguistic 
tactic that lends credibility to the call-in show’s claim of featuring “competing 
versions of reality” (Hutchby 1996:8) via saliva wars. 
Moreover, this chapter’s investigation of saliva wars through participants’ 
speech reporting practices contributes to the dissertations’ overarching objective: 
to describe ways of talking that are unique to Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows. 
For instance, call-in show saliva wars allow participants to wrangle with and 
viewers to process knotty and sensitive issues in a real yet playful manner. My 
investigation recalls Irvine’s (1993) insights on her study of verbal abuse in a 
Wolof village: 
Acts of abuse and defamation of character provide a special opportunity 
for the study of responsibility and evidence in talk. Anthropologists and 
sociologists have long noted that a society’s principles of conduct may 
often be most clearly revealed in the breach—through violations and 
disruptions of normative forms of conduct and social relations, and 
through negotiated claims about those violations (105). 
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Likwise, the linguistic resources call-in participants draw upon when engaged in 
saliva wars confirm Pomerantz’s (1984) finding that “requesting, giving, 
considering and evaluating evidence are practices which are within the repertoire 
of social actions that are performed by competent people within a culture” (607). 
Moments of conflict constitute crucial components of political TV call-in 
shows, so much so I argue, that they delineate, if not define, this mass-mediated 
programming genre. It is through the guise of saliva wars that Taiwan’s 
underlying tensions and empirical crises are exposed, thus offering everyday 
citizens and sociopolitical leaders a forum to deliberate their dangers (wei 危) and 
opportunities (ji 機). From this perspective, call-in show saliva wars constitute an 
acceptable means for Taiwan’s competing ideologies—including national identity 
and cross-straits relations—to be voiced and displayed while allowing for the 
recreation and reevaluation of constantly shifting sociopolitical agendas and 
discourses. Aside from being morality games and character contests on the call-in 
show sound stage, saliva wars also represent Taiwan’s ethno-political conflicts 
and national identity struggles on the political stage writ small. 
In the case of call-in show saliva wars, Sacks’ (1992) observation that 
arguments generate “happy conversations” can be modified to include the 
generation of “happy politics” insofar as sociopolitical figures capitalize upon this 
speech event to articulate and negotiate their disparate perspectives. Recalling the 
recent past in which public discussions of political events and issues were banned 
in Taiwan, and moreover, individuals who defamed political leaders ran the risk 
of incarceration, the prevalent use of reported speech on call-in show saliva wars 
constitutes a significant sociolinguistic development and sociopolitical milestone 
in the country’s democratization process. 
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Chapter Eight: From Civil War to Saliva Wars—Taiwan’s “Not-
so-quiet” Revolution 
 
This dissertation began with the observation that Taiwan’s call-in shows, 
and by extension its mass media, promote crisis discourses that are at once 
empirically based on sociohistorical events in Taiwan and rhetorically (re)created 
through strategic language practices such as reported speech by its participants. I 
have also suggested that with the arrival of call-in shows on cable TV in the early 
1990s, Taiwan’s sociopolitical leaders have found a favorable televisual 
environment in which to feature and promote crisis events and issues. Volosinov’s 
(1973 (1929)) observation that “relations of high complexity and tension” (153) 
reside within reported speech captures the manner in which call-in participants 
used this linguistic device to animate the dangers and opportunities within the 
crisis topics they deliberated, while doing so in ways that problematized the 
viability as well as perpetuated the circulation of such discourses. 
My interdisciplinary approach to investigating the dialectical relationship 
between the TV call-in show’s crisis frame and its participants’ linguistic 
behavior on the one hand, and Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis ambiance on the 
other, generates a study in which its various components “interpenetrate” one 
another (Hawkes 1996:5). In seeking to demonstrate that language use represents 
a valuable conduit for examining political and mass media processes, my study 
also offers the opposite, namely, that political agendas and mass media products 
indeed influence linguistic practices. In the following sections, I summarize the 
study’s findings as well as suggest directions for future research. 
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OVERVIEW OF STUDY: CLAIMS AND FINDINGS 
In my examination of call-in participants’ use of reported speech as a form 
of evidentiality, I discovered speech reporting involves not only the competent 
“giving” of the reported utterance on the behalf of the reporter, but also an open-
minded “getting” on the part of the listener. While previous scholars have 
established that reported speech represents a convincing form of evidence for 
claims of knowledge, my analysis of call-in show saliva wars suggests that speech 
reporting also constitutes a highly negotiated process between reporter and 
receiver. 
Despite the possibility of having one’s reported speech-based evidentiality 
refuted by another speaker, certain types of speech reporting nevertheless prove to 
be more persuasive than others. In several excerpts, I illustrated that the 
participants’ use of direct and even hypothetical reported speech increased the 
credibility and validity of a call-in participant’s comments. In contrast, attempts to 
bolster an argument with the aide of indirect reported speech failed to achieve the 
same, and in some cases, even detracted from the participant’s assertions. 
Moreover, I discovered that the manner in which verbal interactions are 
framed can influence the persuasiveness of a participant’s speech reporting 
practices. For instance, participants (e.g., moderators, panelists, callers) who used 
reported speech in ways that contributed and even magnified the program’s crisis 
frame were more successful in persuading other participants to maintain the 
overall crisis ambiance. Inversely, those participants who attempted to refute the 
program’s crisis orientation faced greater difficulties in having other participants 
ratify their opposing interpretations, despite attempts to present evidence towards 
the contrary. 
In analyzing excerpts where participants combined other linguistic tools— 
such as parodic stylization and code-switching—with reported speech, I found 
that these devices allowed the participant to further distinguish her own voice 
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from those she animated. Participants’ use of such polyphonic strategies not only 
enacted hyper-performances of locially identifiable public figures and their 
respective linguistic behaviors, but also critically editorialized the original 
utterance’s meaning as well as judgmentally marked the original speaker’s 
character. I found that by combining other linguistic properties with reported 
speech, call-in participants diversified the number of linguistic devices they had at 
their disposal to transform and supplant socially constituted identities and locally 
recognizable power relations. 
This study has also revealed that call-in participants use reported speech to 
surreptitiously leak their own impressions towards an issue or figure into their 
commentary while maintaining their “neutral” stance. That is, speech reporting 
subtly disguises the reporter’s assessment of the original remark through the voice 
of an “Other” or, in Goffmanian terms, the reporter assumes the stance of 
animator and not author of the reported utterance. As a “cloak and dagger” 
linguistic device, the call-in participant places herself in the powerful position of 
impugning another speaker’s words, personality, and intent with reduced 
impunity to her own person. Yet, evoking the words of another may not be as 
neutral as it first appears, particularly when another speaker refuses to accept 
reported speech as an argumentative strategy. Speech reporting thus constitutes a 
double-edged sword as it can indiscriminately help or hinder the reporter’s 
argumentative objectives. 
Speech reporting also provided participants a linguistic device for 
alternatively maintaining and flouting the Chinese values of moral face (lian 臉), 
social face (mianzi 面子), and social harmony (hemu 和睦). Call-in participants 
actively negotiated these sociocultural values when they performed reconciliation 
talk and engaged in saliva wars. Although I have suggested that the call-in show’s 
performative space provided participants a relatively safe and socially acceptable 
forum in which to temporarily shed the sociocultural constraints of attending to 
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lian, mianzi, and hemu, I nonetheless found that call-in participants mitigated the 
impact of their verbal affronts by directing their acts of social dis-harmony toward 
their interlocutor’s linguistic behavior, and particularly, speech reporting 
practices. Even when a call-in participant targeted another speaker’s character for 
criticism, reported speech served as a foil for personal denigration. In so doing, 
call-in participants used reported speech as a buffer between the directed criticism 
and the breach of social harmony caused by the verbal affront. 
Drawing from Basso’s (1979) observation that joking performances 
convey messages about two sets of relationships—a present one between the 
current interlocutors and an absent one based on the present situation—my study 
found that call-in participants’ speech reporting behaviors also indexed both 
present and absent crisis scenarios within their verbal interactions. The present 
crisis scenario call-in participants referenced through their linguistic practices 
paralleled the call-in show itself, namely, the program’s crisis frame and featured 
topic. At the same time, participants used reported speech to articulate and 
reproduce absent crisis scenarios, including crisis discourses circulating in Taiwan 
society such as the country’s precarious national security and conditional 
sovereignty, the citizenry’s ambivalent identity formation processes, and struggles 
over gendered relations of status and power. 
This study likewise discovered that call-in participants used reported 
speech to conduct thought experiments and craft storyworlds as a means to 
forward alternative and oftentimes unfavorable scenarios that challenged 
dominant sociopolitical discourses that might otherwise remain unarticulated. 
Hypothetical reported speech proved particularly useful in this case, as 
participants used this linguistic device to rhetorically entertain and resolve 
disparate perspectives towards the program topic, and by extension, contest 
prevailing crisis discourses. Yet, in articulating popularized and even 
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marginalized understandings of Taiwan’s various crisis discourses, participants 
nevertheless continued to contribute to the circulation of such discourses. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
At the outset of the dissertation, I identified this study as one that draws 
upon methodologies and theoretical frameworks from the ethnography of 
speaking, conversation analysis, language as social action, and communication 
studies in its intension to further linguistic, sociocultural, and mass media 
research on Taiwan. Following my analysis of call-in show participants’ speech 
reporting practices however, I find that this study also has relevance to mass 
media studies, popular culture, and political science. 
My discourse-centered analysis of TV call-in show verbal interactions 
relied upon an ethnographic approach to understand how participants used 
language to articulate complex and oftentimes contradictory interpretations of 
sociopolitical crisis issues and events in Taiwan. How speech reporting 
constitutes one feature of call-in show ways of talking directed my investigation 
on the ways this linguistic device contributed to the program’s crisis frame and 
participants’ crisis readings of the deliberated topics. Participants’ speech 
reporting practices dually highlight present relationships within the call-in show 
setting, namely, those between in-studio participants, as well as relationships 
absent from the studio context.  
The creative ways in which call-in participants used reported speech to 
index and negotiate Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses within a marked 
performative space coincide with Duranti’s (1994) assessment that it is through 
speakers’ linguistic practices that crises become an occasion for reassessing social 
order. Much like his Samoan setting where political acumen is strongly affiliated 
with verbal skills, Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows offer participants a space 
to create a “path of words” where solutions to conflicts over definitions and 
linguistic framings can be crafted through ways of speaking (176). In the present 
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case, call-in participants laid a path of words with the utterances of other 
speakers, a linguistic strategy I recognize as “ways of reporting.” 
In promoting a conversation analysis approach to examine talk-in- 
interaction, I found that by donning “mundane colored glasses” (Schegloff 
1988/89:217) in my investigation of the political TV call-in show, I was less 
susceptible to having my “moral/political/dramatic sensibilities mobilized by the 
data” (ibid:218). Moreover, my turn-by-turn examination of participants’ verbal 
interactions revealed how the “generic domain” of reported speech reveals much 
about the sociopolitical issues and events they index (ibid). Indeed, videotaped 
data of the call-in shows further verified this finding. Through the combined use 
of participant observation and videotaped data, I was able to critically address 
what Koven (2001) remarked as a shortcoming in reported speech research, 
namely, the inability to compare the original utterance to its future reporting and 
thus evaluate the extent of their “reportedness.” 
In addition, my research contributes to understandings of speech reporting 
in naturally-occurring speech in Mandarin Chinese. While previous studies on 
reported speech of Mandarin speakers either quantitatively compared the number 
of instances of direct versus indirect reported speech or evaluated their use within 
a formal versus informal language use paradigm, my study expands the 
applications of reported speech beyond these dichotomies. Call-in participants 
used reported speech to present sources and evidence; conduct thought 
experiments; negotiate the sociocultural values of face, image, and harmony; 
juxtapose the “real” world with the storyworld; and most significantly, to animate 
and reconfigure dominant sociopolitical crisis scenarios within Taiwan society. 
As for the field of communication studies, my study illustrates the benefits 
of using ethnographic methods for examining quasi-mediated interactions. While 
communication studies scholars of radio and TV talk/call-in shows have used 
discourse analysis to draw associations between language on the one hand, and 
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political participation and democratic values on the other, such an approach reifies 
language as product and sociopolitical participation as process. My study offers 
an alternative approach in which linguistic practices and sociopolitical discourses 
dialectically inform and recreate one another such that “language is a part of 
communicative conduct and social action” (Hymes 1972a:316). 
By extension, this study also contributes to mass media studies by 
considering how “tabloid” journalism can challenge dominant discourses by 
foregrounding marginalized voices and identities (Gamson 1998). Although some 
scholars have decried the rise of infotainment, I have shown that the merging of 
performative linguistic and mass-mediated practices with information content has 
a significant place in modernizing and democratizing societies such as Taiwan. 
Infotainment can open up discussions of controversial issues and events, which in 
some ways reflects the gradual democratization of a previously silenced populace 
and censored mass media. Although sound bite-oriented verbal sparring and 20-
second caller segments have their political drawbacks, such as giving short shrift 
to complex topics, nonetheless the call-in show’s many advantages include 
incorporating public participation in political discussions and featuring opposing 
viewpoints rather than subtly obfuscating dissension in the name of general 
consensus. 
In addition, this investigation furthers the development of a “(linguistic) 
anthropology of mass media” (Spitulnik 1993). That is, my examination of 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows integrates “the study of mass media into 
[anthropology’s] analyses of the ‘total social fact’ of modern life” (ibid:293), in 
this case, one predicated on “crisis” discourses. This study also situates mass 
media as a site and impetus for “fundamental and irreversible social and cultural 
change” in a modernizing and democratizing society (ibid:306), including one 
where sociopolitical leaders’ utterances are vulnerable to interpretation and 
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reappropriation by not only call-in participants, but also a diverse and 
transnational viewing audience. 
In regards to the developing field of Taiwan studies, my linguistic 
anthropological investigation into the role political TV call-in shows play in 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment offers an interdisciplinary understanding of 
the country’s mass media liberalization and democratization processes. This 
“multilateral” approach expands upon previous research that has primarily 
focused on one or two of these areas—namely, Taiwan’s linguistic, mass media, 
and democratic development—but rarely all three simultaneously. My study also 
draws attention to alternative sociopolitical spheres in Taiwan where marginalized 
voices and actors have increasing opportunities to participate in previously 
restricted venues such as broadcasting and mass media. Similarly, my 
ethnographic investigation of a popularized mass-mediated forum broadens 
traditional anthropological research in Taiwan from the study of “native” 
languages and cultures (e.g., those of Taiwan’s various Aboriginal groups) to 
contemporary sociopolitical venues. 
This project also contributes to popular culture studies where new mass-
mediated spaces like talk shows and the Internet garner greater scholarly attention 
as they dismantle and blur the arbitrary distinction between public and private 
spaces, voices, and identities. Although my examination of call-in participants’ 
speech reporting practices represents a localized investigation of how everyday 
linguistic practices are strategically applied in sociopolitical discussions on 
Taiwan’s political TV call-in shows, my findings have relevance for other modern 
and modernizing societies as well. In particular, my research forwards an 
understanding of popular culture as involving “both ideological constraint and 
expressive process” (Traube 1996:133). Moreover, this study situates call-in show 
participants as “actively engag[ing] in mass-produced cultural forms [and] 
producing meanings informed by their lived experience” (ibid:135). 
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My investigation into call-in show ways of reporting also offers the field 
of political science a non-conventional approach toward examining the emergence 
of democratic processes and practices through language use. My study 
demonstrates that popularized avenues such as political TV call-in shows deserve 
as much scholarly attention as conventional political forums in Taiwan such as the 
Legislative Yuan or the campaign trail, particularly in terms of analyzing public 
participation and sociopolitical discourses. My investigation into call-in show 
saliva wars as a postmodern linguistic expression of formerly physical 
confrontations illustrates what an ethnopragmatics approach can offer in 
understanding the transformation of political processes in the face of 
technological and sociological changes. 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
As previously mentioned in the introductory chapter, the present study 
does not provide ethnographic data on the reception of political TV call-in shows 
by viewers in Taiwan and elsewhere.1 Investigating how Taiwan viewers receive 
and interact with call-in shows would have enriched this study by providing a 
perspective of how mass-mediated products are incorporated into the everyday 
lives of its consumers (cf. Caldarola 1994; Eiselein 1972, 1975; Lull 1990; 
Mankekar 1999; Radway 1984). This viewpoint would have also offered insights 
into how “media consumption is embedded in the culture of media production” 
(Spitulnik 1993:299; cf. de Certeau 1984; Lave et al. 1992). Future research on 
this topic should seek to incorporate this angle. 
Another area that requires further analysis involves the interaction 
between call-in show technology and participant linguistic behaviors. Such an 
investigation would include examining how call-in show production mangers 
frame the narration of a topic through visual, audio, and satellite technologies. 
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This involves exploring how “technologically mediated environments” such as 
call-in shows require and challenge participants to negotiate “complex 
participation frames including different semiotic modes” (Keating 2000:100).  
Examples of areas that can be explored in greater detail include the ways 
participants interact with call-in show video clips, how call-in operators select and 
potentially screen callers, the influence phone-in polling has on participant 
discussions, and well as the different linguistic practices participants use with 
physically absent, yet virtually present interlocutors who are incorporated through 
satellite transmission. For call-in program viewers, the addition of topical aids 
such as headlines, cartoons, maps, and information-bearing “news mixed 
supplements” before commercial breaks, also comprise the technologically 
enhanced experience of watching these programs that the in-studio participants 
may not see, and therefore, cannot interact with. 
Given this study’s focus on verbal demonstrations of reported speech, 
further research is required to examine the role nonverbal forms of expression 
play in participants’ speech reporting practices, including gestures as well as body 
movement and alignment. This study attempted to incorporate in its analysis of 
reported speech body movement and gestures, especially when they played a 
significant role in speech reporting performances (e.g., 2100 moderator Lee Tao’s 
arm and finger gestures when indexing an imaginary interlocutor; Mr. Tim Ting’s 
hand gestures when differentiating himself as animator and Pres. Chen Shui-bian 
as author of a reported remark). Examining how call-in participants enhance their 
verbal utterances with nonverbal behavior not only enriches one’s understanding 
of reported speech, but also abets studies on gesture and nonverbal speech 
practices in general (cf. Haviland 1993; Kendon 1981, 1997; McNeill 1992; 
Schegloff 1984). In short, future research on speech reporting should regard 
                                                                                                                                     
1 Several of the cable TV stations (e.g., TVBS, ETTV) broadcast their call-in shows to the U.S., 
Singapore, and Australia. 
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gestures as “culture-specific emblems that function as complete, quotable 
utterances in their own right, independent of or substitutable for speech” 
(Haviland 1999:89). 
Subsequently, call-in show research should also explore the variety of 
codes or languages participants use on the programs. Given Taiwan’s multilingual 
environment, and especially with the growing prestige and use of Taiwanese in 
informal and formal settings, examining when and how call-in participants insert, 
borrow, or switch between different codes would provide valuable insights into 
the shifting relationship between as well as changing attitudes towards the 
“national language” (guoyu 國語) or Mandarin Chinese and traditionally 
marginalized languages (e.g. Taiwanese, Hakka, and the various Aborigine 
languages) in Taiwan. Furthermore, with Taiwan’s recent language reforms that 
require students to begin learning English in middle school, and combined with 
the popularity of private English language lessons for preschool children, further 
study into the presence and use of English in mass-mediated forums such as call-
in shows is also warranted.  
Furthermore, given that Taiwan’s call-in shows are primarily broadcast in 
Mandarin, it is worthwhile to note the role mass media plays in influencing 
sociolinguistic changes towards language use and linguistic ideologies. The study 
briefly addressed some of these issues in two call-in show excerpts, including 
moderator Lee Tao’s code switching from Mandarin to Taiwanese and guest 
panelist Mr. Ting’s English word borrowing. Both of these linguistic choices 
instantly created a multilingual setting, which contrasted with the predominantly 
Mandarin-based program discussion. Moreover, it is telling that call-in 
participants inserted codes that were readily available in Taiwan’s multilingual 
environment as a means to strategically index locally-marked sociopolitical 
identities and to forward an ideological stance, respectively. 
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Prior to the U.S. war with Iraq, several European leaders published an op-
ed article in the Wall Street Journal in which they declared their support for the 
U.S., a gesture New York Times contributor William Safire called “op-ed 
diplomacy.”2 Expanding upon this mass-mediated diplomatic approach, I consider 
call-in shows and their sociopolitical deliberations as engaging in a form of “call-
in show diplomacy,” a significant, yet overlooked function of this programming 
genre that deserves greater study. The call-in show’s diplomatic role can be 
discerned from efforts to incorporate overseas Chinese, many of whom are voters 
in Taiwan, in discussions on Taiwan’s sociopolitical processes through on-site 
broadcasts in the U.S, a event that occurred during Taiwan’s 2000 presidential 
campaign season. Aside from enlarging the call-in program’s viewing audience, 
these broadcasts strengthen ties between Taiwan and overseas Chinese (huaqiao 
華僑) residents who often serve as unofficial diplomats for the ROC government 
in the communities in which they live.3 These communities also represent a 
marginal yet important space in cross-straits tensions as both the governments of 
Taiwan and China regard overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and intellectuals as a 
rich source of economic and symbolic capital. 
Along these lines, call-in show diplomacy has the potential to play an 
influential role in cross-straits diplomacy. The possibilities already exist through 
Taiwan-China guest panel verbal interactions, as demonstrated in episodes in 
which 2100: All People Open Talk invited scholars from China to participate 
through satellite transmission. Although this study did not analyze these 
interactions, I particularly encourage communication studies and public 
diplomacy scholars, and others, to examine call-in shows as a potential conduit 
                                                 
2 In “And now: op-ed diplomacy,” New York Times, Monday, February 3, 2003. 
3 The scandal involving Taiwan national Jimmy Chung and his solicitation of financial support 
among the overseas Chinese community for former President Clinton represents a case in point. 
 326
for informal “track three”4 cross-straits diplomacy. Given that Taiwan’s call-in 
shows are already broadcast to overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. and 
Singapore for instance, it is only a matter of time before residents and government 
officials in Hong Kong, Macau, and China have access to these programs as well, 
if not already. 
While my study focused upon the relationship between political TV call-in 
shows and Taiwan’s sociopolitical transformation, there are other mass-mediated 
oppositional public spheres that also wield increasing influence in moderating 
public discussions of current affairs in Taiwan. One promising space is the 
Internet, which call-in programs such as 2100: All People Open Talk and 8 
o’clock Loud and Soft Voices already maintain websites for viewers to post 
messages or email comments. As an interactive medium, it is worthwhile to 
consider the role reported speech (in the form of written quotations) plays in 
recreating and proliferating crisis interpretations of sociopolitical events and 
ideologies, and moreover, how these linguistic practices accentuate or differ from 
those promoted on call-in show broadcasts. 
In my analysis of call-in participants’ reactions to the PRC’s banning of 
pop star A-mei, I briefly included Internet postings from A-mei fans in the PRC to 
illustrate the extent of her alleged political transgression. What I did not mention, 
however, was the humorous yet potentially threatening cross-straits Internet 
“hacker war.” Paralleling the PRC/A-mei crisis, this hacker war reportedly began 
when PRC Internet users infiltrated ROC government websites and posted pro-
China propaganda. In retaliation, Taiwan Internet users redecorated PRC 
government webpages with images of Hello Kitty revolving to the strains of the 
                                                 
4 The phrase “track three” plays with the notion that current informal cross-straits diplomacy is 
referred to as “track two” diplomacy, including the Koo-Wang meetings in 1992, meetings 
between low-level officials, and sociocultural exchanges. “Track one” diplomacy represents direct 
or formal dialogue between Taiwan and China, which has never existed between the two 
geopolitical entities since the KMT moved its regime to Taiwan in 1949. 
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ROC national anthem.5 This Internet manifestation of cross-straits tensions 
illustrates that public participation in the reproduction and consumption of 
sociopolitical crisis discourses increasingly assumes a myriad of forums as it 
unfolds in newfound places. 
This seemingly “nonserious” cross-straits confrontation on the Internet 
recalls a related need for further research on the role of speech play in call-in 
show deliberations. My dissertation cursorily examined this linguistic behavior 
through call-in participants’ verbal sparring performances and during moderator 
Lee Tao’s prosodically marked and hypothetically reported speech-laden 
monologue on Taiwan’s national identity crisis discourses. However, call-in 
participants also use puns, jokes, and anecdotes to spice their remarks with 
mocking insinuation and facetious implications.6 As a “deeply serious and 
significant” feature of verbal interactions, speech play offers both participants and 
scholars of call-in shows a valuable and versatile resource for expressing and 
analyzing “implicit and explicit metacommentary” (Sherzer 2002:1) regarding 
controversial sociopolitical issues and events. 
A final area that requires further study involves addressing call-in 
participants’ wide repertoire of argumentative styles during program 
deliberations. My analysis on the use of reported speech as evidentiality, a 
measurement of authority, and a persuasive device merely introduces one 
argumentative resource. Although my examination of call-in show saliva wars 
provides a detailed analysis of argumentative talk, further research should be 
conducted on how call-in participants’ confrontations are structured by turn-
taking, initiated and closed, as well as co-opted by the moderator or other 
participants (Lunsford et. al. 2001). In short, how call-in participants succeed or 
                                                 
5 What these two markedly different hacking styles reveals about the popular and political cultures 
in Taiwan and the PRC I leave for other scholars to explore. 
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fail in performing confrontation talk constitutes a key component of the call-in 
show’s crisis frame, including the recreation and perpetuation of crisis discourses 
in public discourse. 
THE TAIWANIZATION OF TALKSHOWS 
Scholars have admiringly described Taiwan’s relatively stable economic 
(from an agricultural to an industrial and technologically based one between the 
1960s to 1980s) and political transformations (from an authoritarian system to a 
democratic society between the 1970s to 1990s) as a “quiet revolution” (cf. Gold 
1984 and Rigger 1999). In contrast, I regard the rise of alternative mass media 
programming—beginning with underground radio in the late 1960s to cable TV 
call-in shows in the mid 1990s—as Taiwan’s “not-so-quiet revolution.” In coining 
this part-facetious, part-descriptive moniker, I deliberately draw attention to the 
gradual emergence of alternative avenues for public, and highly vocal, political 
participation in Taiwan. 
Yet the “Taiwanization” of talk shows into “knock and respond” (kouying 
叩應) shows in this democratizing society and emerging mass media environment 
continues to reflect the country’s unique sociohistorical development and 
geopolitical circumstances. As Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001) observe, media 
issues have a tendency to become highly politicized in Taiwan, and subsequently, 
develop into political objects and sites of contestation. The scholars also regard 
Taiwan as a “media-friendly” society, considering that its mass media institutions 
have been at the center of the country’s sociopolitical evolution (ibid:5). This 
study’s examination of call-in show crisis topics and participants’ strategic 
language practices lends further credence to this reading, especially by 
encouraging public discussion of controversial events and sensitive issues. 
                                                                                                                                     
6 For an analysis of a guest panelist’s effective use of punning when discussing cross-straits 
tensions during the PRC/A-mei crisis, see Chu (forthcoming) in “Taiwan’s mass-mediated ‘crisis 
discourse’: pop politics in an era of political TV call-in shows.” 
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In her characterization of Israeli prime-time talk shows, Liebes (1999) 
describes this discursive forum as epitomizing the replacement of “reporting by 
argument…a sense of unity by conflict, and the sense of the anchor’s control by 
an image of playful chaos” (123). While my study’s examination of call-in show 
saliva wars finds credence for this programming genre’s “playful chaos,” it is 
Liebes’ observation that talk shows engender “unity by conflict” that most 
resonates with my investigation into call-in show crisis discourses. Through call-
in participants’ speech reporting practices, I found that call-in show discussions 
were linked by disparate yet equally urgent readings of the various sociopolitical 
events or issues. 
The importance of political TV call-in show’s in Taiwan’s collective 
consciousness is also substantiated in Tolson’s (2001b) assessment that talk 
shows deserve attention if only for provoking considerable public debate about 
their presence and role in societies where popular programming wields growing 
influence. My analysis of call-in deliberations of Taiwan’s ambivalent national 
identity(-ies) and cross-straits impasse with China demonstrated that participants 
use this mass-mediated space to verbalize and negotiate such issues, which in turn 
circulate in public discourse and impact sociopolitical process. For instance, the 
organization of call-in teams by political parties during the 2000 presidential 
election as a means to sway voter perceptions demonstrates the influential role 
call-in shows play in Taiwan’s sociopolitical landscape. Similarly, call-in shows 
can fan public disapproval and moderate the admonishment of public officials, as 
in the case of Vice President Annette Lu’s controversial remarks. These two 
examples illustrate the extent to which local call-in show producers and 
participants have “Taiwanized” this originally-Western programming product. 
Given these developments some scholars have expressed disappointment 
in cable TV’s failure in providing impartial news coverage, a service for which 
Taiwan’s non-cable TV stations have long been criticized. Political scientist and 
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Taiwan studies scholar James Robinson (1996) dismisses cable TV news 
programs, including political talk shows, as simply promoting “greater 
competition in biased reporting” (in Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2001:76). Although 
Robinson’s call for “more objective commentary” (ibid) by Taiwan’s news media 
is valid in terms of the reporting of news, however, the call-in show’s role as 
infotainment provider and product precludes it from this expectation. Rather, my 
study illustrates the worthiness of examining call-in participants’ subjective 
remarks for what they reveal about Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses, and 
moreover, for how they recreate and reconfigure such discourses through verbal 
interactions. 
In my interviews with participants, viewers, and scholars of call-in shows, 
several individuals commented on the populist tendencies in Taiwan politics and 
recent mass media developments. For instance, in a personal interview, Chengchi 
University (政治大學) communications scholar Bonnie Peng (彭芸) expressed 
her reservations toward the political TV call-in show as a mass-mediated 
representative of Taiwan’s nouveau public sphere, especially when the 
sociopolitical elite are paid to deliberate facetious topics—such as whether former 
ROC president Lee Teng-hui could produce a self-deprecating “farewell” video 
like former U.S. President Bill Clinton did—over “serious” issues (e.g., political 
corruption, rising crime, economic slowdown) (Bonnie Peng 2000). While call-in 
show fans may be amused by and its detractors scornful of such infotainment fare 
headlining as “news,” it is nevertheless worthwhile to note the popularization of 
news coverage in Taiwan even if it leans towards “new news” (Kalb 1998). Given 
Taiwan’s recent mass media liberalization, each call-in show episode strengthens 
the country’s sociopolitical democratization including what can, rather than what 
cannot, be discussed. Moreover, call-in show topics are selected for their appeal 
to viewers rather than government censors, which again demonstrates the gradual 
popularization of politics in Taiwan. 
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MEDIA-TING TAIWAN’S POP POLITICS THROUGH EVERYDAY DISCOURSE  
Bosco (1994) describes Taiwan’s post-martial law environment as 
constituting a “struggle between orthodoxy of the center and heterodoxy of the 
periphery [that] has given way to the unorthodox cosmopolitism of Taiwanese 
popular culture” (394). In this study, call-in show participants’ use of reported 
speech as a means of animating and contesting sociopolitical crisis discourses 
represents an example of how the center and periphery in Taiwan are increasingly 
blurred through postmodern, “unorthodox” political discourse. My analysis 
suggests that public political discourse in Taiwan has become popularized through 
new mass media venues as call-in participants increasingly draw from everyday 
linguistic resources (e.g., reported speech) and personal experiences in their 
deliberations. 
Applying everyday ways of speaking alone, however, does not mark call-
in show deliberations as a form of “popular politics” or pop politics. For instance, 
Chinese societies, including Taiwan, have long appreciated the use of well-
established proverbs to describe current events as a sign of a speaker’s linguistic 
dexterity and political astuteness. Rather, what popularizes call-in show 
discussions is in the manner call-in participants adroitly reappropriate the real or 
imagined words of sociopolitical figures, including leaders (e.g., ROC President 
Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu) and pop stars (e.g., A-mei), as 
their own for strategic application and reinterpretation. It is this equal opportunity 
revoicing of another speaker’s words that characterizes the popularization of 
political discussion in call-in program verbal interactions. Thus, speech reporting 
represents a sociolinguistic “equalizer” in that all speakers, regardless of political 
background and linguistic competence, have the potential to use this linguistic 
device to editorialize an utterance and by extension a speaker’s character. 
The mediazation and popularization of political practices in Taiwan is also 
marked by the shift from physical sparring to verbal sparring as the confrontation 
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mode of choice among most politicians.7 The emergence of saliva wars as both a 
colloquialism and TV call-in show mainstay reveals that sociopolitical leaders are 
modifying their behavior in ways that the public (e.g., the viewers and electorate) 
deem as acceptable political conduct.8 Although call-in show saliva wars 
represent the newest form of political performance on the one hand, they have the 
benefit of rechanneling political tensions into acceptable verbal expression in 
ways that both articulate and renegotiate such conflicts on the other. 
The form of pop politics that political TV call-in show epitomize, 
however, differs from what Taiwan’s mass media has self-reflectively and 
metadiscursively dubbed “media politics” (meiti zhengzhi 媒體政治),9 a term that 
describes the growing number of media celebrities in the political realm.10 In 
contrast, the political TV call-in show’s raucous deliberative format, crisis frame, 
and sound bite-oriented summaries of program topics as well as participants’ 
tongue-in-cheek verbal performances constitute a popularization of sociopolitical 
issues and discourses. My study’s examination of this programming genre’s 
reliance on video clip summaries of current events and participants’ insertion of 
reported speech as argumentative evidence (e.g., Mr. Ting’s revoicing of 
President Chen’s “compatriot” utterance provides as a strong example) 
foregrounds how these practices contribute to the “sound biting” of political 
                                                 
7 I cautiously qualify this assessment with the word “most” to allow for the periodic occurrence of 
physical assaults between politicians in Taiwan. See Chapter Seven for reference to one such 
recent episode. 
8 This is not to say that the public does not appreciate and welcome political performance; 
however, voters have penalized politicians who have “performed” too much or unfavorably by 
electing them out of office. 
9 In the December 2002 Taipei City Council elections, voters elected five “celebrity politicians” to 
office including a TV news show host, a sports news anchor, an impersonator of former ROC 
president Lee Teng-hui, and an actor. Taiwan’s political pundits reportedly predicted that these 
electoral victories suggested an increasing role for media politics in future elections (Taipei Times 
Online, December 8th, 2002). 
10 This latest generation of media personalities-cum-politicians contrasts with the rise of “black-
gold” (heijin 黑金) politics in the 1980s and 1990s in which gangsters-cum-politicians was 
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discussion, not to mention sociopolitical discourses, in Taiwan. It is this sound 
biting tendency and discursive process as disseminated through new mass media 
conduits that characterizes Taiwan’s emerging pop political environment and 
unorthodox politicking. 
The popularization of politics in Taiwan in the form of call-in show crisis-
oriented deliberations recalls Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of “political fetishism,” 
whereby “delegates” or representatives of a group appear as self-sufficient 
spokespersons who “engage in verbal battles” (Thompson 1991:27). Yet, the 
appearance of autonomy these spokespersons have (e.g., politicians representing a 
political party), conceal from themselves and others the sociopolitical discourses 
on which their influence and the power of their words depends (ibid). 
Consequently, call-in shows represent a popularized and mass-mediated version 
of Bourdieu’s “political field,” while its participants constitute the agents who 
reproduce Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses through their linguistic 
practices, especially when engaging in saliva wars. Ironically, the more often 
participants appear on call-in shows to problematize prevailing crisis discourses, 
the more they endow them with a life and value of their own. 
Yet, this study suggests that locating the production and fetishization of 
Taiwan’s sociopolitical crisis discourses within popularized forms and venues of 
political discussion does not diminish their significance, but rather, enhances it. 
Schegloff (1988/89) recognizes that complex sociopolitical processes often arise 
from everyday linguistic practices such that even the most “momentous issues in 
the civic polity are played with the same practices of conduct as inform the most 
humble scene” (237). Consequently, this study argues that to disregard the 
“common practices of mundane sociality” occurs at the “peril of 
                                                                                                                                     
decried as infiltrating the political scene. Although black-gold politics is largely associated with 
the KMT, it continues to exert its presence under President Chen’s DPP administration. 
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misunderstanding what is, at least officially, of much greater seriousness” (ibid).11 
To regard the use of reported speech as a means to animate and negotiate crisis 
discourses as a mundane act both underestimates the influence this linguistic 
practice lends its users as well as overlooks the complexity of its latent messages. 
Lastly, call-in show crisis frames and participants’ performative 
interpretations also draws comparisons to the “CNN-effect,” that is, the extent to 
which television pictures of crises drive the foreign policy agenda of Western 
governments such as the United States (cf. Negrine 1996). Along these lines, call-
in show crisis-of-the-day topics and participants’ urgent rhetoric generate a “call-
in show effect” which influences both governmental behavior and public 
perceptions of Taiwan’s sociopolitical issues and events. Needless to say, the 
repercussions of a “call-in show effect” go beyond the breadth of the current 
study. I consider this programming “side effect” as worthy of further study and 
encourage other researchers to pursue it. 
CALL-IN SHOW DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Liebes (1999) claims that events or topics that stir public emotions can be 
both opportune and risky as “the public demand for reassurance and the popular 
demand for the allocation of blame leads in a melodramatic, populist direction” 
(122-23).12 My study embraced this dualism as it examined call-in participants’ 
articulation and negotiation of the dangers and opportunities laden within the 
program topics they deliberated. For instance, while Lee Tao enacted the 
confusion wrought by Taiwan’s national identity crisis in his polyphonic and 
multivocal monologue, this was contrasted by PFP Legislator Diane Lee’s 
                                                 
11 From a slightly different perspective, Thompson regards the vehicle of national entertainment in 
U.S. popular culture has the “uncanny ability to dissolve just about anything and incorporate it, 
transformed and repackaged, into the body politic” (New York Times, August 8, 2002, A17). 
12 Blum-Kulka et. al.’s (2002) study of argumentation on Israeli talk shows also acknowledges the 
“pop” nature of political discourse on talk shows as demonstrated through language use, in this 
case, the Jewish tradition of xavruta or the practice of paired-study of Talmudic texts in an 
aggressive and quarrelsome tenor. 
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performative “thought experiment” that reassuringly reconciled her own and 
Taiwan’s Chinese and Taiwanese identities. 
Another danger/opportunity dichotomy this study faced included its 
narrowly focused investigation into the political TV call-in show’s crisis frame by 
means of its participants’ speech reporting practices. This ambitious endeavor had 
the potential to trivialize its subject, not to mention a topic-cum-phenomenon that 
has assumed “mania” (rechao 熱潮) proportions in Taiwan’s popular and political 
imaginary. My study could have been undermined by the topic’s “political or 
otherwise dramatic character,” and correspondingly, the expectation that its 
inquiry “live up” to this image (Schegloff 1988/89:216-217). Rather than be 
overwhelmed by the monumental scale of its subject, however, my study 
capitalized upon the opportunity that examining seemingly “mundane 
considerations” (ibid) (e.g., reported speech) offered to investigating the political 
and emotive dimensions of call-in show verbal interactions.  
While the call-in show crisis frame’s wei (危)/ji (機) or 
danger/opportunity dualism drove my investigation of participants’ speech 
reporting practices, another dialectical feature ran throughout the study. This 
feature included the present and absent relationships participants’ verbal 
interactions indexed and recreated. On the one hand, the dangers of deliberating 
controversial topics with political opponents and colleagues within the call-in 
show setting had the potential to carry over to other sociopolitical figures and 
relationships outside of the studio context. On the other hand, participants eagerly 
capitalized upon the call-in show’s contrived setting as they temporarily shed 
identities and suspended relationships they were required to maintain outside the 
program. The call-in show thus offered a welcome opportunity for participants to 
play with a variety of characters and voices in the name and interest of the call-in 
show’s performative frame. However, it should be noted that the 
danger/opportunity relationship remained tenuous as a participant could not 
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anticipate when a “play” or non-serious character or voice might be interpreted as 
a “serious” one by another participant or call-in show viewer.  
Overall, the inherent contradictions latent within call-in show participants’ 
articulations and explanations for Taiwan’s crisis discourses were readily 
apparent in the creative linguistic practices speakers used to juggle the dangers 
and opportunities sociopolitical events and issues alternatively provoked and 
inspired in the public imaginary. This finding collaborates with Edelman’s (1977) 
observation that “our modes of referring to problems and policies creates for each 
of us a succession of crises, of respites, of separate grounds for anxiety and for 
hope. . .This, too, is a formula for coping with them ineffectively, and that is 
bound to reinforce anxiety in its turn” (41). My study thus regards call-in show 
ways of reporting as merely one expression of the tensions and ambivalences the 
people of Taiwan experience in their daily interactions, be it on mass-mediated 
programs, during legislative interpellation sessions, or in face-to-face interactions. 
SITUATING CALL-IN SHOW “WAYS OF REPORTING” 
As this study’s final note, I would like to recall Carbaugh’s (1988) 
opening remarks in his ethnographic examination of Donahue. He stated that his 
aim was not to claim that talk show participants speak a particular way, but to 
forward a “way of listening” to cultural discourses and a culture speaking to itself 
in one American venue. My examination of political TV call-in show verbal 
interactions in Taiwan has similarly explored both the “getting and giving of 
information” in this setting (Bauman and Sherzer 1989:xv). In short, while this 
study ostensibly explored ways of speaking, or more specifically, ways of 
reporting on call-in programs, it also investigated ways of contextualizing call-in 
show deliberations of crisis discourses within Taiwan’s evolving sociopolitical 
environment. Thus, this investigation of Taiwan’s call-in shows primarily 
represents a study on call-in show “ways of speaking/reporting,” and second, of 
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linguistic practices that are discursively relevant and intriguing regardless of their 
spectacle or non-spectacle characteristics (cf. Edelman 1988; Schegloff 1988/89).  
When I introduced the dissertation’s focus on call-in show participants’ 
speech reporting practices, I linked Volosinov’s (1973 (1929)) notion of 
dialogism as “speech within speech, utterance within utterance and at the same 
time speech about speech, utterance about utterance” (115) with the Chinese 
saying “within speech there is speech” (hua zhong you hua 話中有話). As these 
two concepts suggest and as my analysis demonstrates, utterances and the words 
that comprise them are constantly being reproduced and reinterpreted by the 
speakers who use them and the listeners to whom they are spoken. My study’s 
finding that call-in participants strategically use reported speech for persuasive 
influence and argumentative substantiation when deliberating sensitive 
sociopolitical issues contends that speech reporting does not represent an arbitrary 
linguistic practice for articulating and resolving Taiwan’s crisis discourses. In 
other words, it is an “illusion” to believe that “language is merely an incidental 
means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection” (Whorf 
1956:134). 
Yet do call-in participants’ linguistic performances of crisis discourses 
constitute what Althusser (1994) identifies as “misrecognition,” that is, mistaking 
a false and partial view of reality for reality itself? Has Taiwan replaced formerly 
and overly KMT-controlled mass media “ideological State apparatuses” with 
publicly participated and “open” deliberations that nonetheless recycle and 
promulgate the same dominant discourses? In other words, are program 
participants and viewers so “seduced” (Hart 1994) by the call-in show’s sound-
bite packaging that its partial perspective, in both senses of the word, has been 
accepted as Taiwan’s “reality”? 
In response, I regard call-in participants’ performances of Taiwan’s 
sociopolitical crisis discourses as exhibiting a “socially constituted linguistics” 
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that is based on linguistic and cultural relativity (Hymes 1972a). Through this 
lens, speakers produce “reality” through their verbal constructions and discursive 
interventions, which are in turn critiqued as well.13 Chng (2002) claims speakers 
“constitute and reconstitute” their sociopolitical and cultural realities through 
language use while “vying constantly for the right to control and to define a 
particular worldview that is consistent with one’s own ideology” (6). In the 
context of political TV call-in shows, speech reporting served as a valuable 
linguistic tool for maintaining and deconstructing Taiwan’s competing 
worldviews regarding the nation and its people’s identities and relations of power 
and status.  
In grounding my study in a linguistic relativity perspective, I emphasize 
the dynamic and negotiated process, or the “getting and the giving,” of speech 
reporting between speaker and listener (Bauman and Sherzer 1989). Le Page and 
Tabouret-Keller (1985) remind us: 
[E]very use of language is a fresh application, a metaphorical extension, of 
existing systems. . .expressing not truths about the external universe but 
views of the universe modeled by a particular speaker or hearer—and 
they…are the only repositories of language, the only creators of systems, 
the only, and idiosyncratic, links between language and the ‘real’ world 
(196). 
It is precisely through call-in participants’ idiosyncratic speech reporting practices 
that utterances are rejuvenated, and subsequently, have the opportunity to assume 
a “fresh” meaning and interpretation. That is, until words are used, we do not 
know the “precise values they will bear in the new context or the precise part of 
the sentence they will form” (ibid:196). My examination of call-in show ways of 
reporting interactions substantiates this finding as the same utterance assumed 
                                                 
13 This perspective draws from the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis which acknowledges a language-
world relationship between the nature of language and how speakers of particular languages view 
their world. Sapir (1966 (1929)) explains language as “a guide to ‘social reality’ [as] it powerfully 
conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes” (68). 
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disparate interpretations from reporting to reporting during call-in participant 
deliberations. 
Hence, call-in show ways of reporting serve as symbolic cues that 
momentarily capture Taiwan’s crisis discourses as reconstituted processes which 
vividly perform the call-in show’s “debate without conclusion” premise. The call-
in show’s non-concluding conclusions and “stay tuned” signoffs not only capture 
the program’s main premise, but also reflect Taiwan’s sociopolitical environment. 
That is, just as speech reporting draws both speaker and reporter into an 
unanticipated relationship, so does the call-in show’s crisis frame and Taiwan’s 
crisis discourses weave intricate webs of significance for its participants and the 
community in which it unfolds. 
For these reasons, to seek a conclusion of any form prematurely and 
unnecessarily restricts a discursive process that thrives on ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Consequently, I find the call-in show’s crisis ambiance and 
participants’ linguistic reflexivity a fitting tribute to Taiwan’s real and imagined 
perpetual crises. As a parting example of the delicate balance between 
sociopolitical “reality” and call-in show verbal art, I conclude my study with 
moderator Lee Tao’s parting words at the end of a 2100 episode on cross-straits 
tensions, one that aptly captures the futility and superficiality of providing a 
“conclusion” per se: 
My time has also run over. As for the five in-studio guests, we also don’t 
have time for everyone to give their closing remarks. However…whether 
the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits understand each other, 
[it’s] just like what Mr. Jin Wei-tsun [a guest panelist] just said, there is 
this mutual understanding. So this kind of situation continues on [and] 
perhaps we all need to carefully observe it. All People Open Talk.14 
Thank you very much for watching. Tomorrow, 9 o’clock [to] 10 o’clock 
[we] meet again. Thank you.15 
                                                 
14 Text in Arial font spoken in Taiwanese. 
15 See Appendix B, Excerpt 15. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A. TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
 
Notation Example Explanation 
.  word. Stop at end of phrase 
: word: Elongated pronunciation; each additional (:) 
refers to the length of the pronunciation 
, word, word Pause between two words or phrases 
-- word--word Abrupt stop between two words or phrases 
underline word Spoken with added emphasis 
Arial font word Spoken in a language other than Mandarin; 
usually code-switching from Mandarin to 
English or Mandarin to Taiwanese. 
(    ) (word) In Chinese text, refers to unclearly spoken 
words and the author’s interpretation of the 
words.  
In English text, refers to unclearly spoken 
words as well as words that were not uttered 
in Chinese but clarifies the English 
translation. 
((   )) ((word)) Comments within an utterance 
{    } {word} Additional sounds, descriptions, and 
clarification 
(xxx)  Unclear utterance; each “x” represents a 
syllable that was unclearly spoken 
[      ] 
[      ] 
[word word] 
[word word] 
Refers to overlapping speech between two or 
more speakers 
= =word= Continuous speech or spoken without pause 
(…)  Omitted text 
(.)  Very brief pause 
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APPENDIX B.  CHINESE TEXT OF CALL-IN SHOW EXCERPTS. 
Chapter Three Excerpt 
Excerpt 1. Lee Tao (2100 moderator) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 2, 2000 
Topic: Bensheng/waisheng: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省 
還要分嗎?) 
 
大家好。歡迎收看2100全民開講。今天要為各位探討一個::..問題！可能一
直都存在我們這個社會裡面，但是大家都很少去，談:。因為這個問題比 
較，敏::感! 
Chapter Five Excerpts 
Excerpt 2. A-mei video clip 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 26, 2000 
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare 
independence? (中共封殺阿妹﹖逼臺獨立?) 
 
我覺得從小生長在中華民國在這兒的人﹐那﹐大家都一起,這個--
小時候我想﹐我相信大家都﹐都--都是唱過國歌的﹐這樣子長大的﹐ 
所以這次是真的很單純。我是以一個歌手的身份去這個受邀﹐然後唱國歌。 
所以﹐eh﹐不應該是這樣子吧。很單純的一件事情唱國歌被弄成是這個--
有一點政治化。這是一個誤會。 
 
Excerpt 3. Vice President Annette Lu video clip 
Program: 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices 
Date: June 12, 2000 
Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎?) 
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看我們總統多英明。{applause} 他找我當﹐副總統。 扮黑臉。{general 
laughter} 然後呢﹐他請﹐我們蔡英文女士當陸委會的主委。請鍾琴女士當 
任行政院的發言人。從今而後﹐台灣女性美妙的聲音﹐不是隨時要從政治舞
台發出去嗎﹖ 
Excerpt 4. Ms. Peng Yen-wen (panelist) 
Program: 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices 
Date: June 12, 2000 
Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎?) 
好…其他呂秀蓮以前講什麼話﹐我不在現場﹐我不是記者﹐我不能--但是 
我這次親身觀察﹐媒體--媒體明明就是扭曲發言。明明在這麼﹐這麼大的文 
章中它挑其中的其實是有點自嘲諷的﹐因為大陸這樣貼她標籤﹐所以它有點 
嘲諷﹐… 
Excerpt 5. Ms. Peng Yen-wen (panelist) 
Program: 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices 
Date: June 12, 2000 
Topic: Should the Vice President be recalled? (副總統該被撤換嗎?) 
 
…我覺得﹐這件事總統府的反應讓我覺得內部溝通﹐的確出現了一些問題﹐
因為﹐它基﹐基本上它今天發表一個新聞稿﹐然後才﹐eh告知呂秀蓮﹐它沒
有去了解呂秀蓮這篇演講的全文﹐我覺得這是一個蠻不尊重副總統的一個… 
Excerpt 6. PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji video clip 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: March 16, 2000 
Topic: Final decision 24 (hrs.): who is letting the electorate vote in fear? (決戰24: 
誰讓選民在恐懼中投票?) 
台灣人民﹐面臨著﹐緊急的歷史時刻。何去何從。切莫意識衝動。以免後悔
莫及。我們相信台灣人民的政治智慧。我們相信台灣同胞﹐會作出明智的歷
史決策﹗但是還有三天。世事﹐難測。台灣同胞﹗你們要警惕啊﹗ 
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Chapter Six Excerpts 
Excerpt 7. DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan (panelist) 
Program : 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 2, 2000 
Topic: Bensheng/waisheng: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省 
還要分嗎?) 
現在的問題說﹐外省人的那個危機感﹐強到幾乎八成到九成集中在宋楚瑜身
上。 
Excerpt 8. Ms. Hsu (caller) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 2, 2000  
Topic: Bensheng/waisheng: must they still be differentiated? (本省，外省 
還要分嗎?) 
 
Hello? Hi. Uh-uh I want to say: that: China—I feel that from—from those first 
generation Mainlander grandfathers and, grandfathers they (okay), I feel that they 
should not in, the media, say too much about their, thinking because I feel that 
they have a problem with their sorrows (okay). So, they will, lead public opinion 
towards the past where there were many (xx). It’s as if (they are) building a China 
within Taiwan that kind of—{line cut off} 
喂? 你好。 啊-啊我想要說:那個:中國-- 我覺得從--
從那個外省來的第一代老伯伯和，老伯伯他們hon，我覺得他們不應該在， 
媒體裡面，講太多他們的，想法因為我覺得它們有悲情的問題hon。那，他
們會，讓我們輿論到以前滿多的一個(xx)。好像等於在台灣蓋一個中國的那
個—{line cut off} 
Chapter Seven Excerpts 
Excerpt 9. Professor Liu Yi-jun (panelist). 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: April 25, 2000. 
Topic: President Lee: removing foreign political sovereignty. Is this 
reconciliation? Provocation? (or) Ethnic relations? (李總統﹕終結外來政權/ 
融合﹖挑撥﹖族群) 
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像現在就說﹐我們台灣有一個問題啊。這次就有陳水扁先生發佈的就說這個
內閣名單裡面. . .這些以前都是美國籍的...今天就說﹐這些人是不是﹐ 
有這種美國帝國主義的就說這個-. . . .還是就說﹐我們要把他當作就說 
他是外來的。因為﹐如果今天要仔細想的話﹐我們曉得…你去查他 
的子女。大概還是清一色的美國籍。{louder}這算不算就說是外來的。 
{faster speech}我相信就是說﹐我們如果在這個方面﹐太多琢磨它會覺得 
說﹐這真的就是口水戰。你不值得就說討論。 
Excerpt 10. Yu Fu (8 o’clock moderator) 
Personal interview. 
 
有的人跟我說﹐“啊﹐你這種﹐那個…節目上面吵著那麼樣子。你中間廣告
時候會不會吵﹖” 我說﹐“他們在吵啊。 他們不是演戲給你看﹐他們是真 
的﹐真的在生氣啊。” 
Excerpt 11. Lee Tao (2100 moderator) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 26, 2000 
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare 
independence? (中共封殺阿妹﹖逼臺獨立﹖) 
 
…是不是來自大陸會有一種回應所謂善意的回應讓台灣的民眾能夠了解是-  
是一個確實的狀況﹐ 或者是一個誤解。 但到目前為止又是如 何﹖ 
Excerpt 12. Legislator Fung Hu-xiang (panelist) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 26, 2000 
Topic: Has Communist China banned A-mei? Is this forcing Taiwan to declare 
independence? (中共封殺阿妹? 逼臺獨立?) 
 
啊﹐根據我這兩天的查證以後了解﹐啊﹐這中間很明顯是有誤會。那麼大陸
上也誤解了。阿﹐阿妹﹐那麼我們的這個﹐台灣的讀者啊﹐從媒體上也有部
份的的誤解。因為在大陸的相關的部門﹐他們並沒有講說是﹐啊﹐“阿妹因
為唱中華民國的國歌﹐所以要禁掉她的歌﹐要禁掉她的廣告。”而是他們籠
統印象誤以為阿妹是支持臺獨﹐是支持陳水扁﹐捧他的場。 
那麼﹐我們這點當然是要去除誤解才能夠了解真相。 
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Excerpt 13. President Chen Shui-bian video clip 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 25, 2000 
Topic: The (ROC) President expresses regret: Does Communist China regard 
compatriots as the enemy? (總統遺憾: 中共將同胞當敵人?) 
 
作為中華民國的國民﹐在中華民國的土地上﹐唱中華民國自己的國歌﹐還要
受到﹐打壓﹐我真的沒辦法想像﹐這難道是對﹐同胞也好﹐對兄弟﹐姊妹也
好﹐應有的。。待客之道嗎﹖這簡直是把我們當作敵人﹐我覺得非常的遺憾
。。。 
Excerpt 14. Mr. Ting Ting-yu (panelist) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 25, 2000 
Topic: Is cross-straits populism heating up? Is conflict unavoidable? Who will 
resolve it? Bian or Jiang? (兩岸民粹加溫? 對決難免? 扁, 江誰解?) 
 
。。。今天陳水扁﹐不是在恭祝中華民國國運昌隆而把自己定位成中國人的
時候。假如﹐尤委員講的﹐親民黨的﹐新黨﹐民進黨﹐國民黨﹐都支持台灣
的話﹐你只要定位成  “我們是中國人﹐我們是一個中國” 。。。 
Chapter Eight Excerpt 
Excerpt 15. Lee Tao (moderator) 
Program: 2100: All People Open Talk 
Date: May 24, 2000 
Topic: Is the PRC banning A-mei?  (中共封殺阿妹?) 
 
我的時間也已經超過了﹐現場的5位來賓我們也沒有時間讓大家來做結論。
不夠。。。兩岸之間的問題是不是大家相互的了解就像剛剛金惟純先生所講
的。。。這樣的情況持續下去我們可能也都要非常謹慎的來觀察。(臺﹕全
民開講) 非常謝謝收看。明天﹐九點十點 再會。謝謝。 
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APPENDIX C.  RUNDOWN SHEET FOR 8 O’CLOCK LOUD AND SOFT VOICES 
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Glossary1 
 
Transliteration2 
 
Chinese English 
translation and 
other 
transliterations 
Explanation and 
supplementary information 
bailian 白臉 “white face”; 
good cop 
Refers to someone playing the 
“good cop” to someone else’s 
“bad cop.” The counterpart to 
“bailian” is “heilian” or “black 
face.” 
baipishu 白皮書 white paper A political announcement that 
typically includes a party’s or 
group’s policies toward an issue 
(e.g., “cross-straits white paper”) 
baise kongbu 白色恐怖 “White Terror” Refers to a period (1950s-1970s) 
in Taiwan in which the KMT 
leadership ordered the 
incarceration and elimination of 
intellectuals and leaders among 
the local population who 
threatened their regime. 
Beijinghua 北京話 Beijing dialect or 
language 
A dialect spoken in the area 
surrounding Beijing, China. The 
term has also been adopted by 
more radical Taiwan 
independence separatists in 
protest to the notion of Mandarin 
or “guoyu” as being the ROC’s 
“national language.” This 
linguistic gesture serves to 
“localize” and excluse those 
speakers who use it as non-
                                                 
1 Not all Chinese terms and phrases presented in the dissertation are listed in the glossary. Only 
those that require greater explanation or reappear several times throughout the dissertation have 
been included. 
2 The transliterations listed in this column represent those that are most commonly used 
throughout the dissertation. Thus, they could be in Hanyu Pinyin or Wades-Giles. However, 
alternative transliterations or spelling forms are provided in the third column under “English 
translation and other transliterations.” 
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Taiwanese. 
bendi 本地 “from this place”; 
native or local 
Also used in Taiwan to refer to 
those who identify with Taiwan. 
benshengren 本省人 “Taiwanese” “people of this province”; Han 
Chinese who immigrated to 
Taiwan prior to 1945. 
bentu 本土 “from this earth”; 
native 
Often used in Taiwan politics to 
refer to Taiwanese consciousness 
(bentu yishi 本土意識) or 
“Taiwanization” (bentuhua 
本土化).  
buyao lian 不要臉 “not wanting or 
needing face” 
A saying that refers to a person 
who is displaying shameful 
behavior. 
buyao mianzi 不要面子 “not wanting or 
needing face 
(image)” 
Refers to a person who is 
displaying behavior that 
undermines her social reputation. 
chuanzong jiedai 傳宗接代 “continuing the 
family line” 
Traditional Chinese concept that 
values men over women as males 
carry on the family name and 
hence lineage.  
chumai Taiwan 出賣台灣 “to sell out 
Taiwan’ 
An accusation used in Taiwan 
against politicians and political 
parties that advocate 
reunification with the PRC. 
Da hejie kafe 大和解咖啡 “Big 
reconciliation 
coffee” 
A cross-party event organized by 
legislators in the Legislative 
Yuan. 
dalu 大陸 a.k.a. “mainland 
China” 
Refers to present-day People’s 
Republic of China. 
dangwai 黨外 “outside the 
party” 
Opposition movement to the 
KMT party prior to the lifting of 
martial law in 1987. 
er-er-ba 二二八 “2-28” Refers to the February 28 
Incident in 1947 in which tens of 
thousands of Taiwanese were 
incarcerated and killed by the 
KMT government following riots 
that were instigated by police 
who harassed a Taiwanese 
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woman who was illegally selling 
cigarettes. 
Fuermosha 夫爾摩沙 a.k.a. Formosa Transliteration of the Portuguese 
name for the island of Taiwan. 
See also “Meilidao.” 
Funu Xinzhi 
Jijinhui 
婦女新知 
基金會 
Awakening 
Foundation 
A women’s rights organization 
in Taiwan. Founded by Vice 
President Annette Lu. 
gei bieren mianzi 給(別人)面
子 
“To give (others) 
face (image)” 
A Chinese concept of 
maintaining the positive face of 
another as a matter of respect 
and courtesy. 
gei renjia fuqi 給人家福氣 “To give others 
happiness” 
A phrase moderator Jin Xiu-li 
used to describe the type of 
verbal interaction viewers prefer 
to watch. 
goutong gongju 溝通工具 “communication 
tool” 
A term a caller used to describe 
using language as a 
communicative resource. 
guoyu 國語 “national 
language” 
Term used in Taiwan for 
Mandarin Chinese, the official or 
“national” language of Taiwan. 
(See also beijinghua) 
Hakka 客家人 kejiaren A Han Chinese ethnic group in 
Taiwan, originally from China. 
he(mu) 和(睦) (social) harmony A Chinese sociocultural concept 
that denotes peace, unity, 
kindness, and amicableness. 
hejie (hexie) 和解 reconciliation Term used in reference to a 
linguistic practice this study dubs 
as “reconciliation” talk. 
heijin 黑金 “black-gold”; 
corruption 
The descriptor “black-gold” 
refers to corrupt political 
practices (e.g., “black-gold” 
politics) and is largely associated 
with the KMT party. However, 
political corruption remains a 
widespread problem in Taiwan 
in general. 
heilian 黑臉 “black face”; bad Refers to someone playing the 
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cop “bad cop” to another person’s 
“good cop.” Its counterpart is 
“bailian” or “white face.” 
Hohlo 河洛話 heluohua Transliteration of “Taiwanese 
language” from Taiwanese. 
Hua 華 a.k.a. Cathay An identifier that primarily refers 
to Han Chinese in China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore.  
Huaqiao 華僑 overseas Chinese Ethnic Han Chinese who reside 
outside of China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. 
Huaren 華人 “Chinese” 
(people) 
An identifier that generally 
encompasses Han Chinese in 
“greater China.” 
ji 機 opportunity; 
time; a pivotal 
turning point 
Here, refers to the second 
ideogram or character in the 
Chinese term for “crisis” (weiji). 
jiang li 講理 to speak with 
reason or 
reasonably 
A phrase moderator Jin Xiuli 
used to describe what kinds of 
programs viewers prefer to 
watch. 
Jiang Zemin zhi 
gan ma nüren 
江澤民 
只敢罵 
女人 
“Jiang Zemin 
only dares to 
insult women” 
Statement that ROC Vice 
President Annette Lu (Lu 
Hsiulian) made after PRC 
President Jiang criticized her in 
the PRC press. 
Jinmenren 金門人 “person from 
Kinmen” 
Referring to residents of the 
island of Kinmen (Quemoy), 
which is part of the ROC. 
keqi 客氣 polite, politeness A cultural value in Chinese 
societies. 
Kinmen 金門 a.k.a. Quemoy; 
Jinmen 
Island off the eastern coast of 
mainland China. Considered part 
of Fujian province by both the 
ROC and PRC. Currently, part of 
the ROC. 
kou maozi 扣帽子 to label someone; 
lit. “to put on a 
hat” 
A phrase used to describe the act 
of labeling someone. Used in a 
saliva war between legislators 
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Yen and Fung (see Chapter 7). 
koushui zhan 口水戰 “saliva wars” Refers to verbal sparring. 
Usually used in reference to 
verbal confrontations in the 
Legislative Yuan or on call-in 
shows. 
kouying 叩應 “knock and 
respond” 
Transliteration of “call-in.” 
kouying jiemu 叩應節目 call-in show Taiwan’s version of talk shows. 
kouying rechao 叩應熱潮 call-in mania Descriptor for the popularity of 
call-in shows in Taiwan. 
Kuomintang 
(KMT) 
國民黨 a.k.a. Nationalist 
Party;  
Guomindang 
A political party on Taiwan. 
Former ROC ruling party on 
mainland China (1911-1949) and 
Taiwan (1945-2000).  
li 禮 etiquette, 
propriety 
Chinese sociocultural concept 
that refers to deference and 
politeness to others. 
lian 臉 “face” or “moral 
face” 
Refers to demonstrating respect 
for an individual with a “good 
moral reputation” and who 
demonstrates decency “under all 
circumstances” 
Lü Dao 綠島 a.k.a. Green 
Island; lit. “green 
island” 
An island off the southeastern 
coast of Taiwan which was used 
to incarcerate political prisoners 
during martial law. 
Matsu 馬祖 a.k.a. Matzu; 
Mazu 
A group of islands off the 
southwestern coast of mainland 
China. Considered part of Fujian 
Province by the ROC and PRC. 
Currently, part of the ROC. 
meiti zhengzhi 媒體政治 media politics Refers to the growing numbers 
of former media personalities 
being elected to public office. 
Meilidao 美麗島 lit. “beautiful 
island”; 
Mandarin 
translation of 
“Formosa” 
Name of a magazine published 
by opposition (dangwai) activists 
in the 1970s. The name was 
inspired by the Portuguese 
descriptor for Taiwan, “ihla 
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Formosa.” 
mianzi 面子 “image”; “social 
face” 
Chinese sociocultural notion that 
involves the projection and 
claiming of one’s social image or 
face. Refers to the prestige or 
reputation a person earns in 
public. 
Minjindang 民進黨 a.k.a. Democratic 
Progressive Party 
(DPP) 
Current ruling party in Taiwan. 
Advocates Taiwan 
independence. 
mohei 抹黑 “to smear black”; 
mudslinging 
Refers to besmirching or 
denigrating someone, such as a 
political opponent. 
muyu 母語 “mother tongue”; 
native language 
Taiwan’s mother-tongue 
language policy requires the 
instruction of Taiwanese, Hakka, 
and Aborigine languages to 
elementary school students. 
nan wai nu nei 男外女內 “men are the 
breadwinners 
(work outdoors) 
women are 
housewives 
(work indoors)” 
Traditional Chinese concept that 
divides public and private spaces 
along gendered lines. 
nan zun nu bei 男尊女卑 “man is respected 
[and] women are 
debased” 
Traditional Chinese concept that 
expresses the sociocultural view 
that men are superior to women. 
pianmian zhencao 片面貞操 “one-sided 
chastity” 
Traditional Chinese view that 
women are obligated to be chaste 
in their sexual activity but men 
are not. 
Penghu 澎湖 a.k.a. Pescadores 
Islands 
Archepelego off of the southeast 
coast of Taiwan. Considered part 
of the ROC. 
qin 親 to be friendly or 
intimate with 
someone 
As a verb, the term can be used 
with an object, such as “being 
close to mainland China” 
(親大陸). 
qin dalu 親大陸 “mainland China-
friendly”; close 
to or initimate 
Phrase used to refer to political 
parties in Taiwan who are 
favorable to China and lean 
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with mainland 
China 
towards China reunification. 
Qing (Dynasty) 清 a.k.a. Ching The name of the last ruling 
dynasty in China. 
Qinmindang 親民黨 a.k.a. People’s 
First Party (PFP) 
Established in 2000 under the 
chairmanship of James Soong. A 
KMT splinter party.  
rechao 熱潮 mania; craze; 
rush 
Used in reference to “call-in 
mania.” Translated a “rush” as in 
“Gold Rush” (淘金熱). 
san cong si de 三從四德 “three obediences 
and four virtues” 
This concept only applies to 
women in feudal Chinese 
society. The three obediences 
refer to obeying the father before 
marriage, the husband after 
marriage, and the son after the 
husband’s demise. The four 
virtues include morality, proper 
speech, modest manner, and 
diligent work. 
sanminzhuyi 三民主義 “Three Principles 
of the People” 
This ideology was crafted by the 
ROC founder, Dr. Sun Yatsen 
and refers to the principles of 
nationalism (minzuzhuyi 
民族主義), democracy 
(minquanzhuyi 民權主義), and 
social well-being (minshengzhuyi 
民生主義). 
shandi 
yuanzhumin 
山地原住民 “mountain 
aborigine” 
The Aboriginal groups in Taiwan 
are broadly distinguished 
between those who live on the 
coastal areas of Taiwan, in the 
mountains, and on neighboring 
islands. 
Shanghaihua 上海話 Shanghainese 
(language) 
A dialect or language spoken in 
Shanghai, China. 
shengji qingjie 省籍情結 ethno-political 
relations; lit. 
“province 
identity 
sentiments” 
A term used to refer to tensions 
between Taiwan’s ethnic groups, 
namely, between “Mainlanders” 
or waishengren and “Taiwanese” 
or benshengren. 
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shengong yuanfu 深宮怨婦 “scorned woman 
in the palace” 
A Chinese phrase that refers to a 
woman that has been neglected. 
An analogy to the neglect of 
wives or concubines within the 
imperial palace. 
shiluogan 失落感 “feelings of loss” In Taiwan, used in connection to 
waishengren who experience 
feelings of loss toward China. 
shuangchong 
daode biaozhun 
雙重道 
德標準 
“double moral 
standard” 
This phrase expresses gendered 
imbalances in traditional Chinese 
sociocultural expectations. 
Taidu 台獨 Taiwan 
independence 
Abbreviation of “Taiwan 
independence.” See “Taiwan 
duli.” 
Taiwan 台灣  Main island of the Republic of 
China (ROC). Term also used to 
refer to the entire ROC 
geopolitical entity. 
Taiwan duli 台灣獨立 Taiwan 
independence 
Non-abbreviated rendition. 
Taiwan tongbao 台灣同胞 Taiwan 
compatriots 
Phrase used by PRC Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji in reference 
to Taiwan’s voters prior to the 
ROC’s 2000 presidential 
election. Inversely, a phrase pro-
China unificationists in Taiwan 
commonly use to demonstrate 
solidarity with the citizenry in 
China is “mainland China 
compatriots” (e.g., 大陸同胞). 
Taiwan Tuanjie 
Lianmengdang 
台灣團結 
聯盟黨 
a.k.a. Taiwan 
Solidarity Union 
Party (TSU) 
Political party established in 
2001 under the leadership of 
former ROC president Lee Teng-
hui. Advocates Taiwan 
independence.  
Taiyu 台語 Taiwanese 
(language) 
Also refered to a Hohlo or 
Taiwanhua (台灣話). 
wailai 外來 “foreign”; lit, 
“coming from 
outside” 
In Taiwan, used in reference to 
foreigners, and in some contexts, 
to Mainlanders (waishengren). 
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waishengren 外省人 “Mainlanders” Ethno-political term used in 
Taiwan to refer to Han Chinese 
who immigrated to the island 
after 1945. 
wei 危 “danger” First ideogram or character in the 
Chinese term for “crisis.” 
weiji 危機 “crisis” The characters that comprise the 
term “crisis” include “danger” 
(wei) and “opportunity” (ji). 
weijigan 危機感 “feelings of 
crisis” 
A phrase used in Taiwan in 
reference to waishengren who 
are afraid of losing political 
power and social status as a 
result of the KMT’s defeat in the 
2000 presidential elections. 
wei fandui er 
fandui 
為反對而 
反對 
“to oppose 
(someone or 
something) for 
the sake of 
opposing” 
To oppose someone or 
something to demonstrate that 
one can. 
wei gongji er 
gongji 
為攻擊而 
攻擊 
“to attack 
(someone or 
something) for 
the sake of 
attacking” 
To attack others to demonstrate 
that one can. 
wei zhichi er 
zhichi 
為支持而 
支持 
“to support 
(someone or 
something) for 
the sake of 
supporting” 
To act as though one supports 
someone or something. 
wenhua zuqun 文化族群 cultural group(s) A means to distinguish between 
various Han Chinese on Taiwan 
by “culture” rather than 
“ethnicity.” 
wuhui/wujie 誤會/誤解 to misunderstand; 
a 
misunderstanding 
Used in featured excerpts in 
reference to the PRC’s 
“misunderstanding” of Amei’s 
performance of the ROC national 
anthem at Presidential Chen 
Shuibian’s inauguration 
xiao 孝 filial piety Chinese sociocultural concept 
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that refers to respect to one’s 
elders (e.g. children to their 
parents). Based on the Confucian 
worldview in which social 
relationships are hierarchical. 
xiaozhong 小眾 “small masses” Refers to a niche audience or 
market. In constrast, the 
neologism “big masses” 
(dazhong 大眾) has emerged that 
plays with this notion. 
xingbie jaose 
chabie 
性別角色 
差別 
sex-role 
differences 
Refers to sociocultural 
demarcations of sex roles in 
traditional Chinese society. 
Xin Taiwanren 新台灣人 “New 
Taiwanese” 
Term coined to encompass all of 
Taiwan’s residents regardless of 
their ethno-political background. 
Xin xinwen 新新聞 The Journalist; 
lit. “new news” 
A weekly news magazine in 
Taiwan. 
Xindang 新黨 a.k.a. New Party KMT splinter party. Established 
in 1994. Advocates pro-China 
reunification. 
yige zhongguo 一個中國 “one China” A political concept that both 
Taiwan and China represent 
“China.” Currently under 
negotiation by the ROC and PRC 
governments. 
yige zhongguo de 
yuanze 
一個中國 
的原則 
“one China 
principle” 
Refers to the agreement that the 
representatives of the ROC and 
PRC governments reached 
regarding the existence of “one 
China.” 
yige zhongguo 
zhengce 
一個中國政
策 
“one China 
policy” 
The political approach that PRC 
authorities and pro-China 
unification advocates in the ROC 
advocate in the pursuit of 
eventual PRC-ROC 
reunification. 
yige Zhongguo 
gezi biaoshu 
一個中國 
各自表述 
“one China, each 
with his own 
interpretation” 
“One China” agreement that 
arose from the 1992 cross-straits 
meeting. 
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yiguo lianglun 一國兩論 “one China, two 
theories” 
Former ROC President Lee 
Teng-hui’s cross-straits policy 
announced in July 1999. (See 
“yiguo liangzhi”.) 
yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制 “one China, two 
systems” 
A political approach or policy 
former PRC chairman Deng 
Xiaoping coined to describe, and 
placate concerns toward, Hong 
Kong and Macau’s reunification 
with the PRC in 1997 and 1999 
respectively. The PRC leadership 
has also attempted to present 
their pursuit of Taiwan-China 
reunification as following this 
dual governmental system. 
yuanzhumin 原住民 Lit. “original 
peoples”; 
“Aborigine” 
Refers to members of Taiwan’s 
Aborigine groups of which there 
are eleven. Believed to be the 
original inhabitants of Taiwan. 
Zhongguo 中國 a.k.a. “China”  Literally translates as the 
“Central Country” or “Middle 
Kingdom.” Today, it is generally 
used to refer to the People’s 
Republic of China. 
Zhongguo 
Gongchandang 
中國共產黨 Communist 
Chinese Party 
(CCP) 
Ruling party in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). 
Zhongguoren 中國人 a “person from 
China”; 
“Chinese” 
Refers to people in both Taiwan 
and China who identify with a 
Chinese worldview. 
Zhongguo renmin 中國人民 Chinese citizens Refers to PRC citizens. 
Zhonghua 
Minguo 
中華民國 a.k.a. Republic of 
China (ROC);  
Founded on mainland China in 
1911 by Sun Yat-sen, “father of 
the ROC.” The ROC’s seat of 
government is currently located 
in Taipei, Taiwan. Other terms 
used to refer to this geopolitical 
entity include Taiwan, Chinese 
Taipei, Democratic China, and 
“the territories of Taiwan-
Penghu-Kimoy-and-Matzu.” 
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Zhonghua 
Renmin 
Gongheguo 
中華人民 
共和國 
a.k.a. People’s 
Republic of 
China (PRC) 
Other terms also used to refer to 
this geopolitical entity include 
China, mainland China, or 
Communist China. Government 
leadership seeks to reunify 
Taiwan with “China.” 
zhongjian 總監 “Senior Vice 
President” 
A title referring to a position 
within a company or 
organization. 
zhongli 中立 neutral; neutrality Used to refer to call-in show 
moderators who do not 
demonstrate overt bias towards a 
particular political party or 
ideology. 
zhong nan qing 
nu 
重男輕女  
 
“valuing men 
over women” 
Traditional Chinese concept that 
privileges men over women in all 
realms of society. 
ziji de ren 自己(的)人 “one of us”; 
referring to an in-
group member 
A phrase used to indicate that a 
guest should feel at home or 
among family. 
zongli 總理 party chairman; 
premier 
Used in the ROC (Taiwan) to 
refer to the KMT “party 
chairman.” In the PRC, the term 
refers to “premier”; in contrast, 
the Communist Chinese Party’s 
“party chairman” is referred to as 
“zhuxi” (主席). 
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List of Individuals1 
 
Name  Chinese Title and Affiliation 
A-mei 阿妹 Pop singer from Taiwan; member of the 
Puyuma (Beinan) tribe, one of eleven 
indigenous groups in the ROC 
Chang Huimei 張惠妹 A-mei’s Chinese name 
Chang Chau-hsiung 張昭雄 2000 vice presidential candidate; Vice 
Chairman of the People’s First Party 
Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 ROC president (elected May 2000). DPP 
chairman (since mid-2002(. Former Taipei 
mayor (1994-1998). 
Chen Shei-saint 
Chen, Apollo 
陳學聖 KMT Legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Chiang Kai-shek 
Jiang Jieshi 
蔣介石 Generalissimo of ROC military and Chairman 
of the KMT party. Former ROC president 
(1948-1975). Led KMT retreat from China to 
Taiwan. 
Chou Hsi-wei 周錫瑋 People’s First Party legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Chou Jinsheng 
Chou, Jonathan 
周晉生 Producer, Always Speak Your Mind 
Fung Hu-hsiang 
Fung, Elmer 
馮滬祥 New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Guo Zhengliang 
Kuo, Julian J. 
郭正亮 Professor of political science at Soochow 
(東吳) University; political analyst 
Ho Sun-sea 何善溪 Editor-in-chief of CTN’s news division and 
moderator of Face-to-Face Debate 
                                                 
1 According to the conventions of Hanyu Pinyin, Chinese names that have been transliterated 
according to this Romanization system do not include a hyphen in their name. However, names 
that have an alternative Romanization spelling (e.g., Wades-Giles) include a hyphen (usually to 
distinguish between the corresponding second and third characters in the second part of the name). 
Although Taiwan does not use the Hanyu Pinyin system, I have elected to transliterate my Taiwan 
informants’ and other public figures’ Chinese names according to this Romanization system when 
an alternative spelling has not been found. I have also included a corresponding English name for 
those individuals who use and are commonly referenced by this name in English language 
newspapers.  
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Hsieh Chi-ta 謝啟大 New Party legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Hsiung Jie 
Hsiung, James C. 
熊杰 Professor and dean of communication studies at 
Shih Hsin University 
Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良 Independent presidential candidate in the 2000 
presidential elections; former DPP chairman 
Jiang Zemin 江澤民 PRC president 
Jin Wei-tsun 金惟純 Publisher, Business Weekly magazine; political 
analyst 
Jin Xiuli 靳秀麗 Moderator, Always Speak Your Mind 
Koo Chen-fu 辜振甫 Taiwan Straits Foundation chairman; the ROC’s 
unofficial representative for cross-straits 
dialogue with the PRC 
Lee Liguo 李立國 KMT news division head 
Lee Ching-an 
Lee, Diane 
李慶安 People’s First Party legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Lee Tao 李濤 Moderator, 2100: All People Open Talk 
Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 Former ROC president and KMT chairman 
(1988-2000) 
Lee Ying-yuan 李應元 DPP legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Lee Yongzhi 李永治 Professor of history at National Taiwan 
University 
Lien Chan 連戰 KMT chairman; former ROC Vice President 
(1996-2000); KMT presidential candidate in 
2000 
Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 DPP legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Liu Yijun 劉義鈞 Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences and 
Philosophy, Academia Sinica 
Lo Fu-chu 羅福助 Independent legislator, Legislative Yuan 
Lu Hsiu-lian,  
Lu, Annette 
呂秀蓮 ROC Vice President; member of the DPP 
Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 Taipei mayor; member of the KMT 
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Mao Zedong, 
Mao Tse-tong 
毛澤東 Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and 
Supreme Leader of the PRC from 1949 and 
until his death in 1976 
Peng Yun 
Peng, Bonne 
彭芸 Professor of journalism at National Chengchi 
University 
Peng Yen-wen 彭弇雯 Secretary-general (general manager) of a non-
profit organization, Awakening Foundation 
(婦女新知基金會) 
Shi Ming-teh 施民德 Former DPP chairperson and legislator, 
Legislative Yuan. 
Song Chuyü,  
Soong, James C.Y. 
宋楚瑜 People’s First Party chairman; independent 
presidential candidate in 2000 
Sun Yat-sen, 
Sun Zhongshan 
孫中山 Founder of the Republic of China and first 
chairman of the KMT 
Tang Fei 唐飛 ROC Prime Minister under President Chen 
(May to October 2000) 
Tang Xianglong 唐湘龍 Media producer 
Ting Tingyu 
Ting, Tim T.Y. 
丁庭宇 Taiwan Gallup, chief consultant; Globalview 
Interactive Research, Inc., Chairman; political 
analyst 
Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 Chairperson of the ROC Mainland Affairs 
Commission (MAC) 
Wang Daohan 汪道涵 Chairman, Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits; the PRC’s unofficial 
representative for cross-straits dialogue with the 
ROC 
Yen Ching-fu 顏錦福 DPP legislator, Legislator Yuan 
Yu Tzu-hsiang 
Yu, Jack Tzu-
hsiang 
游梓翔 Professor of communication studies at Shih 
Hsin University 
Yü Fu 漁夫 Moderator, 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices 
Zhong Qin 鐘琴 Spokesperson for the Executive Yuan 
Zhu Rongji 朱鎔基 PRC prime minister 
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Personal Interviews 
Bu Dazhong (卜大中) 
January 25, 2000. Moderator of Face-to-Face Debate (CTN). Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
Chou, Jonathan (周晉生); Chou Jinsheng 
April 7, 2000. Producer of Always Speak Your Mind (ETTV). Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
Ho Sun-sea (何善溪) 
February 22, 2000. Editor-in-chief of CTN News and moderator of Face-
to-Face Debate (CTN).  Taipei, Taiwan. 
Hsiung, James C. (熊杰); Xiong Jie 
April 6, 2000. Professor of communication studies at Shi Hsing 
University. Taipei, Taiwan. 
Jin Xiuli (靳秀麗) 
April 11, 2000. Moderator of Always Speak Your Mind (ETTV). Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
Lee Tao (李濤) 
March 28, 2000. Vice President of TVBS and moderator of 2100: All 
People Open Talk. Taipei, Taiwan. 
Lee Liguo (李立國) 
February 15, 2000. KMT news division head (新聞黨部書記長). Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
Peng Yen-wen (彭弇雯) 
July 19, 2000. General manager (秘書長) of Awakening Foundation 
(婦女新知基金會), a women’s non-profit organization. Taipei, Taiwan. 
Peng, Bonnie (彭芸); Peng Yun 
July 2000. Professor of journalism at National Chengchi University. 
Taipei, Taiwan. 
Xi Shenglin (奚聖林) 
February 1, 2000. Producer of Face-to-Face Debate (CTN). Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
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Yu, Jack Tzu-hsiang (游梓翔); Yu Tzu-hsiang  
February 24, 2000. Professor of communication studies at Shi Hsing 
University. Taipei, Taiwan. 
Yü Fu (漁夫) 
April 5, 2000. Moderator of 8 o’clock Loud and Soft Voices (SETN). 
Taipei, Taiwan. 
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